Part One: Reading the Statement
[Note: For the convenience of readers, the article appears in two parts.]
By Worku Aberra
I. From Seattle to the October Statement
On 17 October 2026, eight Oromo intellectuals issued a statement under the name of the Council of Oromo Scholars. It appeared during the renewed war in Tigray, under way since September; federal forces had taken the regional capital, Mekelle, two weeks earlier (Reuters 2026a). The authors urged cooperation among political forces opposed to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and called for an inclusive transition. That cooperation already had a vehicle: seven organizations had formed the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival (the Alliance) on 20 September 2026 to overthrow the government.
The statement describes the participation of the Oromo Liberation Front-Oromo Liberation Army (OLF-OLA) in the Alliance as “a significant first step” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026). An earlier appeal for cooperation, issued in Seattle on 31 July 2025 in the name of “Oromo Intellectuals and Representatives of Political Parties,” provides a basis for comparison (Seattle Resolution 2025). Although the signatories overlap only partly, the two documents indicate a move toward cooperation and a common political future for Ethiopians. Either some Oromo intellectuals have revised their views, or those who already held such views are now prepared to state them in public.
I consider the October statement a positive development in Oromo intellectual discourse on national unity. Its concern for state survival and call for cooperation across ethnic groups point toward a shared future, although the commitment to a common Ethiopian state is implicit. The language on self-determination leaves the constitutional option open, from a reformed federation to secession.
My earlier commentary on the Seattle resolution has warned that “in the absence of an explicit repudiation of state dissolution, pro-unity constituencies have little reason to extend their trust.” It asked whether the resolution reflected “a genuine reconsideration of secessionist aims or merely a tactical pause driven by shared opposition to the regime” (Aberra 2025). The October statement lends support to the first reading. The October statement lends support to the first reading: evidence of reconsideration, but not yet a repudiation of state dissolution.
The future of the Ethiopian state is the central question of this commentary. Part One asks whether the proposed cooperation among ethnic groups implies a commitment to a common political order. The authors cite grave allegations against the government as grounds for that cooperation; I examine only how they frame those allegations: whose experience the account places at its centre, and whose it leaves unnamed. My interpretation of the statement is distinct from my own position on self-determination, a position I present and defend in Part Two.
II. The Context: A Divided Field
The appeal for cooperation covers the members of the Alliance and could extend to groups outside it, but it may meet resistance among Oromo nationalists mainly over one partner of the Alliance: the Amhara Fano National Movement. The authors appear to anticipate that resistance in their direct appeal to Oromo intellectuals, civic actors, and political stakeholders. Many nationalists hold Fano responsible for the killings of Oromo civilians in Wollega, attribute irredentist ambitions to it, and accuse it of seeking a unitary state: a return, in their view, to the order the Oromo national movement arose to overturn (Aberra 2026a). For these readers, an alliance with Fano could look like betrayal.
Disagreement over the Alliance, though, may reflect more than objections to Fano: wider divisions within Oromo politics. These differences appear to concern political strategy to achieve the objectives of the movement, particularly the political future of Oromia and national unity in Ethiopia. Two prominent critics illustrate the divergent interpretations of the Alliance.
Tsegaye Ararssa opposes the Alliance as a threat to Oromo national liberation: participation, he argues, compromises the struggle for an independent Oromia (OMN 2026). A defender of the Seattle resolution (Kebede 2025), he now maintains that, for the Oromo, the Prosperity Party and Fano are one and the same: one exercises power; the other seeks to replace it (Ararssa 2026). He describes Fano as a “terrorist” organization and the OLA’s leaders as “traitors and murderers” (OMN 2026). His criticism extends from the choice of partner to the leaders responsible for that choice.
Jawar Mohammed also rejects the Alliance, but for different reasons. He describes it as the most unpopular initiative he has seen among the Oromo and argues that its members share neither a political objective nor even a tactical one (Rosser 2026). In a separate interview, he has warned that the Alliance could lead to the fragmentation of Ethiopia (Awramba Times 2026). Tsegaye interprets the Alliance as a threat to Oromo independence; Jawar sees it as a danger to Ethiopian unity. The same alliance, different interpretations.
The Seattle resolution supported three organizations: the armed OLF-OLA, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). They have since pursued different political courses: the OLF-OLA has joined the Alliance, while the OFC and the OLF appear to favour engagement with the government. WardheerNews reports talks between Oromo political figures and the government and names the chairmen of the two organizations, Merera Gudina and Dawud Ibsa, among those reportedly designated to engage the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (WardheerNews 2026). If confirmed, their involvement would suggest cooperation with the government, though it would not by itself establish a commitment to national unity or opposition to the Alliance. The October signatories, for their part, endorse the Alliance, as noted earlier.
For the reasons discussed above, I regard the October statement as a departure from calls for outright independence for Oromia, and its signatories as moderates, although they leave their constitutional preferences unstated.
The statement may also reflect a longer shift toward national unity among some Oromo nationalists. At the London conference in October 2016, Liban Wako Filate advocated the disintegration of Ethiopia, a position that appears to have attracted support among those present. In his subsequent defence of the speech, he reported an ovation from the audience; another account of the conference describes “cheers and applauses” (Wako Filate 2016; Bulbulaa 2016). A decade later, the October statement identifies the disintegration of the state as a danger. Several factors may help explain a shift toward cooperation and unity:
- persistent fragmentation among Oromo political organizations and partisan, regional, and religious differences that could expose an independent Oromia to division;
- continuing territorial disputes between Oromia and the neighbouring regions;
- doubts about whether independence would secure liberty, justice, and democracy, reinforced by repression under Oromo-led governments and authoritarian rule in independent Eritrea;
- the record of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray, where Getachew Reda, former president of the interim administration, has repeatedly alleged corruption and mismanagement (Fana Broadcasting Corporate 2025), and opposition figures have criticized authoritarian rule (Reyot Media 2024);
- the high costs of prolonged armed struggle without a decisive military victory;
- the advantages of cooperation with other Ethiopians for a movement unable to remove the government alone: a broader base of political support, greater resources, and stronger organizational capacity in a common struggle against authoritarian rule.
These explanations are plausible but untested. The historical contrast suggests a change in the positions expressed within Oromo nationalist discourse; it does not establish a change in the views of particular individuals. The extent and causes of that shift require evidence beyond these public statements.
III. The Advance on Seattle
The October statement develops the Seattle resolution in four respects: stronger commitments to peaceful coexistence, clearer recognition of mutual dependence, more concrete support for cooperation across communities, and explicit concern for state survival.
Commitments to peaceful coexistence are stronger in the October statement. The Seattle resolution warns that the regime sows conflict “between the Oromo and the neighboring brotherly communities” and urges all communities “to remain vigilant to protect their unity and brotherhood” (Seattle Resolution 2025). The October statement turns that warning into norms for the new order: “the peoples of Ethiopia must not be made enemies of one another,” and “the struggle for justice and freedom must not become a struggle between communities.” The authors seek “a political order in which no community is subjected to domination or collective punishment” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 1–2).
Mutual dependence—the connection between Oromo interests and those of other Ethiopians—receives clearer recognition. The Seattle resolution addresses other communities chiefly as partners against the regime. In the October statement, Oromo aspirations “need not be pursued in isolation from the legitimate aspirations of other peoples.” The authors add that “a political arrangement that protects the rights, dignity, and agency of all communities offers a more sustainable basis for addressing the country’s interconnected crises.” Their closing premise is explicit: “the security, freedom, and dignity of our peoples are interconnected” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 2–3).
Recognition of mutual dependence still leaves the form of the state undecided. The term “legitimate aspirations” is undefined and could encompass secession. Interdependence also exists between sovereign states as well as within them; so, its recognition provides no assurance of commitment to a common Ethiopian state.
Cooperation across communities also takes more concrete form. The Seattle resolution pledges support to three Oromo organizations and calls for dialogue among Oromo groups to “expand further to engaging other communities” (Seattle Resolution 2025). The October statement goes beyond dialogue through its endorsement of the Alliance, whose founding statement lists Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan, Somali, Afar, Benishangul, and Gumuz organizations (Alliance for Survival 2026).
The proposed transition broadens participation further to armed and unarmed opposition groups, civil society, and representatives of “Ethiopia’s diverse nations and nationalities.” Within their own constituency, the authors urge Oromo intellectuals to approach the new alignment “with seriousness, political maturity” and caution against “reflexive rejection driven by partisan interests, historical antagonisms, or political mistrust” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 2–3).
The treatment of historical grievances clarifies the basis for that cooperation. Such grievances “must be acknowledged and addressed through credible political mechanisms,” yet “should not become insurmountable obstacles to cooperation” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 2). The authors reject the use of historical grievances as a veto on partnership, but the practical force of that principle depends on whether political actors uphold it.
The most consequential development concerns the survival of the state. The Seattle resolution says nothing about the future of the Ethiopian state, whereas the October statement calls for a broad-based transition “to avert further bloodshed and the potential disintegration of the state” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 1). The warning implies opposition to the break-up of the state and marks the clearest movement toward unity. Read alongside the language on self-determination, it leaves open whether that opposition extends to separation by consent. The authors imply a commitment to continued union without explicitly affirming it.
The four advances strengthen the case for cooperation and a shared political future, but leave the form of that future unresolved. The statement contains no explicit affirmation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and the proposed transition leaves the authority and permanence of common institutions unspecified. The next section examines these omissions and other passages that admit more than one reading.
IV. Unresolved Questions
Self-determination
The central unresolved question concerns the future political order of Ethiopia. The transition, the statement says, “must also create a process by which the peoples of Ethiopia can freely determine their political future, without coercion or the imposition of predetermined outcomes.” Alongside lasting peace, justice, and democratic governance, the statement names “the right to self-determination” among its aims (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 2).
The wording draws on the language of the current Constitution and echoes the provision in the Alliance’s founding statement that decisive national questions be “resolved with the direct participation of the peoples” (Alliance for Survival 2026). The authors commit themselves to a process of free consent while leaving the constitutional outcome open, from continued union to separation.
The authors may have strategic reasons to leave their commitment to Ethiopian unity implicit. Some nationalist readers might regard any retreat from the language of self-determination as capitulation; an explicit pledge to preserve territorial integrity could alienate those who retain secessionist aspirations. Differences among the signatories may also contribute to the ambiguity. Both explanations are plausible inferences rather than established motives. The authors could clarify whether they advocate self-government within Ethiopia, favour secession, or reserve judgement, and distinguish their preferred outcome from the alternatives they believe the process should permit. Part Two presents my position on that choice.
Equal citizenship
Equal citizenship requires clearer treatment alongside collective rights. The statement speaks throughout of “peoples” and “nations and nationalities,” terms drawn from the constitutional vocabulary of Ethiopia. That vocabulary gives primacy to groups as the bearers of sovereignty: the Constitution vests sovereignty in the “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” rather than in citizens as individuals (Ethiopia 1995, art. 8). The Seattle resolution, by contrast, addresses “all peoples and citizens of the country” (Seattle Resolution 2025). The October statement leaves the relationship between collective rights and equal citizenship unspecified.
A statement intended to promote cooperation cannot be expected to settle questions of constitutional design, but the protection of equal citizenship bears directly on its purpose. The Constitution guarantees equality before the law (Ethiopia 1995, art. 25); how that guarantee operates under sovereignty vested in groups is essential to any proposed order. Citizens who live outside the region associated with their community need assurance that their rights will be protected. An explicit affirmation of equal citizenship alongside collective rights would help provide that assurance.
Oromo centrality and the framing of grievance
The statement presents a national crisis through the experience of the Oromo. Although “the crisis affects all peoples of Ethiopia,” the authors maintain that “its origins and consequences in Oromia require particular attention” and that “Oromo political aspirations and the rights of the Oromo people must remain central to any political process” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 2).
That emphasis reflects the authors’ primary constituency: they write chiefly for an Oromo audience, though they also address other communities. First, the assertion that the crisis “now engulfing the entire country” “began in Oromia eight years ago” requires a clearer causal account: the statement leaves unexplained how the conflict in Oromia developed into the wider national crisis (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 1).
Second, the emphasis on Oromo aspirations may weaken the appeal for cooperation, since prospective partners judge a coalition partly by whether it accords equal consideration to their claims. The qualification that Oromo aspirations “need not be pursued in isolation” tempers the emphasis without resolving the ambiguity of “central”: those aspirations may stand among the core concerns of the process or take precedence over the claims of other communities. The authors could clarify the intended meaning.
The account of government abuses gives limited recognition to the experiences of other communities. The statement describes the Oromo as having endured “horrors never before seen in Oromo history” and says collective punishment was “later extended to other peoples of the country, one after another,” but names no other community or its grievances (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 1). Readers from those communities may struggle to recognize their own ordeal in that account. Explicit acknowledgement of their experiences would strengthen the appeal to a common future.
The treatment of “historical grievances,” discussed above, also leaves the proposed remedies unspecified. The grievances of the Oromo are well founded: the suppression of their language and culture, the loss of their land, and their incorporation by conquest in the late nineteenth century belong to the historical record. Acknowledging those experiences is a condition of lasting cooperation. The authors call for redress “through credible political mechanisms” but leave those mechanisms unnamed. Other communities have grievances of their own; a common state could address historical and current injustices through shared procedures to assess evidence, acknowledge harm, and resolve present claims. The authors could specify the arrangements they favour.
Alliance accountability and the transition
The authors’ declared standards should apply to the partners they endorse as well as to the government. Their opposition to domination, intercommunal conflict, and collective punishment carries conviction when it binds allies; standards reserved for adversaries look tactical. The authors could strengthen their appeal through an explicit commitment to the same standards for every party and a willingness to scrutinize the conduct of allies as well as adversaries.
The statement recognizes that cooperation must outlast the removal of the government. It warns that “without a credible transitional arrangement” the country risks reproducing the patterns it seeks to escape and encourages the Alliance to develop “credible mechanisms for resolving disagreements” (Council of Oromo Scholars 2026, 2–3). The statement identifies the need but leaves the means unspecified. Enforcing agreed rules among armed organizations lies beyond the authors’ reach, but they can clarify the arrangements they expect. Three questions would give their proposal substance:
- Who would authorize and supervise the transition?
- How would armed partners come under common civilian authority?
- What procedures would govern disputes and secure acceptance of decisions by the parties that lose?
These questions concern the credibility of the transition, particularly the willingness of armed partners to accept common rules and civilian authority. A common adversary creates an incentive to cooperate; a durable settlement must sustain that incentive after the adversary is gone. Monitoring, enforcement, and external guarantees can raise the cost of defection from a settlement (Walter 1997, 2002). The authors could encourage accountability among their partners through public scrutiny of their commitments and conduct.
The statement is also silent on reported Eritrean military involvement in the renewed war in Tigray. By the time the statement appeared, Ethiopia and Eritrea had severed diplomatic relations, and witnesses had reported the movement of Eritrean troops through Tigray. Asmara denies any presence, and independent confirmation is limited (AFP 2026; Reuters 2026b; Critical Threats Project 2026).
Foreign involvement bears directly on the outcome of the war and on the transition that would follow. A government that intervenes in a war abroad pursues its own interests, and those interests need not coincide with those of Ethiopians. Among other possible motives, Asmara may seek to weaken Ethiopia’s capacity to press its claim to sea access. Military support can tip the balance of the war and so decide who negotiates the transition, and on what terms. In the transition itself, such intervention could constrain the parties in two ways: an agreement among Ethiopian parties cannot by itself bind a foreign army, and a patron’s support could make secession more attractive to an armed client than a settlement within Ethiopia.
Silence on foreign intervention leaves a potential source of influence over the outcome and the transition unexamined. The authors could clarify whether their endorsement extends to Alliance members that accept foreign support and specify the conditions under which they would regard that support as compatible with an outcome decided by Ethiopians and a democratic transition.
V. Conclusion
The October statement marks a clear advance on the Seattle resolution: it strengthens commitments to peaceful coexistence, recognizes mutual dependence more clearly, gives more concrete support to cooperation across communities, and expresses explicit concern for state survival. Within a divided Oromo political field, these positions reinforce a current of support for a shared political future, though its influence beyond the signatories is uncertain.
The statement identifies aims for the political order after the transition, among them non-domination and democratic governance, but leaves its institutions unspecified; its language on self-determination keeps the constitutional outcome open. On that open question, I favour self-government within a united and democratic Ethiopia for its social, economic, and political advantages. Part Two defends that view and argues that any decision on secession should await conditions that make consent free and informed.
The authors could strengthen their contribution through a clearer position on union and consistent political standards. They could explain whether their conception of self-determination envisages a continued Ethiopian union and clarify what Oromo centrality means for other communities. An affirmation of equal citizenship alongside collective rights, coupled with recognition of the experiences of other communities, would strengthen the appeal for cooperation.
The historical grievances of the Oromo are well founded; arrangements that address them alongside those of other communities would advance the same purpose. The authors’ endorsement of the Alliance would carry greater weight if they identified the essential features of a credible transition, encouraged accountability among their partners, and addressed the implications of foreign intervention.
Other Ethiopians, whatever their views on the Alliance, should welcome this movement among some Oromo intellectuals toward cooperation for a common political future. Intellectuals from other communities can support that aim and examine the proposals critically. The statement’s broader message deserves greater weight than its endorsement of a particular alliance: cooperation can build trust, clarify differences, and strengthen the common struggle for a united and democratic Ethiopia.
References
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Worku Aberra is a scholar in residence in the Department of Economics at Dawson College, Montreal.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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