The World Must Avert Another Catastrophic War in the Horn of Africa

Mesenbet Assefa (PhD) 
Professor of Law, Fellow at Horn Institute for Strategic Studies 

Abstract

Ethiopia and Eritrea share significant historical and cultural affinities that continued for  generations.  But Eritrea’s cession from Ethiopia in 1993 has created complex political and security challenges for both states. Eritrea’s path to independence came after a long and brutal armed struggle that lasted for three decades. The Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) fought side by side to defeat the Military Dictatorship of Mengistu Hale Mariam in 1991. However, just after 5 years of Eritrea’s independence, in 1998  Ethiopia and Eritrea were dragged into one of the bloodiest conflicts in the  world which led to hundreds of thousands of casualties. The immediate cause of the war was a border dispute over  Badme, located between Northern Tigray and Southern part of Eritrea. Eritrea was also involved in the recent Tigray conflict between Abiy Ahemd’s Federal Government forces and the TPLF. The conflict had a devastating humanitarian consequence with hundreds of thousands of casualties and decimated the economic and social base of the region. Regrettably, another major war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is on the horizon. This time, the reconfiguration of the political crisis in Tigray coupled with Abiy Ahmed’s increasing pressure at home could trigger a military action to take over the port of Assab, in Eritrea. This will have unprecedented economic and humanitarian catastrophe unlike we have seen before. The international community must act now and exert pressure to prevent an impending disaster from happening in the Horn of Africa. 

The Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world. Historically, the Horn region  which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia has faced some of the worst conflicts in the world. Most of these countries have faced civil wars that created weak and fragile states that continue to face protracted conflicts. Conflict experts observe that the state fragility in the region manifests itself in recurring civil wars, widespread poverty, increasing unemployment of young people, and weak security posture of the states (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, 2024). Somalia has been without an effective government for more than three decades. Eritrea, described by many experts as the North Korea of Africa has been a militarized state with a weak economy, significant unemployment and immeasurable human rights abuses that left hundreds of thousands of Eritreans as refugees in many other states including Ethiopia (Economist, 2018). The big brother in the  region, Ethiopia is relatively a power house in the region with a sizable population which is the second in Africa and a significant economy which is the 5^th biggest economy in Africa. Nevertheless, Ethiopia itself has been devastated by the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia and the ongoing conflicts in Amhara and Oromia regions. The only relatively stable state in the region is the small state of Djibouti that hosts some of the biggest military bases including the United States, China, France and Japan. It relies on the support of France for its security and has been relatively stable for decades. 

In a highly volatile region, the ongoing confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea could lead the region into something that we have never seen before. Recent reports indicate that the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is becoming ever more likely as each side continues to issue inflammatory statements and mobilize their forces for war (Chatham House, 2025). Credible reports indicate that both countries have started a significant mobilization of their armed forces with some reporting a mass mobilization in Eritrea (Reuters, 2025). Both countries have complex historical relationships. Eritrea was part of one of the provinces of Ethiopia until it seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. It took more than 30 years of armed struggle for Eritrea under the Eritrean Liberation Front (EPLF) together with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to defeat the Derg Military Junta under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam  in 1991. The newly independent Eritrea under the leadership of Esaias Afeworki began to be ruled under a military dictatorship with no constitution, political parties, civil society, or democratic elections. Its Marxist and isolationist policies left its economy in tatters and its repressive human rights violations have left the country with an exodus of its young people to other countries (UN Watch, 2025).  

Historically, Eritrea was part of the provinces of Ethiopia. But Italy’s occupation of Eritrea in 1890 made it to be separated from Ethiopia. In the Second World War,  Britain became a protectorate of Eritrea under the British military administration from 1941 to 1952. After the British Protectorate ended, under UN mandated Resolution 390 A (V) on December 2, 1950,  it was decided that Eritrea should be federated under the  Sovereignty of the Crown of Ethiopia. But the Federation also allowed certain autonomy including its own constitution, parliament, judicial system and languages. But slowly Emperor Haile Selassie made sure that Eritrea was fully integrated with Ethiopia without any autonomy. Finally, in 1962, Eritrea’s Federation with Ethiopia ended making it fully integrated with Ethiopia as its regional provinces. This reinforced the beginning of the armed struggle within Eritrea that gained momentum, particularly after the Dreg military Junta took over political power in Ethiopia in 1974. Many observers believe that the dissolution of the Federation with Eritrea was rushed and counterproductive to the Unity of Ethiopia. After 30 years of painful armed struggle, the Eritrean Liberation Front together with the TPLF was able to defeat the Derg in 1991. In 1993, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia and became an independent country. Ethiopia at the time became one of the first countries to recognize Eritrea’s independence without any conditions. 

But Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia left lingering and complex political, and socio-economic issues that continued for many years. The first major issue was the fact that Eritrea’s independence effectively made Ethiopia a landlocked country. Eritrea’s long coast stretching from  Ras Kasar to Ras Dumera with hundreds of Kilometres and barely less than 60 KM from Ethiopia meant that Ethiopia became a landlocked country (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 2024). During Eritrea’s independence, the late Meles Zenawi, who was the then  Prime Minister of Ethiopia and key ideologue of the TPLF did not see the need for port access or somehow did not want to have confrontation with the EPLF and its leader Esayas Afeworki. But in truth, it was a major issue that should have been deeply discussed and settled at the time. In particular, many point out that the port of Assab, which is the closest coastline to Ethiopia and has unique historical ties with Ethiopia should have been part of Ethiopia. They argue that the port itself and the infrastructure in the port was built by previous leaders of Ethiopia. They contend that the port city of Assab also had a significant population from Ethiopia, specifically from Afar and Wollo regions in Ethiopia. Moreover, with  a significant population and growing economy, the lack of access to the sea has become an unacceptable geopolitical reality for the political elite in Ethiopia. There is no doubt that the issue of port access has been one of the most enduring issues for many Ethiopians over the last three decades. These historical factors continue to drive the sentimental attachment of many Ethiopians to the port of Assab. Because of these factors,  many see Ethiopia’s lack of access to the sea as betrayal of Ethiopia’s key strategic interests in the region. With the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed as the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 2018, there has been a resurgence of these sentiments. 

Map of Eritrea: The coastline of Eritrea is represented by the red colour 

It is true that this is not the first time that Ethiopia and Eritrea are going to war. After Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia, war broke out between the two countries in 1998 which became one of the bloodiest conflicts in the word that led to the death of hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides. The immediate cause of the conflict was Eritrea’s attempt to annex the disputed border area called Badme, which ultimately dragged Ethiopia into the conflict. It was only after the Algiers Agreement in 2000 that the two countries agreed on cessation of hostilities and  settled their dispute peacefully (UNNMEE). Recently, during the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the TPLF, Eritrean forces were directly involved in the conflict by siding with Abiy Ahmed’s Federal Government of Ethiopia (The New York Times,  2023). This move by Eritrea was aimed at containing the TPLF that was perceived as the arch enemy of EPLF’s inner core. While both EPLF and TPLF had strategic cooperation during the armed struggle to overthrow the Derg military dictatorship, things significantly changed after Eritrea’s independence. EPLF blamed TPLF for isolating Eritrea economically and politically and its persistent war propaganda against TPLF was used as a form of garnering local support and forced military conscription in the country. The recent conflict between Abiy Ahmed’s Federal Government and TPLF provided the opportune moment for EPLF to take action and defeat them militarily. It is widely reported that during the Tigray conflict, Eritrean forces have committed widespread human rights violations including crimes against humanity and war crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2021). 

Yet another round of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is in the corner. And this time it will have catastrophic humanitarian and security consequences unlike we have seen before. The immediate factors for the recent confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea can be seen in two ways. First Ethiopia has long seen its access to the sea as pivotal to its geostrategic interests in the region for both economic and military ends (Washington Post, 2024). With a rising population and economy, the country has persistently tried to have a stronghold and ownership of a port in the Red Sea area. While Djibouti provides an outlet to most of its goods, it does not meet its military and economic ambitions. This interest has increased after the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 2018. His first attempt was signing an MoU with Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, that gave Ethiopia the right to use and develop the port of Berbera for 50 years (BBC News, 2024). In return, Somaliland was offered a share in the Ethiopian Airlines and to push for its recognition as an independent state, a fact that was later denied by the government of Ethiopia. But the political backlash that ensued this move and changing circumstances in the Tigray region have made access to the port of Assab in Eritrea as a more preferable option to Ethiopia. Second, the Ethiopian political psyche has for long been fixed with gaining port access and its inability to get access to the Port of Assab is perceived as a major historical mistake of its leaders. This may push Prime Minister Abiy to use it as a means of galvanizing national unity and containing ethnic tensions within the country itself (Middle East Council on Global Affairs , 2024). 

This looming conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has also to be seen in light of the complex history of the EPLF and TPLF. The EPLF and the TPLF fought together a war of independence for their respective two regions -Eritrea and Tigray respectively. Both political parties have a Leninist-Marxist root that was victim to the political fervour of the 1970s and 80s. During the armed struggle to overthrow Mengistu,  both the EPLF and TPLF shared intelligence, resources and fought side by side to overthrow the Derg. While Eritrea opted for its independence due to its unique history of Italian colonial rule, Tigray represented by TPLF opted to hold on to power in Ethiopia by creating a coalition of political parties under the umbrella of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Beyond this, Eritrea and Tigray enjoy significant cultural affinities. The most dominant ethnic groups in Eritrea, the Tigrinya who live in the highlands of Eritrea and Tigrayans  in Tigray speak Tigrigna and are dominantly Orthodox Christians.  One can barely differentiate the lifestyle of many Eritreans from Tigrayans and indeed most Ethiopians in general. This was certainly the experience I had when I visited Asmera, the capital city of Eritrea and its main port city, Massawa in the summer of 2019.

But beneath this cultural affinity is also a simmering competition for power and dominance by the inner cores of the EPLF and TPLF, representing their respective communities. There are multiple historical accounts that indicate this competition and even animosity between the two parties that still continues today (John Young, 1996). But things have changed in more recent times. The TPLF after losing the war with the Federal Government in 2022 has become desperate for relevance and continuity in the region. While the Pretoria Peace Agreement in 2022 provided a framework for cessation of hostilities and DDR, it did not address all the complex political issues in the aftermath of the war one of which was the fate of the party and its leadership in Tigray (IGAD, 2025). The Transitional Government of Tigray  led by Getachew Reda and some senior leadership of a faction of the TPLF that was established by the federal government could not sustain its power. The hardliners within the TPLF led by former Party-Chair and President of Tigray region Debretsion Gebremichael persistently undermined the authority of the Transitional Government. They argue that the Transitional Government compromised the key political interests of Tigray that were meant to be resolved by the Pretoria Peace Agreement including the return of internally displaced people, border claims of Wolkait and Raya areas, and the reconstruction of Tigray. 

To be fair, the Transitional Government of Tigray could not at this particular point in time make these huge controversial political demands. The region is in a major humanitarian catastrophe and the focus of the Transitional Government  was on recovery and DDR efforts as well as restoring law and order. Moreover, serious political demands on Wolkait and Raya would also trigger another round of conflict between the Amhara region and Tigray regions, as the Amharas claim both areas as their historical lands. But the increasing frustration of the Debretsion’s camp finally seems to have resulted in  ousting the President of the Transitional Government of Tigray Getachew Reda and his colleagues from their leadership in Tigray (Reuters, 2025). The Head Office of the President in Mekelle as well as regional offices in other parts of the region have been seized by Debrestion’s faction of the TPLF. It is plausible to argue that the reformist camp of the TPLF led by Getachew Reda seems to have lost its foothold in Tigray. The President of the Transitional Government of Tigray Getahcew Reda has left Tigray and went to Addis Ababa. More recently, it was announced that Getachew is appointed as Advisor to the Prime Minister on East African Affairs with a Ministerial Portfolio. He also appointed Profesor Kindeya Gebrehisot as Advisor to the Ministry of Education with a State Minister Portfolio. These appointments by Prime Minister Abiy can also help rebuild his foothold in Tigray in case a conflict with Eritrea is ignited.. As the  new President of the Tigray Interim Administration,  General Tadesse Werede seems to have a more neutral position. But there   are discussions of whether the Federal Army will be able to intervene in Tigray in case things go out of hand.

The resurgence of the hardliners of TPLF in Tigray leaves Prime Minister Abiy’s Federal Government  with limited choices and in difficult situations. This is where war with Eritrea comes into the picture. In a recent interview, Getachew Reda stated that a faction of the TPLF is currently working with Eritrean forces to regain foothold in Tigray and confront Prime Minister Abiy (Reeyot Media, 2025). These claims paint a dangerous political and security prospect for the region. It opens the region into unchartered territories. Abiy can longer use the pacifist and more moderate leadership of Getachew Reda to appease the TPLF. He will have to confront the demands of the hardliners which will be an enormous political undertaking for Abiy. Observers point out that Abiy could use the issue of Assab Port in Eritrea to leverage the TPLF and pacify domestic political tensions. If successful, Abiy’s takeover of Assab Port of Eritrea could contain the domestic political tension and tribal wars and project Ethiopia’s geostrategic relevance in the region. But this he can only do if he is able to at least garner some support within the TPLF. Observers point out that it is not only Getachew Reda’s moderate faction but also another third faction that could be swayed to Abiy’s move (The Africa Report, 2025). While it is not clear who these groups are within the TPLF, commentators point out that there is a sizable faction within the TPLF that is neither supportive to Debretsion or Getachew. Moreover, Abiy could also use Debretsion’s camp if he can convince them that in the long term political and economic benefit of Tigray is better served with ensuring access to the Port of Assab.

All these issues create the most unpredictable and unprecedented security situation in the Horn of Africa. Aby’s attempt to take over Assab Port of Eritrea could  open the door for a protracted war that will be hard to predict. It could have colossal security and humanitarian consequences. In the first place, Ethiopia itself is in unprecedented security challenges with major conflicts ongoing in Amhara and Oromia regions. Its economy is in tatters and the macro-economic adjustments made by the IMF has exacerbated inflation, food shortages, increase in fuel prices and decimated its economic base (Capital, 2024). Ethnic tensions in the region have reached their peak point with the Amhara Fano forces becoming a formidable rebel group that continues to challenge Abiy’s power. Similar ethnic-based rebel groups operate in Oromia and other regions in the country. While Abiy could overtake Assab port at some cost, sustaining its foothold in Assab port and maintaining its power in Ethiopia won’t be easy. Eritrea while, a small country, commands a highly experienced military that has the security acumen of the region over the past half century. It could also draw support from Egypt, and other states that Ethiopia considers as its arch enemies. The war in neighbouring Sudan between Burhan’s forces and General Dagalo’s forces provides another complex security challenge for the looming war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Security reports already indicate that some remnants of the TPLF as well as the Eritrean Islamic Front have already been involved in military confrontations in Sudan (East African Review, 2024). The Fano forces command a strong presence in the border between Ethiopia and Sudan, in some occasions overpowering the Ethiopian Defence Forces to retreat to Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2024). 

One can only imagine what another war between Ethiopia and Eritrea will be like. Any prospect of stability in the region will be dashed if Abiy pushes for military confrontation with Eritrea with the intent of capturing the Port of Assab. It will open for complex and intractable conflicts that will be difficult to contain. While it is evident that both Ethiopia and Eritrea enjoy a significant amount of cultural and historical affinity, any prospect of access to the port should consider soft power rather than military power. Trade and open borders between the two communities in the long term will have significant economic benefits. Moreover, any prospect of conflict at this point will be  like  adding fuel to the fire. The presence of unprecedented security and socio-political challenges in Ethiopia and the region at large would call for preventive diplomacy efforts by regional actors such as IGAD, and the African Union as well as the EU and the US. It is high time for the international community to act swiftly to contain the imminent risk of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 

The writer could be reached at : mesenbet.assefa@aau.edu.et  

References:

• Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) (2024).  https://acleddata.com/africa/horn-of-africa/ 
• BBC News (2 January 2024) Ethiopia signs agreement with Somaliland paving way to sea access, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566 
• Capital (2024), Ethiopia’s Economic Reform: Who truly Benefits ? https://capitalethiopia.com/2024/12/09/ethiopias-economic-reforms-who-truly-benefits/ 
• Chatham House, (19 March 20205). Tensions in Tigray Could Spark War Between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Disaster Must be Avoided https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/tensions-tigray-could-spark-war-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea-disaster-must-be-avoided 
• East African Review (7 May 2024). TPLF Accused of Involvement in Sudan Conflict and Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia, https://eastafricanreview.com/2024/05/07/tplf-accused-of-involvement-in-sudan-conflict-and-human-rights-abuses-in-ethiopia/
• Human Rights Watch (21 March 2021). Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians 
• https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians
• IGAD, Full text of the Pretoria Peace Agreement: https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf
• John Young (1996). The Tigray and Eritrean People’s Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism, 34 Journal of Modern African Studies.
• Middle East Council on Global Affairs  (September 2024): Ethiopia’s Quest for a Sea Port A Threat to Regional Stability? https://mecouncil.org/publication/ethiopias-quest-for-a-seaport-a-threat-to-regional-stability/ 
• Modern Diplomacy (16 March 2025). Ethiopia’s Dangerous Descent: The Road to War with Eritrea After the Siege of Tigray, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/03/16/ethiopias-dangerous-descent-the-road-to-war-with-eritrea-after-the-siege-of-tigray/
• Reeyot Media (17 March 2025)  Interview with Getachew Reda, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5UacNaSL6E 
• Reuters (14 March 2025). Explainer: Why are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the Brink of a Possible War, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/why-are-ethiopia-eritrea-brink-possible-war-2025-03-14/ 
• Reuters (12 March) Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Urges Federal Intervention after Town Seized, 12 March 20025:

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-tigray-region-urges-federal-intervention-after-town-seized-2025-03-12

• Sudan Tribune (2 September 2024).  Sudan Closes Its Border After Fano Military Seizes Town, https://sudantribune.com/article290290/ 
• The Africa Report (27 March 2025). The Four Horsemen of the TPLF: Meet the hardliners seeking to dominate northern Ethiopia, https://www.theafricareport.com/380046/the-four-horsemen-of-the-tplf-meet-the-hardliners-seeking-to-dominate-northern-ethiopia/
• The Economist (14 August 2018 .Why Eritrea is called the North Korea of Africa https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/14/why-eritrea-is-called-africas-north-korea
• The New York Times (31 March 2023). Slaughter on Eve of Ethiopian Peace Draws Accusations of War Crimes, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world/africa/eritrea-ethiopia-tigray-war.html 
• UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Full Text of the Algiers Agreement: https://unmee.unmissions.org/algiers-peace-agreement
• UN Watch (6 October 2024) Eritrea Confronted at the UN Human Rights Council, https://unwatch.org/eritrea-confronted-at-the-u-n-over-rampant-human-rights-abuses/ 
• Washington Post (8 January 2024).  Ethiopia’s Controversial Quest for Access to the Sea, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/08/ethiopia-red-sea-access-somaliland/

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com

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