The Paradox of Ethiopianism, Part II: Citizenship, Reconstruction, and National Renewal

By Sirak Zena

Introduction 

From Communal Security to Democratic Citizenship

Part One has investigated the structural factors that have facilitated Amhara self-organization, as well as the democratic constraints that should govern such initiatives. It put forward that while defensive mobilization may offer temporary protection and political agency, it cannot serve as a sustainable foundation for national life.

Thus, Part Two transitions from a diagnostic framework to a focus on reconstruction. It explores the constitutional, institutional, and political conditions essential for fostering equal citizenship, impartial security, minority protection, accountable governance, and lawful political competition. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for genuine dialogue, mutual recognition, and consensus on Ethiopia’s political end state.

The central argument asserts that Ethiopianism can evolve into a credible democratic covenant only when communities possess the security necessary to choose coexistence, and no group is compelled to choose between communal survival and national belonging.

VII. From Communal Security to Democratic Reconstruction

The moral legitimacy of defensive self-organization ultimately depends on the political future it seeks to build. Collective protection may be necessary when public institutions fail, but it cannot provide the permanent foundation of a democratic society. Ethiopia’s central challenge, therefore, is to construct an order in which communal security and shared citizenship reinforce rather than negate one another.

This requires more than appeals to national unity. Civic loyalty cannot be revived through patriotic rhetoric while communities fear displacement, dispossession, exclusion, or violence. A democratic Ethiopianism can become credible only when communities trust that their basic rights will survive changes in government, regional authority, and political influence. Political defeat must be survivable: losing power must not expose any community to existential insecurity, collective punishment, or exclusion from citizenship (Przeworski, 1991).

Ethiopia’s crisis arises from the interaction between constitutional design and authoritarian practice. The post-1995 constitutional order placed ethnicity at the center of territorial administration, political representation, and collective organization. At the same time, centralized party control, politicized security forces, weak judicial independence, and selective enforcement weakened the institutions that might have moderated intercommunal conflict. Constitutional incentives fostered ethnically organized competition, while authoritarian governance undermined the impartial mechanisms needed to manage it.

A sustainable political settlement must therefore address both dimensions. Reforming constitutional provisions without transforming coercive institutions would leave communities vulnerable to manipulation. Democratizing elections without rethinking the relationship among ethnicity, territory, representation, and security would leave foundational conflicts unresolved. Democratic reconstruction requires simultaneous attention to constitutional legitimacy, equal citizenship, federalism, impartial security, minority rights, accountable governance, lawful dispute resolution, and the transformation of defensive mobilization into responsible civilian participation. Together, these conditions form the institutional foundation on which Ethiopianism can recover democratic meaning.

VII.A. Conditions for Legitimate Constitutional Reform

The legitimacy of constitutional reform depends not only on its substantive provisions, but also on the process through which those provisions are formulated. In societies marked by deep division, a constitutional settlement must be anchored in broad participation, transparent procedures, and genuine consent among major political and social constituencies. Processes undertaken amid active conflict, widespread displacement, political intimidation, or the systematic exclusion of opposition actors cannot credibly reflect free and informed public consent.

Accordingly, any institutional body tasked with facilitating constitutional dialogue must be demonstrably independent of the incumbent government and of armed or partisan interests. The selection of commissioners, delegates, and experts should occur through a negotiated, publicly credible process rather than through unilateral appointment by those in power. Regional representatives, opposition parties, civic organizations, women’s associations, religious communities, displaced populations, professional associations, and politically marginalized minorities must all have substantive opportunities for participation.

Security and inclusion do not require perfect national consensus before constitutional deliberations begin. They do, however, require conditions in which participants can deliberate freely, reject proposals without fear of reprisal, and negotiate without coercion. If constitutional restructuring proceeds while significant constituencies remain marginalized, displaced, intimidated, or excluded, reform will likely be perceived as a tool of partisan consolidation rather than as a genuine political covenant. Such a process would deepen the gap between constitutional language and lived political reality.

For Ethiopianism to emerge as a voluntary democratic commitment rather than as an ideology imposed from above, the constitutional process itself must embody the equality, reciprocity, and mutual recognition that the future political order seeks to institutionalize. The reconstruction of a shared state cannot proceed through procedures that reproduce exclusion.

A flawed consensus in stage-managed dialogue disregards genuine public involvement, ensuring that the ultimate accord will be unsustainable and setting the stage for subsequent discord.

VII.B. Equal Citizenship and Protection Beyond Ethnic Affiliation

A credible system of equal citizenship is a core substantive requirement for democratic legitimacy. Every Ethiopian should enjoy enforceable rights regardless of membership in a region’s titular or dominant ethnic community. Freedoms of residence, movement, political participation, property ownership, linguistic and cultural expression, religious observance, and access to public services must be guaranteed uniformly across the country.

This principle is especially important for minorities residing outside regions associated with their ethnic group. A federal system cannot provide meaningful communal autonomy while leaving internal minorities politically vulnerable. Group recognition and individual citizenship must operate together rather than as antagonistic principles. As Kymlicka argues, minority rights are compatible with liberal citizenship when they protect communities from domination without authorizing domination within or between communities (Kymlicka, 1995).

For the Amhara, this means that security cannot rest solely on protection within the Amhara region. Amhara civilians residing elsewhere must possess the same enforceable rights as all other Ethiopian citizens. Reciprocity is equally indispensable: Oromo, Tigrayan, Agaw, Qemant, Gumuz, and other minorities living within Amhara-administered areas must receive equivalent protection. A democratic constitutional order cannot denounce ethnic exclusion in one region while tolerating it in another.

Ethiopianism can flourish only when national citizenship has tangible meaning wherever citizens reside. It must serve not merely as an emotional attachment or historical legacy, but as an enforceable guarantee that no individual is rendered politically subordinate because of ethnicity, language, religion, or place of residence.

VII.C. Impartial Security and the Rule of Law

Equal citizenship acquires substantive meaning only through institutions capable of enforcing and safeguarding it. Ethiopia therefore requires security institutions that serve constitutional law rather than those that serve governing parties, regional elites, or ethnic constituencies. Both federal and regional security forces must operate within transparent legal frameworks, remain subject to civilian oversight, and be bound by enforceable standards of accountability.

The state must also establish credible mechanisms for intervention when regional authorities are unable or unwilling to protect minorities. Such intervention must be governed by clear legal rules to prevent the federal government from using minority protection as a pretext for political domination. The aim should be neither unchecked regional sovereignty nor arbitrary federal coercion, but a constitutional allocation of responsibilities subject to independent judicial oversight.

Judicial reform is indispensable. Courts must possess the authority and independence to review administrative decisions, protect constitutional rights, adjudicate territorial disputes, and hold security officials accountable. In the absence of judicial independence, constitutional guarantees remain vulnerable to selective interpretation, forcing communities to rely on political patronage or armed mobilization rather than the rule of law.

A democratic Ethiopianism cannot endure where citizens perceive state security institutions as partisan, ethnicized, or predatory. National belonging becomes credible only when the law protects all communities impartially and when recourse to public institutions is more reliable than reliance on communal self-help.

VII.D. Constitutional Recognition without Permanent Ethnic Enclosure

Ethiopia’s diversity cannot be effectively governed by negating communal identities. Efforts to impose cultural uniformity or suppress ethnonational aspirations risk replicating historical patterns of domination and intensifying resistance. Nevertheless, recognition should not require the permanent confinement of citizens within ethnically exclusive territories.

A future constitutional process must critically reexamine the relationship between communal recognition, territorial autonomy, local democracy, and national citizenship. This does not require the immediate abolition of federalism or the rejection of meaningful self-government. Rather, it requires an open assessment of whether existing arrangements equitably protect communities, how administrative boundaries should be established, and what remedies should be available to minorities residing within ethnically designated regions.

The appeal of Article 39’s secession provision must be understood in the context of Ethiopia’s history of authoritarian violence and the resulting collapse of trust in shared state institutions. For communities fearful of domination or renewed state violence, the right of exit may appear to offer a constitutional safeguard or safety valve against perpetual subordination. A durable Ethiopian union, however, cannot answer such fears through coercive unity or by dismissing the grievances that make separation attractive.

At the same time, political fragmentation alone does not eliminate authoritarianism. Patterns of domination may be reproduced within successor states or newly empowered regional authorities. The more sustainable objective is therefore to construct a voluntary democratic federation in which robust self-government, equal citizenship, and protection from domination reduce the perceived necessity of secession. 

A constitution should be designed to sustain democratic unity, not normalize political fragmentation. Although secession may appear to safeguard self-determination, its constitutional recognition can also produce adverse political and psychological effects by encouraging separatist expectations, weakening intergroup trust, and making the state appear reversible rather than durable. A more defensible approach is to strengthen democratic governance, federal accommodation, and plural recognition so that diversity is managed within the state rather than transformed into a recurring constitutional contest over exit.

The decisive issue is not simply whether a constitution includes or excludes a secession clause, but whether the state is organized around democratic institutions capable of accommodating diversity, protecting plural identities, and managing grievances through legitimate procedures. Constitutional recognition of secession does not by itself ensure stability or freedom; it may coexist with insecurity if the broader political order remains exclusionary, coercive, or unresponsive. The more durable solution lies in building an inclusive democratic order in which regions and communities enjoy meaningful participation, recognition, and a fair distribution of power and resources.

Territorial disputes should likewise be resolved through lawful and publicly credible procedures rather than demographic coercion, administrative manipulation, or armed intervention. Depending on local conditions, appropriate mechanisms may include independent boundary commissions, judicial adjudication, negotiated autonomy, local referenda conducted under secure conditions, or special administrative arrangements for contested areas. No single mechanism can address all disputes, but all legitimate procedures must protect displaced populations, prevent intimidation, and uphold the rights of affected minorities.

The constitutional objective should be neither centralized assimilation nor perpetual ethnopolitical separation. It should be a federal or decentralized system in which communal identities are recognized without wholly determining each individual’s political status. Ethiopianism can flourish only when citizens can belong simultaneously to their communities and to a shared political order, without one identity negating the other.

VII.E. Electoral Design and Cross-Communal Political Incentives

Institutions must also foster incentives for political cooperation across communal boundaries. In deeply divided societies, straightforward majoritarian electoral systems can enable a single coalition to dominate state institutions, leaving others in a condition of persistent insecurity. Democratic stability may therefore require negotiated representation, coalition-building, mutual restraint, and institutional arrangements that give major communities confidence in the political system (Lijphart, 1977).

One institutional proposal warranting careful consideration is Prof. Messay Kebede’s suggestion in Reimagining Ethiopia to combine regional self-government with a directly elected national presidency. ¹ While a parliament or federal chamber would represent the country’s territorial and communal diversity, a president elected by the national electorate could incentivize candidates to seek support across ethnic and regional lines. In this framework, the presidency would function as a unifying political institution, capable of moderating centrifugal pressures without abolishing federalism or regional autonomy. Its principal aim would be to reconcile regional self-rule with shared governance at the national level (Kebede, 2026).

Direct presidential elections, however, do not inherently produce national integration. In a polarized society, such contests may devolve into winner-take-all struggles, intensify communal fears, and risk concentrating excessive authority in a single office. Any presidential system would therefore require robust constitutional safeguards, including meaningful geographic thresholds for electoral support, clearly defined limits on executive power, fixed terms, independent courts, legislative oversight, and credible protections for regional governments and political minorities. Messay’s proposal should be evaluated and considered alongside parliamentary and hybrid alternatives as part of an inclusive constitutional reform process.

The broader principle is more important than any particular executive model. Political institutions should be designed to discourage monopolization of the state and reward actors capable of building constituencies across regional, religious, and ethnic divisions. Electoral rules, legislative procedures, decentralized governance, and executive structures should incentivize coalition-building rather than ethnic outbidding.

For Ethiopianism to flourish, the national political arena must become a space where communities engage one another as partners in governance rather than as rival blocs competing for exclusive control of the state.

VII.F. Accountability and Reconciliation without Collective Guilt

Political reconstruction demands rigorous and credible accountability for violence perpetrated against civilians. Impunity deepens communal fear and perpetuates cycles of retaliation by convincing victims that their safety depends on their own capacity for revenge. Effective accountability must therefore be individualized, evidence-based, and institutionally impartial. Entire communities cannot justly bear responsibility for the actions of governments, political parties, armed groups, or historic regimes. Collective guilt undermines the very foundation of justice and reconciliation.

A legitimate accountability process must document abuses across all communities, recognize victims without political selectivity, facilitate return or compensation for displaced populations where possible, and prosecute those responsible for grave crimes through impartial legal procedures. Reconciliation cannot rest on denial, nor can it proceed through inherited collective blame. Its purpose should be to restore civic equality and create institutional safeguards against recurrence, not merely to transfer humiliation from one group to another.

Ethiopianism, understood as national identity and civic belonging beyond ethnic or regional lines, cannot be rehabilitated as a shared moral identity if one community’s history is reduced to indictment. In contrast, another community’s suffering is rendered invisible. A sustainable common political future requires recognizing historical injustice without transmitting undifferentiated guilt across generations or populations. Only by rejecting both denial and collective blame can Ethiopia cultivate an inclusive civic identity rooted in justice and mutual recognition.

VII.G. From Defensive Organization to Democratic Participation

Within this transitional context, Amhara self-organization may provide collective protection, political representation, and enhanced bargaining power. Its enduring significance, however, will depend on its capacity to convert wartime or emergency solidarity into accountable civilian institutions. Military coordination, by itself, cannot substitute for a coherent political program, representative leadership, or democratic legitimacy.

Amhara political actors must therefore cultivate institutions capable of articulating public objectives, managing internal disagreements, representing regional and religious diversity, safeguarding minorities, and negotiating constructively with other Ethiopian communities. Diaspora organizations likewise bear responsibility for coordinating advocacy and material support without deepening internal divisions, promoting maximalist rhetoric, or exercising influence without accountability to affected populations inside Ethiopia.

The same principle applies to other communities. Ethiopia’s reconstruction cannot be achieved through the unilateral triumph of any single ethnonational project. A sustainable settlement requires organized communities able to negotiate from positions of security while accepting constitutional limits, reciprocal rights, and the legitimacy of shared institutions. Collective agency should serve as a basis for political partnership, not as a permanent instrument of mutual siege.

The transition from survival-driven politics to democratic coexistence requires simultaneous progress on two fronts. Communities must attain sufficient security to participate without fear, while national institutions must gain sufficient credibility for permanent communal defense to become progressively unnecessary. Neither process can be entirely deferred to the other. Requiring vulnerable communities to disarm politically before institutions offer genuine protection is unrealistic; expecting common institutions to recover while every community pursues unlimited self-help is equally unsustainable.

The objective is not to eradicate communal identity or demand immediate trust where trust has repeatedly been violated. Rather, it is to create conditions in which trust can be gradually rebuilt through political experience: equal enforcement of rights, impartial protection, accountable governance, minority security, lawful dispute resolution, and political competition in which the loss of power does not imperil collective existence.

Institutional reform alone, however, cannot yield democratic coexistence if political actors continue to interpret one another through inherited suspicion, rigid identity categories, and zero-sum assumptions. As Messay Kebede argues, reimagining Ethiopia requires an internal transformation: a critical reexamination by citizens and political elites of the beliefs, values, and historical narratives that shape their relationships with other communities (Kebede, 2026).

Such transformation does not require abandoning communal identity. It requires moving beyond the treatment of identities as static political enclosures and understanding them instead as dynamic, mutually recognizable, and capable of participating in a shared national future. Constitutional reconstruction and moral renewal must therefore advance together. Institutions can create incentives and protections for cooperation, but citizens and leaders must also be willing to inhabit those institutions democratically.

Ethiopianism can flourish only when the country’s constituent communities are secure enough to choose coexistence freely and confident enough to participate in common institutions without fear of collective erasure. In the Amhara case, defensive organization may be a necessary response to immediate threats. However, it should serve as a bridge to effective citizenship rather than a permanent substitute for it. These objectives are not strictly sequential: communal security, responsible self-organization, and commitment to Ethiopia’s reconstruction can — and must — advance in tandem.

For Ethiopia, national reconstruction must mean more than the mere preservation of territorial unity. It must entail a democratic covenant in which communal security and common citizenship reinforce, rather than negate, one another. Only then can Ethiopianism move beyond abstraction and become a credible political relationship among communities protected, represented, and recognized as equal partners in a shared state.

However, forging this democratic covenant and fostering true Ethiopianism demand more than shared aspirations; they require confronting the deep-seated mistrust, contested histories, and existential fears that continue to divide Ethiopia’s political elites. Moving from principle to practice means addressing not only the structural and institutional aspects of national reconstruction but also the intricate dynamics of identity, trauma, and dialogue among political elites and communities alike. The following section explores why reckoning with these realities is both urgent and indispensable for Ethiopia’s renewal and survival.

VIII. Reckoning with Identity: Dialogue, Division, and the Pursuit of Renewal and Survival in Ethiopia

A peaceful political transition in Ethiopia remains elusive. Beyond calls for the removal of the current administration, there is currently no unified agenda or well-defined political body to oversee the transition process. Achieving these goals necessitates genuine, inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders. The failure to address these fundamental issues risks plunging the nation into fragmentation, violence, and the insecurity associated with a quasi-anarchic condition. Agreement on a common adversary does not guarantee a shared future.

Political elites and inclusive dialogue are pivotal to Ethiopia’s national renewal. While Ethiopian actors possess negotiation experience, their efforts are impeded by entrenched mistrust, competing historical narratives, and divergent visions for the country’s future. Overcoming these challenges requires not only bargaining but also deep emotional acknowledgment and historical reckoning. This approach facilitates a more constructive and democratic process—one that fosters coexistence and ensures that no community’s security is compromised for the sake of another.

The competing visions of ethnic federalism, civic nationalism, and secession shape Ethiopia’s political trilemma. These are not merely policy preferences but deeply rooted identity frameworks. When political elites from these factions convene, they often communicate in entirely different “languages,” as their core social goals and existential fears are fundamentally at odds. Elites must explicitly recognize that the discourse centers on identity, history, and trauma before meaningful policy or legal negotiations can take place.

Even within the broad discourse on ethnic federalism, there is no unified political vision. One faction principally supports maintaining constitutional continuity, arguing that the existing federal framework should remain intact and that political change should focus mainly on replacing current leadership. For some in this group, this position is rooted in fears that major institutional changes could undermine the political gains and representation secured after the EPRDF era. Advocates of continuity often justify their stance by invoking the need for stability, warning that sudden structural reforms could cause disorder, create a power vacuum, or spark renewed conflict.

A second faction also supports ethnic federalism but believes the current regime has either distorted or insufficiently implemented its guiding principles. As a result, this group calls for a more thorough regime change, possibly alongside targeted constitutional reforms, to restore or better realize the intended federal arrangement.

A third faction argues that ethnic federalism is too embedded in Ethiopia’s institutions, territorial boundaries, and political expectations to be dismantled suddenly. However, this group envisions a gradual shift toward a more civic federal model. As a result, disputes arise not only between ethnic federalism, civic federalism, and secessionist paradigms, but also within ethnic federalism itself—over what must be preserved, what should change, and the future direction of the constitutional order.

The crisis among Ethiopian political elites extends beyond mere constitutional disagreements; it reflects a deep polarization that permeates both emotional and interpretive domains. Political adversaries now view each other not simply as rivals with differing institutional preferences, but as existential threats to collective security, historical legitimacy, or group survival itself. Simultaneously, these elites often interpret the same political events through mutually exclusive historical narratives and explanatory frameworks. This divergence makes consensus elusive, not only on policy issues but also in understanding Ethiopia’s past and envisioning its political future.

In this context, opposition coordination based solely on resisting the current regime is inadequate as a foundation for democratic reconstruction. Political actors need to be willing to challenge entrenched assumptions, critically examine the networks of trust shaping their interpretations, and genuinely engage with perspectives outside their usual circles. This approach does not require abandoning principles such as federalism, unity, autonomy, or justice; instead, it demands recognition that a sustainable political settlement cannot emerge while factions remain trapped in narratives equating compromise with betrayal and dissent with existential hostility.

Therefore, Ethiopian political elites must move beyond competing narratives of grievance and participate in structured, cross-ideological negotiations about the country’s institutional future. While historical grievances should be acknowledged, they must not become permanent instruments of political mobilization. The ultimate goal should be to establish an inclusive framework before political transition occurs—one capable of transforming political rivalry from a struggle for collective survival into healthy competition within widely accepted institutions.

To bridge this profound divide, political leaders must approach dialogue not as a contest but as an exercise in psychological safety. By employing techniques such as “looping for understanding,” elites can reflect upon and validate their opponents’ historical fears without necessarily endorsing their solutions. Only when each faction feels heard and respected regarding its core survival anxieties can the conversation progress beyond defensive posturing and toward a shared, practical framework for the future.

History demonstrates that negative coalitions—alliances formed solely by opposition rather than shared goals—inevitably fracture once their common adversary disappears. For all communities—whether opposing the regime on the ground, from the diaspora, or resisting from within Ethiopia—lasting stability and an end to violence require more than a shared opposition.

Leaders and representative elites must transcend superficial alliances focused solely on regime change and commit to the challenging, direct work of consociational dialogue that fosters coexistence. By employing communicative techniques such as “looping” to validate opposing existential fears, leaders can co-create a transitional framework that guarantees mutual survival before a power vacuum emerges. Elites must look beyond immediate tactical gains and secure an end-state architecture in which power transitions no longer pose existential threats. An alliance formed without such an agreement is not a blueprint for peace; it is a countdown to the next conflict.

Any tactical or provisional coalition that treats the other as a mere political instrument may achieve military victory against a shared adversary, the regime; however, it cannot produce a stable postwar political settlement without prior consensus on the final political outcome. An alliance lacking a shared vision of the end state constitutes a political time bomb.

Military alliances may be necessary as tactical instruments, but they must not be conflated with genuine political unity. If political elites fail to confront, negotiate, and agree on the end state in advance, their victory risks planting the seeds of an even deeper national crisis.

Moreover, idealizing armed struggle or relying on coalitions without political cohesion leads to strategic failure, civilian suffering, and internal fragmentation. When armed groups pursue divergent end objectives without a unified political vision, their efforts become directionless and ultimately harm the very communities they claim to protect.

Ultimately, the author avoids dogmatism, offering a historically informed judgment and balanced expectations. In the Ethiopian context, failing to introduce a clear end-state architecture at this juncture may precipitate an existential contradiction. At the same time, this perspective does not demand universal assent, nor does it express contempt for dissenting viewpoints.

The following section turns to the consequences of negative coalitions organized primarily around regime change without a shared political end-state. It then identifies the minimum agreements and institutional safeguards to be established before a power vacuum emerges, to reduce the risks of fragmentation and create conditions for a stable and inclusive transition.

IX. From Negative Coalition to a Pre-Transition Institutional Pact

“Why ‘Oust First, Talk Later’ Fails”

The preceding analysis underscores an urgent imperative: Ethiopia’s political crisis cannot be solved simply by opposing the existing regime. While tactical cooperation among armed and political actors can be rational or necessary, unity based solely on shared hostility to the incumbent cannot serve as a foundation for a stable transition. Durable change demands more than negative cohesion.

The issue is not tactical cooperation itself, but the lack of agreement on what comes next. A shared adversary can temporarily mask deep disagreements over federalism, self-determination, territorial authority, constitutional design, security arrangements, and the political end state. However, once that adversary is gone, these postponed contradictions are likely to resurface amid uncertainty and widespread militarization. Agreeing on whom to oppose is not the same as agreeing on how to govern the state that follows.

IX.A. The Consequences of an Unnegotiated Political Rupture

When political or armed actors with fundamentally divergent visions unite primarily around regime opposition, the weakening or collapse of the existing order exposes disagreements that tactical coordination only temporarily contained. Absent a prior institutional settlement, four interrelated dynamics become especially perilous.

1. The Collapse of Coalition Cohesion

A coalition built around a common adversary risks losing its central source of cohesion once that adversary is removed. Disputes over territory, identity, constitutional order, political authority, and command structures may then resurface precisely when institutional uncertainty is at its peak. Tactical coordination may therefore unravel just when political cooperation is most vital. Former allies can rapidly become competitors for coercive and political power, especially in the absence of a mutually accepted framework for transition.

2. The Security Dilemma and Competitive Militarization

If the central state is weakened or paralyzed before transitional rules are established, each armed or political group may begin to interpret others’ actions through the lens of a security dilemma. Issues that might otherwise be negotiable—such as control of security forces, safeguarding strategic sites, administering major cities, and exercising interim authority—can quickly become matters of survival. Precautionary mobilization by one group may be seen as preparation for domination by another. This dynamic can spark preemption, competing military deployments, and a race to secure irreversible advantages before meaningful negotiations even begin.

3. Diaspora Polarization and Political Escalation

Diaspora advocacy organizations, media networks, financial channels, and politically engaged communities abroad wield substantial power to shape narratives and mobilize resources. In the absence of a shared transitional framework, these networks can reinforce rival armed or political factions, entrench maximalist positions, and frame compromise as betrayal. Political polarization abroad can thus become a force multiplier for instability at home, rather than a resource for negotiated reconstruction.

4. Territorial Conflict, Displacement, and De Facto Fragmentation

The danger is ultimately both territorial and political. When actors pursue incompatible visions of federalism, autonomy, secession, territorial administration, or national unity, unresolved struggles over central authority can quickly escalate into local contests over land, boundaries, and jurisdiction. Temporary zones of military control can solidify into enduring political realities, displacement may become inextricably linked to territorial claims, and disputes that could be resolved institutionally may become almost impossible to reverse once settled by force. Regime collapse without a negotiated transition, therefore, risks producing not democratic reconstruction, but an institutional and security vacuum.

IX.B. The Minimum Pre-Transition Institutional Pact

The appropriate response is not to insist on resolving every constitutional issue before political change. Such expectations are unrealistic in a deeply divided society. What is essential, however, is a minimum pre-transition institutional pact that sets the rules for managing unresolved disagreements.

These provisions are not meant to predetermine Ethiopia’s final constitutional order. Their purpose is to prevent political transition from devolving into a contest for state capture and to preserve enough institutional stability for legitimate constitutional deliberation to follow.

1. A Common Security Architecture and Verifiable Demobilization Framework

No sustainable transition can coexist indefinitely with multiple armed formations exercising independent sovereign authority. Political and armed actors must therefore reach prior agreement on the management of forces during the transitional period.

This should include clearly defined command arrangements, restrictions on unilateral armed movements into major cities and strategic sites, credible ceasefire monitoring, and an agreed pathway toward disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) or integration into professional security institutions.

Sequencing is essential. Vulnerable communities cannot be expected to relinquish their defensive capabilities before credible institutions exist to protect them, just as the state cannot stabilize while competing armed structures retain autonomy. Security transformation must therefore be reciprocal, gradual, and verifiable.

2. Time-Bound Interim Governance with Enforceable Limits

A pre-transition pact must define the basic structure, mandate, duration, and decision-making processes of the interim political authority. The aim is to prevent unilateral state capture while preserving enough administrative capacity to maintain order, deliver essential services, facilitate political dialogue, and prepare for legitimate constitutional and electoral processes.

Interim governance should be explicitly limited in both scope and duration. No faction should be allowed to transform military advantage or participation in regime change into a permanent political monopoly. Instead, the transitional framework should create neutral ground where competing constituencies can negotiate the future under more secure and inclusive conditions. 

Acknowledging the intricacies of this endeavor, the author of this article wrote a two-part series and proposed a temporary caretaker government as a viable institutional framework for managing this pivotal transition (Zena, 2025). This is offered not as the exclusive framework but as one of multiple potential configurations that ought to be assessed through comprehensive political discourse and based on their ability to maintain impartiality, avert state appropriation, and support a legitimate democratic transition.

3. Minimum Constitutional Rules of the Game

Ethiopia’s final constitutional settlement should not be imposed by armed groups or negotiated solely in a state of emergency. Constitutional legitimacy requires broad participation, public deliberation, and sufficient political stability to achieve genuine consent.

Nevertheless, certain minimum questions cannot safely remain wholly unresolved during the transition. Political actors should reach provisional agreement on the legal framework governing the interim period, the distribution of authority between federal and regional institutions, procedures for addressing territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the treatment of self-determination claims, the protection of individual and communal rights, and the process through which more fundamental constitutional questions will later be decided.

The crucial distinction is between settling the final constitution in advance and agreeing in advance on how constitutional disagreements will be resolved. The former is premature; the latter is indispensable.

4. Neutral Conflict Resolution and Territorial Arbitration

Territorial disputes are among the most dangerous potential triggers of post-regime conflict. Ethiopia’s internal boundaries intersect with competing historical narratives, population movements, displacement, administrative claims, and communal fears. Such disputes cannot be safely left to whichever armed or political actor controls contested territory during a moment of national uncertainty.

A pre-transition framework must therefore establish independent, mutually credible, and procedurally transparent mechanisms for resolving territorial and jurisdictional disputes. Depending on the circumstances, these mechanisms could include judicial review, boundary commissions, negotiated interim administrations, locally agreed arrangements, or eventual referenda conducted under secure conditions. The essential principle is to remove territorial disputes from the battlefield and address them through lawful, credible procedures whenever possible.

5. Protection of Core State Functions During the First 30–90 Days

Political transition is not only a constitutional or security challenge. States can fragment when administrative, financial, and infrastructural systems collapse faster than new political institutions can take their place. The first weeks after a major rupture may thus determine whether the transition leads to stabilization or fragmentation.

A pre-transition agreement should specify how essential state functions will be protected during this period. These functions include central banking and payment systems, customs administration, telecommunications, dams, electricity and fuel distribution, airports, major transportation corridors, public health systems, and core administrative services. These institutions must not become prizes for competing factions.

Civilian protection must be treated as an equally urgent priority during this period. In conditions of weakened state authority, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, arbitrary detention, localized violence, and criminal predation can expand rapidly. Transitional arrangements must therefore ensure continuity of basic public security, protection of civilians, and lawful policing, particularly in areas where armed groups or criminal networks may exploit institutional weakness. The safety of ordinary citizens is not secondary to political stabilization; it is one of its essential conditions.

Where necessary, temporary professional or technocratic management can help preserve administrative continuity, but such arrangements should remain subordinate to a legitimate, time-bound interim authority, including a caretaker government if that model is adopted. The objective is administrative stabilization—not technocratic substitution for political legitimacy or political control.

If rival forces seize revenue sources, communication systems, transportation networks, or strategic infrastructure, armed competition can build its own economic base and gradually solidify territorial fragmentation. Protecting core state systems is thus inseparable from preserving the state itself.

IX.C. From Regime Change to Political Settlement

The core choice facing Ethiopia is not merely regime change versus maintaining the status quo. The more consequential distinction is between political change governed by negotiated rules and state rupture dictated by competing coercive power.

“Oust first, talk later” is inadequate because the questions deferred are precisely those most likely to determine whether transition leads to democratic reconstruction or renewed conflict. Security arrangements, interim authority, constitutional procedures, territorial disputes, and the preservation of essential state institutions cannot safely be improvised after the governing order has collapsed.

The minimum institutional settlement proposed here does not require political actors to abandon their distinct visions. Ethnic federalists, civic federalists, advocates of greater regional autonomy, pan-Ethiopian actors, and proponents of different interpretations of self-determination need not settle every constitutional disagreement before a transitional process begins. What is essential is that no actor should resolve those disagreements unilaterally by military advantage or state capture.

This is the institutional essence of dialogue. Political actors need not agree immediately on Ethiopia’s ultimate destination, but they must agree on the rules by which that destination will be debated, negotiated, and legitimately determined. A pre-transition pact is not a substitute for democracy; it is a safeguard to preserve the political space in which democracy can take root.

The priority is neither premature constitutional finality nor an alliance united only by opposition to the incumbent. What matters is reaching sufficient agreement before a political rupture to ensure that rivals remain competitors rather than existential enemies. Only with such prior restraint can regime change become a pathway to democratic reconstruction, rather than the start of another cycle of fragmentation and war.

The real choice is stark: not regime change versus no regime change, but regime change anchored in a binding transitional pact—or regime collapse followed by violent militarization. “Oust first, talk later” is not a strategy; it is an invitation to national catastrophe. Ethiopia’s opposition forces, armed actors, and diaspora power centers must break the cycle. The priority is clear: negotiate the minimum institutional settlement now—before the state’s center collapses and negotiation gives way to open war.

The roof should be built before the storm, not after the walls begin to fall.

X. Conclusion

The contemporary predicament of the Amhara reveals a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Ethiopia’s political order. Historically, many Amhara embraced Ethiopian identity as their primary framework of belonging. However, the post-1995 constitutional system progressively tied representation, administration, territorial authority, and political bargaining to ethnically organized institutions. The resulting tension is not simply between Ethiopianism and Amhara identity, but between a universal national aspiration and a political structure in which security and influence are increasingly mediated by ethnic affiliation. 

Amhara political consciousness therefore emerged under conditions distinct from those that shaped Ethiopia’s more established ethnonational movements. Its relatively late and reactive consolidation left unresolved tensions among Ethiopian identity, Amhara solidarity, and historic subregional affiliations with Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, and Shewa. These complexities have hindered the development of a durable institutional center capable of linking local trust to collective action. Recent efforts at coordination may begin to address this organizational deficit. However, unity will be politically meaningful only if it produces accountable leadership, coherent strategy, internal pluralism, and credible civilian representation. 

This essay has interpreted Amhara self-organization principally as a contingent response to insecurity and institutional failure. Such organization does not intrinsically reject Ethiopia, nor should it be conflated with exclusionary nationalism. A community deprived of confidence in public protection may understandably seek collective capacity for self-defense, representation, and bargaining power. However, necessity alone does not confer unlimited legitimacy. Defensive mobilization is morally defensible only insofar as it protects civilians, rejects collective punishment, respects minorities, permits internal dissent, exercises restraint, and remains accountable to democratic purposes. 

These principles are universal. Amhara security cannot be built on others’ insecurity, just as Ethiopian unity cannot be sustained by asking vulnerable Amhara civilians to trust institutions that have failed them. Rights claimed by one community must be reciprocally extended to all. Any movement that begins as self-protection but devolves into domination, retaliation, or permanent ethnic absolutism undermines both its moral foundation and the possibility of genuine national reconstruction. 

Enduring communal mobilization cannot provide a sustainable political settlement. Ethiopia needs a constitutional and institutional order in which citizenship protects individuals across all regions, minorities are secure regardless of location, courts are independent, security institutions are impartial, and territorial disputes are resolved through lawful procedures rather than force. Political competition becomes genuinely democratic only when losing office or influence does not expose communities to displacement, dispossession, or danger. Reconstructing Ethiopia requires that political defeat be survivable and coexistence credible. 

The paradox of Ethiopianism is that national reconstruction may now require vulnerable communities to attain sufficient security and political agency to participate with confidence in a shared democratic order. Defensive organization can provide temporary protection and leverage, but it should serve as a bridge to democratic citizenship, not a permanent substitute for it. The goal is neither to erase communal identities nor to transform them into fortified enclaves, but to build a political order in which communal security and national belonging reinforce one another. 

Ethiopia’s future will not be secured by appeals to abstract unity, inherited patriotism, or the unilateral ascendancy of any one community. Nor will tactical alliances or superficial unity yield a durable national renewal. Instead, the country’s stability depends on the disciplined work of building institutions that enable every community to survive, participate, and belong as equals—anchored by genuine dialogue, mutual recognition, and a collectively agreed-upon vision for Ethiopia’s political end-state. Institutions provide the scaffolding for democratic governance, but justice also requires ethical renewal and a transformation in how elites and citizens perceive one another. Ethiopianism will regain its democratic meaning only when it becomes a lived political covenant—one in which no community must choose between survival and citizenship.

Democratic reconstruction therefore requires not only agreement on Ethiopia’s long-term political principles, but also prior agreement on the rules governing political transition itself. A minimum pre-transition institutional pact—covering security arrangements, interim authority, constitutional procedures, dispute resolution, and the protection of core state institutions—can help ensure that regime change does not become a contest for unilateral state capture. Such an agreement would not determine Ethiopia’s final constitutional order; rather, it would preserve the political space in which that order can be negotiated democratically.

In conclusion, it is essential to recognize Fano’s dedication to fostering a more inclusive future by advocating for the Amhara cause, protecting its people, and strengthening Ethiopian unity. Fano exhibits bravery by collaborating with other Ethiopian factions encountering analogous threats. Their fortitude is widely acknowledged, alongside the persistent challenges they must surmount in the ongoing pursuit of justice.

Ethiopia is not yet broken; the current fracture is only beginning to open, shedding its outer shell to reveal the areas where we must tend, rebuild, and unite.  

Author’s Note

Ethiopian identity is a multifaceted and contested construct, shaped by a range of experiences encompassing belonging, memory, justice, pride, pain, and aspiration. This essay explores Ethiopianism through the lens of recent Amhara self-organization, notably the Fano-AFNM, which reflects both the subject matter and the historical tendency among many Amhara to root their political identity in Ethiopianism. The emergence of organized Fano structures and broader Amhara self-organization has posed a challenge to established Amhara political elites, who view such community-based organization as diverging from traditional pan-Ethiopian ideals.

This essay does not assert that Ethiopianism is exclusive to the Amhara; rather, it is a shared, dynamic political identity continually shaped by Ethiopia’s diverse populations through periods of conflict and coexistence. Its meaning has remained fluid, as communities and political traditions have variously embraced, reinterpreted, or rejected Ethiopianism in response to evolving experiences of power, exclusion, security, war, and belonging. These variations reinforce the central argument: Ethiopianism must not be monopolized by any single group. Its future hinges on evolving into a voluntary, inclusive democratic covenant in which all Ethiopians participate as equal citizens. The renewal of Ethiopianism necessitates the cessation of authoritarianism and the establishment of a democratic order grounded in popular sovereignty, equal citizenship, and accountable governance.

While any single group cannot achieve this renewal, I acknowledge the political elites and organizations committed to the Ethiopian cause, and I fully recognize the historical and political factors that have given rise to multiple platforms. My assessment of all existing organizations in the diaspora indicates that they primarily focus on activism to promote awareness. The political landscape in Ethiopia necessitates an organized political framework for dialogue to resolve differences, identify common ground, mobilize the public, and effect democratic change. This also requires political actors to reach a minimum agreement on the rules governing any future transition before a rupture occurs, so that regime change does not become a competition for state capture. Ethiopia’s future cannot be secured solely through fragmented groups and narratives; it requires a unifying political vision and organization rooted in the lived realities, aspirations, and dignity of its people.

The nation must be understood not only through the claims of political elites and factions but also through the intrahistoria of ordinary citizens, whose hopes and anxieties endure beyond moments of peace and crisis. Ethiopia’s middle class—though limited in size—bears a disproportionate moral and political responsibility as a stabilizing force for democracy, accountability, and institutional restraint.

History must illuminate the future rather than constrain it. Its wounds should be acknowledged, its lessons critically examined, and its mistakes contextualized; however, it cannot solely dictate the political trajectory ahead. The enduring questions regarding secession, self-determination, ethnic federalism, and civic federalism necessitate dialogue, prudence, and a commitment to engage competing perspectives with seriousness and empathy.

Ultimately, all Ethiopians share fundamental aspirations—democracy, economic well-being, security, education, health, employment, and the opportunity to thrive—and political elites must transcend division, bridge historical and political divides, and align their leadership with the common will of the people, ensuring that Ethiopia remains a true home for all its citizens.

In political philosophy, emphasizing the potential for a negative future is distinct from fatalism or prophetic warning. In Weberian terms, this appeal pertains to the ethics of responsibility: by anticipating the consequences of inaction, one seeks to compel human agency and accountable political judgment. The underlying principle is that identifying a threat constitutes the first and most essential step toward its prevention. It is from this analytical perspective that we must approach our immediate choices.

*As George Orwell’s admonition reminds us, the future is not predetermined; our present actions shape it. If Ethiopia is to bequeath its achievements, dignity, and even its unresolved challenges to future generations in peace and harmony, its citizens and political leaders must fulfill their responsibilities now. Otherwise, we risk allowing division, fear, and fragmentation to define national life. The moral imperative is clear and urgent: such a future must not be allowed to materialize. Preventing it depends on the choices we make today (Orwell, 1949).

(Adapted from Orwell, 1949*).

Endnote

1The author adopted this institutional framework after engaging with Professor Messay Kebede’s 2018 essay, On Transitional Government and Ethnic Federalism. This proposal informed the author’s theoretical study essay, “Trans-Ethnic Federalism: Exploring Hybrid and Presidential Systems for National Unity,” completed over a year ago. In line with Professor Kebede’s caution that such proposals “should not be considered an endorsement of some of the ideals circulating among the ruling clique,” the author postponed publication to prevent misunderstanding, political misappropriation, or regime-clan distortion, especially given the study’s examination of hybrid and presidential formations. Such ideas are judged not only by their normative merits but also by the political context in which they emerge.

PDF of Part I and Part II

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

__

Join our Telegram Channel: t.me/borkena

Like borkena on Facebook

To submit a press release, send the submission to info@borkena.com

Add your business to Ethiopian Business Listing / Ethiopian Business Directory  

Join the conversation. Follow us on X (formerly Twitter)  @zborkena to get the latest Ethiopian news updates regularly.

References 

Kebede, M. (2026, June 22). Reimagining Ethiopia. ZeHabesha.

https://zehabesha.com/reimagining-ethiopia

Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. Yale University Press.

Orwell, G. (1949). Nineteen eighty-four. Secker & Warburg.

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press.

Zena, S. (2025, September 1). A Strategic Reflection on ‘The Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia ‘. Borkena.com

https://borkena.com/a-strategic-reflection-on-the-idea-of-a-caretaker-government-in-ethiopia-part-two/ (The entire downloadable PDF edition can be found at the end of part two on Borkena.com.)