Landlocked Ethiopia, Unstable Red Sea, and Geopolitical battle in the Horn of Africa 

Landlocked Ethiopia, Unstable Red Sea, and Strategic battle in the Horn 

By  Metta-Alem Sinishaw
Washington, DC 

Executive Summary  

Ethiopia currently faces multi-front insurgencies, severe economic distress, and a legitimacy deficit  which collectively poses a serious threat to national survival. The insurgencies are manifestations of a  much deeper strategic crisis that needs political reconfiguration. Ethiopia’s internal political crisis, its  quest for access to the Sea, and the dispute over Nile water resources are increasingly intertwined.  

Ethiopia’s quest for access to the Sea is a legitimate and pragmatic effort aimed at building regional  integration. Dependence of a country with over 130 million people, expanding economy, and  asymmetrical military prowess on a single port increases vulnerability and undermines Ethiopia’s industrial aspiration. Although a commercially leased port is required, it represents only a partial  solution to meeting the expanding operational needs. As the security of the Red Sea affects Ethiopia  much more acutely than any of its neighbors combined, the fundamental geopolitical question Ethiopia seeks to answer is: “why would neighbors resist to offer Ethiopia a naval base while accommodating similar needs of other countries?” 

As the geographic and demographic center, Ethiopian stability has significant repercussions on its  neighbors. Ethiopia’s sudden rhetoric on access to the Sea and rapprochement with sub-state actors has distorted its otherwise valid security demand and angered its neighbors. Egypt capitalized on the  tension and forged a tripartite agreement with Eritrea and Somalia to contain Ethiopia. Its continued encirclement will only exacerbate regional insecurity. Ethiopia’s untactful rhetoric brought strategic costs: the US and EU firmly backed Somalia’s territorial integrity while maintaining Ethiopia in its  counter-terrorism commitments. While Russia quietly monitors shifting alignments, China views  Ethiopian ambition with skepticism to protect its extensive Belt and Road Initiative and avoid a  precedent for Taiwan. Amid this friction, Türkiye brokered the Ankara Declaration, in which Somalia  recognizes Ethiopia’s right to access the sea in exchange for a firm commitment to Somalian unity. 

Ethiopia’s domestic stability, infrastructure ambitions, and military capabilities remain deeply tied to  Gulf backing. Rivalry between Gulf Royals is splitting the region into two informal and fluid “blocs”  that function without legal or institutional mechanisms. On one hand, the UAE Bloc comprises Israel  and aligns with Ethiopia, Somaliland, RSF (Sudan) and desires to project forward commercial and  maritime power in the Red Sea. Conversely, the Saudi bloc includes Egypt, Türkiye, Qatar, Somalia,  SAF, and Eritrea and desires to restrict Red Sea governance exclusively to littoral states and deprive  other middle powers from gaining a foothold in the region.  

Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea deteriorated following the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. In response to  Ethiopian sudden shift in rhetoric on sea outlets, Eritrea forges partnership with the Tigray People’s  Liberation Front (TPLF) old guards that considered the Pretoria deal as complete surrender. In the  face of narrowing political space and shared threat from the federal government, seven Ethiopian  political and armed opposition groups, including the TPLF, Amhara Fano, and the Oromo Liberation  Army (OLA) forged the Ethiopian People’s Forces Alliance for Survival. The alliance seeks to  overthrow the government and establish an inclusive transitional administration. 

Despite contradictory ideology and various national orientations, the alliance marks a paradigm shift  in the Ethiopian fragmented political landscape. Rebels are suppressing their self-contradictions to avoid horizontal conflicts and pave the way for convergence. With fluid institution and organization, the  cohesion and success of the alliance would only be tested through time, especially until after it offers a credible alternative and inclusive political architecture, beyond coordinated military operations. 

Rivalry of Gulf Royals increases asymmetric backing and strategic vulnerabilities. Collaboration with the UAE enabled Ethiopia to render Egyptian-led encirclement ineffective. Yet intensified insurgencies  prompted the withdrawal of Ethiopian peacekeeping forces from Somalia. 

Political survival forces rebel to become conduit for external geopolitical rivalries. Disrupting rebels’ access to foreign lifeline is the only mechanism to force them towards a compromise. If the war on  Iran prolongs, declining Gulf attention will force cash-starved Horn economies to shift their alignment. 

The ongoing crisis is not a conventional civil war fought to control the capital but more of a critical  existential dispute over what kind of state Ethiopia must become. While external powers can offer  financial, technological, and military aid, they cannot settle deep-seated domestic political fractures. 

Winning the internal war will enhance Ethiopian regional posture and attractiveness to powers. Yet there is no military solution to domestic political demands. The federal government may possess the  operational reach to suppress specific fronts, but it cannot win the broader political war without  genuine institutional reform. Even if the federal government successfully suppresses insurgencies, it  may still lose the political war. Conversely, while capable of degrading federal military capacity and  capturing strategic hubs, the alliance lacks a cohesive political program to govern. Thus, a negotiated  political settlement is needed to restore lasting stability. Ethiopia’s regional posture will be significantly  enhanced through internal healing and reconciliation. 

While a political solution must come from within, heavy reliance of Ethiopian political actors on  external support only delays dialogue, in the absence of which the International Community (IC) has a  moral responsibility to pressure the fragmented domestic actors into a negotiated compromise. In collaboration with the IC, the US and EU should condition debt-restructuring agreements on verified,  inclusive, and genuine political dialogue. The US should encourage Egypt and Ethiopia towards a  comprehensive “two waters” framework to deescalate regional crises. Under this framework, Ethiopia would appease Egyptian concern over the Nile and GERD in exchange for a reliably negotiated maritime access to the Red Sea. The US should urgently persuade its key regional allies (Saudi and  UAE) to cease fueling regional conflicts and restraint from transactional engagement with non-state  and sub-state actors. 

BRICS should complement international diplomatic efforts. Its New Development Bank could foster  South-South cooperation by financing a tripartite Nile Water, Energy, and Food Security Nexus to  pacify rivalry between its members, Egypt and Ethiopia. The AU, in cooperation with the UN, should  challenge the Saudi-led Red Sea Council to revise its exclusionary “littoral states first” governance  model and become inclusive to accommodate the needs of vital non-littoral anchor states.  

The AU, UN, and IGAD should jointly pressurize Ethiopian political actors to agree on comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) and negotiate a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) transitional compact to integrate and stabilize the state and preemptively mitigate the zero-sum  “winner’s dilemma” that threatens Ethiopian and reginal security.

1. Introduction 

Ethiopia continues fighting multiple insurgencies and the current political architecture could not  restore political stability and remain a fundamental structural fault line. Lingering armed  confrontations consumes Ethiopian meager economy and poses a severe foreign exchange crisis  that led to painful currency devaluation. Unresolved debt restructuring negotiations continue aggravating the security crisis. High youth unemployment and civil unrest directly feed into active  insurgencies. The humanitarian crisis remains unabated; millions are internally displaced and millions  of others are in urgent need of emergency food. While acute malnutrition surpassed the critical  threshold, nine million children are out of school. 

The government’s increased reliance on military response and dwindling political space further  exacerbates grievance and erodes state legitimacy. The 2026 election was conducted amidst  active conflicts and omitted key jurisdictions. The National Dialogue Commission excluded  dominant political and armed groups. Seven political and rebel groups forged the Ethiopian  Peoples’ Forces Coalition for Survival or “alliance for survival” that vowed to topple the incumbent  government. Recent explosions around the capital and critical military infrastructures raised  questions about the governments’ established supremacy in military technology. 

Ethiopian sudden quest for a Sea outlet added a new height of tensions with neighbors, unsettled  Egypt, and entangled internal actors with external adversarial states. The rivalry between Egypt  and Ethiopia over the Nile, GERD and the Red Sea creates geopolitical standoffs. The Horn remains in  political turmoil and competition for influence along the Red Sea continues proliferating conflicts.  Sudanese civil war, intra-Somali political tensions, and Ethiopia’s insurgencies are interconnected  with external proxies. Rival middle powers are using transactional deals to pull Horn of Africa  nations into proxy alliances, including alliance with non-state actors to contain their adversaries  from within. The deal offers internal dissidents access to adversarial states and critical support. 

Efforts to resolve Ethiopia’s internal political crisis should not exclusively rely on domestic  discontents, changing regional dynamics should be accounted for. This paper attempts to map out Ethiopia’s dominant political fractures and their interplay with neighboring states. It evaluates  the impact of global power competition, transactional deals by regional rivals, and the efforts of  Ethiopian opposition groups to rescue the country, before outlining a modest strategic way-out. 

2. Existential Threat: The New Strategy for Political Dominance  

The term “existential threat” has become a dominant political buzzword in the Red Sea Region.  Egypt considers Ethiopian development efforts on the Nile River as a threat to its existence.  Ethiopia believes that the lack of access to the Sea threatens Ethiopian national survival. Djibouti  views Ethiopian port diversification policy as a threat against its existence. The Sudanese warring  factions accuse each other of threatening Sudan’s survival as polity. Somali views Ethiopian  Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland as unprovoked aggression against its  sovereignty and territorial integrity. Eritrea considers Ethiopia’s rhetoric on access to the Sea as a  direct threat against its sovereignty. The utilization of existential threat across the region  demonstrates the lack of shared regional agenda, shifting alignment, and entanglement with rival  foreign states in which one country’s gain is tantamount to another country’s loss.

The use and misuse of “existential threat” in the Ethiopian political landscape is even much more  nuanced. Political elites’ selective narrative about historical grievance, real or imagined, has  transformed political competition into existential threat. Since the politicization of ethnicity as  modus operandi, rival political elites portray themselves as defensive while being perceived as  offensive by others, making conflict resolutions nearly impossible. Every ethnic group appears to  have contradictory memories with varying historical pasts, making it impossible to have a shared  collective national memory. Ethnic entrepreneurs perceive losing political control in each group’s  territory as equivalent to losing one’s homeland. 

The fundamental feature that differentiates a genuine existential threat from that of political threat  is the evidence based upon which the respective narratives are built. The 1991 victor prescribed  ethnocentric arrangement has empowered ethnic groups, promoted vernacular languages,  developed local cultures and traditions. However, despite claiming to have redressed historical  grievances, the political architecture only shifted and institutionalized inequality and domination. Assigning federating units to a dominant ethnic group intensified victimhood narratives and  exacerbated the claim over existential danger when competing for political power.  

The Ethiopian state currently faces a profound national security dilemma, while the federal  government argues that “armed resistance groups threaten national survival,” regional  governments counterclaim that “centralization threatens regional autonomy and therefore we must  resist.” However, not all existential threat claims are unfounded. For example, persistent  atrocities against Amhara and the recent Tigray war made existential politics much more credible.  Human Rights Watch documented serious abuse by multiple parties to the conflict which created  powerful lessons for every Ethiopian political actor: “If we lose political power, we may eventually  lose our physical security” making political compromise harder. 

If applied, critical analysis could have helped to distinguish between community security, political  autonomy, and elite political power competition to identify the scope, extent, and intent of the  threat that political elites often present as one and indivisible. Ethnic entrepreneurs view another  governance model simply as an existential threat to their own model. Under current arrangement,  political programs and policy preferences are not criteria for affinity with political parties and  political loyalty remains exclusively dependent on ethnic identity. 

When each actor is organized politically and militarily to defend itself against the other, the  combined effect creates a national security dilemma that forces even groups with contradictory  ideology to forge tactical alliances despite lacking a shared national political program. The  emergence of “Tsimdo” and alliance for survival follows this pattern. Such alliances remain purely  tactical and operational and rarely get strategic height. Therefore, a serious attempt to chart a new  political dispensation in Ethiopia must reimagine how the unfolding tactical alliance could be  transformed into a veritable national political and security program in which no community feels  excluded.

3. Internal Faultlines and vulnerabilities of Contemporary Ethiopia 

The 2026 National Dialogue Commission deliberation recognized that variation in historical  narratives, state building, heritage, institutional design (ethnic vs Unitary), forms of government  (religious vs secularism), and loyalties (class vs ethnic) are the fundamental faultlines. The violent  insurgencies Ethiopia continues facing today are only manifestations of a much deeper strategic  crisis that demand political reimagination and overhaul over state architectures. In the absence of  middle ground and compromise, reconfiguration of fundamental state structure remains only  desirable. Continued internal disharmony exasperates fragmentation and makes Ethiopia a  geopolitical battle ground. Despite the urgency, however, Ethiopian political actors seem to favor  zero-sum games.  

With a growing population of more than 130 million, expanding economy, and asymmetrical military  power balance, dependence on a single port increases Ethiopian vulnerability and severely  undermines its industrial aspiration. It stresses that denying access to the sea while reaping massive economic benefit by small sized littoral states is inherently unsustainable and unjust.  Ethiopia’s sudden and aggressive rhetoric and its controversial dealings with sub-state actors  have deeply alienated its neighbors and overshadowed its otherwise valid national interests. 

Recent Ethiopia’s demand for maritime access is a legitimate and pragmatic path toward regional  stability. Lack of favorable response to Ethiopian longstanding predicament will only aggravate  regional insecurity. Because Red Sea instability harms Ethiopia more than any of its neighbors  combined, temporary commercial leases are simply insufficient. Ethiopia realizes the distinction  between commercial and sovereign access and its geopolitical cascading effect. However, it  questions why neighboring states failed to offer Ethiopia with a naval base while allowing several  other countries. 

Despite recent calls for peaceful negotiation and dialogue for mutual economic dividend, Ethiopian request remains misconceived and contentious. Immediate neighbors continue viewing Ethiopian  positions as an existential threat and establish alliances with the adversaries of Ethiopia and UAE,  Ethiopian dominant external enabler. Ethiopia currently stands at a historical crossroad juncture,  and its future would be redefined by the following three inextricably linked domestic and regional  geopolitical drivers. These dynamics critically determine Ethiopian relations with its neighbors  that align with a web of adversarial actors seeking to project influence in the Red Sea region.  

1. Accelerating domestic fragmentation

 isolated and coordinated insurgencies are severely  overstretching federal forces, as witnessed by the recent withdrawal announcement of  Ethiopian peacekeeping mission from Somalia. Continued failure of the Ethiopian government  to harmonize domestic forces will unavoidably exacerbate Ethiopia’s vulnerability and offer  regional adversaries with opportunity for aggressive proxy meddling. 

2. The Red Sea stalemate

Ethiopia’s rhetoric on the Red Sea and framing of permanent,  sovereign sea access as a non-negotiable strategic imperative has triggered acute security  anxieties among Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti and led to shifting regional alignments. Egypt and Saudi are cooperating with other coastal states that view the Red Sea exclusively as littoral states affairs and seek to contain non-coastal states, and  

3. The hydrological faultline

The completion of GERD and Ethiopia’s continued desire to build  three more dams on the Nile River remains an unyielding existential flashpoint for Egypt, and its  aggressive move to construct a military and political encirclement of Ethiopia via treaties with  Eritrea and Somalia and recently with Sudan.  

As a credible internal political settlement significantly enhances Ethiopian regional posture, its  fragmentation opens doors for meddling. Without a genuine political settlement, Ethiopia will  remain in perpetual conflict in which River Nile and the quest for access to the Red Sea serve as  catalysts. Only if Ethiopia establishes a legitimate new political architecture and resolves  conflicts, it can achieve national cohesion, improved security, promote economic growth, and  reestablish its lost regional anchor state status. 

4. Shifting Alliances and Changing Geopolitical Relations with Neighbors 

 Ethiopia’s current foreign policy focuses on nationalist assertiveness, an existential drive for sea  outlet, and sovereign power projection. As the region’s largest landlocked country, its rhetoric for  maritime access has altered its relations with neighbors and affected regional security landscape.  Following is the summary of Ethiopia’s relations with the region. 

Sudan

Despite fractured and volatile relations with Sudan, Ethiopia remains opportunistic and  cautious to balance its interest in Blue Nile water rights and disputes over border territory. The  strained relations over the disputed Al-Fashaga border became even more polarized during the  Sudanese Civil War. Since then, fighting near the border over the disputed farmland has been  triggering military incidents. Ethiopia actively navigates the fallout from Sudan’s civil war while  collaborating with UAE to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that pushed the Sudanese  Armed Forces (SAF) closer to Egypt and join the anti-Ethiopia regional networks. SAF accused  Ethiopia of sheltering and permitting paramilitary RSF to transfer supply and armaments. Despite  fluctuating internal dynamics, SAF offers Ethiopian rebel fighters’ sanctuary, medical assistance,  and cross-border supply routes to counter Ethiopian increasing alignment with RSF. 

Somalia

Ethiopia considers the Somalian federal government as a fragile state that cannot maintain regional  security and circumvent via sub-state actors to secure its sovereign maritime footprint in the Red  Sea. The 2025 MoU with the self-declared Somaliland to lease commercial and naval space in  exchange for formal recognition of Somaliland’s independence shattered its otherwise amicable  relations. Somalia viewed the MoU as a direct violation of its national sovereignty and territorial  integrity. Egypt, Ethiopian main regional rival, capitalized on the deteriorating relations and quickly  signed a defense pact with Somalia. Growing internal insurgency has forced Ethiopia to announce its desire to pull Ethiopian peacekeeping forces from Somalia. If implemented, it demonstrates  Ethiopian declining regional posture and embolden its adversary’s encirclement policy during a  time when it is seeking to gain a foothold on the Red Sea.

Eritrea 

The 2018 rapprochement and the close collaboration between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2020 against TPLF during the Tigray war collapsed in 2022 following the Pretoria Peace  Agreement. Ethiopia views Eritrea with deep suspicion and considers its president as detriment  to Ethiopian regional ambition. Conversely, Eritrea considers Ethiopian historical claim and quest  for access to the Red Sea as a prelude to coercive pressure which collectively result in a  deteriorated bilateral relation. 

Eritrea perceives Ethiopian ambition as an existential security threat and prompted troop buildup  along the border. On one hand, Eritrea joined Somalia and Egypt and forged a tripartite security  axis aimed at encircling Ethiopia. On the other hand, Eritrea subtly aligned with TPLF hardliners  and other Ethiopian groups to counter the federal government from within. Eritrea provides safe  haven, training, weapons, and logistics to challenge the Ethiopian Defense Forces and prevent a  potential Ethiopian aggression. Relations sharply deteriorated after the emergence of “Tsimdo”  and its collaboration with the alliance for survival. Both countries continue supporting each  other’s opposition groups. Following the recent explosions in Addis, Eritrea and Ethiopia severed  diplomatic ties and are at the brink of war.  

Djibouti

Except for transitional tension, Ethiopian relations with Djibouti remain pragmatic with deep  bilateral economic integration, handling over 90% of Ethiopian maritime imports. Nevertheless,  Ethiopian port diversification policy aimed at eliminating dependence on a single port aggravates  Djibouti’s insecurity of losing billions in transit fees. While economic cooperation remains active,  Djibouti’s relations with Ethiopia are transactional and distrustful due to the possibility of losing its  lucrative monopoly if Ethiopia gains access to the sea elsewhere (Somaliland or Kenya). Djibouti  played a key role to de-escalate regional tensions but remained focused on shielding its commercial  interest. During the 2024 Arab League session in Bahrain, Djibouti called for respect of Arab state  sovereignty amid the Ethiopia Somalia rivalries, supporting Somalian position against Ethiopia. 

Kenya

is the only stable and predictable neighbor that entertains pragmatic relations with  Ethiopia. They have strong security ties to collaborate on joint anti-terrorism and a commercial  deal through cross-border infrastructure initiatives in the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia  Transport Corridor (LAPSSET.) Ethiopia collaborates with Kenya and South Sudan in strategic  regional integration to increase interdependence, predictability, and stability. Kenya maintains  neutrality and plays a mediatory role between Ethiopia and its hostile neighbors. It serves as the  primary economic balancer in the region through cross-border infrastructure initiatives and green  electricity exports. However, Kenya remains concerned over escalating regional rivalries. 

South Sudan

Ethiopia’s relations with South Sudan are cordial. They have shared concerns over  ethnic conflicts and maintain strong mutual security cooperation along the border. Although  internal political fragility constrains its desire to engage boldly in regional disputes, South Sudan  remains aligned on infrastructure expansion and trade and is largely dependent on Ethiopian  political mediation and security cooperation.

5. Under Pressure: How Powers Competition is Forcing Ethiopian Hands  

Ethiopia’s attractiveness to powers depends on its commitment to internal harmony and pursuing  coherent foreign policy that fits into the geopolitical demand of the day and its potential contributions for regional security and stability.  

If Ethiopia integrates water, hydropower, cheap electricity, industrialization, exports, rail corridors,  and ports with the Red Sea security and Gulf and Indian Ocean markets, it could fundamentally  transform its geopolitical and geostrategic significance. Ethiopia should leverage its strategic  location, key water resources, and agricultural capital and seek to diversify trade corridors and  reduce dependency on single ports. Ethiopia should present Nile water and access to the Red Sea as  a single and comprehensive framework that links water to food, trade corridors, maritime access,  and regional security. 

Conversely, without a predictable government and internal turmoil, powers and regional actors  alike could exploit its vulnerability. In addition, Ethiopia should avoid the temptation to pursue  unilateral territorial recognition and use of coercive strategy that threatens its neighbor’s sovereignty. 

5.1. Great powers competitions: the US/EU, China, and Russia 

Great powers evaluate Ethiopian quest for access to the Sea mainly through maritime security  prism to balance strategic regional stability. As powers remain preoccupied by the war in Iran and  Ukraine, the Ethiopian internal crisis is unlikely to become a priority. The US and EU consistently  reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity to prevent fragmentation, while keeping Ethiopia aligned  on counter-terrorism initiatives to secure the Red Sea shipping corridors. As Ethiopia plans  to build Africa’s largest airport, its relationship with the US is expanding from security into  economic and investment.  

As the largest bilateral lender, China’s relations with Ethiopia are predominantly economic. China  favors current regional security arrangements to shield its Belt and Road Initiative and would  minimally be interested in addressing Ethiopian internal fractures. When the International  Monetary Fund (IMF) viewed Ethiopian debt as unsustainable, China serviced Ethiopian debt to  appease fiscal constraints. As the largest creditor of the Djibouti port, China views Ethiopian port  diversification policy with skepticism and discourages Ethiopian unilateral efforts to recognize  Somaliland to prevent a precedent for Taiwan. 

Russia has long-term strategic relations focused on military hardware that is expanding into  nuclear energy. In recent years, Ethiopian attraction to Russia gravitates towards diversifying  alternate partners in the emerging “multi-polar” order and joining BRICS. Russian engagement  remains focused at strengthening Ethiopian federal government’s coercive hard-power  capabilities and investing minimally, if any, to reconcile its internal contradictions. 

5.2 BRICS and the multipolar shift: Strategic Opportunities for Ethiopia 

As the rule based global order evolves, BRICS would have a role to play. Expanding BRICS signals  growing multipolarity and increased strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. Despite  connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf and Indian Oceans, however, it could not necessarily guarantee  its stability due to rivalry among its member states: Ethiopia vs Egypt, UAE vs Iran, China vs India.  BRICS offers rivals (Egypt and Ethiopia) proximity to eastern powers and additional diplomatic  channels for dialogue to address their disputes over the Nile, GERD, and Red Sea. Both Egypt and  Ethiopia are exploiting the diplomatic platform to promote their national interests.  

Although BRICS does not replace the US and EU, the dilemma of whether it would resolve the  growing tension among its members such as Ethiopia vs Egypt over GERD, Nile, and Red Sea  remains to be seen. China is likely to emerge as a major beneficiary in the Horn due to its heavy  economic weight and established bilateral relations which would compel regional states to align  with its demand. As China converges with Egypt to protect its investment in the Red Sea Suez  Canal, Ethiopia would expand its growing partnership with India to diminish dependency on  single power. The 2026 BRICS Declaration endorsed Ethiopia’s quest for WTO accession, ICAO  Council candidacy, and hosting of COP32. It provides a powerful platform to enhance  international legitimacy and market integration. To maximize this opportunity, Ethiopia must  expand the initial gain and transform its natural assets into regional bargaining chips.  

6. Clash of Middle Powers: Rivalry beyond superpowers in the Horn of Africa 

The Red Sea has integrated the Horn of Africa with the Arabian Peninsula and transformed the  region into a unified geopolitical and security landscape. Gulf and other middle powers are  competing for influence in the Red Sea corridor and are forcing resource-constrained Horn of  African states to shift their alignment through transactional bilateral relations.  

In recent years, Saudi and Emiratis are converging with other state and non-state actors to forge  broad, fluid, and porous rivalry “blocs” that are driven by national interests and geopolitical  competition. Both blocs function informally without legal, institutional, or organizational  mechanisms and collaborate with states that aspire to gain foothold in the Red Sea region,  projecting influence, countering adversaries, protecting sovereignty, and transactional economic  benefits.  

The rivalry of Emiratis vs Saudi, both of whom are key US allies, is proliferating horizontal conflicts  in Sudan and Yemen, intensifying tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia, aligning with  contradictory actors in Sudan and Somalia. Türkiye has proven that defense ties with Somalia and  economic investments in Ethiopia are not mutually exclusive and emerged as an indispensable  mediator.  

Middle powers’ competition for influence particularly creates a volatile dual reality for Ethiopia.  On one side, convergence between UAE and Israel, both of whom are signatories to the Abrham  accord, offers Ethiopia critical financial, technological, and military lifeline and successfully  weakened Egypt’s containment strategies. On the other hand, proximity to the Emirates  entangles Ethiopia within the broader Saudi Emirati contest. Saudi Arabia actively champions Somalian territorial integrity that undermines Ethiopian Red Sea ambition. Entanglement further  increases Ethiopian vulnerability and enables rebels to gain financial, armament, and diplomatic  support from adversaries.  

6.1. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)  

UAE converges with Israel to counter Saudi’s hegemony on the Red Sea and aligns with other  progressive states and non-state actors in the region. Emiratis is considered as a revisionist  power broker that engages transactionally. It pursues a “string of ports” to control logistics and  maritime choke points along the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. UAE favors pragmatism  and openly funds regional administrations and secessionist entities. It partners with autonomous  enclaves and non-littoral regional states to build trade routes independent of hostile host  governments.  

Israel and UAE have dynamic objectives in Ethiopia and Somalia to reinforce each other’s regional  ambition. Ethiopian relations with UAE started in 2018 and continues steadily deepening with  shared regional economic and security interests along the Red Sea shipping lanes. Ethiopia views the UAE as its most indispensable foreign ally that provides a crucial financial lifeline, military  hardware, and infrastructure investment. In the face of mounting economic distress, currency  crisis, and stalled debt restructuring, UAE offers Ethiopia an indispensable breathing room. 

UAE encourages Ethiopia to seek sovereign access to the Sea to gain a strategic foothold on the  Red Sea for shared benefits. It has been backing Ethiopian port diversification ambition and  injected billions. It is also a dominant ally of the Sudanese paramilitary Rapid Support Forces  (RSF) and leading partner for local Somali regional governments pursuing greater autonomy. It  closely collaborates with Somaliland and grants financial and military resources in support of  Ethiopian regional postures. 

However, the strong relationship hinges on the leaders of both countries and lacks institutional  arrangements. The bilateral relations remain asymmetry due to structural imbalance between  Ethiopian temporary financial relief and Emiratis aspiration on gaining ports, Red Sea ports, food  security, and military cooperation. As a key partner, UAE has done little, if any, to address the  Ethiopian governance crisis and continues exploiting Ethiopian core vulnerabilities. Its military  support carries significant risks and has been straining Ethiopian relations with Sudan and Egypt  due to UAE’s support to Sudan’s civil war. UAE’s prolonged engagement in the Sudan, Libya, and  Somalia conflicts is likely to attract proxy support for Ethiopian rebels from UAE’s adversaries. 

6.2. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)  

Saudi Arabia views the Red Sea as its vital economic and security hegemony and aims to maintain the status  quo. It believes that the Red Sea governance should be dictated exclusively by coastal nations and favors a “littoral states first” strategic approach. In 2020, in collaboration with Egypt, Saudi  spearheaded the establishment of the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea  and the Gulf of Aden (CAASRSGA) to safeguard the security of the Red Sea and improve regional  coordination. The Council aims at countering strategic interference from non-littoral states. 

While Iran and Türkiye were the primary targets, the Council progressively targeted Emirates and  Israel. In response to UAE’s increasing penetration in Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan, Saudi shifted  from cautious investment to a more assertive engagement by reengineering its Red Sea strategy. Saudi Arabia persuaded Jordan, Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti to join the Council and deprive a  foothold to the UAE along the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s exclusion was partly by the desire to appease  Egypt’s dispute over GERD and partly to discourage UAE’s indirect penetration into the Red Sea. 

Based on shared geopolitical interest, Saudi, Egypt, Türkiye, and Qatar, Eritrea, Djibouti, and  Somalia created a dynamic alliance to counter the growing penetration of the UAE-Israel-Ethiopia axis into the Red Sea. Following the Iran war, Saudi led multi-nations Red Sea security  partnerships alongside Egypt, Somalia, and Djibouti. Recently, it signed and activated the Mecca  Joint Defense Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan. It seeks to establish structured, state-to-state maritime security to counter-balance unilateral moves in the region. Saudi Arabia especially aims at  disrupting Emirati arms and logistics flows to the RSF and supports SAF in Sudan to push back the  UAE. Saudi Arabia deprived UAE of military overflight permission and closed a major RSF supply node in  Libya. It committed $1.5 billion weapons supply to SAF which unavoidably spills over into Ethiopia  and exacerbates domestic instability. 

Saudi Arabia favors traditional institutional state to state relations and maintains sound bilateral  diplomatic and strong labor and economic relations with Ethiopia. However, it prioritizes security  along the Red Sea coastline and remains wary of Ethiopia’s unilateral maritime ambition. Saud  views the Ethiopian unilateral MoU with Somaliland as a regional destabilization effort that  creates vacuums in which its adversaries (UAE and Israel) could exploit. It aligns with Egypt,  Somalia, and Djibouti and strongly advocates for Somalian sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

As the Iran war makes the Red Sea corridor even more invaluable, Saudi strengthens its ties with  Türkiye and Pakistan to protect its dominion on the Red Sea. Egypt and Saudi are entangled with  Sudanese civil war and their rapprochement with Eritrea could be motivated, at least partly, to  gain access to Ethiopian insurgent groups through Eritrea. 

Despite the escalation risk Saudi’s alignment with Egypt and Eritrea poses, Saudi carefully  balances its alliance with Egypt while keeping Ethiopia stabilized. It mediates Ethiopia and Eritrea  to prevent military confrontation. However, Ethiopia remains vigilant of Saudi’s strategic regional  alignment. Saudi’s increasingly dominant role in the Red Sea combined with Egypt’s hostility  could bring a much more sophisticated, coordinated, and financed regional opposition bloc to  Ethiopia. This pushes Ethiopia to be even more close to UAE and RSF to deter adversarial support  to the Ethiopian rebels. Ethiopia worries Saudi’s growing reliance on Egypt and Eritrea and rivalry  with UAE could encourage support for the alliance for survival, which aggravates its predicament. 

6.3. The State of Israel 

Ethiopia and Israel have deeply rooted historical and multidimensional relations. Israel’s  periphery doctrine to build alliances with non-Arab states and counterbalancing threats in the  Red Sea and Nile Basin are the pillar principles for convergence. They have a defense agreement  on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to counter regional threats. The emerging  Tri-Axis (Ethiopia, India, and Israel) combines Israeli ISR and Indian economic and infrastructural  statecraft with maritime domain which places Ethiopia as a regional anchor. The socio-cultural  and diaspora relations in which the Beta Israel (Ethiopian Jewish) community forms a cultural  bridge between the two countries. 

Ethiopian partnership with Israel has significant and broad geopolitical implications for the Horn  of Africa. Ethiopia’s core existential priority, securing sovereign access to the Red Sea port directly  aligns with Israel’s expanding security presence around the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb.  Recognizing Somaliland and advocating for Ethiopian ambition for a Sea outlet will allow Israel to  counter Iranian backed Houthis, other regional hostile actors, and create a buffer in the Red Sea  maritime routes. 

Israel’s strong bilateral partnership with Ethiopia further aligns with that of UAE’s close security  and economic cooperation. The triangular (Ethiopia, Israel, and UAE) axis directly rivals the Saudi led group that aims at restricting access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s strategic alignment  with Israel’s Red Sea strategy forces Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran to recalibrate their regional postures  and adopt distinctive geopolitical countermeasures. 

Egypt views Ethiopia’s security partnership with Israel as an existential threat to its regional  dominance and pursues an aggressive strategic encirclement against Ethiopia. Egypt is fearful that  close ties with Israel will enable Ethiopia to project influence over the Nile River and Red Sea. It is  anxious that access to Israeli military technology would enable Ethiopia to effectively challenge its interests in the region. Using Israel as leverage, Ethiopia would successfully circumvent Egypt’s  strategic encirclement and containment. Thus, Egypt engages with counter-alliance through a  security pact with Eritrea and Somalia. Egypt is committed to protect its hegemony over the Red  Sea and recently deployed more military assets to Somalia to challenge Israeli’s presence in Somaliland and stretched Ethiopian military along its eastern border. 

Türkiye avoids direct confrontation and pursues a pragmatic balancing and economic hedging  with equidistance. It recognizes the growing Israeli influence in Somaliland and Ethiopia as  competitive expansion into its strong sphere of deep military and economic interests. It counters  Israeli’s expansion through commercial and defense agreements (mainly drone technology) with  Ethiopia while maintaining massive naval footprint in Somalia. Using its ties with Ethiopia and  Somalia, it acts as diplomatic buffer and mediated the Ankara Declaration to prevent a potential  war between Ethiopia and Somalia.  

Iran views Israel’s partnership with Ethiopia and Somaliland as a threat to its proxy operations  across the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb. It fears that presence in the Horn provides Israel with  forward operating sites to monitor Houthi activity and track Iranian movement. Iran pursues a  pragmatic diplomatic channel and engages with Ethiopia to build a buffer against Israeli’s encirclement. It succeeded in keeping Ethiopia at bay by offering drones during the 2021Tigray  war and aspires to prevent Ethiopia from falling exclusively into the Israeli Emirati side. Iran  leverages the Houthis as an asymmetric counterweight to the Israeli and Ethiopian presence in  Somaliland. 

6.4. The Republic of Türkiye 

Türkiye favors geopolitical pragmatism and recognizes that isolating Ethiopia, African diplomatic  capital with the largest demographic force, is counterproductive. It projects hard power in Somalia  and is a primary investor in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. It has successfully established a  multi-vector regional policy, serving as a key defense partner to Somalia while keeping deep  economic and military ties with Ethiopia.  

In response to Ethiopia’s Somaliland MoU, Türkiye signed a defense agreement with Somalia  under which Türkiye helped rebuild, equip, and train the Somali Navy while assisting in maritime  patrol to deter piracy, illegal fishing, and foreign incursions. In return, the pact offers Türkiye  offshore hydrocarbon exploration and extraction rights. Türkiye operates its largest overseas  military base in Somalia and serves as the primary institutional backbone for the Somali  National Army. It remains the single most country of Türkiye’s power projection in Africa where its  relations are anchored on security, naval protection, and state building. 

Despite a strong defense pact with Somalia, Türkiye maintains excellent relations and considers  Ethiopia as a key continental economic engine. Türkiye is the second-largest foreign investor (FDI  & Industrial) in Ethiopia. It has supplied Ethiopia with military hardware & drone technology that  were instrumental in repelling the 2021 rebel advances and earned immense political credit. This  unique dual trust from both Ethiopia and Somalia allowed Türkiye to emerge as a successful  mediator and balancer to restore diplomatic dialogue. The agreement preserved Somalian  sovereignty and discouraged unilateral state recognition of Somaliland while facilitating a reliable  commercial access to the sea for Ethiopia.  

Türkiye’s success in mediation served to counter its rivals indirectly. Reconciling Ethiopia with Somalia undermined Egypt’s strategy of using Somalia as a springboard to build a hostile  encirclement against Ethiopia. Türkiye’s defense assistance further diminished Somalian  dependence on Egyptian military support. It countered UAE’s autonomous enclave in Somaliland  by offering military training, state-building assistance, and strengthening the Somalian federal  government while keeping the doors open for Ethiopia. 

6.5. The Islamic Republic of Iran 

Iran is known more by its asymmetric influence and security disruption along the Red Sea than  economic investment. Iran maintains a tactical security alliance with the Sudanese Armed Forces  (SAF) which is backed by Saudi, Egypt, Türkiye, and Qatar. In the past, Saudi Arabia persuaded Djibouti,  Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan to sever ties with Iran in return for military and economic  incentives. Iran leans towards Eritrea than Ethiopia due to the direct access to the Red Sea Eritrea  could offer. Eritrea’s critical view of Israel as an Ethiopian enabler has been an additional advantage  that Iran exploits in Eritrea. Iran could use Eritrea as a staging ground (directly or via the Houthis) to open a second maritime front in the Red Sea shipping lanes, a major strategic risk that  dominant powers are monitoring closely.  

Strategically, Iran projects influence through proxies mainly via the Houthis to target the Red Sea  shipping lanes. Despite reduced posture since its war with US/Israel, Iran mainly engages via the Gulf  and other Red Sea states without bilateral ties with Horn countries. 

Iran’s broader strategy of countering the Gulf and westerns along the Red Sea shipping lanes  creates direct harm for landlocked Ethiopia. Iran maintains low-profile pragmatic ties with  Ethiopia and supplied the Mohajer-6 drones during the 2021 Tigray war. Although Iran isn’t a  critical player in the Ethiopian internal conflict directly, its relationship with Eritrea could offer  proximity to Ethiopian insurgents to counter the UAE. As it remains in war, it is unlikely to offer direct  support to Ethiopian rebels, at least in the short term. However, Iran’s proximity to Eritrea and  Sudan could extend to the alliance for survival to discourage Ethiopian growing convergence with  Israel and UAE and to prevent Ethiopia from falling exclusively under UAE and Israeli influence.  

However, focus on the Iran war has shifted Gulf countries priority and if prolonged, will diminish  external patronage over Horn countries. This may encourage local rivalries, especially between  Egypt and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, Türkiye is capitalizing on Gulf’s distraction and expanding its  own influence by encouraging Ethiopia-Eritrea to restrain. 

6.6. The State of QATR 

Qatar stands against the Ethiopia-UAE-Israel axis, aligns with the Saudi led bloc, opposes Israel’s  recognition of Somaliland, and plays a significant role in Somalia especially after the fallout  between Somalia and UAE. Qatar alignment with Somalia on sovereignty served as an instrument to  replace the UAE and become Somalian key security partner. In addition to UAE’s facilitation of  Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Qatar deeply resents UAE’s sponsored entry of a Yemeni  separatist leader in Somaliland. Qatar adheres to the “One Somalia” doctrine in support of  Somalian territorial integrity which positions it against Ethiopia. Its proximity to SAF in Sudan and  Eritrea may offer proximity to Ethiopian rebels and may pressurize the Ethiopian government to  officially renounce its Mou with Somaliland.  

Qatar mainly focuses on diplomatic mediation, humanitarian aid, and targeted investments, and  avoids military alignment with any single Horn actor. Along with Egypt and Iran, Qatar offers finances to  SAF in Sudan, humanitarian support in Somaliland, and aspires to become a regional mediator. However, Qatar’s closer ties with Eritrea in the past had constrained its relations with Ethiopia.  When its relations improved through pragmatic engagement, Qatar explored diplomatic channels  and investment opportunities in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, Qatar remains sympathetic to Eritrea  suggesting a potential hostility towards Ethiopian Red Sea ambition. Qatar maintains minimal  footprint in Ethiopian internal conflict and remains invested in Somalia and Sudan. 

7. Middle Powers Rivalry and the Evolving Threats Against Internal Stability

7.1 The Saudi-Emirates Rivalry and the implication for Ethio-Eritrea Relations 

Gulf’s transactional engagement with Horn states have fragmented domestic politics, weakened  governance mechanisms, militarize strategic maritime routes, and embolden authoritarian  actors. Gulf rivalry encourages state and non-state actors in the region to become client partners.  In Somalia, Gulf-backed alignments emboldened breakaway federal states against the central  government. In Sudan, UAE and Saudis alignment along the belligerent RSF and SAF Generals,  respectively, engulfed Sudan in a quagmire that is spilling over into Ethiopia. Partnering with UAE  ties Ethiopia to align with RSF in Sudan which in turn could strengthen domestic insurgencies  through support from Emirates’s adversaries.  

The Saudi and Emirates led blocs would approach the Ethiopian alliance for survival from  opposite positions. UAE executes its Horn of Africa strategy by aligning with the Ethiopian federal  government and thus positions structurally against the alliance. While the UAE will stand along  Ethiopia to protect its investment and counter Saudi’s dominance in the region, strong ties with  Egypt would push Saudi to align with Eritrea in support of the new alliance indirectly. Although  Saudi is mediating Ethiopia and Eritrea, it is likely to support the position of Eritrea against  Ethiopia to curb Emiratis penetration into the region. The tripartite security pact among Egypt,  Eritrea, and Somalia directly reinforces the emerging anti-Ethiopian government alliance.  

The rivalry of Gulf states is a double edge sword. On one hand, if Gulf attention shifts to Iran  and/or Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea may not be economically strong to support Ethiopian rebels directly and this will allow the Ethiopian military to redirect its full capability towards  internal rebels. On the other hand, if Gulf rivalry fractures the GCC, it encourages proxy conflicts,  exacerbates Ethiopian internal conflicts, and entangles Horn states into the Saudi-UAE contest. The Saudi bloc’s support to Egypt, Eritrea, and Sudan could indirectly reach Ethiopian rebel  alliance to curb Ethiopian growing ambition in the Red Sea 

7.2. Rivalry among Israel, Türkiye and UAE and Ethiopian Internal Stability

 As signatory to the Abrham’s accord, Israel leans towards the UAE-led axis. UAE reportedly  facilitated the Israeli’s recognition of Somaliland to counter Iranian-aligned networks in the Red  Sea. Israel’s collaboration with UAE and Ethiopia directly feeds into Ethiopian domestic and  regional tensions. Israel has opened a new economic office in Ethiopia and is persuaded to abstain  from voting against Israel on the UN resolution concerning the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Such  partnership entrenched the Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia-Sudan partnership to contain Ethiopia.  

Alignment with Israel and UAE exacerbates Ethiopian vulnerability and offers Ethiopia’s internal  insurgencies access to the adversaries of the UAE-Israel bloc. Entanglement in adversarial actors  transforms Ethiopian insurgency into active extension of Middle Eastern rivalries and creates  additional pressure points for the Ethiopian government from within. Israel’s alignment with  Emirates and Ethiopia and recognition of Somaliland stirred the Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi, and Türkiye alliance to counterbalance. Türkiye responds well to the Ethiopian policy of port diversification  and desires closer partnership with Ethiopia, but not at the expense of Somalian sovereignty. Türkiye condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and stood against the UAE-Israel partnership. It deployed F-16 fighter jets in Somalia to deter Israeli’s growing influence and  warning Ethiopia and others from further unilateral recognition.  

Competition between Türkiye and UAE in Somalia added another layer of complexity to the  Horn’s security. Türkiye most likely will not support Ethiopian rebellion groups unless Ethiopia  desires to activate the 2025 MoU with Somaliland. By restraining Ethiopia, Türkiye stabilizes the  region which otherwise would have irritated the Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia axis to directly support the  Eritrean coordinated “Tsimdo” and the alliance for survival. While fighting its domestic rebels,  Ethiopia must satisfy Türkiye’s demand of not undermining Somalian sovereignty, the failure of  which would push Türkiye to activate its partnership with Egypt and Sudan to channel resources  to Ethiopian rebels, should Türkiye desire. 

8. From Nile to the Red Sea: How Ethio-Egyptian Rivalry is shaping the Horn

8.1 Egypt’s Strategic Encirclement of Ethiopia  

The completion of GERD has fundamentally altered the hydro-political landscape of the Nile  Basin. In response, Egypt shifted its campaign for legally binding agreement into military  encirclement. It engages in aggressive diplomatic offensives and institutional multilateralism by  framing the Ethiopian MoU as an illegal aggression of Somalian sovereignty both within the Arab  League and the African Union. It continues lobbing the UN to frame GERD and Nile water security  as an international peace and security issue. Egypt continues pressurizing Ethiopia to get  operational concessions and the release of more water during the dry seasons, which undermines  Ethiopian sovereign rights. 

Ethiopian sudden ambition to have sovereign access in the Red Sea directly contradicted Egyptian  hegemony over the Red Sea. Egypt capitalized on the regional tension and partnered with  Ethiopian neighbors to pressurize Ethiopia and resolve the lingering dispute over GERD. The  tripartite defense pact serves Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrean alliance as bedrock and has been  extended to Djibouti and SAF in Sudan. The pact adheres to the foundation of the Red Sea  Council that Egypt helped to establish and asserts that Red Sea belongs exclusively to coastal  nations and intentionally excludes Ethiopia out of maritime frameworks. The pact transformed  Ethiopia’s Red Sea quest from a localized diplomatic dispute with Somalia into a multinational  proxy standoff that eventually forced Ethiopia to shift away from unilateral recognition of  Somaliland, at least for now.  

The deployment of Egyptian troops and military assets in Somalia represents a consequential  security shift in the Horn of Africa and seriously undermines Ethiopian regional posture. This  direct military footprint affects the security landscape, power balances, and proxy dynamics  across the Horn. For example, Egyptian military presence in Somalia stretches Ethiopian National  Defense Forces, which indirectly strengthens Ethiopian domestic rebels and weakens the Ethiopian  government from within. In a major escalation, Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan signed the  Alamein Declaration by extending the tripartite alliance. The quadrilateral summit created an  exclusive political and military bloc designed to coordinate intelligence, protect Nile water rights,  and effectively isolate Ethiopia. Egypt would implement the pact by deploying 15,000 troops to  Somalia and securing naval access in Eritrea.

If Ethiopia succeeded in gaining access to the Red Sea, it will most likely face Egyptian naval  blockades under the guise of defending Somalian territorial integrity. The Egyptian military in Somalia  aims at restraining Ethiopia from implementing its MoU with Somaliland and discouraging its  quest for access to the Red Sea. Following the establishment of the alliance for survival,  the Ethiopian federal government was forced to announce its desire to withdraw its peacekeeping  military personnel from Somalia to suppress domestic insurgents. 

Egypt capitalizes on regional frictions to build anti-Ethiopian regional alliances. It collaborates with the TPLF hardliner faction and other broader regional dissidents. It offers asymmetric support for  Ethiopian insurgencies via regional proxies to keep Ethiopia stays busy on its internal security and  diminish its capacity to project influence in the wider Horn of Africa. It channels clandestine  intelligence and covert diplomatic support, including indirect material backing and logistics  through allied regional proxies, especially Eritrea and SAF.  

8.2 Ethiopia’s Counter-Encirclement Strategy and Regional Alliances 

In response to Egyptian penetration in Somalia, Ethiopia sought to cultivate regional proxies by  deepening its security leverage in autonomous Puntland and Somaliland. Ethiopian ties with local  militias opposed to the federal government could force the Somalian government to restrain and  discourage its growing partnership with Egypt.  

UAE is leveraging its capital and drone technology to enable Ethiopia to remain a dominant and  friendly anchor state that will allow UAE to project influence and implement its overarching  geopolitical strategy in the Horn. UAE’s support for Ethiopia is motivated by its desire to secure  maritime gateways and control trade, logistics, and naval choke points surrounding the Bab-el Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea corridor. By isolating Egypt, UAE aims at  curtailing Saudi’s increasing ambition to dictate Red Sea security singlehandedly. UAE views  Egypt’s close ties with Saudi and aggressive regional posture unacceptable and offer Ethiopia with  critical support, diplomatic shield, and serve as structural counterweight to Egyptian hydro hegemony on the Nile.  

UAE and Ethiopia converged to counter the Egyptian led anti-Ethiopia encirclement through multi-tiered strategies. UAE funnels billions and finances the Berbera corridor including a highway to  link to Ethiopia which serves as backbone for Red Sea access strategy. UAE encourages discreet  international ties to prepare Somaliland for independence and neutralizes Somalian ability to  completely deny Ethiopia maritime access. If Ethiopian quest for access to sea via Somaliland  meets strong opposition, UAE would offer alternative transit logistics facilitation through its other  port networks without succumbing to an Egyptian naval embargo. 

UAE’s engagement in drone diplomacy and air superiority continues providing military hardware,  maintenance, and surveillance capabilities to bolster Ethiopia. It shares critical maritime and  logistics intelligence to keep Ethiopia abreast of Egyptian naval movements. As primary creditor  to Egypt, UAE signals and discourages escalatory warfare in the Horn of Africa by imposing fiscal  restraint on Egypt. UAE could exploit its financial leverage over Egypt to limit Egypt’s fiscal ability  to sustain expensive long-term military deployments in Somalia, along the Ethiopian border.

8.3 Deepening China–Egypt Relations and the Implication for Ethiopia 

Chinese interest in the region is primarily connectivity, trade, security and strategic access to the  Red Sea and Suez Canal, which signals expanding interest in regional security. Ethiopia is anxious  that Egypt’s deepening security relations with China could provide Egypt with additional  diplomatic, economic, and strategic leverage that undermines Ethiopian interest on the Nile River  and Red Sea. 

Economically, Egypt is emerging as a Chinese strategic hub that connects Asia, Africa, and Europe  through the Suez Canal route which unavoidably adds a security dimension in their bilateral  relations. Ethiopia maintains “all-weather” strategic relations focusing mainly on economic  partnership, which compels China to manage the Egypt-Ethiopian dispute over GERD neutrally rather than decisively aligning to either side. China is most likely to maintain strategically balanced  relationships with both countries. 

However, China would face its most structural dilemma on GERD. While Ethiopia considers  GERD as a development tool for energy and national sovereignty, Egypt views GERD as a  fundamental national-security issue. Chinese support to Ethiopian development could be  perceived by Egypt as contradictory to its strategic interest. Alternatively, Chinese bold alignment  with Egypt on GERD would undermine China’s extraordinary economic partnership with Ethiopia  and diplomatic ties with sub-Sahara Africa. Thus, China would be more interested in promoting  negotiation, stability and mutually acceptable arrangements than openly endorsing either side’s  maximalist position. 

In addition to GERD, the strategic position of China, Egypt, and Ethiopia on the Red Sea could  complicate the geopolitical calculus. Heavy reliance on the Red Sea and Suez Canal for its economic  interest is pushing China to advocate for a new regional security framework which signals its deep  interest in a new Red Sea security architecture far beyond mere economic relations with regional  states. This converges with Ethiopian quest for secured sovereign access in the Red Sea and  Egypt’s desire to have a dominant role in the Red Sea security and Nile strategic water resources.  However, despite overlapping interests, Egypt’s commitment to exclude non-littoral countries  from the Red Sea security sharply opposes Ethiopian ambition. For this reason, some may be  tempted to perceive the convergence between China and Egypt as an anti-Ethiopian partnership.  

Ethiopia should consider expanding into the China–Ethiopia–Horn industrial corridor rather than the  wanning China–Ethiopia economic partnership. The most strategic dilemma Ethiopia should  navigate is “How could it fit itself into the emerging Chinese broader Red Sea–East Africa  strategy.” Ethiopia must revisit its grand strategy to be linked to the Chinese production and  logistics network and compel China to support Ethiopian economic integration into the Red Sea.  Ethiopia must also learn from Egypt to redesign its alignment with China, US, EU, Gulf, Türkiye,  and India to extract economic and strategic value from each relationship.

9. Restoring the State: Emerging Paradigm for National Salvation 

The coming together of ethnonationalist military-political elites can be considered a paradigm  shift. The convergence diminishes horizontal conflicts and facilitates negotiation with the  incumbent administration. It should distinguish ideological alliance from strategic alignment and  whether Ethiopian rebels could cooperate without agreeing on what Ethiopia should become.  

Opposition groups with contradictory ideology could theoretically cooperate based on shared  enemy or “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” logic. Shared opposition to the federal  government could temporarily override deep disagreements among insurgent groups. An alliance doesn’t necessarily need to answer, “What political dispensation should they need to offer  currently?” prior to resolving “What could have prevented the alliance from achieving any  desirable political objective?” If so, the alliance could operate at two levels: (1) common short term objective that aims either to weaken or remove the incumbent government, and (2) separate  long-term objectives to decide afterward what political order should replace the administration.  However, such agreement remains purely tactical rather than coherent ideology for governance. 

The dominant challenge for the federal government is not singularly defeating rebel groups but  rather the most consequential transition from coercive maneuvering to a legitimate political  settlement and mobilization of Ethiopia’s enormous national power. Without a compromise, even if the  federal government could arguably defeat insurgencies, it may still lose politically. Similarly, using  resources from UAE/Ethiopian rival states, rebel groups could weaken the federal militarily but  not control and reconfigure the state. The current crisis is not a struggle for controlling the center  but redefining what kind of state should Ethiopia become which calls for a genuinely negotiated  political settlement to bring Ethiopia back into stability.  

In September 2026, the alliance used advanced drones or technological warfare which signals  access to external supply and entanglement with a more powerful proxy. It challenges the  government’s established superiority in drone technology. However, military victory alone is  unlikely to resolve the internal crisis. Only inclusive negotiation and painful concessions among all  actors and redefining state political structures is needed to earn political legitimacy at home and  reassert autonomy in today’s most delicate geopolitical Horn of Africa region.  

9.1 The emergence of “Tsimdo” and its Continued Development  

Ethiopian intensive rhetoric on the Assab port and desire to disarm the Amhara regional forces in  2023 has shattered deteriorating relations with Eritrea and Fano, respectively, both of which were  key allies during the Tigray war. “Tsimdo” (a Tigrigna word for partnering) was conceived in March  2023 through a bilateral initiative between the Eritrean government and the TPLF hardliner old  guards who saw the Pretoria Agreement as a complete surrender.  

Ethiopia views “tsimdo” as a dangerous military alliance of “Axis of Destruction“ designed to  overthrow the federal government. It believes “Tsimdo” is a covenant of Ethiopian “historical  enemies” that aims at stripping Ethiopian regional influence. “Tsimdo” rejects Ethiopian accusation  and defends itself as a peaceful, cross-border “people-to-people” framework committed to grassroot conflict resolution among borderline communities of Sudan, Eritrea, and northern  Ethiopia, implying the regional convergence beyond Ethiopian border. 

Irrespective of its effectiveness, “tsimdo” appears to be real and expanding under the  coordination of Eritrea and TPLF. It serves as a platform between Ethiopian and foreign actors and  funnels resources. Eritrean collaboration with hardcore TPLF leadership succeeded in convincing  some elements from Fano and fractured OLA, both of whom were previously exiled in Eritrea, to  join the evolving alliance. In October 2025, a loose military alignment involving Eritrea, Sudanese  Armed Forces (SAF), TPLF, Fano, and OLA convened in Sudan and Kenya in May and August 2026,  respectively, for consultative meetings. 

In September 2026, a broader Ethiopian rebel group of seven Ethiopian opposition  groups formed an alliance for survival with the announced objective of joint political, military, and  diplomatic actions to challenge and replace the ruling Prosperity Party (PP). In the past, these  rebels fought each other but forged a loose, tactical anti federal government alliance without  deliberation. TPLF and Fano crossed a fundamental red line due to the irreconcilable positions  over the same disputed territory which represented Fano’s founding grievance against TPLF.  Similarly, Fano and OLA have fundamental ideological differences. 

The alliance is a work-in-progress as mutual suspicion still exists not only among Ethiopian rebels  but also between Eritrea and TPLF. A unified and fully functional anti- government alliance  remains limited despite genuine signs of cooperation manifested through troop mobilization and intensive media campaigns. The alliance will remain fragile for the foreseeable future as it is a  marriage of convenience and lack shared ideology. 

Egypt tasked Eritrea to organize the Ethiopian opposition groups in collaboration with TPLF.  Egyptian intelligence and security covertly channeled logistical support to Ethiopian domestic  insurgents via Eritrea and Sudan. Evidence suggests a wider and complex web of tactical  convergences among external actors exerting compounded security pressures to contain  Ethiopia. In addition to drawing SAF, Egypt’s proximity to the Eritrean regime proves the  regionalization of Ethiopian internal conflict with Egyptian clandestine operational and covert  logistics, armaments, and diplomatic support.  

9.2 United in Division: What forces Ethnonationalist groups to Converge?

 If each rebel group perceives that they cannot defeat the incumbent government single handedly  despite interconnected threats, they can converge to mount a more coordinated attack. They  hope to force the vulnerable administration to stretch its military, intelligence, financial, and  political resources across several fronts at the same time. If implemented coherently, the strategy  will suffocate, divide, and pressurize ruling party officials and senior military officers for change.  Groups with contradictory ideologies could converge if they have shared enemies and overlapping  grievances.  

Rebels have not yet designed a shared national political program with specific strategic objectives. However, they may have common short-term interest in weakening the center, ensuring its political survival, and pushing the conflict outward. Instead of agreeing on a maximum program,  rebels seem to have converged towards a minimum program of changing the current political security structure without delving into political settlement. In 1991, for example, Ethiopian rebels’ groups with different ethnicities and political orientation cooperated because defeating the Derg  regime came first, but only TPLF has succeeded to dominate the federal power structure. 

Ideological differences and territorial disputes among members would become detrimental to a  national political program. Despite convergence, each group may have calculated strategically  that if the other two groups pressurized the administration, the federal government would be  overstretched to fight three insurgencies and impose its will by force. For the alliance, tactical  cooperation remains the most rational choice, even if the three groups do not trust each other. 

The paradox is that weakening the government makes the alliance more attractive to the rebels.  However, lack of shared political programs makes the alliance weaker once it achieves its  minimum tactical objective, if at all it is feasible. If the alliance succeeded in weakening the  federal government, the fundamental question emerges over who would control the center, underscoring military cooperation alone will never produce a granted political integration. 

To be successful, the alliance must have, while postponing the most divisive constitutional  questions, designed at least a minimum national program on how to establish a provisional and  subsequently inclusive transitional government. Without a comprehensive national political  framework, a tactical alliance could only defeat or seriously weaken a common adversary and  produce a dangerous competition among former allies. Rebels could weaken their common  enemy following which the alliance is most likely to collapse from internal contradictions. 

It is likely that the alliance could coordinate rebels’ asymmetrical capabilities, institutionalize  fragmented units, expand geographical presence, build local, regional, and international  legitimacy and become formidable challengers to the government. However, defeating the  government is much easier than replacing it successfully through political pluralism. Therefore,  despite suspicion and deep mistrust. The fundamental issue is not whether rebels could  temporarily cooperate, but rather “could they transform their tactical convergence into a credible  and inclusive national political program.” 

9.3. The New Alliance and its Pathway for Progress

Whether the alliance would emerge as a cohesive military machine remains to be seen. It is still  fluid and its ability to overthrow the government is much less certain. The alliance is unlikely to  become one unified army, but temporary convergence could transform Ethiopia’s conflict from  multiple disconnected regional insurgencies into a coordinated national political crisis. 

The biggest strategic pressure it could possibly exert is simultaneous political-military pressure  from several directions, stretching government security apparatus, and making political control  increasingly expensive. Ultimately, increased pressure could deteriorate political confidence that  will be followed by elite defections and increased vulnerability of the regime. But the fundamental  challenge facing the emerging alliance is how can they govern the state that their insurgency made  ungovernable without an inclusive national political program?

In the absence of an alternative comprehensive political vision, the government would benefit by  presenting itself as the only actor capable of preventing a national crisis. Controlling some territory  is not equivalent to replacing the federal government. If the objective is to replace the  government, the alliance could be more consequential if it transforms the tactical military  alliance into a minimum national political program and offers credible alternative political order.  This effectively renders the government’s monopoly unnecessary and/or unsustainable, including  depriving constituencies of reason to align with the administration. 

The alliance must elaborate its position on Ethiopian unity and the distribution of political power.  They should propose a road map to guarantee unity without forced homogenization, autonomy  without disintegration, and political inclusion and security guarantees through broader Security  Sector Reform. Ultimately, the alliance does not need to agree on what Ethiopia should become  but agree on the rules and mechanisms by which Ethiopians should peacefully decide about what  kind of arrangement would Ethiopians decide about their future. 

10. The Path to Lasting Concord 

10.1. Would military confrontation resolve the Ethiopian predicament? 

Due to a lack of a functional and trusted dialogue mechanism, the political discourse remains in a  severe stalemate. In the absence of political negotiation, military victory would not resolve the  seasoned state structural crisis. Even if the federal government successfully suppresses some of  the insurgencies and installs negative peace, it cannot win the broader political legitimacy without  political reform and institutional reconfiguration. Conversely, for the rebels, while capable of  degrading federal military capacity and capturing strategic locations, they lack unified ideology,  national program, and cohesion to bring stability and reinstitute new political dispensation. 

The government does not necessarily need to defeat every opposition group to remain in power.  The government must entertain alternate avenues to achieve peaceful political settlement among  competing elites beyond administrative control. The fundamental crisis revolves around elite  competition, and the government should work to de-escalate intensified conflicts through genuine  and comprehensive negotiation beyond cessation of hostilities. Optimizing regime’s survival and  state consolidation needs new political architecture in which federating units can compete  without perceiving political defeat as collective annihilation. Conversely, the alliance for survival  should explore seriously how to transform military confrontation into political settlement.  

The central question is: “Could the incumbent administration end insurgency, ethnic polarization,  state fragmentation, and become politically dominant to reclaim legitimacy? Despite holding on  to a fragmented state with fast eroding legitimacy, the administration is unlikely to consolidate  political power without serious political reform. Despite winning the 2026 election, the government  has lost political legitimacy from dominant regions. The deliberation of the National Dialogue  Commission showed acceptable procedures in isolating relevant national agenda, but it excluded  key insurgent groups and other dissident voices which signals it is unlikely to address the  countries’ glaring and immediate challenges in the face of regionalized conflicts.

The alliance draws strength from different geographic, social, and political constituencies which  makes it almost impossible for the government to neutralize. If managed carefully, diversities in  ethnicity and ideology could release multiple pressure points against the government and offer  alternative discourse to the public. The dilemma is not whether the newly formed alliance would  defeat the government. In the face of a common adversary, ideological contradictions could easily  be suppressed to counter a shared enemy. The question remains how would the alliance convince  Ethiopians that the next administration will be more inclusive, stable, and legitimate?  

The alliance is intentionally postponing the political settlement until after removing the incumbent  administration which carries forward the temptation to redefine state structure single handedly by  a potential dominant group. If the alliance becomes militarily strong, the need for political  architecture becomes even more important in which a dominant group may attempt to maneuver  the political outcome and serve a narrow group interest.  

If the alliance seeks domestic legitimacy and international recognition, it must confront the  question of what comes next much earlier and demonstrate convincingly how it would manage  contradictory ideologies. Without harmonization of the endgame, the diversity that gives the  alliance strengths would eventually become a great vulnerability and an unfortunate mechanism for  its collapse. The strategic cost of internal disagreements would even become more significant if  the shared adversary collapses and opens the “common-enemy paradox” in which former allies  would become bitter enemies to grab power following victory. Military victory without a negotiated  political program will only lead to power vacuum that eventually could lead to protracted military  confrontation among camaraderie, as was the case in Angola in 1975 or in Ethiopia in 1991. 

Members of the alliance must confront ideological contradictions and forge a manageable  pluralism through a political compromise that will serve as an instrument for institutional rule. One  way of preventing future fragmentation is establishing the principles and rules of governance  before victory rather than drafting an ideological manifesto. A military victory without a political program  couldn’t guarantee the institutionalization of legitimate new order. The most pragmatic and  strategic victory is not winning the military confrontation. It is harmonizing Ethiopian political  actors and building a shared future for all stakeholders to allow citizens to live peacefully and realize their respective full potential. 

10.2. How would the Alliance Overcome its Contradictions and Build Lasting Stability? 

For the alliance to be successful, beyond intense media campaigns, it must identify and satisfy at  least the following five conditions. 

1. A minimum national political program 

Given the massive security crisis and urgency for peace to prevail, the alliance shouldn’t be asked  whether they stand for unitary Ethiopia, ethnic federalism, confederation or self-determination.  The alliance should design a minimum national program to address the immediate political crisis  and should not attempt to resolve lingering major constitutional questions. They must recognize  their disagreement about the final political architecture and agree on the fundamental rules of  how to resolve them. They should agree at least on the following three-phased transitional  arrangement to reconcile ideological variation.

• Phase one of the transitions should focus on cessation of hostilities, release of political  prisoners, reintroducing political freedoms, institutionalizing transitional order, security sector reform, and humanitarian rehabilitation.  

• Phase two focuses on political settlement and comprises constitutional conference,  mechanisms for territorial disputes, negotiating regional autonomy and building electoral  institutions.  

• Phase three will deal with legitimate competition by defining the rules of the game for  competitive elections, constitutional referendum, and peaceful transfer of power. This will  allow rebels and others to retain different visions and compete for power without making  cooperation impossible. 

2. The alliance must resolve the real or perceived “winner’s dilemma” 

The alliance must assure the public about the breadth of intragroup relations based on  democratic principles. As members of the alliance have differences in organizational strengths  and leadership capabilities, they must decide on who would control the national defense forces,  intelligence and security services, federal police, economic centers such as Banks, Airports,  Telecommunication and state bureaucratic machines. Successful transition  requires comprehensive pre-arranged agreement on the rule of power sharing far beyond coordinating military operation command and control. Ethiopian political groups in the past have  exploited or misused public thrust and derail transitions for political expediency.  

3. The alliance must offer reassurance to stakeholders 

Transforming the insurgent alliance into a national political alliance requires inclusivity and public  buy-in. Diverse stakeholders must be consulted for endorsement and legitimization. The alliance  of the traditional trio dominant groups and elite tokenism will only lead to rejection and counter mobilization. The alliance must not be transferring power from one ethnic bloc to another but  rather create a national political system. If the alliance wants to emerge politically powerful and  earn public support, no segment could potentially monopolize or dominate the state. 

Before forcing the rebels to reconcile its self-contradictions, the alliance could use the untapped  Ethiopian diaspora to build consensus, design a comprehensive diplomatic and public relations  eco-system to ensure the Ethiopian public and the international community. However, despite  immense potential, diaspora mimics domestic faultline, exacerbating internal contradictions.  

Diaspora, especially in the US, has substantial economic and diplomatic leverages and exerts  disproportionally higher influence through political activism. It offers alternate media platforms, but most outlets entertain only a handful of disgruntled politicians, disconnected intellectuals, and radical activists. The fragmented diaspora is mistrustful of home institutions, clashes with domestic  realities, and remains unable to mediate the current impasse between the rebels and  government. Therefore, the alliance should be cautious when navigating the diaspora to take  advantage of its immense capabilities. 

4. Transforming from military to political program and civilian leadership  Rebel groups could win over the military conflict and lose politically if the alliance doesn’t earn  political legitimacy through a negotiated political transition. If the alliance remains only a collection  of rebels, the incumbent administration will remain the sole representative of the Ethiopian  state despite eroding legitimacy and increasing insecurity. Establishing parallel political legitimacy and credible civilian leadership composed of genuine representatives of constituencies beyond  the armed groups is critical. Transitional security forces must be politically neutral and obey civilian leadership. The leadership should ensure that every community receives political  guarantees during the transition and constitutional questions would be addressed through a genuine and inclusive dialogue.  

5. Mechanism for resolving internal contradictions among member organizations 

Members of the alliance have different propensity for a stronger Ethiopian national-state, regional  autonomy, reformed ethnic-federal arrangement, or self-determination. Such fundamental  differences in state structure pose serious challenges, may exacerbate the deep mutual mistrust and horizontal conflict, and render the alliance dysfunctional. Therefore, members of the alliance  must adhere to no permanent monopoly of power, no forceful alteration of territorial settlement,  and no collective punishment against any communities. Sustainable and effective alliance requires devising institutional mechanisms based on democratic values on how to resolve  differences when or before they arise. The alliance should restrain from political maneuvering to consolidate power for a specific group. 

10.3. Appeal to the International Community 

Ethiopian political solutions must ultimately come from internal actors. However, amid the internal  crisis, lack of neutral platform, and regional tension, political actors could not negotiate. Powers have the moral responsibility, notwithstanding sovereign rights, to pressurize internal actors for a  compromise and negotiated settlement. The International Community should encourage a multi-layered engagement to respond to Ethiopia’s internal ills and its legitimate quest for access to the  Red Sea. However, external powers could offer financial, technological, and diplomatic support  but not settle domestic political fractures. Without internal reconciliation, foreign actors couldn’t  implement Security Sector Reform (SSR) and negotiate Disarmament, Demobilization, and  Reintegration (DDR) as has been seen in the Pretoria Agreement. 

10.3.1. The United States (US) and European Union (EU) 

The US and EU have demonstrated more interest and have more leverage than other powers to  broker peace. The US has the 2021 accountability-focused executive order which offers legal  power to target individuals responsible for prolonging conflict, blocking humanitarian access, or  obstructing ceasefires. Leaving the Red Sea region for middle powers would only exacerbate the  region’s predicament and aggravate maritime security along the Red Sea shipping lanes. If the US  couldn’t intervene with strong measures, the proxy conflict would spill into the Red Sea  region where US strategic interest of maritime security, counterterrorism, and containing hostile  states will be compromised. They should discourage zero-sum transactional engagements by imposing meaningful and tangible constraints on those that are detrimental to regional peace and  US strategic interests.  

1. The US and EU should condition financing and direct foreign assistance to verifiable  milestones within a restructured genuine and all-inclusive National Dialogue. They should mandate that the Ethiopian government must negotiate with politico-military groups to  achieve national harmony.  

2. The US and EU should collaborate with regional actors to facilitate a multi-lateral  comprehensive two waters (Nile and Red Sea) regional framework. According to this  framework, Ethiopia should appease Egyptian concern on Nile water, offer agricultural land,  and supply electric power to the region in return for a granted and reliable access to the Red  Sea corridor. They should support financing Ethiopian port diversification with neighboring  coastal states. Ethiopia would formally renounce its unilateral de jure territorial recognition of  Somaliland and maximize GERD’s potential for the management of waterflow and power  production that ultimately creates interdependency and stability. 

3. The US should encourage, especially Saudi and Egypt, to chart a more inclusive regional  diplomatic architecture and join non-coastal countries into the Red Sea Council and Abraham  Accord. The US should establish an institution that collaborates directly with the African Union,  Türkiye, and Qatar that have legacies in resolving African conflicts. The US should persuade  Saudis and Emiratis to curb their transactional engagement with non-state actors and warn against channeling indirect support to sub state and non-state actors. 

10.3.2. How could BRICS help Resolve Regional Crisis and Build Stability 

The 2026 BRICS summit underscored the great importance of Gulf–BRICS cooperation. BRICS  member states have major interests in ports, food security, and Red Sea maritime commerce  and security. It should encourage a Horn–Gulf focused strategic economic architecture rather than  treating the Red Sea exclusively as a security issue. Membership in BRICS offers Egypt and  Ethiopia unique diplomatic and institutional arrangements to transcend rivalry. BRICS should  encourage the Horn region to transform from a geopolitical battleground to economic hub by  taking advantage of Ethiopian strategic location, critical assets of water, and expanding  demography to promote regional stability. 

1. The Water-Energy-Food Nexus: 

Ethiopia should propose a comprehensive BRICS-backed  African Water SecurityInitiative. By linking cheap electricity exports and regulated flood  control to Sudanese agriculture and Egyptian water-management predictability, Ethiopia  should reposition the Nile as an engine of regional interdependence rather than conflict. 

2. Port corridor Diversification: 

The New Development Bank (NDB) of BRICS should support  an integrated upstream-downstream investment fund and view the Nile as a cooperation  platform rather than an exclusive hard-security lens. BRICS should bundle Ethiopian port  diversification with GERD’s cheap hydroelectric output, agricultural expansion and  predictable water-management.

10.3.3. Other Multilateral Agencies 

1. The African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) should collaborate with the Arab League under the auspices of the UN to encourage multi-layer  cooperation on the Nile River and Red Sea. The cooperation should recognize Ethiopia’s sovereign right to develop its water resources and gain reliable access to the Red Sea. In return, Ethiopia should cooperate on hydropower, irrigation, drought management, electricity exports, food  security, agricultural modernization, and climate adaptation.  

2. The AU and IGAD, in cooperation with the UN, should engage the Red Sea Council to revisit its  exclusionary “littoral states first” governance model. They should advocate for an expanded  transregional Red Sea maritime integration that includes non-littoral states to defuse the isolation of landlocked economies. 

3. The AU, IGAD, and other stakeholders should pressurize Ethiopian political actors,  notwithstanding sovereign rights, to converge into a comprehensive Security Sector Reform  (SSR) and an integral Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) with the support  of the AU Peace and Security Council to mitigate the existential “winner’s dilemma.”

PDF version of the article available here

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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