By Simon
Ethiopia’s Maritime Puzzle
Since losing its coastline with Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has wrestled with dependence on Djibouti for over 95 percent of its imports and exports. For years, this reliance has fueled unease in Addis Ababa about sovereignty, security, and economic growth.
Now, a new chapter is unfolding. Between 2023 and 2025, Ethiopian leaders have swung between fiery threats, unilateral port deals, military revisionism, and diplomatic appeals. Ethiopia’s calculated ambiguity about its quest to the sea outlet is bereft of stealth.
From Abiy’s Warning to Somaliland’s Deal
In October 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warned parliament that Ethiopia “must acquire a port” and, if denied justice, “we will fight.” The bluntness alarmed Eritrea and Somalia.
By January 2024, Addis Ababa pursued a different path: a controversial Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. The deal promised Ethiopia access to Berbera port and potential military basing in exchange for possible recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Mogadishu denounced the move as illegal, Egypt rallied to Somalia’s side, and the region braced for escalation.
Taye’s Softer Line at the UN
Fast forward to September 2025. Speaking before the UN General Assembly, President Taye Atske-Selassie struck a more conciliatory note: “All that Ethiopia asks for is access to the sea.”
Gone were the threats of 2023. The statement echoed international law, which recognizes landlocked states’ rights to transit but only through agreements with coastal neighbors.
Generals Raise the Stakes
Yet, behind the podium diplomacy lies a harder edge. In September 2025, Major General Teshome Gemechu, a senior Ethiopian defense official, openly questioned the legitimacy of Eritrea’s 1993 independence. He suggested that the Red Sea port of Assab had been wrongly ceded, hinting at unfinished business.
Similarly, Brigadier General Bultii Taaddasaa, Chief Executive Officer of Ethiopia’s Military War College, features prominently in Ethiopia’s strategic discourse. His influence shapes how the officer corps frames questions of sovereignty, access, and regional order (see video here: https://youtu.be/Pl3x-oDK1DA?si=1vzql8V6q0LZ-dkZ).
Propaganda as Pretext
Alongside these voices, Ethiopian state and allied media have amplified a narrative that Eritrea is backing insurgencies in both Tigray and Amhara.
One striking video, titled “የሽግግር መንግስት የባህር በር አሳልፎ የመስጠት መብት የለውም” (“The Transitional Government Has No Right to Cede the Sea Port”), is available here: https://youtu.be/hhgmWdL4A1U?si=0ILGU9g-Uzjwl_-T. It asserts that no government has the right to give away a port, framing maritime access as a matter of national betrayal.
But the narrative stretches credibility. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has historically despised Eritrea — from the 1998–2000 border war to the recent Tigray conflict, where it accused Eritrea of atrocities. Branding TPLF as an Eritrean proxy is politically convenient, but factually dubious.
Why This Matters
1. Dual messaging — At the UN, Ethiopia presents moderation; at home, generals and propagandists float sovereignty revisionism.
2. Legal limits — International law provides rights of transit, not territorial claims.
3. Regional instability — Eritrea views such rhetoric as existential. Somalia is already destabilized by the Somaliland deal. Djibouti fears being sidelined. Egypt sees an opportunity to exploit Ethiopia’s overreach.
The Horn’s Precarious Balance
The Horn of Africa is no stranger to war over borders. The 1998–2000 Ethiopia–Eritrea war cost tens of thousands of lives. A return to sovereignty disputes would risk dragging the region into another cycle of conflict, at a time when drought, displacement, and economic fragility already burden millions.
Ethiopia faces a stark choice: pursue negotiated, contractual access through Djibouti or Somalia — preserving regional stability — or indulge revisionist claims and propaganda, risking regional war and international isolation.
The Bottom Line
Ethiopia’s maritime rhetoric is more than a policy debate; it is a struggle between moderation and militarism. If Addis Ababa’s diplomats prevail, the country may secure fair access through law and negotiation. If its generals and propagandists dominate, the Horn of Africa could face yet another destabilizing crisis.
Ethiopia’s calculated ambiguity about its quest to the sea outlet is bereft of stealth.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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Here is my opinion posted under “Assab and Beyond: Pathways to a Win–Win Maritime Settlement” since they are close:
1). Claiming Ethiopia’s Own vs. Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambition: Ethiopia is just claiming what has been its own since the dawn of time, but annexed by EPLF/Eritrea in 1991/1993 with the complicity of TPLF/Tigray [Both are Egypt-funded/armed Secessionist Bandits].
2). Affar is Ethiopia’s Land & Sea Coast: Affar is Ethiopia’s Affars’ home land Red Sea Coast [from south of Massawa to north of Djibouti]. It was annexed by EPLF/Eritrea in 1991 when Egypt’s Proxy Secessionists [EPLF & TPLF] invaded-and-occupied Ethiopia.
3). West’s Travesty of Justice-1: Germany occupied France’s Alsace-Lorraine twice and forced to return it to France twice [≈1918 & ≈1945]. Eritrea was Ethiopia’s land occupied by Italy during the First Italo-Ethiopian War (≈1896) and stayed under Italy till ≈1945.
When WW-II ended [≈1945], the Italian Command in Eritrea surrendered to the British [Allied Powers] & handed Eritrea over to the British. Why didn’t the British/Allied return Eritrea to Ethiopia as the European Allied Command returned Alsace-Lorraine to France?
4). West’s Travesty of Justice-2: Djibouti is also another Ethiopian land never returned to Ethiopia. Ethiopia leased Djibouti to France for 99 years. France let Djibouti become an independent country rather than returning it to Ethiopia or renewing its lease on Djibouti.
5). Disingenuous Proposal [The Third Travesty of Justice]: Portraying Aseb/Affar as “Eritrean Sovereign Territory” & “Ethiopia’s Quest for Access to Red Sea via Aseb” as aggression on Eritrea’s Sovereignty is just the Third Travesty of Justice in the Series…