HomeOpinionWill the TPLF Be Lucky a Third Time? 

Will the TPLF Be Lucky a Third Time? 

Can We Put New Wine in an Old Wineskin? 

TPLF  _ Ethiopian politics
Eyassu

By Eyassu Ephraim G. Hanna
London, UK 

Here we go again. Does history repeat itself? Only time will tell. For now, let us observe how  events unfold in Ethiopian politics. As before, seven-armed groups have united under TPLF  leadership—though, for the sake of political correctness, nominal leadership has been  conferred upon the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM). Together they have  established the Ethiopian People’s Forces Alliance for Survival (hereafter “the Alliance for  Survival”) with the stated aim of removing Abiy’s government by military force. The formula  is hardly novel. It was employed to overthrow the Derg regime nearly forty years ago, when  the TPLF allied with the EPLF and formed a united front with former EPRP members, the OLF  and other so-called political organisations, thereby establishing the EPRDF. The TPLF then  governed—and plundered—the country for twenty-seven years. 

In truth, the TPLF’s gravest sin has been its betrayal of the nation. Its core political  philosophy rests upon ethnic politics and so-called self-determination. On this basis, the  TPLF established an ethnic- and language-based federal system, thereby sowing the seeds of  distraction, perpetual ethnic conflict and social disintegration. It used the Amhara people as  a scapegoat for every political failing in Ethiopia. According to the TPLF’s political lexicon,  Ethiopia was forged by the Amhara—particularly under Emperor Menelik—a century ago;  Ethiopia (Abyssinia), led by Amhara kings, comprised disparate states in the manner of the  British, French and other European empires. The Amhara, so the narrative ran, had  subjugated all nations and nationalities, denying them political, economic and cultural  rights; the Amhara were therefore the enemy of Ethiopia and its people. Consequently, the  TPLF pursued a policy of dismantling everything built by previous governments. They altered  the national flag; they created new administrative regions based on language; they banned  history teaching at university level; they formed a pseudo-Amhara political group known as  the NADM to subjugate the Amhara people; they openly declared that they had destroyed  the Orthodox Church—the pillar of Amhara society; and they systematically permitted  ethnic cleansing across Oromia and elsewhere to displace Amhara communities. All of this is  well documented, and even the TPLF cannot deny it. 

After protracted suffering, Amhara and Oromo political elites came together and removed  the TPLF from power. This Amhara–Oromo alignment became known as Oro-Amhara. Yet  once the Oromo assumed power, they too betrayed the nation—particularly the Amhara  people. They declared, “It is our turn, and we may do as we please,” and they have done so  ever since. Soon after taking office, they began killing Amhara politicians, including Dr  Ambachew and Brigadier General Asaminew Tsige and his associates. Indeed, the  assassination of Engineer Simegnew Bekele, chief engineer of the Renaissance Dam, sent shockwaves across the nation. General Asaminew Tsige and his associates were killed on  Abiy’s orders. As Abiy consolidated power, he expelled Amhara politicians from his circle— among them his former ally in the Oro-Amhara coalition, Dr Gedu Andargachew, a former  regional president, minister and adviser, who was exiled, while others were imprisoned. 

Meanwhile, the TPLF continued its opposition to Abiy’s government. Soon after losing  power, it established a group called “Confederate,” the logic being to construct a new  political arrangement based on confederation—a loose alliance of sovereign states or independent groups joining for shared purposes such as defence, trade or foreign policy,  while retaining their own supreme authority. To this end, the TPLF mobilised disgruntled  political actors across ethnic groups. But the new political order led by Abiy rejected this  ideology, and it was swiftly quashed. 

The TPLF then returned to the drawing board and devised a new strategy to regain power or  topple Abiy. Thus, was born the 2020 Tigray War—a devastating armed conflict that lasted  from November 2020 to November 2022 in northern Ethiopia. The TPLF miscalculated the  mood of the Ethiopian people, particularly the Amhara. Indeed, one of the TPLF’s political  gurus, Getachew Asefa, stated that they had scores to settle with the Amhara people. The  war, therefore, was not only against Abiy but against the Amhara people as well. Nor did the  TPLF’s miscalculation end there. They fired a few missiles towards Asmara; in doing so, they  awakened the monster. Isaias and the Amhara people allied with Abiy, and together they  crushed the TPLF. Thanks, however, to America and Alex de Waal’s appeal to the  international community, the TPLF was saved from total annihilation—unlike the Liberation  Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Nigerian Biafra. The TPLF and the Ethiopian government  signed the Ethiopia–Tigray Peace Agreement, known as the Pretoria Agreement, a 2022  treaty that halted large-scale fighting in northern Ethiopia. 

Despite the Pretoria Agreement, full peace has not been established between the TPLF and  the Prosperity Party. Low-intensity conflict has persisted. Moreover, the Pretoria Agreement  has generated a new political problem: Asmara and Addis Ababa have become enemies  once again, and the attempt to dismantle the Amhara regional forces provoked a wave of  resistance, with most regional forces joining the existing Fano movement. The TPLF now  finds itself sandwiched between Amhara Fano forces, Isaias Afwerki and Abiy Ahmed’s  regime. 

Once again, the core TPLF leadership returned to the drawing board and drafted a new  blueprint for survival. The first move was submitted to their godfather, Isaias Afwerki. This  action was unthinkable, given that only a few years earlier they had accused Isaias Afwerki’s  army before the international community—including the UN, US and EU—of being a  genocidal force responsible for mass rape, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet  TPLF leaders, in their desperation, crossed the Mereb River to kiss Isaias’s feet. 

In Addis Ababa, Abiy’s political miscalculations continued. He tells the nation that Ethiopia  will soon claim the Red Sea coast by all means necessary. He says he is on a mission to  correct historical mistakes and injustices. His generals, politicians, ambassadors and 

supporters blew Abiy’s Red Sea trumpet until the dead in the Addis Ababa Trinity Church  graveyard awoke. Abiy was emboldened by the Arab emirates and sultanates. But his  unwise statement—more rhetoric than actionable policy—created a hostile posture in  Asmara towards Addis Ababa. As a godfather and master planner, Isaias created a new  group known as Tsimdo. Tsimdo underwent a natural metamorphosis and finally developed  wings, claws, teeth and horns. Now it is ready for action under a new name: the Alliance for  Survival, or AFS. 

The question now is: will the TPLF be “third time lucky”? According to the AFS  announcement by Zemen Kassa, leader of the AFNM, the alliance comprises seven-armed groups: the AFNM, TPLF, OLF (OLA), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Afar  Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF, or Ugugumo), the Benishangul Peoples’  Liberation Movement (BPLF), and the Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement (GPDM). 

As noted earlier, the TPLF, OLF (OLA) and ONLF stood shoulder to shoulder against  Ethiopia—and, by extension, against the Amhara. These political groups were founded upon  an ideology antagonistic towards Ethiopia and the Amhara people. Each has Amhara blood  on its hands. They are all liberation fronts—liberation from what? From Ethiopia. Thus far,  they have not concealed their intentions, political objectives or goals. In a recent statement,  the TPLF’s second-in-command indicated that the TPLF will adopt two routes to secure self determination: the Yugoslavian or Czechoslovakian way. The OLF (OLA) has long aspired to  establish an Oromia state; its grievance with Abiy amounts to nothing more than a struggle  for political power. The ONLF is a Somali nationalist armed and political organisation seeking  self-determination for the Somali-inhabited Ogaden. 

I keep three political groups outside this analytical framework for the time being—namely  ARDUF (or Ugugumo), BPLF and GPDM—in reserve. They may play a significant role, but  they do not alter the outcome of this analysis. 

Herein lies the political dichotomy and paradox. The Amhara Fano was established to  safeguard the Amhara people from the historical assault launched by ethnic politics. The  TPLF is the architect of that politics: it conceptualised, developed, implemented and  executed it with the help of other liberation fronts—now identified as new partners of the  Amhara Fano. The Amhara people have been marginalised, executed, excluded and made to  shed blood because of TPLF politics, yet Fano leaders have joined the TPLF and this new  alignment to save the Amhara from that very politics. Some may associate this paradox with  Stockholm syndrome. It deserves, perhaps, a new political term altogether. 

The announcement was welcomed by many, who argue that the new political force will end  Abiy’s regime. I understand their point. Here, I and others have no disagreement with the  need to remove Abiy and his political enterprise from power. We agree that the country  needs peace and a democratic, accountable government. But the question is, as a wise man  once said: can we solve the problem with the same mind and framework that created it? Or  can we put new wine into old wineskins?

One troubling feature of the current debate is the pressure to treat any criticism of the  alliance as proof of support for Abiy’s government. That is an old political tactic: reduce a  complex argument to a binary choice and demand loyalty instead of scrutiny. Ethiopians  need not choose between Abiyism and the TPLF, or between one-armed camp and another.  The country is larger than its political factions, and citizens are entitled to question every  movement that seeks power in their name. 

As it is your country, Ethiopia is my country too. It is our home. We have no other. Our  voices, therefore, are equally valued. The TPLF’s persistent effort may pay off. We cannot  know whether the TPLF will succeed for a third time. If it does, at what cost? I have  observed a political shift from questioning and criticism to full-throated support; a classic  example is the shift of the veteran politician Ephraim Madebo. By his own account, he is  thrilled by the new AFS statement. He asks for nothing more. 

But history has taught us otherwise. A leopard never changes its spots—nor does the TPLF.  Ethnic politics has cost us dearly and brought the country to the brink of disintegration.  There are internal and external players who wish to see Ethiopia disintegrate. From  Washington to Mekelle, from Dublin to Mekelle, from Oslo to Addis Ababa, from Cairo to  Ethiopia, international networks are working in concert while the Ethiopian people suffer. 

Now countless people are dancing around the TPLF-led coalition. We have seen this before.  When Emperor Haile Selassie was removed from power, Ethiopians rejoiced without  questioning what would come next. They called the king countless derogatory names. Next,  when the TPLF came to power, it was the Amhara who showed them the road to Addis  Ababa and carried TPLF guns all the way. Then, when the TPLF was removed from power, it  was the Amhara who said Abiy was our Moses, come to lead us to the Promised Land.  Millions gathered at Meskel Square in Addis Ababa to celebrate Abiy, and the same story  was repeated across the world—in London, Washington and Berlin. But soon the excitement  turned to disappointment. Now the same people rally behind the TPLF and its political  enterprise out of desperation. Those who hate ethnic politics, those who loathe TPLF rule,  are suddenly falling in love with it. Well, we shall see the outcome—but we must be  prepared for anything: from a Somalia- or Sudan-style civil war to Rwanda-style genocide,  Libya-style government or Syria-style government. Anything is possible. Or we may welcome  Yugoslavia Version II. 

So, what should a concerned Ethiopian do? My answer is simple: build and support a  political movement that can protect the country from disintegration without reproducing  the divisions that brought us here. Ethiopia needs organisation, political imagination and  accountability—but it also needs a framework broader than the interests of any single  ethnic group or armed organisation. In my view, neither the TPLF nor the Alliance for  Survival should be treated as the automatic saviour of Ethiopia merely because they claim  they can remove the current government. Removing one government is one political task.  Building a stable, democratic and inclusive Ethiopia is another—and far more difficult—task.

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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