 has undergone a profound and highly contested transformation. Read.){kind=link}
By: Yihenew Ewnetu
Sweden
Introduction
The political trajectory of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has undergone a profound and highly contested transformation following the much-heralded political transition of 2018. Initially celebrated domestically and internationally as a democratic breakthrough aimed at dismantling the Tigray People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (TPLF)-led regime, the transition has instead facilitated a complex structural reconfiguration. Over the past several years, the central state apparatus has shifted from a TPLF- led minority authoritarian one to a highly repressive, majoritarian dictatorship. This paradigm shift has raised critical questions regarding the nature of citizenship,being a political demographic majority, and the survival of the multi-ethnic Ethiopian state..
Aim of the Study
The primary aim of this study is to critically explore the emergence, development, and persistence of an Oromo-dominated ethnocratic regime in Ethiopia. Furthermore, this synthesis seeks to evaluate the regime’s hitherto track records—encompassing its political, economic, and human rights dimensions—and forecast its forthcoming effects on the nation’s socio-political fabric, state stability, and inter-communal relations.
Methodology
To achieve this aim, this study employs a qualitative analytical framework rooted in political sociology and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The research synthesizes academic literature, legal and constitutional texts (specifically the 1995 FDRE Constitution), reports from international human rights monitors (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission), and the public rhetoric, speeches, and leaked communications of prominent political elites. By triangulating these sources, the study maps the structural, ideological, and administrative mechanics of state capture.
Methodological Limitations
The primary limitation of this study stems from the highly volatile and restrictive security environment currently characterizing the Ethiopian state. The pervasive state of conflict and the intense state surveillance severely restrict ethnographic
fieldwork and primary data collection. Consequently, the analysis relies heavily on secondary literature, human rights documentation, and the discourse of political elites. While this reliance provides a robust macroscopic view of the state’s institutional trajectory, it may obscure localized, grassroots variations in how these ethnocratic policies are experienced or contested daily.
Theoretical Framework: Definition and Attributes of a Majority-Dominated Ethnocratic Regime
To systematically analyze Ethiopia’s current governance structure, it is imperative to ground the discourse in the political sociology framework of “ethnocracy.” An ethnocratic regime is defined as a system wherein the apparatus of the state is explicitly appropriated by a dominant ethnic group—or a political elite claiming exclusive representation of that group—to facilitate its own demographic, economic, territorial, and political expansion (Yiftachel, 2006, p. 16). Unlike liberal democracies, which derive legitimacy from the universal consent, equality, and individual rights of all citizens, an ethnocracy operates on the structural principle that the state fundamentally “belongs” to a specific national or ethnic identity (Aalen, 2011, p. 71).
When an ethnocratic model is commanded by a demographic majority, it assumes a distinct dictatorial attribute characterized by the “tyranny of the majority.” In this context, an “Oromo-dominated ethnocratic majority dictatorial regime” refers to a governance structure where the electoral and administrative advantages gained by the demographic size of the titular group—the Oromo—are weaponized within a federally mandated ethnic structure. Because the state’s electoral, administrative, and constitutional laws are built upon ethnic proportionality and territorialization, a majority ethnic group can leverage its immense demographic weight to monopolize regional and federal legislatures (Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12).
Attributes of this regime type include the institutionalization of rigid, mutually exclusive political identities. As Mamdani (2020) argues regarding “define and rule” strategies, such systems govern by deliberately fragmenting the population into “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” tiers of citizenship (p. 84). The central state is thereby converted into an instrument for the dominant group’s advancement, maintaining a facade of federalist, majority representation in the legislative bodies and thereby dictating its interests through lawmaking, ensuring the implementation of these laws and policies via the executive body it dominates and controls. Other defining attributes include “subversive assimilation” (leveraging state machinery to expand the dominant group’s footprint), ideological imposition (elevating a specific ethnic identity to a national standard), and “crony ethnocracy” (tethering economic resources and land access to ethnic loyalty).
Results and Analysis
The Legal and Constitutional Architecture of Dominance
The emergence and persistence of the current majority-dominated ethnocracy cannot be understood in a vacuum; it is fundamentally rooted in the legal and constitutional architecture established following the 1991 regime change. The 1995 FDRE Constitution abandoned the principle of unified, individual-based citizenship in favor of multinational federalism. By codifying “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples” as the primary sovereign entities under Article 46, the constitution engineered a bifurcated system of civic belonging, permanently dividing the populace into “indigenous” (titular) and “non-indigenous” categories (Turton, 2006, p. 24). The ultimate guarantor of this bifurcated system is Article 39, which grants the unconditional right to self-determination up to secession. While ostensibly designed to empower historically marginalized nationalities, the practical application of this constitutional framework de-institutionalizes individual political and property rights. It provides a ready-made legal instrument for dominant groups to exert total, exclusionary control over local and national politics and resources. If an individual does not belong to the titular ethnic group governing a specific region, their administrative representation and land ownership rights can be legally revoked under the guise of regional protection (Abbink, 2011, p. 605).
Politically, this constitutional ground was reinforced by the deliberate suppression of an opinion-oriented national multi-party system in favor of a rigid ethnic party system. This electoral framework inherently disadvantages cross-ethnic, civic-nationalist coalitions. Operating within this system, the state apparatus—spanning the legislature, military, and intelligence services—is purged of independent actors. Without robust cross-ethnic accountability, the constitutional principle of democratic “representation” is seamlessly transformed into majoritarian dictatorial domination (Aalen, 2011, p. 78; Clapham, 2017, p. 86).
The Historical Transition: From Minority Hegemony to Majoritarian Primacy
The shift to an Oromo-dominated ethnocracy occurred through the political transition of 2018, which brought Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to power. For nearly three decades prior (1991–2018), the TPLF operated a minority-led ethnocracy. Representing roughly 6% of the population, the TPLF ruled via “hegemony by rotation” and stringent centralized control, utilizing satellite or appendaged parties (Teletafi) within the EPRDF coalition to manage the Oromo, Amhara, and Southern nations etc. These satellite parties, lacking grassroots legitimacy, were entirely dependent on the TPLF’s security apparatus (Tronvoll, 2018, p. 112). The 2018 transition dismantled this minority control in favor of “majoritarian primacy.” The dissolution of the EPRDF and the subsequent creation of the Prosperity Party (PP) in 2019 was marketed globally using the philosophy of Medemer (synergy) to project a unified, liberalizing, pan-Ethiopian image. In practice, however, the PP effectively centralized executive power and stripped away the internal coalition-based checks and balances that had previously necessitated compromise (Tronvoll, 2018, p. 115).By replacing federal and military personnel with a new, Oromo-centric political class, the regime transitioned from a minority ethnocracy with fragile satellite alliances to a majoritarian ethnocracy. This new regime leverages its immense demographic base to assert that its dominance is the natural, inevitable, and democratic outcome of Ethiopia’s demographics, effectively “re-ethnicizing” the central state under a new hegemon (Clapham, 2017; Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12).
The Three-Fold Alliance: Bureaucratic and Ideological Consolidation
To protect, ensure the survival of, and expand this newly formed Oromo-dominated ethnocracy, the Abiy regime engineered a formidable, three-fold political and bureaucratic alliance. This structural coalition successfully fused historically disparate factions of Oromo politics into a singular, highly efficient state-capturing apparatus.
The Ideological Vanguard (OLF-Veterans): Upon assuming power, the regime invited exiled leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) back to Ethiopia. While engaging in military conflict with the OLF’s armed wing, the regime successfully co-opted the OLF’s radical ideological tenets and absorbed veteran cadres into the state machinery. Prominent OLF co-founders and veterans, such as Lencho Letta, Dema Nego, Zegeye Asfaw, and Lencho Bati, have functioned as trusted confidants, senior advisors, and ambassadors. Operating in closed-door meetings, they provide historical legitimacy for the ethnocratic project, pushing an aggressively aspirational narrative that seeks to eradicate past victimhood in favor of a “prosperity” and greatness doctrine (Østebø, n.d.).
The Bureaucratic Machinery (OPDO-Veterans): The second pillar relies on the entrenched bureaucratic networks of the former Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO). While Abiy centralized power, he retained the deep regional networks and counsel of influential OPDO veterans and former regional presidents like Abadula Gemeda and Muktar Kedir, who provide crucial backroom guidance (Lavers, 2024). Veteran ministers such as Girma Birru were integrated into Abiy’s inner circle, functioning as chief macroeconomic advisors and board chairmen for major state-owned enterprises, allowing the ethnocratic elite to exercise sweeping control over national economic policy and resources (Ashagrey, n.d.; Chiyemura, n.d.).
The Centralized Command (New PP-Elites): The ultimate consolidation was achieved through the elevation of a new, fiercely loyal cadre of PP elites. Handpicked figures such as Oromia President Shimelis Abdisa and Addis Ababa Mayor Adanech Abebe represent this centralized command. Utilizing the “convince and confuse” strategy openly articulated by Shimelis, these new elites maneuver federal resources, the military, and urban planning policies to aggressively neutralize opponents and cement the state’s majoritarian character (Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12).
Arguments For and Against Majoritarian Domination
Proponents of the current regime’s trajectory ground their arguments in demographic mandates and historical restorative justice. From this perspective, the Oromo—as Ethiopia’s largest demographic bloc—have been historically subjected to cultural suppression and political exclusion by successive imperial and minority-led (TPLF) regimes. Consequently, the rise of an Oromo-dominated central state is framed not as authoritarian capture, but as an indigenous reclaiming of rightful political space. Supporters argue that majoritarian rule is an inherently democratic reflection of population distribution, fulfilling the promise of self-determination enshrined in the 1995 Constitution.
Conversely, critics argue that substituting a minority dictatorship with a majority one does not resolve Ethiopia’s structural crises; it merely changes the beneficiary of state capture. Opponents emphasize the “tyranny of the majority trap,” arguing that demographic weight is weaponized in the absence of liberal constitutional protections for individuals. By conflating the state apparatus with the ethnic identity of the Oromo elite, the regime inherently creates a system of “second-class citizenship” for minorities, suffocates cross-ethnic civic integration, and fosters a zero-sum political environment that guarantees perpetual inter-communal violence (Aalen, 2011, p. 78; Abbink, 2011, p. 612).
Ideological Imposition: Oromummaa as an Instrument of State Capture
Central to the maintenance, justification, and expansion of this majority dictatorship is the aggressive deployment of Oromummaa as a de facto state ideology. Originally conceptualized as a socio-cultural framework for reclaiming Oromo language and heritage, Oromummaa has been transformed by the contemporary political elite into an exclusionary ideological weapon for state capture (Clapham, 2017, p. 62). This ideology operationalizes a revisionist historical narrative that frames the Ethiopian state’s evolution strictly through a lens of colonial subjugation, positioning the Oromo universally as indigenous victims while casting other groups—most notably the Amhara—as historical oppressors or alien settlers. This framing establishes a moral imperative to reshape the state exclusively in its own image, legally and morally legitimizing demographic engineering and mass evictions as righteous acts of restorative justice (Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12). Furthermore, Oromummaa functions as a potent mechanism for internal policing; any Oromo intellectual or politician advocating for cross-ethnic solidarity is swiftly branded a traitor, thereby ensuring the ruling party maintains a strict monopoly on the “Oromo agenda” (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 89).
Subversive Assimilation
The regime’s theoretical commitment to majoritarian primacy is operationalized most visibly through state-sponsored demographic engineering. This calculated strategy of “subversive assimilation” permanently alters the demographic and administrative reality of contested territories. The most prominent case study is the “Sheger City” mega-project on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. While officially marketed as an urban development initiative, human rights monitors categorize it as a textbook example of ethno-nationalist gerrymandering (EHRC, 2023, p. 25). The project involves the systematic, ethnically targeted demolition of tens of thousands of homes belonging to non-Oromo minorities and the urban poor. By classifying these residents as “illegal squatters,” the regional government strips them of property rights, simultaneously facilitating the resettlement of ethnic Oromos into these newly cleared zones. This dual process effectively “swallows” the multi-ethnic character of the capital, creating an artificial demographic majority that ensures future administrative or electoral contests will inherently favor the Oromo political elite (Human Rights Watch, 2023, p. 18; Tronvoll, 2022, p. 93).
Track Record Since 2018: Violence, Security Dilemmas, and Crony Ethnocracy
Since consolidating power, the regime’s human rights, security, and economic track records have been defined by systemic ethnic polarization. The state’s monopoly on force has been increasingly utilized to target demographic groups perceived as existential threats. The narrative of correcting historical injustices has translated into the violent displacement of populations labeled as “settlers” (Neftegna). In the Wollega zones of Oromia, ethnic Amharas are frequently targeted by radical ethno-nationalist militias like the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Independent investigations consistently document state complicity, noting that state security forces frequently withdraw prior to massacres or actively ignore pleas for intervention, effectively stripping non-titular groups of their right to life (Amnesty International, 2022, p. 14; Human Rights Watch, 2022, p. 31). This targeting has catalyzed a profound “security dilemma.” Because the central government is viewed as an extension of a hostile ethnocratic occupation, targeted groups have been forced to militarize for their own survival, driving the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region. The federal state has thus lost its legitimacy as a neutral arbiter, normalizing a state of perpetual, decentralized warfare (Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 15).
Economically, the regime has entrenched a “crony ethnocracy” where access to land titles and municipal resources is tethered to ethnic loyalty. The wealth extracted through state patronage is heavily concentrated in the hands of high-ranking PP officials and affiliated businessmen, leaving the broader population impoverished. As inflation surges, the regime relies on nationalist rhetoric to distract from its socio-economic failures (Clapham, 2017, p. 74).
Convergent Behaviors Among Oromo Political Organizations
A critical factor in the consolidation of this regime is the overarching ideological consensus among supposedly divergent Oromo political organizations. Despite tactical differences, the PP, OLA, and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) share a convergent behavioral trait: the instrumentalization of ethnic identity to secure absolute primacy. There exists a tacit agreement regarding the systemic eviction of ethnic Amharas and the territorial claim over Addis Ababa. Political elites openly assert that the Oromo are destined to dominate the Ethiopian state for thousands of years, weaponizing “democratic representation” to legitimize permanent hegemony. Crucially, this tacit alliance extends to the fierce defense of the 1995 TPLF-authored constitution, as it provides the exact legal mechanism required for a demographic majority to rule dictatorially while maintaining a facade of federal legality (Abbink, 2011, p. 609; Vaughan, 2011, p. 52).
The Erosion of the Middle Ground and Suppression of Civic Nationalism
A fundamental requirement for the survival of an ethnocratic majority dictatorial regime is the systematic suppression of cross-ethnic, civic-nationalist political alternatives. Because the regime derives its legitimacy solely from its demographic weight and its claim to be the exclusive defender of the Oromo identity, any political movement organized around universal citizenship, ideological principles, or class solidarity poses an existential threat to its power structure (Abbink, 2011, p. 605). Under the current administration, the political middle ground has been deliberately eroded. While the PP outwardly utilizes the rhetoric of Medemer to appeal to a pan-Ethiopian sensibility, its practical governance demands absolute subservience to the ethno-nationalist agenda dictated by its Oromo core. Proponents of civic nationalism—who advocate for individual rights over group-based sovereignty—are routinely marginalized, smeared in state media as “assimilationists,” or branded as agents of a defunct imperial past seeking to undermine multinational federalism (Clapham, 2017, p. 68). By criminalizing or neutralizing moderate voices and independent journalists, the state guarantees that the only viable avenue for political expression or grievance redress is through rigid ethnic mobilization. Consequently, marginalized minorities are forced into “subversive resistance,” transforming Ethiopia into an archipelago of mutually suspicious, ethnically homogenous enclaves operating in active opposition to the central authority (Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12).
Institutionalizing the “Winner-Take-All” Ethnocratic State
The persistence and escalation of Ethiopia’s political crises underscore a fundamental flaw in the institutional design of the 1995 constitutional framework. By normalizing the “Nation, Nationality, and People” as the fundamental unit of political participation, the state inherently institutionalized competition between rigid ethnic blocs rather than fostering competition between programmatic, policy-oriented political parties. Political sociologist Jon Abbink (2011) argues that this framework perversely incentivizes “ethnic entrepreneurs” to consolidate power by mobilizing the largest possible demographic base to secure federal control, a dynamic that inevitably leads to a zero-sum, “winner-take-all” political arena (p. 614). Because the Ethiopian Constitution provides no robust institutional safeguards for individual, pan-Ethiopian citizenship rights that transcend ethnic identity, the central state remains an asset to be captured rather than a neutral arbiter to be shared. Proponents of the current regime frequently invoke the “will of the people” based on demographic size to legitimize their dominance. However, when demographic weight becomes the primary metric of political and territorial authority, the state naturally skews toward the interests of the largest group, effectively transforming the democratic concept of “representation” into authoritarian “domination” (Clapham, 2017, p. 86).
The Trajectory of State Fragility and Perpetual Border Conflicts
The long-term continuation of legally mandated ethnic segregation, compounded by majoritarian dictatorial practices, presents a series of catastrophic risks for the Ethiopian state’s survival. Academic projections warn of destabilizing scenarios centered around perpetual territorial conflict. The first immediate danger is the proliferation of territorial irredentism. Because the 1995 Constitution links political representation and economic sovereignty directly to demographic control over land, regional borders have evolved from administrative lines into existential frontiers (Turton, 2006, p. 24).
As demographic pressures intensify and the central state actively encourages ethnic territorialization, regional states inevitably clash over contested borderlands. These skirmishes frequently escalate into full-scale proxy wars, exacerbated by the militarization of the regions. Over the past decade, regional governments have built up massively armed Special Forces that function as quasi-national armies, effectively bypassing federal authority and eroding the central state’s monopoly on violence (Abbink, 2011, p. 605). When the federal government intervenes, it is rarely seen as a neutral peacekeeper; instead, federal interventions are perceived as calculated maneuvers to expand Oromo territorial claims, further inflaming regional resistance.
The “Yugoslavia Scenario” and the Constitutional Time Bomb
The structural inclusion of Article 39—the unconditional right to self-determination up to secession—functions as a constitutional time bomb in an environment of entrenched segregation. In a majority-dominated ethnocracy, where minorities are systematically excluded and marginalized, political crises rapidly degenerate into threats of dissolution. The Tigray War (2020–2022) served as a grim preview of this balkanization scenario, demonstrating the catastrophic costs when a well-armed regional state leverages its constitutional autonomy to rupture from the federal center.
If the Oromo-dominated regime continues its trajectory of subversive assimilation and violent demographic engineering, it risks triggering simultaneous rejections of the federal arrangement by multiple major regions, notably the Amhara. If the state devolves into a patchwork of ethnically “pure” enclaves violently expelling non-indigenous populations, the resulting fragmentation would plunge the Horn of Africa into unprecedented humanitarian and geopolitical chaos, mirroring the violent collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Turton, 2006, p. 24; Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12).
Future Scenarios: The Destiny of the Oromo and Marginalized Ethnicities
The future of the Oromo and the rest of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups under an Oromo-dominated ethnocratic majority dictatorial regime appears highly precarious. For non-Oromo ethnic groups, the persistence of this regime signals a future of continued marginalization, systematic displacement, and forced assimilation. As the state effectively devolves into an instrument of majoritarian expansion, the evaporating political middle ground leaves minority and peripheral groups with no alternative but to engage in violent subversive resistance.
For the Oromo population, the future under this ethnocracy is an “identity trap.” While the political elite consolidate unprecedented wealth and state power through cronyism, the ordinary Oromo citizenry is largely excluded from these economic dividends. More dangerously, the elite’s aggressive ethno-nationalism traps the broader Oromo population in a state of permanent hostility with their neighbors, isolating them regionally and internationally (Aalen, 2011, p. 78).
To understand the long-term consequences of this trajectory, one must compare it with the price paid by the TPLF and the Tigrayan people. For 27 years, the TPLF utilized state capture to enrich a narrow elite, ruthlessly suppressing opposition and alienating the broader populace. When the regime’s power monopoly inevitably collapsed, the backlash was catastrophic, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and the near-total destruction of Tigray’s infrastructure (International Crisis Group, 2021). The current Oromo-dominated regime is accelerating down a strikingly similar, yet potentially more destructive, path. By aggressively alienating multiple massive demographic blocs, the Oromo political elite are fostering deep-seated, inter-generational grievances that will ultimately determine the catastrophic destiny of the entire nation.
The Anatomy of the Dictatorial Trap and Systemic Collapse
The political trajectory of Ethiopia under the current administration represents a structural commitment to an ethnocratic model that is inherently unstable and inherently self-destructive. By tethering the state’s survival to the demographic, economic, and political dominance of a single group, the ruling elite has maneuvered the country into a fatal “dictatorial trap.” The profound paradox of the post-2018 transition is that while the official state rhetoric of Medemer (synergy) was marketed globally as a liberal, unifying, and peace-building project, the structural reality on the ground has been the aggressive consolidation of a majority-dominated ethnocracy (Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 12).
This regime’s reliance on “subversive assimilation”—utilizing the bureaucratic and coercive machinery of the state to expand the dominant group’s cultural and territorial footprint under the guise of constitutional legality—is not merely an administrative choice; it is an existential requirement for the regime’s survival. The state has been converted into an exclusive instrument for the Oromo elite’s advancement, while maintaining a fragile, increasingly transparent facade of federalist representation.However, this strategy ultimately fails because it cannot generate long-term, cross-ethnic legitimacy. Instead, it systematically destroys the social fabric of the country. By erasing the political middle ground and equating civic nationalism with treason, the regime guarantees that marginalized groups are forced into “subversive resistance.” This dynamic breeds deep-seated, inter-generational resentment that ensures the cycle of political violence, militarized ethno-nationalism, and state fragility continues indefinitely. The regime’s majoritarian dominance cannot manufacture genuine stability; it only breeds reactive insurgencies and militarized regional fragmentation, pushing the state ever closer to systemic collapse (Abbink, 2011, p. 612; Kassaw & Veneranda, 2024, p. 15).
Conclusion
The Destiny of the State and the Scenarios Ahead
To summarize the emergence, development, and trajectory of the Oromo-dominated ethnocratic majority dictatorial regime, one must recognize that the crisis in contemporary Ethiopia is not merely a failure of political leadership, but the logical, catastrophic endpoint of a constitutional system that prioritizes ethnic identity over individual citizenship. The transition from a minority (TPLF-led) to a majority (Oromo-dominated) hegemony has not solved Ethiopia’s historical crisis; it has merely shifted the epicenter of the conflict to the Oromo-dominated core, leaving the state increasingly isolated from its diverse periphery (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 95). Looking forward, the destiny of the rest of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups under such a regime is bleak: it is a future defined by systemic marginalization, periodic ethnic cleansing, and a desperate, violent struggle for physical and cultural survival against an assimilationist center. For the Oromo people, the destiny is equally tragic.
The political elite are driving their own demographic into an unwinnable “identity trap,” wherein the short-term accumulation of wealth and power by a few guarantees the long-term isolation and enmity of the many. Should the current ethnocratic architecture collapse under the weight of its own polarizing violence—a scenario that historical precedents suggest is highly probable—the blowback against the Oromo demographic could mirror, or vastly exceed, the catastrophic price paid by the Tigrayans following the fall of the TPLF.
Ultimately, Ethiopia is faced with two mutually exclusive scenarios. The first scenario is the continuation of the current ethnocratic trajectory, which will inevitably culminate in the “Yugoslavia Scenario.” In this outcome, the state devolves completely into heavily armed, mutually hostile ethno-national enclaves. The resulting balkanization will not only violently fracture the Ethiopian state but will plunge the entire Horn of Africa into an era of unprecedented geopolitical, economic, and humanitarian ruin, creating a vacuum of statelessness and mass displacement (Turton, 2006, p. 24). The second scenario requires a fundamental constitutional paradigm shift. History demonstrates that regimes relying on the exclusionary domination of one group in a highly diverse, multi-ethnic federation eventually face a terminal crisis of legitimacy that cannot be managed through authoritarian coercion. Therefore, state survival dictates the necessity of dismantling the ethnicization of political rights. The 1995 FDRE Constitution must be radically reformed or replaced to transition from group-based sovereignty to universal, individual, citizen-based sovereignty. Without robust institutional safeguards for individual rights that transcend ethnic identity, the Ethiopian state will remain an asset to be violently seized rather than a shared national home. Only by abandoning the dictatorial trap of ethnocracy and embracing genuine civic nationalism can Ethiopia avert systemic collapse and forge a viable, peaceful future for all its citizens.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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