HomeOpinionWhy Ethiopia Has Not Found Peace — and How Ethiopians Can Build...

Why Ethiopia Has Not Found Peace — and How Ethiopians Can Build It 

An evidence-based analysis of conflict, governance, and pathways to a durable settlement

Publication draft prepared for review and attribution by the intended publisher. This is an independent analytical draft, not an endorsement by any organization. 

Ethiopia _ Politics
The author (file photo)

 Aklog Birara (Dr)  

Executive summary 

Ethiopia’s experience since 2018 is not a simple story of a peace prize followed by war. It is a story of an initially promising opening that did not resolve deeper struggles over political legitimacy, 

The newly appointed Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed Ali managed to do two things simultaneously: charmed Ethiopians and the international community presenting himself and his party as reformists; and b) dismantled national institutions systematically and replaced them with Oromo elites and beneficiaries. This state capture changed the distribution of power, income and wealth, security arrangements, identity, land, and accountability.  

By all measurements on the ground concerning human life and wellbeing, Abiy Ahmed Ali is a murderer/genocider. Bloodletting of civilians he considers unworthy of life does not bother him. He undermines peace and democracy deliberately and systematically. 

Abiy Ahmed Ali suffers from a distorted mindset of grievance redress by punishing his enemies and opponents, slaughtering, starving, displacing, harassing, jailing primarily Amhara and Tigrayans (Abyssinians or northerners) by any means necessary. The costs are enormous. 

Accountability matters  

Abiy Ahmed Ali and partners must be held accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Ethiopia will never enjoy peace without accountability.  

The institutional and structural changes taking place under the watch of Abiy Ahmed Ali are dramatic and irreversible. Think of the replacement of Ethiopia with Oromia; think of the change in the redesignation of Addis Ababa as Finfinnee. Think of Afan Oromo replacing Amharic as Ethiopia’s official language. There is nothing the international community would do if these were to occur.  

The 2018 rapprochement with Eritrea was a genuine diplomatic achievement. Yet the 2020–22 Tigray war, continuing violence in Oromia and the conflict in Amhara since 2023 reveal how fragile a settlement becomes when adversaries do not trust institutions or believe they can protect their interests peacefully. Root causes remain intact.  

The 2022 Pretoria agreement stopped a major phase of warfare but did not settle all underlying disputes or include all directly affected constituencies. [1–5] 

A viable peace process must therefore do more than obtain another ceasefire. It needs enforceable civilian-protection commitments, inclusive negotiation, independent monitoring, credible justice, space for peaceful political competition, and a negotiated approach to contested constitutional and territorial questions. No community should have to accept collective punishment, and no armed actor including the ruling party should be exempt from scrutiny. 

The single most critical hurdle to lasting peace and stability in Ethiopia is the Abiy ruling party and state. It is intolerant of peace and stability. It thrives on division. conflict and war. It breeds animosity and fear among ethnic and faith groups. It compromises Ethiopia’s sovereign interests by submitting itself to the UAE and its regional national goals.  How does one explain Abiy Ahmed’s strategic partnership with Sudan’ s RSF? With the UAE? 

Why peace is illusive in Ethiopia.  

From the promise of 2018 to recurrent conflict 

Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in April 2018 and initiated reforms, including political prisoner releases and an opening of civic space. The Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 recognized particularly his role in the rapprochement with Eritrea, not a finding that Ethiopia had achieved lasting internal peace. The Nobel committee itself acknowledged the difficulty of democratization and continuing internal conflicts. [1] 

The question posed to the Nobel Committee is why a peace prize without demonstrated commitment to permanent peace and democratization?  

The transition unfolded amid longstanding grievances over centralized authority, ethnically organized federalism, political exclusion, competing territorial claims and unequal perceptions of security. Conflict between the federal government and the TPLF escalated into war in November 2020. The war involved federal, Tigrayan, Eritrean and regional forces, and devastated communities across Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The African Union-mediated Pretoria cessation-of-hostilities agreement of November 2022 reduced the fighting but left disputes over territory, displacement, implementation, and accountability unresolved. [2, 3, 6] 

The AU failed to demand inclusion of critical stakeholders: Afar and Amhara.  

In Amhara, tensions over the Pretoria process, territorial claims, and the April 2023 plan to dismantle regional special forces contributed to a confrontation between federal forces and Fano formations.  

In Oromia, armed conflict involving the Oromo Liberation Army and government forces persisted, accompanied by allegations of serious abuses against civilians. These conflicts have different histories; treating them as one undifferentiated rebellion obscures what each settlement must address. [2, 4, 7] 

Left with a sense of impunity, the Abiy government continued its assaults on civilians in the 

Afar. Amhara, Gambella, Oromia, Somali and Tigray regions. The latest flare between Oromo and Somali regional forces with the complicity of federal forces forced tens of thousands to flee to Kenya. In effect, Abiy Ahmed’s war is no longer confined to the Amhara and Tigray regions. It is national and regional.  

What the evidence shows about the democratic deficit. 

Freedom House’s 2026 assessment classifies Ethiopia as “Not Free,” scoring it eighteen out of one hundred, and identifies restrictions on political competition, media, civil society, due process, and independent institutions. Its Freedom on the Net report identifies connectivity restrictions in conflict-affected areas, including Amhara. These are assessments by an independent monitoring organization, not a legal determination that every government action is unlawful. [4, 8] 

Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026 describes continued armed conflict, serious abuses by warring parties, and restrictions on civic space. The UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia documented serious violations and abuses by multiple parties during the northern war, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Responsibility for incidents must still be assessed on evidence, with individual accountability rather than collective blame. [2, 5] 3 | 

Why peace has remained elusive: Competing claims of political legitimacy 

Many political constituencies disagree not only about who should govern but about the rules of the state itself: the balance of federal and regional authority, the rights of individuals and communities, the electoral system, and the status of disputed territories. Without trusted procedures for resolving those questions, every major policy dispute can become a security crisis. 

In huge part, the reason is because Abiy Ahmed Ali has Oromoized the state and government. Non-Oromo are subject to alienation, marginalization, and submission. The option left is to defend their sheer survival.  

Security dilemmas and coercive disarmament 

When communities fear that, surrendering arms leaves them vulnerable, disarmament without credible guarantees can intensify insecurity. Conversely, the proliferation of armed forces undermines civilian authority and exposes communities to abuse. Sequenced, independently verified security arrangements are essential; neither unconditional coercion nor indefinite militarization offers a stable solution. 

Incomplete peace agreements and excluded stakeholders 

Pretoria demonstrated that negotiation could stop large-scale fighting. It also illustrates the limits of a deal that does not settle implementation, return of displaced people, disputed boundaries, and the security concerns of other affected actors. Durable arrangements must incorporate local communities, women, displaced persons, and civil society—not only the signatories who command fighters. [3, 6] Pretoria is flawed because it is not inclusive. 

Impunity, civilian harm, and collapsing trust 

Allegations of unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, attacks on health care, abductions and abuses by both state and non-state actors deepen grievances and discourage reconciliation. Independent investigations, survivor-centered remedies, and fair trials are necessary to break cycles of retaliation. The absence of trusted justice also makes ceasefires difficult to sustain. [2, 5] Humanitarian distress and regional spillover 

Displacement, damaged health and education systems, insecurity along transport routes, and constraints on relief access compound the political crisis.  

Relations with Eritrea and Sudan and disputes across the Horn of Africa add external incentives and risks. A November 2026 U.S. A Congressional Research Service report warns that overlapping rebellions and regional tensions could fuel a wider confrontation; such risk analysis should not be confused with a prediction that war is inevitable. [3, 9] 

The United Arab Emirates is a major component of the Ethiopian crisis. The international community must sanction this state actor that supplies drones and other weapons to Abiy’s army that in turn uses these weapons to slaughter civilians like chickens.  The UAE is a destabilizing force in Africa.  

Independent domestic and international observers question “

Why Ethiopian elites fail to work together, do the needful and propose viable solutions with a timeframe” is baffling.

 What Ethiopians together can do: a practical peace architecture. 

First 90 days: protect lives and create a credible opening. 

  • Announce and independently monitor reciprocal civilian-protection commitments: no attacks on civilians, schools, clinics, aid workers, or civilian infrastructure; publish incident-reporting channels and rapid investigation procedures. 
  • Negotiate localized humanitarian pauses and safe access routes, with UN, Red Cross and trusted Ethiopian relief organizations assessing needs impartially across Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Afar and other affected areas. 
  • Begin confidential exploratory talks involving federal authorities and relevant armed and civilian representatives; establish mutually acceptable mediators and guarantees against retaliation for peaceful participation. 
  • Release people arbitrarily detained, protect journalists and civil society monitors, restore communications where restricted, and enable independent observation subject to lawful security safeguards. 

Three to twelve months: negotiate and verify. 

  • Create an inclusive national peace forum with meaningful participation by women, youth, religious leaders, professional associations, displaced communities, minority groups, and diaspora voices; participation must not be equated with endorsing any armed group. 
  • Agree on phased ceasefires and security arrangements, with transparent benchmarks for troop repositioning, demobilization, reintegration, local policing, and protection of vulnerable populations. 
  • Establish independent, survivor-centered mechanisms for documentation, truth-seeking, reparations and prosecution of serious crimes, with safeguards for witness security and due process. 
  • Launch technical commissions on contested territories, federal-regional powers, land rights, and electoral rules; defer final decisions to legitimate constitutional and democratic procedures rather than military victory. One to three years: institutionalize peace. 
  • Strengthen electoral administration, judicial independence, parliamentary oversight and protections for opposition parties, media, and civil society. 
  • Rebuild public services and livelihoods using transparent needs-based allocations, audited funds, and community oversight; prioritize displaced people’s voluntary, safe and dignified return, or other durable solutions. 
  • Develop shared civic education and cross-community dialogue that recognize the suffering of Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan, Afar, Somali, and other Ethiopian civilians without competitive victimhood. 
  • Secure regional non-interference commitments and international support for verification and reconstruction, while keeping Ethiopian communities central to decisions. 5 | Who must contribute—and what they can commit to. 

Federal institutions: uphold constitutional and humanitarian obligations, enable independent monitoring, negotiate in good faith, and accept impartial accountability.  

Armed groups: halt attacks on civilians, permit humanitarian access, reject forced recruitment, and participate in verifiable security talks.  

Political parties and regional administrations: pursue claims through nonviolent, transparent processes. Religious and community leaders: provide trusted spaces for dialogue without silencing victims.  

Diaspora organizations: support documented advocacy, relief, and bridge-building rather than dehumanizing rhetorical hold vigils and protests and highlight the tragedy inflicted on ordinary citizens by their own government that is supposed to protect them. 

In this connection, the protests consisting of members of the Horn of Africa in Washington on November 16 as well as those in Minnesota that issued a strong statement calling on the international community to hold the government of Ethiopia accountable are remarkable and encouraging developments.  

International partners: support mediation, needs-based aid, and independent accountability without imposing a political outcome. 

How to measure whether a peace process is real

Public monthly indicators should include civilian deaths and injuries independently documented; safe humanitarian access and assistance delivered; school and clinic functionality; verified ceasefire violations; numbers of displaced people accessing voluntary durable solutions; arbitrary detention cases reviewed; participation of women and displaced communities in talks; and implementation of agreed security and justice milestones. A peace announcement without measurable improvement in civilian safety is insufficient. 

Conclusions 

  1. Abiy Ahmed’s OPDO dominance and reconfiguration of the Ethiopian State notwithstanding, Ethiopia’s crisis cannot be explained solely by one leader, one ethnicity or one-armed movement. It is the entire system that must be overhauled.  
  1. Decisions by political and military leaders’ matter, but the deeper challenge is the absence of trusted, enforceable rules for resolving disagreement.  
  1. The 2018 opening showed that change is possible; the wars that followed show that ethnic elite dominated diplomacy without inclusive institutions is fragile.  
  2. Assessing and critiquing the OPDO-dominated Prosperity Party is important but not enough.  
  3. Ethiopia cannot afford to suffer from a mental model of permanent war. It is not a win-win model at all. It is a choice Aby Ahmed has chosen, but not for the benefit and wellbeing of the Ethiopian people.  
  1. Equally, the Amhara Fano National Movement has an obligation to assess its institutional and leadership strengths and weaknesses and renew itself. The leadership must also evaluate the value added of the newly formed Alliance for Survival. Whose agenda is this new entity advancing? 
  1. Long-term Ethiopians can build a more durable peace by insisting on good and democratic governance that guarantees equal civilian protection, accountable government, nonviolent political competition, genuine representation, and practical agreements whose implementation can be verified. There is no evidence that the Abiy regime is ready and willing to democratize Ethiopia. 
  1. The choice of constitutional arrangements and political leadership belongs to Ethiopians through peaceful, rights-respecting processes. 
  1. This is the reason a Pan-Ethiopian platform to discuss the elephant in the room–why no peace and democracy? – is essential.  
  1. Finally, this author believes Ethiopians together must push for an all-inclusive series of conferences at the earliest opportunity.  

Sources and editorial notes 

  1. Nobel Peace Prize, “2019 — Abiy Ahmed Ali” https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/laureates/2019
  2. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Ethiopia https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/ethiopia 
  3. Congressional Research Service, The Unfolding Conflict in Ethiopia, November 6, 2026 https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-11-06_IF13344_c5a4aa38378990aa0f52cb314883fe9fc012dabe.pdf
  4. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Ethiopia https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2026 
  5. UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, investigative findings (2023) https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wpcontent/uploads/2023/10/report/comprehensive-investigative-findings-and-legaldeterminations-international-commission-of-human-rights-experts-on-ethiopia/a-hrc-54crp-3.pdf 
  6. UK Home Office, Country Policy, and Information Note: Tigrayans and TPLF (December 

2024) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ethiopia-country-policy-and-informationnotes/country-policy-and-information-note-tigrayans-and-the-tigrayan-peoples-liberationfront-ethiopia-december-2024-accessible 

  1. Belgian CGRS, Ethiopia: Security Situation in Amhara, May 28, 2026 https://www.cgra.be/sites/default/files/rapporten/coi_focus_ethiopie._veiligheidssituatie_i n_amhara_20260528.pdf 
  2. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2026: Ethiopia https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-net/2026 
  3. Council on Foreign Relations, Ethiopia Conflict Tracker, updated November 2026 https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia 

Editorial caution: Figures, battlefield control and responsibility for specific incidents may be disputed or changed. This article distinguishes institutional findings from analysis and proposals. Check sources again immediately before publication. The recommendations are proposals, not claims of agreement among parties. 

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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