In recent weeks, Ethiopians have watched an odd transformation. A ruling party that once spoke the language of conquest now speaks the language of “dialogue.” The Prosperity Party (PP) that vowed to “crush” its enemies suddenly wants to “hear their concerns.” The same government that deployed tanks and drones against the Amhara community in the name of eliminating Fano fighters is now organising public discussions in Addis Ababa and advertises “peace agreements” with forces it previously branded as terrorists.
What is this? A genuine change of heart – or a dangerous political gamble dressed up as reform?
From “We will eliminate them” to “We will listen”
The shift is not cosmetic. PP officials have toned down their war rhetoric, opened media space (selectively), and signalled a supposed “comprehensive agreement” with Amhara Fano forces. At the same time, they are softening their posture towards other previously demonised actors, trying to appear more inclusive and reasonable.
On the surface, this looks like a government that has learned from a decade of bloodshed. But Ethiopians know that in politics, especially under PP, tone changes faster than structures. Before anyone celebrates, we must ask the harder question: why now?
Below are four possible calculations behind this new posture.
1. Election optics and the myth of “short memory”
First, elections are coming – even if dates and details remain fluid and selective. The regime understands that it can manipulate state machinery, security forces, and the election board to secure victory. But it also knows it needs a minimum façade of pluralism to keep external partners calm and aid money flowing.
That means staging a performance of “opening up”: a few televised discussions, some “agreements” with armed groups, and controlled criticism in the media. The message to the outside world is simple:
“Look, Ethiopia is reforming again. Yes, we made mistakes during the war, but now we listen and reconcile.”
At home, PP is betting on something even more cynical – that Ethiopians’ trauma, exhaustion, and daily economic struggle will erase memories of massacres, mass detentions, and broken promises. If the price of flour and transport falls slightly, they hope people will forget who put them into this crisis in the first place.
2. Fear of the northern “tsimido”
Second, there is the fear factor. Abiy once appeared convinced he could intimidate or even defeat Eritrea and force a new regional order – including a path to Assab. But as tensions over Red Sea access escalated, Eritrea mobilised heavily, and analysts warned that renewed war could be catastrophic for both countries and the wider region.
At the same time, Abiy’s relationship with both TPLF/TDF and Amhara forces has collapsed into deep mistrust. The possibility, even if remote, of a “northern axis” or tsimido (encirclement) involving Eritrea, resurgent Tigrayan actors, and a more organised Fano is a nightmare scenario for PP.
The army is overstretched, morale is uneven, and Ethiopia has already experienced what multi-front war looks like. Suddenly, making tactical peace with one part of this northern puzzle – Fano – becomes attractive. Not because PP respects Amhara demands, but because it wants to neutralise one threat while it manages others.
3. International pressure: “Do not burn the country again”
Third, there is growing international fatigue and pressure. After the Tigray war, multiple reports documented atrocities by federal and allied forces, including mass killings, sexual violence, and starvation as a weapon of war. Donors cut budget support, downgraded Ethiopia’s credit rating, and tied new loans to “reform” and de-escalation.
Today, with fears of a new Ethiopia–Eritrea war and renewed instability, Western and regional actors are sending a clear message: no more total war. That does not mean they fully side with Fano or any opposition group; it simply means Abiy cannot massacre civilians or bomb cities with the same impunity and still expect diplomatic protection and bailout packages.
So, PP adjusts its tactics. Instead of open brutality everywhere, it mixes selective repression with photo-op “dialogues,” town halls, and choreographed reconciliations – a softer script written for Washington, Brussels, and the Gulf capitals.
4. An economy on the edge
Fourth, the economic reality is brutal. Inflation has stayed painfully high, debt distress is serious, and donor support is shrinking. Even as official reports talk about “strong growth” and “successful reforms,” independent analysts warn that high debt, inflation, and governance failures threaten Ethiopia’s stability.
War is expensive. Sustaining large-scale campaigns in Amhara, Oromia, and potentially against Eritrea would push an already strained economy closer to the cliff. Every drone, every mobilisation, every prolonged state of emergency drain resources that the regime desperately needs for basic survival and for meeting IMF conditions.
Under these pressures, reducing open conflict, at least temporarily, becomes a matter of regime survival. Talking to Fano is cheaper than shelling them every week.
So, has PP really changed?
Here is the uncomfortable truth: a change in tactics is not the same as a change in values.
PP’s core instincts remain visible:
- It negotiates only when forced by pressure – military, diplomatic, or economic.
- It treats agreements as disposable tools, not sacred commitments.
- It views time not as a path to genuine reform, but as something to be bought, stretched, and manipulated.
In such a context, any “peace deal” or “understanding” with Fano or other opposition forces should be read as a tactical pause, not proof of repentance. The ruling elite is buying time – to reorganise forces, repair its image, and prepare the next move.
What this means for Fano and for Ethiopians
For Fano and other resistance groups, the danger is clear: mistaking tactical manoeuvres for strategic transformation. Accepting demobilisation or disarmament without enforceable guarantees, independent monitoring, and real political restructuring is to walk voluntarily into a trap.
For ordinary Ethiopians, the message should be equally clear:
- Do not confuse softer speeches with deeper reforms.
- Do not assume that a few town-hall meetings mean an end to authoritarianism.
- Do not let temporary economic relief erase the memory of mass graves and destroyed communities.
Ethiopia’s crisis is not just about one bad policy or one miscalculated war. It is about a political culture built on opacity, impunity, and opportunism. As long as that culture remains intact, no amount of “listening sessions” will make the country safe.
Real change will not come from a leader who treats politics as a gamble and the people as expendable chips on the table. It will come from dismantling the structures that allow such gambling in the first place: unchecked security forces, party capture of the state, and a political economy that rewards brutality over accountability.
Until then, Ethiopians have every reason to treat PP’s new smile with extreme caution – not as a sign of rebirth, but as a familiar mask worn by a regime that has not yet faced justice for its past or changed its vision for the future.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
__
Support Borkena : https://borkena.com/subscribe-borkena/
Join our Telegram Channel : t.me/borkena
Like borkena on Facebook
Borkena Ethiopian News Youtube Channel
To submit Press Release, send submission to info@borkena.com
Add your business to Ethiopian Business Listing / Ethiopian Business Directory
Join the conversation. Follow us on X (Formerly Twitter) @zborkena to get the latest Ethiopian News updates regularly.
I was going to say that the writer failed to do his due diligence but realized that the writer is trying to convey his ill conceived empty rhetoric hoping to salvage the debacle in the anti-Abiy camp. The title itself tells the writer’s mental myopia. It is no wonder that the author did not want to disclose his full name because he knows the story trying to tell is devoid of facts and contrary to the basic and fundamental principles of PP. The failure of our “political elites” is not just the falsehood of their narratives but the lie they tell us about what we know to be true. This writer attempted to tell us that PP is now desired to engage in dialog because “it is afraid of some change”. Really? What change? The opposition as we know it does not exists and PP is the most popular political organization in the country. Form its inception PP’s political discourse is dialogue. To deny this will full ignorance and intellectual dishonesty. The PM made dialog his signature policy from the start. That is the reason he invited all political organizations and media outlets to return to Ethiopia and engage in a peaceful political discoursed. There is a saying in Ethiopia “A foolish daughter teaches her mother how to give birth to children.” The author’s mptive becomes cllear at the end of the article.
The author states “For ordinary Ethiopians, the message should be equally clear:
Do not confuse softer speeches with deeper reforms.
Do not assume that a few town-hall meetings mean an end to authoritarianism.
Do not let temporary economic relief erase the memory of mass graves and destroyed communities.” He is attempting t garner support for the anti-Abiy camp with his lies and fear mongering message. Individuals like the author have peddled their fear mongering messages for years. However, at this juncture, the people are not listening. It is obvious the author has no clue and just like his “comrades” he is living in the delusional bubble he created. The basic principle of MEDMER is dialogue and no one has been preaching and working hard to make dialogue part of our political culture the PM and his PP party. Any assertion contrary to this fact and is a wishful thinking among those who falsely believe that the Ethiopian government is challenged by the rebel forces fighting against a formidable Ethiopian Defense Force.