Ethiopia’s Crucial Juncture: Elite Coalition and the Path to Democratic Transition (Part 3)

From Moral Vision to Institutional Design

Translating principles into practice through frameworks, roadmaps, and ethical safeguards for a democratic future.

Sirak Zena

From Ethical Restraint to Institutional Design

Part Three commences at the intersection of theoretical principles and ethical responsibility. It explores the mechanisms through which moral convictions can be operationalized into institutional frameworks that promote accountability, safeguard neutrality, and facilitate Ethiopia’s transition to democracy. In this concluding analysis, the coalition is assessed not merely on its rhetoric but on its structural integrity, its ability to withstand betrayal, its ability to address the seductions of power, and its ability to formulate a strategic roadmap that empowers the people to reclaim agency over their future.

From Principle to Design: Building the Path to Transition: With the ideological landscape clarified, the task now shifts from understanding to building: designing institutions, sequencing steps, and safeguarding against betrayal during transition.

11. Between Triumph and Paralysis

A recurrent challenge for opposition movements is the allure of believing that authoritarian regimes, weakened by crises, can be swiftly dismantled. In contemporary Ethiopia, economic collapse, military overstretch, and widespread popular discontent may lead some to presume that the regime’s removal will be straightforward. 

However, such optimism poses the risk of significant miscalculation.  Authoritarian systems frequently demonstrate greater resilience than they initially appear, adapting through means such as repression, manipulation, or external support; furthermore, the politicization and co-optation of the military warrant particular attention. Overconfidence can lead to premature actions that provoke severe crackdowns, squander public momentum, and erode the coalition’s credibility when anticipated outcomes fail to materialize.

Conversely, perceiving the regime as invulnerable can instigate paralysis and demoralization, discouraging action even when genuine vulnerabilities exist. Both extremes diminish the coalition’s effectiveness. The former reduces the transition process to a simplistic matter of leadership change, overlooking the entrenched institutions and practices of authoritarianism; the latter permits authoritarian inertia to persist unchallenged.

The coalition must adopt a balanced approach, eschewing both triumphalism and defeatism. This necessitates a rigorous analysis of the regime’s strengths and weaknesses across political, military, economic, and international dimensions, alongside a realistic appraisal of public sentiment. Most crucially, it demands comprehensive contingency planning. A framework must be established to address both rapid regime collapse and prolonged struggle, ensuring adaptability in response to evolving circumstances.

To inspire public trust, the coalition’s communications should strike a meticulous balance between hope and realism, projecting confidence in eventual change while avoiding the misconception of effortless victories. Autocrats can sustain power without popular support by adeptly managing elites, military and security forces, and silencing dissent. By navigating the dual pitfalls of underestimating and overestimating authoritarian resilience, the coalition can credibly guide Ethiopia toward a sustainable transition.

Recognizing the razor’s edge between triumph and paralysis makes it clear that the coalition’s success will not be determined by principles alone but by its ability to navigate practical obstacles. Several critical political, institutional, and organizational challenges will determine whether the coalition can maintain credibility and steer Ethiopia toward a caretaker transition rather than into renewed conflict.

12. Critical Challenges for the Coalition’s Transition Effort

In the context of Ethiopia’s democratic transition, the coalition of elites must confront three critical challenges that could undermine even the most meticulously planned roadmap: the politicization and co-optation of the military; possible rivalry among the coalition of elites, political parties, and armed groups; and the entrenched power of regional elites. These issues represent significant threats that necessitate strategic navigation to avert setbacks and ensure a successful transition toward inclusive governance.

1. Politicization and Co-optation of the Military

The politicization of the Ethiopian military constitutes a substantial barrier to democratic transition. This issue stems from its historical involvement in political upheavals, such as the post-1991 restructuring orchestrated by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF disbanded and rebuilt military forces with select personnel, thereby compromising their integrity and impartiality.

Presently, the upper echelons of the military are significantly corrupt, with senior officers maintaining financial ties to the regime, eroding professionalism, and heightening the risk of internal divisions that could derail reform efforts. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the coalition should reassure the military of its preservation during the transition, deferring significant changes to a future elected government, thereby stabilizing the institution and minimizing obstruction.

A strategic approach should include differentiating ranks and targeting outreach to mid- and lower-level officers and soldiers who may support reform, while providing guarantees on salaries, pensions, and structural continuity. This approach should also address corruption through investigations and accountability measures and establish robust civilian oversight to ensure neutrality.

Ethnic-based recruitment in the military exacerbates this situation by fostering loyalty among the ruling elite’s co-ethnics. This engenders divisions and marginalization, heightening the risks of defections, mutinies, coups, or fragmentation during regime shifts, ultimately undermining social cohesion and the democratization process. 

The existence of ethnically organized forces, as well as intelligence agencies and federal police, long-standing instruments for suppressing dissent and surveilling opposition, presents additional threats, as their leadership may undermine coalition efforts; thus, the coalition must expose abuses and counter interventions until a democratic government implements genuine Security Sector Reform (SSR).

By engaging with the rank and file, offering institutional safeguards, and phasing in reforms under civilian oversight, the coalition can mitigate military risks, protect the transition, and pave the way for establishing a professional, depoliticized defense force.

2. Entrenched Regional Elites

Entrenched regional elites present another significant obstacle within Ethiopia’s de facto unitary system, which is often misrepresented as federalism. Centralized power has enabled these leaders to consolidate authority, resist reforms out of fear of accountability for abuses or loss of privileges, and perpetuate the status quo to safeguard their interests. Their opposition is existential, viewing authoritarianism as essential to their survival. Neglecting to address these dynamic risks undermines national reforms at local levels, particularly as these elites exploit ethnic divisions within the federal structure to suppress dissent and reinforce their control.

The coalition must engage some of these elites with assurances against immediate displacement while firmly signaling long-term accountability; involve local communities and grassroots organizations to build alternative structures through civic engagement and decentralized decision-making; and commit to reforms under an elected government that enhance transparency, curb resource exploitation, and promote equitable allocation, with the caretaker administration enforcing these measures during the transition.

There are, however, exceptions where assurances against immediate displacement cannot apply, most notably in Oromia, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Somali regions, where entrenched elites have not only upheld authoritarian practices but also inflicted violence upon their own people. In such cases, accountability may precede accommodation.

Countering ethnic manipulation requires promoting national unity and inclusivity, fostering trust across communities to ensure that reforms benefit all Ethiopians. Balancing engagement with reform is crucial to preventing national destabilization, dismantling entrenched structures, and promoting a decentralized, accountable democracy.

3. Preventing Rivalry Among Elites, Political Parties, and Armed Groups

The scenario following the regime’s collapse in Ethiopia may provide a considerable risk of rivalry for supremacy among expatriate coalitions, domestic political parties, and armed factions. Despite the regime’s efforts to undermine all three entities, each continues to wield considerable influence: domestic parties maintain connections to the citizenry and articulate grievances related to the war and economic collapse; armed groups in Amhara and Oromia have made substantial sacrifices in defense of their communities; and diaspora elites benefit from organizational autonomy, international networks, and resources. If these factions turn against one another, the precarious transitional period could devolve into chaos.

To mitigate rivalry, the respective roles of these actors must be mutually acknowledged and respected. Regardless of their strengths or weaknesses, domestic parties should be recognized for their closeness to the people and their capacity to translate public concerns into practical political demands. Armed groups warrant acknowledgment for their sacrifices and their role in resisting repression while also committing to disarmament within a legitimate framework. Diaspora elites must recognize that their contributions are most valuable when they complement local actors through advocacy, resource provision, and international engagement rather than substituting for them.

A productive way to operationalize this recognition is through a joint declaration of principles. This document would articulate three shared commitments: (1) nonviolence as the fundamental principle guiding the transition, (2) endorsement of a neutral caretaker framework that delineates power from process, and (3) consensus that legitimacy can only be derived from democratic procedures rather than force or elite agreements.

In this context, the caretaker government model, comprising Tier One (focused on elections) and Tier Two(Conflict Stabilization Council), serves as a vital safeguard. As a coalition of elites, political parties, or armed groups does not constitute either tier, this structure mitigates the risk of any single actor monopolizing the transition. Instead, it facilitates an environment in which parties, armed groups, and diaspora coalitions can reorganize while concurrently ensuring that the process itself remains insulated from domination.

Neither tier is composed of aspirants to office, which removes the incentive for zero-sum competition in the immediate aftermath of regime change. This arrangement provides breathing space: the caretaker ensures elections and civic reopening, while domestic parties, armed groups, and diaspora elite coalitions prepare to contest democratically during the transition.

By integrating recognition, restraint, and procedural guarantees, Ethiopia’s diverse political actors can transform potential rivalry into complementary roles. Such collaboration would reassure the public that the transition will not replicate historical patterns of exclusion and betrayal but rather lay the groundwork for a genuinely democratic future.

Identifying these challenges is only the beginning. To move from critique to construction, the coalition must translate principles into a practical roadmap. Without such a framework, mistrust and fragmentation will overwhelm the transition. 

Nevertheless,  the most formidable challenge to any coalition does not come from the outside, from repression or scarcity, but from within. History teaches that the decay of great movements often begins not in defeat but in temptation: the moment when conviction yields to convenience. As Ethiopia’s political crisis deepens and the regime grows desperate, the actual test for the coalition will not be strategic endurance but moral coherence, its ability to withstand the seductions of power and resist the age-old politics of co-optation.

13. The Temptation of Betrayal

Betrayal in political movements is a recurring phenomenon observed throughout history. This reflection is not written out of fear of defection within the coalition but as a principled reminder of the moral risks that accompany transitional politics. It draws on broader lessons from other societies that faltered not because of external defeat but because of internal decay.

Every transition tests the moral core of its leaders. As Ethiopia faces another pivotal moment, the coalition’s credibility will be measured not by eloquent declarations but by its moral fortitude amid the temptations of power. The weakening of a regime does not signal the end of tyranny; it often marks its most seductive phase.

When legitimacy wanes, authoritarian regimes resort to tactics of fragmentation, offering wealth, political appointments, or ethnic privileges to lure opponents. Such maneuvers exploit ambition and self-interest, turning reformers into custodians of the old order. When elites capitulate, they perpetuate the very system they once opposed, proving that oppression often survives through the hands of its former adversaries.

Betrayal emerges from many sources: political co-optation, ambition, disillusionment, or factional rivalry. These tendencies, long present in Ethiopian politics, may intensify as armed resistance expands and the regime seeks to neutralize opposition through selective accommodation. The promise of “inclusion” or “dialogue” can dissolve unity before transformation takes root.

This moment is thus a moral crucible for the coalition. The defection of even one prominent figure accepting power from the regime would erode trust across Ethiopia’s ethnic and political divides. The tragedy of Ethiopian politics lies less in the absence of intellect than in the poverty of integrity.

Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil” (Arendt, 1963) does not center on betrayal per se but rather on the belief that ordinary individuals can perpetrate heinous deeds not due to inherent wickedness but because of thoughtlessness, self-interest, conformity, and moral apathy. Betrayal can be understood in this context, especially regarding elites who oppose the regime’s cruelty but ultimately switch sides to comply with unjust systems, constituting a betrayal of their conscience and moral duty. In political transitions, betrayal often manifests subtly, cloaked in terms like pragmatism, temporary compromise, strategic patience, national unity, constructive engagement, pragmatic engagement, peace before justice, etc. However, each rationalization erodes the moral core of collective action.

To counter these risks, the coalition must establish clear ethical guardrails that bind principle to practice:

1. Public Ethical Boundaries: The coalition must issue a written declaration rejecting any negotiation or arrangement that compromises democratic principles or caretaker neutrality. No member should engage privately with the regime without the collective’s explicit consent. Transparency protects unity and ensures that all interactions align with democratic objectives, rather than political opportunism.

2. Accountability Frameworks: Internal mechanisms to monitor integrity must be established. Any member accepting favors, privileges, or appointments from the regime should forfeit their standing within the movement. This measure sustains credibility and disciplines ambition before it metastasizes into betrayal.

3. Reaffirming Democratic Legitimacy: Legitimacy cannot be conferred by an autocrat’s invitation or elite negotiation. It must arise from the people’s consent, expressed through free and fair elections under a neutral caretaker government.

Resisting co-optation is both a strategic necessity and a moral imperative. As Immanuel Kant argued, moral worth lies in acting from duty, rather than self-interest. Integrity is the perseverance of principle even when betrayal promises comfort.

Defections driven by personal gain are not merely predictable; they are profoundly destructive. They corrode public faith, deepen despair, and confirm the cynical belief that every ideal is ultimately for sale. The coalition must respond with a swift, public, and principled disavowal of any defector, transforming betrayal into a cautionary marker in Ethiopia’s democratic journey.

For Ethiopia’s elites, the moral challenge is not to outwit the regime but to outlast temptation. Only through steadfast integrity can the cycle of betrayal be broken, allowing a politics of trust to emerge, and with it, the foundations of a genuine democratic transformation.

The recent alignment of certain Tigrayan elites with the very regime responsible for the devastation of their own people stands as a sobering example of political and moral dissonance. In a nation where nearly a million lives were lost, and countless women were subjected to unimaginable violence, such cooperation cannot be excused as pragmatism; it is complicity in unresolved moral and political crimes. Their actions, driven by personal interest and political rivalry rather than principle, expose a deeper malaise within Ethiopia’s elite culture: the readiness to trade justice for access and integrity for convenience.

Tigray, like the rest of Ethiopia, yearns for democracy, peace, and renewal. But no region can attain these ends through alliances with an autocracy that denies them to others. This episode is not merely a political miscalculation; it represents the moral bankruptcy of seeking power through proximity to authority. Betrayal and opportunism are often camouflaged with self-interest. Betrayal, as history teaches, rarely announces itself; it comes cloaked in the language of reconciliation, peace, democracy, and pragmatism.

Moral integrity without institutional design risks dissolving into sentiment, while structure without virtue collapses into manipulation. Having tested the coalition’s moral compass, the next challenge is to translate ethical restraint into procedural architecture. Ethiopia’s transition cannot rest on the virtue of individuals alone; it must be anchored in a roadmap that guards against betrayal by design, one that separates power from process, defines roles before contestation, and ensures that the people themselves remain the ultimate arbiters of legitimacy.

The following section offers a concise synthesis of the framework for caretaker governance, drawn from the companion paper “A Strategic Reflection on ‘The Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia.’” It is included here in summary form to align with the present discussion. At the same time, readers are encouraged to consult the full version for a comprehensive exposition of the two-tier caretaker model and its operational details.

14. A Roadmap for Transition 

Having examined the moral and political trials of coalition-building, this section now turns to the practical architecture of Ethiopia’s democratic transition.  

For Ethiopia, the collapse of authoritarianism, whether because of internal contradictions, a popular uprising, or armed struggle, is no longer a matter of if, but when. The danger is that regime change without preparation could trigger violence, fragmentation, or a return to authoritarianism. A credible roadmap is therefore essential: not one that imposes outcomes in advance, but one that prepares neutral mechanisms through which Ethiopians can decide their future.

A. Pre-Transition Principles

Before the regime change, the coalition of elites must agree on a small set of minimal but core principles. These principles are not designed to resolve Ethiopia’s deep-seated disagreements over federalism, civic nationalism, or separatism, etc., but to ensure that the transition itself does not devolve into violence or a relapse into authoritarianism.

●  Commitment to Nonviolence: Disagreements are to be resolved through dialogue and democratic processes, rather than force.

●  Democratic Legitimacy: Future arrangements must be decided through inclusive and transparent procedures that enable citizens, rather than elites, to determine the outcome.

●  Rejection of Domination: No group or faction can monopolize the transition; neutral procedures must guarantee fair participation for all.

●  Protection of Rights (Coalition Commitment): From the outset, the coalition must ensure freedom of expression, open deliberation, and inclusive participation within its own ranks, while also publicly advocating for the rights to speech, assembly, and media freedom during the transition. By modeling rights internally and demanding them externally, the coalition can build trust that it is committed to fairness rather than domination.

These principles provide a shared floor, not a ceiling. They avoid forcing premature consensus on Ethiopia’s most existential disputes while still offering reassurance that no side will be excluded or overpowered. Importantly, they should create the foundation for a neutral caretaker arrangement, since no single party or armed actor can credibly govern alone.

It is from these principles that the logic of a two-tier caretaker framework follows: one body to manage electoral preparation, and another to oversee conflict stabilization. The highlights of this structure are outlined below.

B. Transitional Phase: Caretaker Government

Given Ethiopia’s deep mistrust and competing visions, no single party or group can credibly govern after regime change. A neutral caretaker government is, therefore, indispensable. The most practical model is the two-tier structure proposed in earlier reflections on Ethiopia’s transition (A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia, Sirak Zena, 2025). This model ensures that election preparation and security stabilization are kept separate, preventing the concentration of power and guarding against the resurgence of authoritarianism.

Tier One: Caretaker Government (Core Body)

●  Composition: Technocrats, civil society leaders, religious figures, respected professionals, and academics vetted by an Independent Selection and Vetting Commission (ISVC) to ensure neutrality.

●  Mandate: Restore civic space, reopen independent media, and organize credible elections within 6–12 months.

●  Restrictions: Members are barred from running for office and from making partisan political appointments.

●   Limitations: Tier One does not exercise direct command over security forces, focusing instead on building legitimacy and opening political space.

Tier Two: Conflict Stabilization and Transition Council (Complementary Body)

●   Composition: Representatives of opposition groups, regional elites, possibly armed actors, and selected international observers, to reflect Ethiopia’s political and regional realities.

●   Mandate: Oversee ceasefires, free political prisoners, coordinate demobilization, and manage regional stabilization efforts.

●  Restrictions: Members are likewise barred from running for office.

●  Limitations: Tier Two does not organize elections or appoint partisan officials; its authority is confined to stabilization and transitional security coordination.

By separating electoral oversight (Tier One) from conflict stabilization (Tier Two), this two-tier structure prevents either group from monopolizing the transition. It balances legitimacy with stability: Tier One reassures citizens that elections will be fair. In contrast, Tier Two reassures armed and regional actors that their concerns will be addressed without undermining neutrality. For a fuller procedural design, including the role of the Independent Selection & Vetting Commission (ISVC) and safeguards against elite capture, see A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia, Section III.

C. Post-Transition: Democratic Resolution of Disputes

Upon the election of a new government under caretaker supervision, Ethiopia must address its fundamental issues of federalism, civic nationalism, and separatism through democratic institutions rather than through provisional entities or unelected individuals. The caretaker coalition’s task ends with restoring civic space and organizing credible elections; from that point onward, responsibility shifts to the newly chosen government and parliament.

The elected government must then initiate:

●   National Dialogue or Constitutional Convention: An inclusive process involving political parties, civic actors, and regional representatives to deliberate on Ethiopia’s future.

●   Referenda: Where questions of self-determination or autonomy arise, internationally monitored referenda should provide legitimate answers based on popular consent.

●   Transitional Justice: The new government must establish truth-telling, acknowledgment, and reconciliation processes that honor victims, provide accountability, and foster national healing.

●   Institutional Reforms: Rebuilding the judiciary, electoral board, and security forces on democratic foundations, ensuring independence and credibility.

This sequencing ensures that the caretaker government is understood not as a substitute sovereign but as a temporary guarantor of fairness. By ending its mandate with elections, it both reassures Ethiopians of its neutrality and lays the groundwork for democratic institutions to resolve disputes legitimately.

D. Sequencing and Safeguards

A credible transition in Ethiopia depends not only on principles and structures but also on the careful sequencing of responsibilities. Each phase must build legitimacy for the next, while safeguards ensure that the caretaker remains a neutral guarantor rather than a substitute government.

●   Phase 1 (0–6 months post-collapse): The two-tier caretaker government and stabilization council are established. Civic space has reopened, political prisoners have been released, independent media have been restored, and ceasefires have been declared.

●   Phase 2 (6–12 months): Preparations for transitional elections are completed. The caretaker focuses solely on creating conditions for credible elections and preventing domination by any faction.

●   Phase 3 (1–3 years post-election): The newly elected government initiates a national dialogue or constitutional convention to debate Ethiopia’s political future. Draft constitutional reforms are prepared, with unresolved questions (e.g., federalism, civic nationalism, separatism) addressed through democratic procedures such as referenda.

●  Phase 4 (3–5 years post-election): The elected government implements institutional reforms in the judiciary, electoral board, and security apparatus while establishing transitional justice mechanisms to address past atrocities and promote reconciliation.

Safeguards across all phases include:

●  Strict Timelines and Rotation: Preventing Caretaker Leaders from Entrenching Themselves in Power.

●  Neutral Oversight: Civil society, regional observers, and international partners verifying compliance.

● Transparency and Communication: Public updates, milestone tracking, and open feedback channels to reassure citizens.

This sequencing ensures that the caretaker government serves only as a temporary guarantor of fairness, handing authority back to the Ethiopian people through elections. By making this limit explicit, Ethiopia can avoid repeating the mistakes of 1974 and 1991, when transitional arrangements collapsed into new authoritarianism.

These time ranges are indicative; the exact duration of each phase may vary depending on conditions on the ground, but the principle of precise sequencing and limited mandates must remain non-negotiable.

E. Why a Roadmap Matters

Ethiopia’s history illustrates the dangers of unprepared transitions. In 1974, the collapse of imperial rule created a power vacuum that was filled by a military dictatorship. In 1991, the fall of the Derg gave rise to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which formalized ethnic federalism in 1995. This arrangement, negotiated primarily as an elite bargain without direct public involvement, produced not democracy but a new authoritarian order. 

More recently, in 2018, promises of reform combined with the weakness of Ethiopia’s political elites allowed a single leader to manipulate the moment and consolidate autocracy under the guise of renewal. Without a credible roadmap, the fall of the current regime risks once again repeating the cycle of domination, mistrust, and renewed violence.

A credible roadmap does not dictate Ethiopia’s final political form; it provides the procedural guardrails that allow Ethiopians themselves to decide. By sequencing minimal principles, a neutral caretaker framework, and then deferring substantive questions to a newly elected government, the roadmap ensures that no faction can monopolize the transition.

Its most significant value lies in reassurance. Citizens, opposition groups, and even armed actors must see that the caretaker is only a temporary guarantor, not a substitute sovereign. By limiting itself to creating civic space and organizing elections, the caretaker strengthens public trust that Ethiopia’s future will be decided by democratic choice.

In this sense, the roadmap is not merely a technical exercise but a moral one: it signals that authority will rest not in elites or the force of arms, but in the people’s consent, freely expressed through democratic institutions.

The Caretaker’s Conundrum: A Metaphorical View

As we consider the challenges ahead, perhaps this analogy captures the essence of our current Ethiopia’s crucial juncture: to illustrate the complexity of our task, consider this scene: Trying to persuade Ethiopian political elites to adopt a caretaker government instead of a transitional one is akin to convincing a group of hungry lions to become vegetarians. They have tasted the meaty power of transitional governments twice before, and the idea of a neutral, temporary caretaker arrangement seems as appetizing as a plate of raw kale. “But we’ve always done it this way!” they roar, conveniently forgetting that “this way” led straight to the den of authoritarianism. The caretaker government stands there, a humble salad in a sea of carnivores, promising, “I’m just here to set the table, not eat the meal.” However, old habits die hard, and some elites still eye that salad, wondering if they can somehow turn it into a steak.

While humorous, this scenario highlights the genuine challenges we face in moving toward a truly democratic future. By acknowledging these difficulties with both seriousness and occasional levity, we can undertake the necessary work of building a fair and inclusive political process in Ethiopia that empowers its people.

15. Benchmarks for Credibility: What the Coalition Must Deliver

To move from abstract commitment to concrete credibility, the coalition must be judged not only by its rhetoric but also by whether it meets a set of clear, measurable expectations. The following benchmarks could transform it from a fragile initiative into a genuine catalyst for democratic transition:

1. Maximum Transparency: Complete disclosure of members is mandated, except for anyone with familial security concerns in Ethiopia; this exception does not apply to those in leadership positions, mandates, funding sources, and decisions to dispel suspicion and build trust. At the same time, the coalition may keep the names of allies within the ruling party, military, or domestic parties confidential for their safety. However, this necessary protection must not slide into secrecy in decision-making, which would erode credibility.

2. Defined Scope: A clear mandate specifying whether the coalition’s primary role is to design caretaker governance arrangements, foster elite dialogue, or serve as a preparatory forum for transition.

3. Inclusivity with Guardrails: Broad representation across federalists, civic nationalists, separatists, regional groups, other diaspora groups, women, youth, and professionals, balanced by safeguards to prevent ethnic vetoes, domination, or exclusion.

4. Independent Oversight: Monitoring by civil society, academics, and independent media, with safeguards to ensure oversight bodies themselves are not captured by factional interests.

5. Time-Bound Roadmap: Clear phases and deadlines to prevent endless negotiations and maintain momentum toward a caretaker structure and eventual elections.

6. Milestone Tracking: Public reporting, through dashboards, briefings, or communiqués, tracking progress against the coalition’s stated goals and timelines.

7. Diversity Metrics: Regular reporting on representation across ethnicity, region, gender, and generations, as well as structured engagement with civic and, where feasible, armed actors willing to pursue dialogue.

8. Integrated Communication & Engagement Strategy:

a) Regular, accurate, and accessible updates through diverse media platforms (radio, digital, print). 

b) Established feedback channels for citizens to provide input, questions, and concerns. 

c) Periodic public forums or digital town halls to foster direct dialogue between coalition members and citizens in diaspora. 

d) Clear protocols for responding to public inquiries and incorporating feedback into decision-making.

9. Security Neutrality Commitment: A pledge that the coalition will not command armed groups but will instead prepare political structures, leaving security oversight to neutral caretaker arrangements.

10. International Engagement Principles: Guidelines for engaging external actors (AU, UN, regional organizations, and key states) in ways that preserve Ethiopian ownership and avoid dependency.

11. Conflict-Sensitive Dialogue: Adoption of codes of language and conduct that avoid inflammatory rhetoric, prioritize mediation, and build habits of respectful disagreement within the coalition.

12.  Succession Protocols: Clear procedures for replacing members who resign, are removed due to misconduct, or breach agreed-upon codes of conduct, ensuring continuity and resilience.

13. Ethics and Integrity Framework: Binding rules that prohibit the use of the coalition for personal political advancement, financial gain, or covert partisan campaigning.

Meeting these expectations will not in itself guarantee success. Failing to meet them will almost certainly doom the coalition to repeating Ethiopia’s cycles of mistrust and fragmentation. It is against this backdrop that the conclusion turns to the larger question of responsibility and choice.

Ethiopian political practitioners and wise individuals can provide additional benchmarks to enhance the credibility of the list.

16. In Respect of Readers: Acknowledging Gaps and Limitations

Although the article offers valuable insights, the author acknowledges minor gaps, such as those that require readers to refer to the companion piece, which presents the proposed alternative idea (trans-ethnic federalism) in the conclusion. Additionally, no article on this topic has been published yet. The coalition has not taken significant actions since its brief formation; consequently, there is no analysis of its function.

1. Incomplete Procedural Analysis Due to Reliance on a Companion Piece

The article’s reliance on a companion piece highlights a significant limitation: the procedural intricacies of the two-tier design are not fully explored here. For readers seeking a comprehensive procedural analysis, it is essential to consult both parts of the series, specifically “A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia.” This reliance may impair the article’s stand-alone nature and understanding of the two-tier proposal.

2. Omission of the Presidential System in the Context of Trans-Ethnic Federalism

The exclusion of a discussion of the presidential system, intended to avoid potential misinterpretations, creates an analytical gap. This omission constrains the study’s analysis of the relationship between trans-ethnic federalism and the presidential governance model, as proposed by Prof. Messay Kebede in his 2018 publication, “On Transitional Government and Ethnic Federalism” (Kebede, M., 2018), which this author cites in short in this work’s conclusion. A more thorough exploration of these concepts would deepen the article’s analysis and provide a holistic view of the governance models under consideration.

3. Limited Assessment of the Coalition’s Actions

The article primarily engages with theoretical frameworks, offering only a cursory mention of the “Concerned Individuals” coalition. Given the coalition’s recent formation and the lack of substantial actions to date, the analysis understandably refrains from detailed critique or commendation. However, this focus on theory over practice leaves readers without a clear understanding of the coalition’s structure or potential impact, representing an area for future research as more information becomes available.

17. The Long Work of Reweaving Our Political Fabric

Ethiopia’s current constitutional order has embedded ethnicity into the very definition of citizenship, governance, and belonging. For over thirty years, institutions, identities, and political expectations have been shaped by ethnic federalism. Generations have grown up understanding power, protection, and dignity through the lens of ethnic self-rule. In this context, a rapid transition to civic nationalism is neither practical nor socially grounded. The bonds of identity, memory, and fear cannot be dismissed by theory or decree.

Yet recognizing this reality is not an argument for permanent fragmentation. It is simply a recognition that democratic transformation must grow from existing conditions, not from abstractions imposed upon them. The path toward a shared civic nation will be gradual, dialogical, and grounded in trust-building. We must first reduce fear, end the cycle of violence, and establish institutions that guarantee dignity and security for all. Only then can civic identity take root, slowly, organically, and authentically. Until that day, we must work with the system we have while gently reshaping it toward the future we desire.

We are stitching a new garment from cloth that has already been worn. The threads must be handled carefully, or the fabric will tear.

 We cannot throw away the fabric of Ethiopia; we must learn how to reweave it.

18. Planting Democracy in Exhausted Soil: The Beginning of a New Civic Dawn

This article calls for empowering citizens to shape their own political future. It notes that Ethiopia’s political history has been defined not by democratic participation but by centralized rule and elite-driven state formation, leaving society with no living institution of democratic practice to draw upon, the manipulation of public perception by political elites, and the strong influence of ethnic, cultural, and religious identities. Yet it views this moment not as a barrier but as an opening, a rare chance for renewal.

For decades, both current and previous governments, as well as opposition parties, have spoken the language of democracy while continuing undemocratic practices. They promise freedom, participation, and accountability, yet fail to embody those principles in their actions. The establishment of democratic institutions that genuinely serve the public is not an overnight achievement; it is a gradual process requiring patience, persistence, and learning.

Still, every long journey begins with a single step. This moment represents the threshold of a new chapter in the people’s struggle for self-determination. To move forward, Ethiopia must invest in building a democratic culture through civic education, open dialogue, and inclusive political reform. The goal is to construct institutions that are rooted in the realities, values, and social fabric of Ethiopian society, ensuring that democracy is not merely adopted but genuinely lived.

At present, our efforts resemble a delicate sapling, requiring fertile soil and abundant sunlight to flourish. The growth potential exists; however, the environment must be revitalized for it to take root and thrive. As we confront these challenges, it becomes clear that we have no choice but to rejuvenate our endeavors and foster a supportive landscape for democracy, its institutions, sustainable growth, and development. In the absence of established democratic frameworks and ready-made solutions, we must adapt and evolve to drive the essential change.

The success of democracy depends on several factors, including the management of the transition, external support, internal adaptation, and time. It frequently necessitates organic evolution, cultural transformations, and institutional reforms to establish itself.

This moment, then, is not simply a political crossroads but a human one. It asks us to imagine ourselves not as spectators of history but as its authors. The work ahead will be slow, imperfect, and at times uncertain, but that has always been the nature of new beginnings.

Imagine a painter before a blank canvas, uncertain, untrained, but finally free to create.
The first strokes may be crooked, the colors awkward, the form incomplete, yet the beauty lies not in the finish but in the freedom itself. Democracy in Ethiopia will begin, slowly, imperfectly, and unmistakably ours, the people, necessitating our efforts to perfect it.

Our task is not to wait for the perfect moment, ideal political structure, or flawless leaders, but to commence our journey together without delay.

19. Conclusion: The Promise and Pitfall of Elite Coalitions

The formation of the coalition of elites under the banner “Concerned Individuals for the Survival of the Nation and People” represents both Ethiopia’s desperation and its resilience. It emerges at a time when the regime is fragile, the state is on the verge of failure, and political parties are weakened or suppressed. Its existence is a warning of how deep Ethiopia’s crisis has become and a call for responsibility to broaden participation and build the trust required for survival.

The coalition’s promise lies not in dictating Ethiopia’s future but in preparing the conditions for Ethiopians to decide it. By focusing on inclusiveness, legitimacy, trust, and narrative discipline, it can create the procedural guarantees that prevent descent into chaos. However, it must also avoid the temptation to become an exclusive circle or to reproduce the divisions it seeks to heal.

In a time of mistrust and competing visions, the idea of a transitional government is fraught with danger; too easily, it becomes a power grab that deepens fractures rather than resolving them. What Ethiopia requires instead is a neutral caretaker government, organized on a two-tier model that separates electoral preparation from conflict stabilization. Only such an arrangement can provide the stability and fairness necessary for genuine democratic choice.

When this article refers to Ethiopia’s potential “constitutional moment,” it should not be read as favoring either federalist amendment or sweeping civic change. The emphasis is on process: that Ethiopians deliberate openly and democratically, without imposed solutions. A viable and pragmatic option worth considering is a variant of trans-ethnic federalism within a presidential framework, initially proposed by Professor Messay Kebede in his 2018 article “On Transitional Government and Ethnic Federalism.” This framework maintains a balance between unity and diversity, ensuring that the final decision rests with the Ethiopian people.

Abiy’s autocracy has made presidential politics taboo. Over nine months ago, this author authored a three-part series on this subject for further discussion, refinement of the concept, and contemplation in light of Professor Messay’s article. The publishing was delayed to avoid misinterpretations. The piece will be released at the appropriate moment.

Ethiopia’s transition will not unfold on a smooth or specific path. The process is inherently unpredictable because of several factors: structural fragility, the suppression of domestic political parties, a politicized military that avoids accountability for its crimes, ongoing fragmented armed movements and groups in various regions, and volatile territorial disputes in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and Somalia. The absence of a trusted, known viewpoint and unified opposition deepens this uncertainty. At the same time, the risk of elite co-optation threatens to repeat the cycles of betrayal that have haunted Ethiopia’s modern history. However, acknowledging these challenges is not a surrender to despair but an act of prudence. A carefully designed caretaker framework, grounded in inclusivity, transparency, civic trust, and ethical discipline, can transform uncertainty into preparation, risk into resilience, and fragility into the foundation for renewal.

Politics, as Hannah Arendt reminds us, begins wherever people gather to deliberate and act together. Such spaces are not yet governing bodies but “spaces of appearance,” where new possibilities are rehearsed in common. Likewise, Isaiah Berlin’s philosophy of value pluralism emphasizes that irreconcilable values, such as unity and autonomy on the one hand, and diversity and cohesion on the other, must often be managed rather than resolved. The coalition’s role, then, is not to eliminate Ethiopia’s pluralism but to create the fair procedures through which these irreconcilable visions can be managed peacefully.

Ethiopia today stands at a crucial juncture. Failure to seize it with humility and foresight will push the country further into fragmentation and violence. However, if elites adopt restraint and citizens prioritize process over power, Ethiopia may yet chart a peaceful course out of authoritarianism. The choice is stark: either repeat the cycles of domination and collapse or build a framework that allows democracy to take root.

By preparing neutral mechanisms for transition, the coalition can give Ethiopians what they have long lacked: the chance to deliberate their destiny freely. That alone would mark a profound break with the past and the beginning of a durable future. Ethiopia requires a caretaker who ensures the integrity of the process, rather than a power-sharing arrangement among the elite.

If Ethiopia is to rise again, it will be by those who rebuild trust where betrayal once stood and light where silence once reigned.

Author’s Final Note

As someone who has long written and advocated for the formation of a forum or coalition of elites, I am cautiously encouraged by the emergence of the forum, CISNP. Limited information is available, but their intention deserves recognition.

The crucial distinction lies between initial intention and intention in action. Philosopher John Searle reminds us that an initial intention serves as a blueprint for action, while an intention in action is the lived commitment that shapes its execution (Searle, J. R., 1980). The gap between the two can be decisive. Ethiopia has learned this distinction painfully; only seven years ago, widespread euphoria turned into war, genocide, repression, economic collapse, and the silencing of dissent once initial intentions gave way to destructive actions.

This is a lesson gained from recent history. The Ethiopian people will not hand over the “Moses rod” of trust as they did before, only to see it used to deepen authoritarianism. They will measure this coalition step by step, judging not its declarations but its conduct and its intention in action.

This piece has traced the dilemmas and possibilities of elite coalitions in Ethiopia’s fragile moment. However, analysis alone cannot guide a nation through transition. The core issue is whether these coalitions can provide an impartial structure that safeguards the process rather than usurping power within the Ethiopian political elite, where transition is synonymous with transitional governance and power acquisition.

For this reason, this piece should be read in conjunction with its companion, “A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia,” where the principles outlined here are given concrete form in the design of a two-tier caretaker arrangement. Together, the two reflections form a single argument: Ethiopia’s future depends less on who governs than on how the path to governance is prepared.

The approval to eradicate the detrimental factors and confront their sources, specifically the regime, is praiseworthy; yet, we face a significant, although achievable, obstacle. Can we agree to replace these features and the regime with a more constructive, pragmatic approach and alternatives? This is a significant matter that necessitates meticulous deliberation and cooperation.

Clarity is essential when faced with a decision. Without a comprehensive understanding of the coalition, it is challenging to take a position either for or against it. I anticipate not just rhetoric, but a transformation of the coalition that includes other groups, both in the diaspora and within Ethiopia, who share the exact cause and aim and actively work to empower the people rather than serve their own interests. The nation seeks a roadmap that empowers the people to choose their government, safeguarded by measures that prevent any illegitimate seizure of power that contradicts the will and interests of the people, as expressed through their votes.

Without such a blueprint and action, the coalition risks being remembered not as midwives of democracy but as mirrors of the Derge, EPRDF, and Abiy-PP, with new faces repeating old betrayals that exhaust Ethiopians. The Ethiopian people may view the imposition of another autocratic administration, justified by the need for survival, security, and order, as a tyrannical force that stifles their freedom and gives rise to a monstrous Leviathan.

At the Edge of Hope

The situation in Ethiopia is grave. The economy gasps, the social fabric unravels, and the nation drifts toward fragmentation, pulled apart by wars that no one can win in the near future. Repression inhibits and diminishes domestic parties; elites, who possess the freedom to contribute and act as agents of change, are immobilized by ethnic and political divisions, while the dictatorship endures, structured and merciless, transforming the nation into a security state that serves the interests of a single individual.

However, unlike the paralyzed elites, the armed groups in Amhara and Oromia, despite their internal disarray and political wisdom of unity, continue to confront the regime with courage and sacrifice. Their struggle, though imperfect, embodies a raw defiance that neither strategy nor structure has yet managed to replace.

It is in such times that hope becomes the rarest virtue. One watches with quiet anguish as opposition voices fade into statements without strategy, and as conviction gives way to hesitation. However, even amid exhaustion, a faint pulse of possibility remains. The coalitions emerging in the United States and Europe, though fragile and late, carry the seed of something redemptive. They may not be perfect vessels, but they could be the first sign of a conscience awakening after a long slumber.

To them, I say: your task is immense, and your time is short. The Ethiopian people, weathered by suffering yet unbroken in spirit, are still waiting for the courage to meet their pain. Do not mirror the divisions you were born to mend; rise above them. Let this coalition be not another echo of betrayal, but the first tremor of rebirth.

As the nation now stands at a crucial juncture, history’s judgment will not rest on whether we dared to hope, but on whether we transformed that hope into action, before the light faded from our collective horizon.

Nations are not reborn by miracles but by those who dare to act before despair and fragmentation become destiny.

Thank you for reading all the way through. Change begins with people who don’t rush the essential things.

Full version of the article is available in PDF format here

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Kebede, M (2018). On Transitional Government and Ethnic Federalism

https://www.ethiopiaobserver.com/2018/08/03/on-transitional-government-and-ethnic-federalism/
Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. United States Institute of Peace Press.
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​​MacIntyre, A. (1984). After Virtue: A study in moral theory (2nd ed.). University of Notre Dame Press.
https://www.ethiopiaobserver.com/2018/08/03/on-transitional-government-and-ethnic-federalism/
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For a detailed rationale of the caretaker government, including the procedural design of Tier One and Tier Two, see my companion piece, “A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia” (Sirak Zena, 2025, Parts One and Two), published on Borkena and Zehabesha.

N.B.: You can find the full text of the downloadable PDF at the end of Part Two on Borkena.

Sirak Zena. (2025, August 31). A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia: Part One.Borkena. https://borkena.com/2025/08/31/a-strategic-reflection-on-the-idea-of-a-caretaker-government-in-ethiopia-part-one/

Sirak Zena. (2025, September 1). A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia: Part Two.Borkena. https://borkena.com/2025/09/01/a-strategic-reflection-on-the-idea-of-a-caretaker-government-in-ethiopia-part-two/

Sirak Zena. (2025, August 30). A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia: Part One.Zehabesha. https://zehabesha.com/a-strategic-reflection-on-the-idea-of-a-caretaker-government-in-ethiopia-part-one/

Sirak Zena. (2025, August 30). A Strategic Reflection on the Idea of a Caretaker Government in Ethiopia: Part Two.Zehabesha. https://zehabesha.com/a-strategic-reflection-on-the-idea-of-a-caretaker-government-in-ethiopia-part-two/

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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