A reflection on political reality, strategic autonomy, alliances, history, and the future of the Amhara struggle
Eyassu Epheraim G Hanna
London UK August 16, 2026
To my dear brothers in the leadership of Fano, I write this neither as a critic standing outside the struggle, nor as someone who claims to possess all the answers. I write as a concerned Ethiopian who believes that the sacrifices made by Fano fighters and the Amhara people demand more than courage alone. They demand political clarity, strategic discipline, foresight, and the willingness to examine difficult questions before history answers them for us. What follows, therefore, should not be understood as an attack on Fano, its leadership, or its struggle. It is a reflection on political reality, intended to identify both the opportunity before us and the dangers that could undermine the very objective for which so many have sacrificed.
Politics is rarely a contest among people who want the same outcome. Different political actors enter the same alliance for different reasons, pursue different interests, and sometimes imagine entirely different futures. This is true of states, political organizations, armed movements, and even individuals within the same organization. For that reason, political analysis, criticism, and advice should not automatically be categorized as supporting the enemy or opposing the struggle. One person may say, “This analysis is against us”; another may say, “This person does not understand politics”; a third may say, “This is enemy propaganda”; while another may read the same argument and conclude that there is something important to consider. Ultimately, politics must be judged by outcomes.
There is an English proverb: “The proof of the pudding is in the eating.” The question for the Amhara struggle is whether we can afford to wait until we eat the fruit of our political decisions to discover whether the tree we planted was healthy. What if our direction is wrong? What if an alliance that appears advantageous today produces a political reality tomorrow that is profoundly different from what we intended? And what if we discover this only after the opportunity to change course has disappeared?
Ethiopia has already given us a painful lesson about the consequences of political expectations. When Abiy Ahmed came to power, millions of Ethiopians welcomed him with extraordinary optimism. Many saw him as a national savior; some even invoked the biblical image of Moses, a leader who would take Ethiopia toward a promised future. Today, many of those former expectations have been replaced by anger, disappointment, conflict, and fear. For many of his former supporters, the leader once celebrated as a “Moses” has become, in their political imagination, a “Pharaoh.” Whatever one’s assessment of Abiy’s government, the broader lesson is
clear: political movements must judge leaders and alliances not only by what they promise today, but also by what their choices are likely to produce tomorrow.
That lesson is particularly relevant to the present Fano debate. There is a tendency to assume that Fano has only two choices: either unite with other forces opposed to Abiy Ahmed, including historical adversaries, or fight alone and become isolated. I believe there is a third possibility: Fano can build independent Amhara political capacity first and then cooperate with other forces from a position of strength and strategic autonomy. This does not mean that Fano should fight everyone alone. It means that it should not assume that its survival requires dependence on any single coalition.
The Amhara constituency possesses considerable potential political resources: a large population, extensive territory, difficult terrain in many areas, important transport and economic corridors, proximity to the federal political center, and a significant tradition of political and armed mobilization. Large Amhara communities also live beyond the formal boundaries of the Amhara Region, including in Addis Ababa and parts of Oromia. Shewa is particularly important in this strategic calculation because parts of Amhara Shewa lie relatively close to the federal capital. None of this means that demographic or geographic strength automatically produces political victory. Population, territory, and social mobilization become political power only when they are organized around a coherent political objective. Nevertheless, these resources mean that the Amhara struggle should not begin from an assumption of helplessness.
The establishment of the Amhara Fano National Movement in January 2026 is therefore an important opportunity. Its founding statement presented organizational unity, self-reliance, comprehensive internal capacity, protection of Amhara rights and interests, and a framework of national democratic unity as important principles. The challenge now is to transform organizational and military consolidation into political clarity. A unified command is important, but military unity by itself does not answer the fundamental political question: what exactly does victory mean?
Fano needs a public political roadmap. If the objective is simply the removal of Abiy Ahmed, what happens the day after? Who forms the transitional government? What constitutional order follows? How are the interests of the Amhara people protected? How are the political rights of other Ethiopian peoples protected? How are territorial and security disputes addressed? How are elections organized? How is the relationship between armed movements and civilian political institutions defined? These are not questions that can safely be postponed until after victory, because today’s alliances are already shaping tomorrow’s possibilities.
This brings us to the difficult question of cooperation with historical adversaries. The argument for such cooperation is understandable. If different political actors believe that the present government represents a common threat, why should they not cooperate temporarily to change the balance of power? This is a legitimate realist argument. Yet a common enemy does not necessarily create a common future. Political actors may share opposition to one government while maintaining fundamentally different visions of Ethiopia’s constitutional order, territorial settlement, distribution of federal power, or role of armed organizations in politics.
The current discussion surrounding Tsimdo should therefore be approached with political seriousness rather than emotional certainty. If Tsimdo represents a genuine alignment among actors who share an immediate strategic interest in challenging the Abiy government, Fano has every reason to examine the opportunity. But examination is not a surrender. Participation in a coalition should not mean accepting every political objective of every participant. The essential question is the political contract: What are the common objectives? What is negotiable? What is non-negotiable? What happens after the common enemy is removed? How are disagreements resolved? What guarantees Fano’s political autonomy?
The key distinction is between an alliance that serves the struggle and a struggle that becomes a component of somebody else’s alliance. Fano can say to another actor, “We will cooperate where our interests converge, but we will not surrender our political program to you.” That is normal politics. A common enemy can create a tactical partnership, but it cannot by itself establish a common political project. If Fano enters an alliance without understanding this distinction, tactical cooperation can gradually become strategic dependence.
At the same time, those who reject cooperation with historical adversaries must answer a difficult question of their own: what is the alternative? If Fano should not cooperate with TPLF-linked forces, Oromo opposition forces, Eritrea, Sudanese actors, or other political actors when interests overlap, how does it avoid isolation? Isolation is not a strategy. The Amhara struggle cannot determine the future of Ethiopia without relationships with other Ethiopian political constituencies. Fano cannot, and should not, be the sole author of post-Abiy Ethiopia. Ethiopia belongs to all its peoples.
The more realistic objective is therefore to ensure that no political settlement concerning Ethiopia can be imposed without the legitimate participation of the Amhara people. That requires political alliances, but it does not require dependence on one alliance. Fano should be able to communicate with Oromo political actors, Tigrayan political actors, democratic forces, civil society, diaspora organizations, regional actors, and others. It should be possible to disagree profoundly with someone on one question while cooperating with them on another. That is politics.
This is why I would describe the appropriate strategy as independent capacity combined with flexible coalition-building. Fano should build sufficient political, organizational, economic, diplomatic, and military leverage that it enters alliances as a partner rather than as a dependent junior member. Strategic autonomy does not mean political isolation. It means being strong enough to negotiate with many actors without allowing any single actor to determine the movement’s political destination.
The question of history is central to this discussion. When many Amhara ask, “How can Fano cooperate with forces that have historically been adversaries of the Amhara political movement?” that question should not automatically be dismissed as emotionalism or backward-looking nationalism. Fano spokesperson Asres Mare Damtie has argued that Fano is not going to waste time on history. The political reasoning behind such a position is understandable: a movement engaged
in an existential struggle cannot remain permanently trapped in historical grievances. Yet there is a critical distinction between being imprisoned by history and understanding history.
The British historian and political thinker John Robert Seeley famously wrote, “History without political science has no fruit; political science without history has no root.” The wisdom of this observation is particularly relevant to the present debate. History without political science produces knowledge without effective political action; but political science without history produces decisions without roots. Without historical understanding, political actors may make decisions in vacuum, repeat old mistakes, and become trapped in reactive politics that responds to today’s crisis without considering the longer trajectory.
A political movement does not have to live in the past, but it must understand the past. History should not dictate that every former adversary must remain an enemy forever. Circumstances change, interests change, and former enemies sometimes cooperate. But history should inform the terms of cooperation. Before entering an alliance, a movement should understand what happened when the relevant interests previously collided, what each actor sought, which disagreements remain unresolved, and what safeguards are necessary to prevent a repetition of the past.
The TPLF question therefore deserves particular attention. Describing the TPLF as a historical adversary of the Amhara political movement is not merely a product of contemporary propaganda. The TPLF emerged from the political environment of the Ethiopian student movement and developed under the influence of Marxism-Leninism and theories surrounding the national question. Its early political thought framed Ethiopian politics in terms of national oppression and self
determination and identified Amhara domination as a fundamental problem. The organization later became central to the EPRDF system and to the establishment of ethnic federalism. Scholarly research documents the importance of the nationality question and Marxist-Leninist political theory in this ideological development.
This history does not mean that every Tigrayan is an enemy of the Amhara, nor does it mean that every TPLF member today holds exactly the same beliefs as the organization’s founders. Tigrayans are not the TPLF, just as Amhara are not synonymous with Fano. The point is narrower and more important: Fano should understand the political tradition, institutional memory, ideological commitments, and strategic interests of any organization with which it considers forming a major alliance.
This becomes especially important regarding Ethiopia’s constitutional order. The post-1991 political system institutionalized ethnic federalism and recognized the right of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination, including secession. If Fano fundamentally disagrees with that constitutional architecture, while TPLF-linked political forces continue to regard it as the essential framework for Ethiopia, then the disagreement is not a minor detail. It is a fundamental political question that cannot simply be postponed until after Abiy Ahmed is gone.
The territorial question is even more sensitive. The issue commonly referred to by Amhara political actors as Welkait is not peripheral to the Amhara political movement; it is deeply connected to questions of identity, security, territorial administration, and political legitimacy. Tigrayan political
forces have historically understood the same territory through a different narrative. Raya presents another dimension of the dispute. If Fano and TPLF-linked forces cooperate, these questions cannot simply disappear. They require an explicit political understanding, whether through negotiation, an agreed transitional mechanism, arbitration, or another legitimate process. Otherwise, an unresolved dispute may simply be transferred from today’s battlefield to tomorrow’s political settlement.
This is why the question should not be, “Can Fano work with TPLF?” The more serious question is, “Under what conditions can Fano cooperate with TPLF-linked actors without surrendering its strategic objectives?” If the answer includes clearly defined red lines, reciprocal commitments, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and a transparent understanding of the post-Abiy political order, then tactical cooperation can be evaluated rationally. If those safeguards do not exist, the risks become much greater.
There is also a broader organizational-security lesson. Any sophisticated political organization will study the internal structure of a potential partner: who makes decisions, who influence whom, where political divisions exist, who is ambitious, who is vulnerable to pressure, and who is committed to particular principles. Fano should assume that other political organizations may conduct similar assessments. This is not uniquely a TPLF issue; it is a basic principle of political competition. Fano therefore needs strong internal institutions, transparent decision-making, security discipline, collective accountability, and procedures that prevent individual personalities from becoming channels through which the entire movement can be manipulated.
The lesson is not that Fano should never talk to TPLF. Nor is the lesson that Fano should forget everything that happened and trusts TPLF because the two sides share an immediate adversary. The lesson is simpler: know your potential partner before entering the partnership. Know its history, ideology, constitutional position, territorial interests, strategic culture, and non-negotiable objectives. Know what has changed and what has not changed. Then decide whether cooperation advances the Amhara struggle.
The same principle should apply to every other political actor. Fano should not romanticize an ally simply because that actor opposes Abiy Ahmed, nor should it reject a possible partner merely because of past hostility. Every relationship should be measured by interests, commitments, capabilities, and likely outcomes. In other words, Fano should neither be driven by historical emotion nor blinded by present convenience.
This leads to perhaps the most important principle for the current struggle: Fano needs friends, but it must not surrender its autonomy to its friends. It needs political partners, but it must not allow any partner to become the author of its political destiny. It needs a broad Ethiopian coalition, but that coalition must be built around negotiated interests rather than assumed ideological unity.
The real test of leadership is therefore not knowing how to find an ally. It is knowing why the ally is needed, what can be exchanged, what can never be surrendered, and what political order is intended when the alliance has served its purpose. If Fano can answer those questions, then cooperation with former adversaries can be a tool of statecraft rather than a source of strategic vulnerability.
My dear brothers in Fano leadership, the men and women who have sacrificed their lives did not sacrifice merely so that one government could replace another. They sacrificed because they believed something fundamental had to change. Those who support the struggle therefore deserve more than slogans. They deserve a political vision explaining what their sacrifices are intended to produce. They deserve to know the destination, not only the identity of the immediate enemy.
Please do not regard every difficult question as an attack. Do not assume that someone who questions an alliance supports the enemy. Do not assume that someone who supports tactical cooperation has abandoned the Amhara cause. Instead, ask a more useful question: what outcome will this decision produce? Measure it against the past, against the present, and above all against the future.
The Amhara struggle has demonstrated enormous capacity for sacrifice. Now it must demonstrate something equally important: political wisdom. The opportunity is enormous, but the danger is equally enormous. Fano can build an independent political force capable of negotiating with every major actor from a position of strength. It can become a central participant in the creation of a new Ethiopian political settlement without claiming to own Ethiopia and without allowing others to determine Ethiopia’s future without it.
That requires three things: independent capacity, a clear political roadmap, and flexible but principled alliances. Do not choose between isolation and dependence. Choose autonomy. Build strength. Build political institutions. Build relationships. Cooperate where interests converge, negotiate where they differ, and defend the fundamental interests of the Amhara people where necessary. But keep the destination clear.
History will not judge today’s political decisions by the intentions we had when we made them. It will judge them by the Ethiopia those decisions helped create. That is why the central question is not simply whether today’s alliance can help Fano win. The deeper question is what kind of Ethiopia will emerge if it does.
The proof of political wisdom, like the proof of the pudding, is ultimately in the eating. But unlike a meal, a political mistake may not be reversible after it has been consumed. We therefore have a responsibility to examine today’s choices before tomorrow makes the examination for us. The Amhara struggle deserves nothing less than that level of seriousness.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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