The Red Sea Ablaze: How the Iran War is Reshaping the Horn of Africa and Global Trade

By Surafel Getahun 

Introduction: A Shockwave Across the Water

On a late February morning in 2026, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East was irrevocably altered. The death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in coordinated US and Israeli airstrikes on Tehran, did not merely mark the end of a political era—it ignited a war that is now sending shockwaves far beyond the Persian Gulf .

For the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, this is not a distant conflict. Separated from Iran by only a narrow stretch of the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Djibouti are finding themselves on the front lines of a new era of volatility. Linked by a dense web of military, political, and economic ties, the crises on one shore of the Red Sea are rapidly cascading to the other .

While the initial strikes focused on the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical oil chokepoint, the war is rapidly expanding westward. The primary concern now centers on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—the 20-mile-wide “Gate of Tears” connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—where Iran-backed Houthi militants are threatening to unleash a new wave of destruction.

This article explores the multifaceted impact of the Iran war on the Horn of Africa, examining the risks of military escalation, the devastating economic consequences, and the shifting geopolitical alliances that will define the region for years to come.

Part I: The Strategic Geography—Why the Horn of Africa Matters More Than Ever

To understand the stakes, one must first appreciate the geography. The Red Sea is not merely a body of water; it is the world’s most vital maritime artery. Approximately 10% of global seaborne trade passes through its narrow confines, including nearly 8% of the world’s liquefied natural gas and a significant portion of container traffic en route to the Suez Canal. For Europe, it is the gateway to Asia. For Asia, it is the route to Western markets.

At the southern terminus of this artery lies the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—the “Gate of Tears”—a 20-mile-wide passage separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea. On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. These two chokepoints are the jugular veins of global energy security. For decades, strategists have warned that any conflict that closes both simultaneously would trigger an economic shock unlike anything seen since the 1970s oil crisis.

The 2026 Iran war has made that nightmare scenario plausible. With the Strait of Hormuz already a war zone, the Bab el-Mandeb is now the obvious pressure point for Iranian retaliation. And unlike Hormuz, which is defended by the full might of the US Fifth Fleet, the Bab el-Mandeb sits adjacent to some of the world’s weakest states.

The Littoral States: A Study in Fragility

The countries bordering the southern Red Sea are a mosaic of instability:

 Yemen has been locked in a devastating civil war since 2014, with the Iranian-backed Houthi movement controlling the capital, Sana’a, and the Red Sea coastline. The Houthis have already demonstrated their capacity to strike shipping, having attacked dozens of vessels during the 2023-2025 Gaza conflict.

 Eritrea is one of the world’s most militarized and isolated states, with a history of harboring Iranian intelligence assets and providing naval access to Tehran during the 2000s.

Djibouti, a nation of barely one million people, hosts more foreign military bases than any other country on earth—including the Pentagon’s only permanent African base (Camp Lemonnier), China’s first overseas military installation, and facilities for France, Japan, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. It is the logistical hub for the entire region.

 Somalia remains mired in a three-decade-long struggle against the Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab, with a federal government that controls little territory beyond the capital, Mogadishu.

Sudan is in the midst of a catastrophic civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a conflict that has already displaced over 10 million people and created the world’s largest hunger crisis.

 Ethiopia, the region’s demographic and economic giant, is landlocked and entirely dependent on the ports of Djibouti for its imports and exports. It is also emerging from a brutal two-year civil war in Tigray that left hundreds of thousands dead and the country deeply fractured.

This is not a region that can absorb external shocks. It is a region held together by diplomatic thread and foreign aid. The Iran war is now threatening to sever that thread.

Part II: The Military Dimension—From Proxy Warfare to Direct Confrontation

The Houthi Factor: Iran’s Red Sea Arsenal

The most immediate and potent threat to the Horn of Africa comes not from Iranian naval vessels, but from the Houthi movement in Yemen. Over the past decade, the Houthis have transformed from a localized Zaidi Shia rebel group into one of the most capable non-state armed forces in the world. With extensive military support from the IRGC—including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long-range drones, and anti-ship munitions—the Houthis have proven they can strike targets hundreds of miles away.

During the 2023-2025 Gaza war, the Houthis launched dozens of attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, forcing major shipping lines to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. They also fired missiles at Israel—a distance of over 1,000 miles—demonstrating a reach that few analysts had previously thought possible.

Now, with Iran itself under direct attack, the Houthis are being positioned as Tehran’s primary retaliatory arm. In early March 2026, Houthi political official Mohammed al-Bukhaiti issued a stark warning: “Our fingers are on the trigger. We will not hesitate to close the Bab el-Mandeb if the aggression against Iran continues.”

For the Horn of Africa, this is an existential threat. A Houthi blockade would not be a limited operation. It would target vessels associated with the United States, Israel, and their allies—but the collateral damage would be borne by the nations of the Red Sea littoral. Every ship that cannot dock at Djibouti or Port Sudan is a ship that is not delivering food, medicine, or fuel to the people of the Horn.

Djibouti in the Crosshairs

Djibouti’s position as the region’s military hub makes it both a strategic asset and a strategic vulnerability. Camp Lemonnier, home to over 4,000 US military personnel, is the primary base for US counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa, including drone strikes against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. It is also a critical node for intelligence gathering on the Arabian Peninsula.

From Tehran’s perspective, Djibouti is an extension of American military power. In a high-escalation scenario, it is not difficult to imagine the Houthis being directed to target US assets in Djibouti. While a missile strike on a foreign base would represent a dramatic escalation, it would also be a powerful signal that the war has expanded beyond the Persian Gulf.

Such an attack would have catastrophic consequences. It would likely draw the United States into a direct confrontation with the Houthis, potentially involving airstrikes on Yemeni territory. It would also endanger the citizens of Djibouti, a nation that has worked hard to maintain its neutrality while hosting foreign forces. The result would be the transformation of Djibouti from a stable hub into a war zone.

Somaliland: The New Front?

Another potential flashpoint is Somaliland, the self-declared independent region of northern Somalia. Somaliland has long sought international recognition, and in recent years it has engaged in quiet but significant strategic discussions with the United States and Israel. In 2024, Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, granting the landlocked nation naval base access in exchange for potential recognition—a deal that enraged Somalia and its allies in the Arab League.

For Iran and its proxies, Somaliland’s growing alignment with the West makes it a legitimate target. Houthi missiles and drones have the range to strike Somaliland’s key ports, including Berbera, which is being developed by the UAE as a strategic alternative to Djibouti. A strike on Berbera would not only damage Emirati interests but also send a message that no Red Sea port is safe.

The Eritrean Wild Card

Eritrea represents a wild card in the unfolding crisis. President Isaias Afwerki has ruled the country with an iron fist since independence in 1991, maintaining one of the most militarized societies in the world. During the 2000s, Eritrea was Iran’s closest ally in the Horn, providing naval access and intelligence support. Although relations cooled as the UAE and Saudi Arabia pulled Eritrea closer to the Gulf orbit, the ties between Asmara and Tehran have never been fully severed.

In the event of a protracted conflict, Eritrea could become a rear base for Iranian operations—or it could be drawn into the war through its own rivalries. Eritrea has a long-standing feud with Ethiopia and has been accused of supporting anti-Ethiopian insurgents. If the war destabilizes Ethiopia, Eritrea may see an opportunity to press its advantage, further complicating an already volatile situation.

Part III: The Economic Tsunami—How the War is Already Hurting Africans

While the military risks dominate headlines, the economic fallout of the Iran war is already being felt in the wallets and stomachs of ordinary Africans. This is not a distant crisis; it is a crisis that is raising prices, disrupting supply chains, and threatening to push millions more into poverty.

The Red Sea Trade Reroute

The immediate response to the outbreak of hostilities was the suspension of Red Sea routes by major shipping lines. Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd all announced that they would reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, effectively bypassing the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.

This diversion adds approximately 3,500 nautical miles to each voyage—roughly 10-14 days of additional transit time. For the global shipping industry, this reduces effective capacity by removing vessels from circulation. For East Africa, it creates a cascade of logistical challenges.

Consider Ethiopia. As a landlocked nation of over 120 million people, Ethiopia relies almost entirely on the port of Djibouti for its imports and exports. The country imports nearly $15 billion worth of goods annually, including food, fuel, and industrial inputs. Any disruption to the Djibouti corridor is an immediate threat to Ethiopia’s economy and stability.

During the 2023-2025 Red Sea crisis, Ethiopia experienced significant delays and cost increases. Now, with the crisis deepening, the situation is even worse. Shipping containers that once cost $2,500 to transport from Asia to Djibouti are now commanding prices of $5,000 or more—if they can be booked at all.

The Fuel Shock

The most immediate impact of the war has been on global oil prices. Brent crude, which was trading at around $66 per barrel in early February, surged past $82 in the days following the airstrikes on Tehran. For East African nations, which are net importers of refined petroleum, this is a severe blow.

In Uganda, where fuel prices directly influence transport costs and food prices, the government has already warned of “inevitable” increases at the pump. In Kenya, where inflation was just beginning to stabilize after a period of high prices, the fuel shock threatens to reverse hard-won gains.

But the fuel crisis is not just about the price of gasoline. It is also about availability. Many of the region’s fuel imports come through the Red Sea, passing through the Bab el-Mandeb. If the strait is blockaded or becomes too dangerous for tankers, the alternative routes—around the Cape of Good Hope—add weeks to delivery times. For landlocked countries with limited storage capacity, even a temporary disruption could lead to shortages.

The Fertilizer Crisis: A Threat to Food Security

Beyond oil, the Iran war threatens global food security through its impact on fertilizer supplies. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical transit point for key fertilizer components, including sulfur, urea, and ammonia. According to data from the Russian Direct Investment Fund, approximately 44% of the world’s sulfur, 31% of its urea, and 18% of its ammonia pass through the strait.

Fertilizer prices are already elevated due to the lingering effects of the war in Ukraine. A disruption in the Hormuz—or a prolonged Red Sea crisis that raises shipping costs—will drive prices even higher. For African farmers, who are already struggling with climate change, land degradation, and limited access to credit, higher fertilizer costs mean lower yields. Lower yields mean higher food prices. Higher food prices mean more hunger.

The United Nations World Food Programme has warned that East Africa is already home to over 50 million people facing acute food insecurity. The Iran war threatens to add millions more to that number.

Inflation and Social Unrest

The combination of higher fuel and food prices creates a toxic mix for social stability. Across Africa, rising living costs have historically been a trigger for protests and unrest. The 2007-2008 global food crisis sparked riots in dozens of countries, including Cameroon, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. The 2022 fuel price increases contributed to protests in Kenya and Nigeria.

In the Horn of Africa, where governments are already stretched thin by conflict and debt, the inflationary pressures from the Iran war could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. Ethiopia is grappling with a foreign exchange crisis and mounting debt payments. Sudan is in the midst of a civil war. Somalia is fighting Al-Shabaab. None of these governments can afford to absorb a major economic shock—and yet they are being forced to do so by a war they did not start.

Part IV: Geopolitical Realignment—The New Great Game in the Horn

The Iran war is not just a military and economic crisis; it is also a geopolitical earthquake that is reshaping alliances across the Horn of Africa. For the past decade, the region has been dominated by the Gulf powers—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—who have poured billions of dollars into ports, infrastructure, and military bases in an effort to counter Iranian influence.

But the 2026 war is changing the calculus. As Iran fights for its survival, the Gulf states are being forced to choose sides—and their choices will have profound implications for their African allies.

The Waning of Iranian Influence

It is important to acknowledge that Iran’s direct influence in the Horn of Africa has declined significantly over the past decade. During the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran cultivated close ties with Sudan under Omar al-Bashir and with Eritrea under Isaias Afwerki. Iranian naval vessels made regular port calls in Port Sudan and the Eritrean port of Assab, and Iranian intelligence operatives were active in the region.

However, the 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen shifted the dynamics. The Gulf states, particularly the UAE, began a concerted effort to pull Horn of Africa nations out of Iran’s orbit. Sudan severed diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016, and Eritrea expelled Iranian diplomats around the same time. Djibouti, which had allowed Iran to operate a “cultural center” that was widely believed to be an intelligence front, also distanced itself from Tehran.

Today, Iran’s influence in the Horn is indirect at best. It relies on its relationship with the Houthis in Yemen and on occasional intelligence-sharing with sympathetic actors. The IRGC does not have the financial resources—or the appetite—to rebuild the network it once had.

The Dilemma for African States

Nevertheless, the Iran war is forcing African states to navigate treacherous diplomatic waters. Countries like Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia have traditionally sought to maintain a non-aligned posture, balancing ties with the West, the Gulf, and emerging powers like China and Russia. But the war is making neutrality increasingly difficult.

Western allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—are pressing African nations to condemn Iran’s aggression and to support sanctions against Tehran. At the same time, the Gulf states are demanding solidarity against Iranian proxies. And on the other side, Russia and China—both of which have significant interests in Africa—are urging restraint and criticizing Western escalation.

For African leaders, the choice is not an easy one. Many are wary of being drawn into a conflict that is not their own. They remember the legacy of the Cold War, when Africa became a battleground for superpower rivalries, with devastating consequences. At the same time, they cannot afford to alienate their key economic partners.

Uganda’s situation illustrates the complexity. The country receives approximately 35% of its $1.6 billion annual remittances from its diaspora working in the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Any disruption to these flows—whether through conflict or diplomatic breakdown—would be a severe blow to the Ugandan economy. Yet Uganda also relies on Western aid and investment, and it has long-standing ties to Israel, which is now a direct participant in the war.

The Gulf States’ Balancing Act

For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the Iran war presents an acute dilemma. On one hand, they have long viewed Iran as their primary regional rival, and they have welcomed the weakening of the Iranian regime. On the other hand, they are deeply concerned about the expansion of the war and the potential for Houthi retaliation against their own territory and interests.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested heavily in the Horn of Africa. The UAE controls the port of Berbera in Somaliland and  the port of Bosaso in Puntland.Saudi Arabia has provided billions in aid to Sudan and has maintained a close relationship with Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti.

If the Houthis escalate their attacks, these Gulf investments could become targets. The UAE, in particular, has already experienced Houthi drone and missile strikes on its territory during the Yemen war. A new wave of attacks would test the Gulf states’ commitment to their African partners and could force them to choose between protecting their interests and escalating their involvement in the conflict.

Part V: The Fragility Factor—When External Shocks Meet Internal Collapse

Perhaps the most overlooked dimension of the Iran war is its potential to interact with the Horn of Africa’s existing conflicts. This is a region that is already burning. The war is not starting a fire; it is throwing gasoline on an existing inferno.

Sudan: The Smoldering Catastrophe

Sudan’s civil war, which began in April 2023, is already one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Over 10 million people have been displaced, and more than 150,000 have been killed. The country is divided between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. Both sides have been accused of war crimes, and the country is on the brink of fragmentation.

The Iran war threatens to further destabilize Sudan in several ways. First, Sudan’s economy is in freefall, and the country relies heavily on imports through Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Any disruption to Red Sea shipping will drive up prices and worsen the humanitarian crisis. Second, both the SAF and the RSF have external backers who may be drawn into the conflict. The RSF has received support from the UAE, while the SAF has cultivated ties with Iran and Russia. A broader regional conflict could turn Sudan into a proxy battlefield.

Ethiopia: The Precarious Recovery

Ethiopia emerged from the Tigray war (2020-2022) deeply fractured. The conflict left hundreds of thousands dead, displaced millions, and exposed deep ethnic and political divisions. The 2022 Pretoria peace agreement brought an end to the fighting, but the underlying tensions remain unresolved.

Ethiopia’s economy is also under severe strain. The country has a massive foreign exchange shortage, high inflation, and a mounting debt burden. It is currently negotiating with the International Monetary Fund for a new loan program, which will require painful economic reforms.

The Iran war threatens Ethiopia’s fragile stability in multiple ways. As a landlocked country dependent on Djibouti’s ports, Ethiopia is highly vulnerable to Red Sea disruptions. Any significant increase in shipping costs or delays will have a direct impact on Ethiopia’s economy. Moreover, Ethiopia has a large population of ethnic Somalis in the Somali region, and any instability in Somalia could spill over the border.

Somalia: The Unfinished Battle

Somalia has been fighting Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group, for over 15 years. The federal government, backed by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and US airstrikes, has made significant gains in recent years, but Al-Shabaab still controls large swaths of the countryside and carries out regular attacks in Mogadishu.

The Iran war could complicate the fight against Al-Shabaab in several ways. If the US becomes distracted by the conflict with Iran, it may reduce its counterterrorism operations in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, which has long sought to align itself with global jihadist movements, could also seek to exploit the chaos to launch new attacks. And if the Houthis become more active in the Red Sea, Somalia’s long coastline could become a transit point for weapons and fighters.

Part VI: The Future—Scenarios for the Horn of Africa

As the war continues, it is possible to envision several scenarios for how the crisis will unfold in the Horn of Africa. These scenarios range from manageable to catastrophic.

Scenario 1: Contained Proxy Warfare

The most optimistic scenario is that the conflict remains largely contained to the Persian Gulf, with the Houthis refraining from a full-scale blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb. In this scenario, the Horn of Africa would still face significant economic pain—higher shipping costs, fuel inflation, and supply chain disruptions—but it would avoid direct military confrontation.

This scenario depends on a number of factors, including the ability of the United States to deter Houthi escalation through diplomatic channels and the willingness of Iran to avoid opening a second front. It also depends on the Gulf states’ ability to mediate between the Houthis and the international community.

Scenario 2: The Bab el-Mandeb Blockade

A more dangerous scenario is that the Houthis carry out their threat to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb, targeting vessels associated with the United States, Israel, and their allies. This would effectively close the Red Sea to commercial shipping, forcing all Asia-Europe trade around the Cape of Good Hope.

For the Horn of Africa, this would be a devastating blow. Djibouti’s port revenues would collapse, Ethiopia’s supply chains would be severely disrupted, and fuel and food prices would skyrocket across the region. The blockade would also likely draw the United States into direct military confrontation with the Houthis, potentially including airstrikes on Yemeni territory.

Scenario 3: Direct Strikes on the Horn

The worst-case scenario is that the conflict spills over directly onto African soil. This could involve Houthi missile strikes on US bases in Djibouti, Israeli strikes on targets in Somaliland, or proxy fighting involving Eritrean or Ethiopian militias.

Such a scenario would devastate the region. Djibouti, one of the few stable countries in the Horn, would become a war zone. Ethiopia, already struggling with economic and political challenges, would face a new security crisis. And the humanitarian situation in Sudan, Somalia, and elsewhere would deteriorate further.

Scenario 4: The Fragmentation Scenario

Beyond the immediate conflict, there is a longer-term risk that the Iran war contributes to the fragmentation of the Horn of Africa. The region is already marked by separatist movements, ethnic tensions, and weak central governments. A prolonged crisis could empower these forces, leading to the breakup of existing states and the redrawing of borders.

This is not an idle concern. Somaliland has already declared independence and is seeking international recognition. The semi-autonomous region of Puntland in Somalia has also asserted its autonomy. In Ethiopia, regional states like Oromia and Amhara have their own political ambitions. And in Sudan, the civil war could result in the partition of the country.

A fragmented Horn of Africa would be a region of endless conflict, with rival factions backed by external powers—including Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Russia—fighting for control of territory and resources. The Iran war may not be the cause of this fragmentation, but it could be the catalyst that accelerates it.

Conclusion: A Call for Strategic Attention

The war in Iran is a tragedy in its own right, claiming lives and destabilizing a critical region. But for the Horn of Africa, it is something more: a threat multiplier that is amplifying existing vulnerabilities and creating new dangers.

The international community has long treated the Horn as a periphery—a place of strategic interest for its bases and chokepoints, but not a priority for sustained diplomatic engagement. The Iran war has exposed the folly of this approach. A region that was already teetering on the edge is now being pushed toward the abyss.

What is to be done? First, the United States and its allies must recognize that the Red Sea is not a secondary theater but a central front in the conflict with Iran. They must take steps to deter Houthi escalation, including a visible naval presence in the Bab el-Mandeb and clear communication of the consequences of attacks on shipping.

Second, the international community must provide immediate economic support to the countries of the Horn of Africa to help them weather the storm of higher fuel and food prices. This includes debt relief, emergency budget support, and increased humanitarian aid for the millions already displaced by conflict and hunger.

Third, African leaders must act with unity and purpose. The African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and individual governments must work together to present a unified diplomatic front, demanding that the Red Sea remain a zone of peace and commerce. They must also resist the temptation to take sides in a conflict that is not their own, preserving their neutrality and their ability to mediate.

Finally, there must be a renewed commitment to addressing the underlying conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, the insurgency in Somalia, and the political crises across the region will not solve themselves. They require sustained diplomatic engagement, financial resources, and political will.

The fire has been lit in Tehran. But the smoke is already drifting south, settling over the ports and cities of the Red Sea. If we do not act—and act decisively—the Horn of Africa will burn. And when it does, the consequences will be measured not in barrels of oil or shipping containers, but in the lives of millions of people who have already endured too much.

Writer’s Note: This analysis is based on reporting and expert commentary from the period following the March 2026 escalation between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Sources include geopolitical analysts, economic data from shipping and commodity markets, and security reports from the Horn of Africa region. The author has drawn on academic research and think tank  publication to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation.

About the Author: Surafel Getahun is a lecturer of  political science and International relations, researcher , and political analyst with extensive experience as a seasoned journalist. He has published numerous articles on Ethiopian politics, regional geopolitics, and development issues in the Horn of Africa.

He can be reached at : surafgeta@gmail.com 

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com     

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