The alliance may be strong enough to challenge the government. But is it wise enough to govern Ethiopia?
By: Habte H.
Few developments expose the contradictions of Ethiopian politics more dramatically than the emerging alliance between Fano, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and other armed opposition movements. Fano and the TPLF are not ordinary political rivals. They come from opposite sides of a catastrophic war. Their constituencies carry memories of killings, displacement, humiliation and destruction. Each side considers itself a victim; each holds the other partly responsible for its suffering.
Yet former enemies are now attempting to cooperate against the government of Abiy Ahmed. This may be political maturity. It may also be desperation disguised as strategy. The alliance’s importance does not lie only in its capacity to pressure or even defeat the government. Its real significance lies in a harder question: can organizations shaped by war, grievance and ethnic mobilization create a political order that is more peaceful and inclusive than the one they seek to replace? Removing a government is one challenge. Preventing the country from collapsing the following morning is another.
Why this improbable alliance makes sense
Despite their bitter history, Fano and the TPLF now share an immediate adversary. Both accuse the PP of concentrating power, using military force to resolve political disputes and marginalizing communities that resist its authority. Their strengths are also potentially complementary. The TPLF possesses decades of organizational experience, diplomatic connections, administrative knowledge and disciplined political machinery. Fano has demonstrated popular mobilization, disciplined fighters, local resilience and the capacity to sustain resistance despite military pressure.
The wider coalition reportedly includes movements from several regions and proposes creating a transitional administration. In theory, such breadth could turn a collection of regional insurgencies into a national political force. But having the same enemy is not the same as having the same country in mind. The alliance may know what it wants to remove. It has not yet shown Ethiopians what it wants to build.
A tactical pact is not reconciliation
There is a fundamental difference between a tactical arrangement and a strategic alliance. A tactical pact says: “Let us cooperate until our common enemy is defeated.” A strategic alliance says: “We have agreed on how Ethiopia should be governed, how our disputes will be resolved and how every citizen will be protected after political change.” The first requires shared anger. The second requires shared principles. At present, the coalition appears to possess much more of the former.
This is dangerous because Ethiopian history is crowded with movements that were clear about the regime they wanted to destroy but dangerously unprepared for the country they inherited. Political victory then became the foundation of a new system of domination. The Derg overthrew an imperial order and produced military authoritarianism. The EPRDF defeated the Derg and constructed another highly controlled political system. Abiot Ahmed came to power promising democratic opening and national reconciliation, only for the country to descend into wars, repression and deeper fragmentation. Why should Ethiopians believe that the next armed coalition will be different? The alliance must answer that question before asking the public for its trust.
Can the TPLF be trusted?
Fano has strong reasons to treat the TPLF cautiously. For nearly three decades, the TPLF stood at the centre of an authoritarian order. It developed considerable state capacity, but it also presided over contested elections, imprisonment of opponents, restrictions on political organization and a system in which real power was concentrated within a narrow political establishment.
Many Amhara activists associate that period with political marginalization, territorial loss and the suppression of Amhara identity-based demands. The TPLF may now speak the language of coalition and inclusion. But has it genuinely reconsidered its political culture – or has it merely lost the power that once allowed it to dominate others? That is not an unreasonable question. Organizations do not become democratic simply because they are pushed out of government.
The TPLF must demonstrate, through binding commitments rather than speeches, that it no longer regards alliances as instruments for returning to power. It must accept equality among coalition members, independent investigation of past abuses and the possibility that democratic processes may produce outcomes it dislikes.
Can Fano become more than an armed resistance?
The same scrutiny must be applied to Fano. Fano has become an expression of widespread Amhara anger, insecurity and political abandonment. Its resilience cannot be dismissed. But resistance alone is not a programme for governing a complex country of more than 120 million people.
What is Fano’s position on constitutional reform, regional autonomy, minority protection, citizenship, economic recovery, transitional justice and civilian control of the military? How would it reassure Ethiopians who fear that Amhara nationalism could become another project of political domination? A movement cannot demand that others understand its grievances while refusing to recognize theirs.
If Fano wants to become a national political force, it must speak beyond the pain of the Amhara people without diluting its responsibility to represent them. It must demonstrate that protecting Amhara lives is compatible with protecting every Ethiopian community. Otherwise, it risks remaining militarily relevant but politically incomplete.
Welkait: the question that cannot be postponed
The territorial dispute over Welkait and surrounding areas is the sharpest test of whether this alliance is real or theatrical. Many Amhara regard Welkait as historically Amhara territory incorporated into Tigray under the TPLF-dominated system. Many Tigrayans regard the same area as part of Tigray and describe the displacement of Tigrayans during the recent war as a profound injustice. Both cannot obtain everything they demand. Neither can be permanently silenced by force. The temptation will be to hide the disagreement until the coalition achieves its immediate objective. That would be a grave mistake. Strategic ambiguity may hold an alliance together during war, but it can tear a country apart after victory.
Welkait should become a cause for disciplined negotiation rather than another battlefield. A credible process would require independent historical and demographic investigation, protection of current residents, voluntary return of displaced people, restoration or compensation for lost property and a constitutionally legitimate decision on future administration. Any solution imposed through military occupation, forced displacement or selective history will eventually collapse. A territorial “victory” that leaves one community humiliated will not end the conflict. It will only transfer the desire for revenge to the next generation.
The most dangerous day is the day after victory
Suppose the coalition succeeds. What happens next? Who leads the transition? Who controls the military, intelligence services, federal budget and regional administrations? How long does the transition last? Can its leaders contest the election they are responsible for organizing? Will armed groups disarm, integrate into a professional national force or preserve separate armies?
These are not secondary details. They determine whether political change produces democracy or a contest among victorious commanders. Africa has seen many liberation movements defeat authoritarian governments only to reproduce the same authoritarianism under new names. Those who fight oppression often begin to believe that their sacrifices entitle them to rule. Martyrdom becomes a political qualification, weapons become electoral mandates and “temporary” transitional governments become permanent.
The new coalition must not ask Ethiopians to trust the goodwill of armed leaders. It must publish an enforceable transitional charter before seeking power. That charter should limit the duration of the transition, guarantee civilian oversight, prohibit revenge and collective punishment, include unarmed political parties and civil society, establish independent transitional-justice mechanisms and specify a credible timetable for elections. If the coalition refuses to explain the day after, Ethiopians should assume that it has not agreed on one.
Ethiopia cannot be divided among armed elites
The coalition must also avoid becoming a bargain through which powerful movements divide Ethiopia into political spheres of influence. Ethiopia is not the private inheritance of Fano, the TPLF, the OLA or any other armed organization. Millions of citizens do not belong to these movements. They cannot be treated as spectators waiting for commanders to negotiate their future.
A transition dominated by armed groups would reward those with guns and marginalize those who pursued peaceful politics. That would send a disastrous message: in Ethiopia, political influence comes not from citizens, ideas or elections, but from the ability to inflict violence. Religious institutions, women’s organizations, professional associations, civic groups, academics, traditional leaders and peaceful opposition parties must help shape any transition. Otherwise, the alliance will not democratize politics; it will militarize it further.
Foreign support is never free
The coalition must also clarify its relationship with external governments. Ethiopia’s conflicts are increasingly entangled with rivalries involving Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt and Middle Eastern powers. Foreign support may appear useful when survival is at stake, but external patrons rarely provide weapons, money or diplomatic protection without expecting influence in return. A coalition that reaches Addis Ababa through foreign dependency may arrive already indebted. No foreign government should determine Ethiopia’s territorial arrangements, security policy, access to resources or political leadership. Those who claim to fight for national survival must not mortgage national sovereignty to finance that struggle.
The alliance’s real historic opportunity
The coalition’s greatest achievement would not be defeating the federal government. It would be defeating Ethiopia’s recurring politics of revenge. If Fano and the TPLF can recognize each other’s suffering, accept accountability, negotiate territorial disputes and submit their ambitions to democratic institutions, they could demonstrate that historical enemies are not condemned to remain enemies forever. That would be revolutionary. But if they cooperate only to seize power, conceal their disagreements and distribute positions among victorious elites, the alliance will become another Ethiopian tragedy dressed as liberation.
The ultimate question is therefore not whether the coalition can win a war. It may possess enough force to destabilize the government and perhaps even change the balance of power. The real question is whether it can survive peace. Ethiopia has had many movements capable of capturing the state. What it has rarely had is a political leadership willing to restrain itself after gaining power.
Until the alliance proves that it possesses such restraint, Ethiopians should neither celebrate it blindly nor reject it automatically. They should examine it with hope—but also with their eyes wide open. The coalition could become a bridge between wounded communities. It could equally become a temporary gathering of enemies waiting for their next war. Its future – and perhaps Ethiopia’s – will be determined by which of those two possibilities its leaders are preparing for today.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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