by Emedo Farda
Teshome Abebe’s (PhD) incisive analysis, “Ethiopia’s Red Sea Reckoning,” provides a vital and sobering corrective to any simplistic narrative of Ethiopian triumph. His central thesis—that the Somaliland MoU was a desperate gambit that backfired, encircling Ethiopia in a web of heightened peril—is powerfully argued and substantiated by the immediate, turbulent aftermath. Indeed, from the vantage point of late 2025, the ledger seems to show only losses: a furious Somalia, an emboldened and encroaching Egypt, a strained relationship with Djibouti, and a more militarized, unstable region. To stop the analysis here, however, is to risk misjudging the nature of the game itself. While he masterfully diagnoses the acute symptoms of the policy’s shockwave, a deeper examination of the omissions and the long-game political logic suggests the MoU may be less a failed checkmate and more a brutally costly, yet strategically calculated, opening move in a decades-long struggle for survival.
The most significant omission in the “boomerang” narrative is the agency and calculated ambition of Somaliland. The author frames the deal as Ethiopia’s opportunistic exploitation of a “low-risk entry point.” Yet for Hargeisa, the MoU was a geopolitical coup three decades in the making. By securing a written agreement from a major regional power actively considering recognition, Somaliland achieved what years of democratic elections and relative stability could not: it forced the international community to engage with its sovereignty claim not as a theoretical Somali civil issue, but as a concrete factor in regional security and economics. For President Muse Bihi, Ethiopia’s “desperation” was his leverage. Even if full recognition is delayed or bartered away, the MoU permanently altered Somaliland’s diplomatic standing, making it a party to rather than a subject of regional negotiations. This transforms the Horn’s geopolitical map, creating a new, semi-sovereign actor whose interests are now formally entangled with Addis Ababa’s.
This leads to the second under-explored dimension: the domestic political utility of the sea access narrative for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Teshome Abebe’s (PhD) correctly notes the policy as a diversion from “pressing needs,” but it is also a potent tool for national consolidation. The “historical right to the sea” is not merely rhetoric; it is a visceral, unifying cry that transcends Ethiopia’s fraught ethnic politics. It appeals to nationalist sentiment, harkening back to the imperial and Derg eras, and frames the government as the defender of a collective future against external encirclement. In the face of internal fragmentation from wars in Amhara and Oromia, the sea quest offers a supra-ethnic, civilizational mission. The very “recklessness” he criticizes can be read internally as boldness in the face of historical injustice. Every countermove by Egypt or Turkey can be, and is, presented in Addis as proof of foreign powers conspiring to keep Ethiopia landlocked and subservient, thereby justifying greater sacrifice and central authority.
Consequently, the MoU can be reinterpreted not as a final solution, but as a strategic forcing function. For years, Ethiopia’s port dependency was a chronic, debilitating condition managed through quiet diplomacy and fee payments. The MoU made it an acute, regional crisis that must be addressed. It shattered a stagnant status quo that overwhelmingly favored port states like Djibouti. By introducing the credible threat of an alternative reality—a recognized Somaliland with an Ethiopian naval base—Addis Ababa has potentially improved its bargaining position for its ultimate, less incendiary goals: reduced port fees in Djibouti, streamlined transit corridors, and guaranteed commercial stakes in multiple ports (Berbera, perhaps even Mogadishu or Mombasa) under a future Somali federal framework. The “gambit” may have been designed to be bargained down from maximalist demands to more achievable, but previously unavailable, concessions.
Teshome Abebe’s (PhD) call for great-power mediation is prescient and likely correct as an endpoint. However, his analysis assumes Ethiopia entered the fray as a passive victim of its own miscalculation, now awaiting rescue. An alternative view is that Ethiopia has actively, if violently, reshaped the negotiating table. It has demonstrated a willingness to bear significant short-term pain and isolation for a long-term strategic imperative. It has clarified for Washington, Beijing, and Brussels that Horn of Africa stability is irrevocably tied to resolving Ethiopia’s maritime dilemma. The “peril” Teshome Abebe’s (PhD) outlines is not just a consequence; it is also leverage. The implicit message to the international community is: “Your preference for regional stability now requires you to engage directly in crafting a sustainable, multilateral solution for sea access. The previous, quiet model is broken.”
Teshome Abebe’s (PhD) essay is an indispensable chapter in the story—a vivid account of the perils of power projection from a position of weakness. Yet, if we consider the long arc of history that a nation of 120 million plans for, the MoU may represent a brutal but deliberate sacrifice on the tactical board to gain position in the strategic game. It has made Ethiopia’s vulnerabilities more immediate and dangerous, but it has also made them impossible for the world to ignore. The true “reckoning” may not be whether the Somaliland move was a mistake, but whether Ethiopia can now withstand the firestorm it ignited long enough to convert this newly forged, though white-hot, diplomatic attention into a lasting and equitable resolution. The gambit has indeed boomeranged with punishing force, but in the hands of a regime playing for existential stakes, that returning boomerang might just be the tool needed to smash a previously unbreakable diplomatic deadlock. The final grade on this policy will be written not in the reaction of 2024-2025, but in the geopolitical reality of 2035.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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