HomeOpinionSovereignty, Stability, or Security? Navigating Abiy’s Red Sea Access Trilemma

Sovereignty, Stability, or Security? Navigating Abiy’s Red Sea Access Trilemma

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Teshome Abebe*

In international relations (IR) and political economy, no single, universally codified “Impossible Trinity” or Trilemma precisely mirrors the impossible trinity in monetary policy or the trilemma in international economics in Abiy Ahmed’s pursuit of Ethiopian sea access, but analogous structural constraints exist that his actions have highlighted—and arguably collided with.

In the way of background, the “impossible trinity” in monetary policy postulates that a country cannot simultaneously maintain: a) a fixed exchange rate; b) free capital movement; and c) an independent monetary policy. And the “trilemma in international economics” is that: a) economic interdependence; b) economic security; and c) geopolitical competition cannot all three exist at the same time. Only two of these objectives can coexist at any given time, as the pursuit of all three inevitably leads to trade-offs that undermine one or more goals.

The assertions made in the first paragraph of this essay draw from realist and liberal IR theories, geopolitical constraints on landlocked states, and the tensions between sovereignty, economic interdependence, and security. Abiy’s efforts, particularly the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland for port access (in exchange for potential recognition and other benefits), illustrate a violation of practical limits rather than a formal academic trilemma.

Relevant Concepts in IR and Political Science

Existing frameworks provide close analogies:

  1. Territorial Sovereignty vs. Economic/Strategic Needs: Post-WWII norms (UN Charter, Helsinki principles, AU borders doctrine) prioritize uti possidetis {Latin to “as you possess”} (respect for colonial-era borders) and territorial integrity. Landlocked states have rights to “access to and from the sea” under UNCLOS Part X (transit rights and freedom of transit), but these require negotiation with transit/coastal states and do not grant sovereignty over coastline or automatic basing rights. Unilateral or provocative challenges often fail or escalate.
  2. Security Dilemma and Geopolitical Trilemmas: Actions to enhance one state’s security (e.g., naval access) can undermine neighbors’ security, triggering alliances or arms races. Related trilemmas appear in contexts like U.S. Africa policy (democracy, counterterrorism, great-power competition) or economic security (openness, protection, innovation).
  3. Horn of Africa “Trilemma” Framing: Commentary has explicitly called the Ethiopia-Somalia-Eritrea dynamics a “Horn of a trilemma,” involving port deals escalating into broader rivalries.

Abiy’s pursuit runs into a practical 

“Access-Sovereignty-Stability Trilemma” (or “Red Sea Access Trilemma”) in the Horn of Africa: A major power cannot simultaneously achieve (1) reliable sovereign or preferential sea access (for economic growth and security), (2) respect for neighbors’ territorial sovereignty (avoiding irredentism or recognition of breakaways), and (3) regional stability and cooperative interdependence without major trade-offs or external backing. I argue here that only two are feasible at once; pursuing all three provokes backlash.

Evidence from Abiy Ahmed’s Actions:

Ethiopia lost its coastline with Eritrea’s 1993 independence, becoming the world’s most populous landlocked country. It relies on Djibouti (primarily), plus Sudan, Kenya, and others for transit. Abiy has framed sea access as “existential” for a nation of 120+ million with growing economy and ambitions for regional leadership—citing trade costs, security vulnerabilities, and historical grievances.

The 2024 Somaliland MoU was the flashpoint: Ethiopia gained approximately 20 km coastline access (Berbera port area) for 50 years, naval basing potential, and infrastructure ties; Somaliland sought recognition (or “in-depth assessment”) and stakes in Ethiopian firms.

Consequences illustrating the trilemma:

  1. Sovereignty violation backlash: Somalia condemned it as aggression against its territorial integrity, nullified the deal, recalled its ambassador, and sought support from Egypt, Turkey, and others. This challenged the AU’s border norms.
  2. Regional instability: Strained ties with Eritrea (historical rival, potential target for Assab port), Djibouti, and others. It spurred realignments—e.g., Somalia-Eritrea-Egypt dynamics, proxy risks, and heightened Red Sea militarization amid Yemen, Gulf, and great-power interests.
  3. Economic gains vs. costs: Short-term leverage for Ethiopia, but diplomatic isolation risks, higher transaction costs from tensions, and stalled broader integration (e.g., AfCFTA or Horn initiatives). Sensing this, Abiy later emphasized peaceful negotiations, but his rhetoric and moves had already securitized the issue.

To be clear, Abiy did not “violate” a formal trilemma but ran into these interlocking constraints. Peace with Eritrea (Nobel-winning) initially boosted stability and potential access, but renewed ambitions clashed with sovereignty norms. The Somaliland gambit traded stability for access while testing sovereignty, yielding partial economic/diplomatic wins at the price of escalated rivalries.

Supporting illustrations:

  1. Historical parallels: Bolivia & Peru sea access dispute with Chile (Pacific War legacy, 1879 to 1884) shows persistent grievances without easy resolution. Central Asian landlocked states rely on negotiated transit without major redrawing.
  2. Ethiopia-specific: Pre-MoU reliance on Djibouti worked for commerce but not “sovereign” control or naval projection. GERD/Nile tensions show similar patterns of resource assertiveness provoking upstream-downstream conflicts.
  3. Broader IR: Russia’s Crimea actions or China’s South China Sea claims demonstrate that challenging sovereignty for “access/security” often isolates the actor or requires power preponderance—Ethiopia lacks this regionally without allies.

Coining the Term: The “Horn Access Trilemma” or “Red Sea Access Trilemma”

I propose the “Red Sea Access Trilemma” (or Horn of Africa Maritime Trilemma): In volatile regions with contested borders and weak institutions, a landlocked aspiring hegemon cannot simultaneously secure preferential maritime outlets, uphold (or minimally disrupt) Westphalian sovereignty norms, and maintain cooperative regional stability. Pursuing sovereign-style access via a breakaway entity (Somaliland) sacrifices stability and invites balancing coalitions.

This justifies coinage because:

  1. It parallels the monetary policy trinity’s mutual exclusivity, and the trilemma in international economics both described earlier.
  2. It is empirically grounded in the 2024 MoU fallout and ongoing tensions.
  3. It extends IR concepts (security dilemma + liberal institutionalism’s limits) to African geopolitics and landlocked development.
  4. Evidence: Escalating camps (supporters vs. adversaries), proxy risks, and Abiy’s shift from economic to securitized framing of the issue.

Policy implications: Sustainable access likely requires multilateral deals, economic incentives (e.g., shared stakes), or mediation—prioritizing stability and negotiated transit over unilateral gains. Abiy’s pursuit may have temporarily advanced Ethiopia’s narrative and options but underscored the trilemma’s bite: full resolution remains elusive without broader compromise.

This framework aids analysis of similar cases (e.g., other African landlocked states like South Sudan) and highlights how domestic ambitions intersect with structural IR limits. Abiy neither fully succeeded nor collapsed the system, but through his unorthodox, even reckless utterances, he illuminated the trade-offs.

Teshome Abebe, PH.D. a former Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs at Two Institutions is Professor of Economics and Faculty Laureate. 

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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