Mr. Jawar Mohammed, Ethnonationalist Narrative Engineering, and the ‘Illusory Truth Effect’

By Yihenew Ewnetu 
Sweden 

In his recent interview with Reyot media ‘s Theodros Tsegaye,Jawar Mohammed implied that Fano presence in Welega was anomalous, obnoxious or unnatural. He said that Fano is an Amhara organization and thus, must restrict itself to the Amhara region. In this academic summary an attempt will be made not only to refute Jawar’s shallow assertion but also to stipulate that the Amhara people have been indigenous to every corner of the present day ‘Ormia region’ centuries before Oromos arrived and started to inhabit these areas. The Amhara Fano National Movement not only deserves to operate in the Oromia region where thousands of Amharas have been slaughtered since the Colonial era but has a moral obligation to either protect them but also organize them to protect themselves from the unabated atrocities sponsored by the national and regional state. . 

1. Introduction 

The historiography of the Horn of Africa, particularly the demographic and political evolution of the Ethiopian state, is often subject to intense and highly politicized debate. In contemporary political discourse, there are deliberate attempts by ethnonationalist Oromo organizations and activists to artificially truncate Ethiopian history, aggressively beginning their historical analyses from the late 19th-century era of Emperor Menelik II. Through this selective historical framing, these actors purposefully conflate state-led dynastic expansion and its subsequent consequences with the demographic realities of the Amhara people, labeling the entire ethnic group as colonizers. 

Concurrently, this narrative relies on a deliberate denial of the historical realities of the 16th century. Ethnonationalist activists systematically deny the existence of inbuilt cultural and organizational structures within the Oromo ethnic group—specifically the militarized Gadaa system—which were historically built with the explicit intention to invade, occupy, and assimilate other communities. There is a deliberate denial of the massive Oromo invasions and the subsequent violent assimilation of indigenous populations that occurred following the weakening of the central Ethiopian government by the devastating invasions of Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmed Gragn). Furthermore, these narratives actively deny the fundamental sociological fact that traditional Amhara culture fundamentally lacks a Gada-like socio-political organization that would have made the mass invasion and structural assimilation of another ethnic group or demographic possible. The systematic conflation of a multi-ethnic imperial ruling elite with the millions of impoverished, sedentary Amhara peasantry forms the bedrock of an ongoing campaign of historical erasure. 

2. Aims of the Synthesis 

The primary aims of this academic summary are structured as follows: 

a) To stipulate historical presence: To establish with empirical evidence the deep-rooted presence of the Amhara people in all areas included in the present-day “Oromia regional state”—specifically in areas such as Bale, Arsi, Hararge, Welega, Illubabor, Jimma, and Shewa—centuries before the Oromo set foot north of the Shebele River. 

b) To refute exclusionary rhetoric: To utilize this demographic history to definitively refute arguments posited by ethnonationalist figures, such as Jawar Mohammed’s assertion (made during an interview with Teodros Tsegaye on Reyot Media), that the Fano should not set foot in Welega based on the false premise that Welega is exclusively Oromo territory while Fano is strictly an Amhara movement. 

c) To affirm the necessity of protective armed groups: To stipulate the historical precedent of protective armed groups in Arsi, led by figures like Asmare Dagne following the Arba Gugu massacres, which successfully averted further atrocities in the area. Consequently, this synthesis argues that there should be protective Fano units to safeguard vulnerable Amhara communities, and that the Amhara people must be organized to protect themselves from massacres, including in regions like Welega. 

● d) To document historical massacres: To describe and categorize the atrocities and massacres perpetrated against the Amhara people when they were unorganized and least suspected violence across distinct historical periods: the Oromo expansion, the Colonial era, the Haile Selassie era, and the Derg era. 

● e) To establish contemporary self-defense imperatives: Learning from these historical eras, as well as the severe atrocities committed against the Amhara during the TPLF regime and the escalated massacres following Abiy Ahmed’s ascent to power in 2018, to demonstrate that it is existentially necessary for the Amhara people to stand together. It argues for the establishment of local Fano movements in self-defense wherever there are actual or potential risks for imminent massacres. The fact that atrocities have continued despite the current Fano struggle cannot lead to the conclusion that the Amhara should passively accept atrocities and genocide. 

3. Methodology and Methodological Limitations 

This synthesis employs a qualitative, multidisciplinary methodology integrating historical document analysis, historiographical review, and applied psychological theory. Historical data regarding demographic shifts, military expansions, and localized atrocities are drawn from established academic texts, imperial chronicles, and colonial records. The analysis of modern violence utilizes frameworks from international human rights organizations and contemporary geopolitical observers to trace the continuity of anti-Amhara violence. 

Methodological Limitations: 

The primary limitation in synthesizing this historical data lies in the precise quantification of casualties prior to the 20th century. Historical chronicles provide qualitative accounts of massacres but lack exact demographic census data for the 16th and 17th centuries. Furthermore, during the Haile Selassie and Derg eras, state censorship and the chaotic nature of rural insurgencies often obscured exact victim counts. Therefore, the estimated figures of displaced and killed Amhara civilians frequently rely on secondary demographic indicators and surviving contemporary accounts rather than comprehensive modern forensic records.This can naturally lead to underestimations of victims of atrocities. 

4. Theoretical Background: The Illusory Truth Effect 

The Illusory Truth Effect is a cognitive phenomenon wherein repeated exposure to a statement significantly increases the likelihood that individuals will perceive it as true, regardless of its factual accuracy (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977, p. 107). This effect is driven primarily by processing fluency; the human brain relies on how easily information is processed as a heuristic for validity. Because repeated statements are processed with less cognitive effort, familiarity is inherently conflated with truth (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015, p. 994). 

Crucially, this phenomenon overrides rationality and factual education through knowledge neglect and source misattribution. Individuals frequently fail to apply their stored, accurate knowledge when evaluating a familiar claim, and over time, they forget the untrustworthy or politically motivated source of the information (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992, p. 450). In social psychology, this explains why mass communication and deliberate political propaganda are so effective: by relentlessly repeating manufactured historical narratives, political actors can successfully engineer societal consensus around blatant falsehoods, effectively desensitizing whole populations to targeted wrongdoing against vilified groups (Fazio et al., 2015, p. 1001). 

This theory perfectly fits how ethnonationalist organizations and activists think and try to influence the political views of the populace. As we shall soon be envisaging it, political activists like Jawar Mohammed do not lack the knowledge or the capacity to fetch knowledge. They have preferred to be selective, avoiding factual historical and demographic evidence and devoted their energy in the production of an ethno-fascistic necropolitical libertanist ideology by mixing colonial and marxist- oriented anti Amhara narratives. They apply this ideology to instigate atrocities and massacres by creating an oppressor – oppressed dichotomy. We shall delve into this matter below.

 5. Results 

5.1 Amhara Demographics Prior to the Oromo Expansions 

The presence of Amhara people in the present day Oromo region centuries earlier than the Oromo People was due to a combination of early independent agricultural migrations and the creation of proto- urban settlements. These prototypes were made possible by military regiments, which were multinational feudal noble warrior classes, who were accompanied by their families, priests, and administrators. These led to effectively forming Amhara demographic islands that expanded over the centuries. 

a) Bale 

Bale was historically a prominent Muslim sultanate located in the southeastern highlands (Scribd, n.d., para. 8). Independent Amhara populations migrated to the region in search of arable land prior to formal imperial expansion, bringing with them the Amharic language and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (Britannica, 2026, para. 6). Later, during the reign of Amda Seyon, Bale was incorporated into the Christian empire as a tributary state (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). To secure this distant province, the Solomonic monarchs established extensive military colonies, specifically the multinational č̣äč̣ wa Bale regiment. The Amhara communities in Bale served as a bulwark against external threats (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). 

b) Welega 

In the western escarpments, traditionally associated with the ancient kingdoms of Damot and Bizamo, independent agrarian and trade-based Amhara settlements were present early on (Scribd, n.d., para. 8). Damot, initially a powerful kingdom, was gradually subsumed by the Solomonic state (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). The Christian empire established settlements to control lucrative trade routes originating in the interior (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, Table 1). Stable Amhara communities were found throughout Welega before the massive population shifts were caused by the oromo expansion before in the 16th century (Scribd, n.d., para. 9). 

c) Jimma (Ennarea) 

The area corresponding to modern Jimma was historically dominated by the Kingdom of Ennarea, inhabited primarily by Omotic and Gonga-speaking peoples (Scribd, n.d., para. 10). Throughout the region’s broader history,Amhara communities, predominantly followers of Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity were living in the area (Britannica, 2026, para. 5). Ennarea subsequently became a vital tributary state to the Ethiopian Emperor (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). To ensure loyalty, garrisons were stationed at the Ennarean court and in key 

defensive passes (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). Intermarriage between the local nobility and the Amhara created a syncretic aristocratic culture in the region prior to Oromo assimilation (Britannica, 2026, para. 6). 

d) Arsi (Fatagar, Dawaro, and Hadiya) 

The region presently known as Arsi historically encompassed the Solomonic provinces of Fatagar, parts of Dawaro, and the northern fringes of the Hadiya sultanate (Scribd, n.d., para. 10). Early demographics here comprised established independent Amhara farmers (Britannica, 2026, para. 7). These regions were heavily militarized following the 14th-century conquests and that led to the formation of garrison ‘towns’ inhabited by different ethnic groups, including Amharas (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, Table 1). The Amhara demographics here were substantial, comprising farmers, clergy, and members of the military regiments tasked with defending the southern marches (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). 

e) Shewa 

Shewa maintained a pre-existing Amhara cultural landscape heavily driven by early southward migrations prior to the restoration of the Solomonic dynasty (Scribd, n.d., para. 6). The Makhzumi Chronicles document a conflict in 1128 AD in Wärjih, confirming that the Amhara had a pre-existing presence before the 1270 Solomonic restoration (Scribd, n.d., para. 4). Subsequently, dynastic expansion militarized Shewa (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, Table 1). Before the 16th century, Shewa was a densely populated Amhara heartland, characterized by deep-rooted Christian traditions, monastic foundations like Debre Libanos (1284), and intensive highland agriculture (Britannica, 2026, para. 4). Although the Amhara people lived in Shewa centuries before the Monastry was established, let us arbitrarily take the year of establishment of the Monastry as a starting point. There is a three centuries gap between the establishment of the Debre Libanos Monastry and the arrival of the first Oromos in the area. 

f) Illubabor 

Situated in the extreme southwest, Illubabor was inhabited by Omotic-speaking communities (Scribd, n.d., para. 12). Early demographic footprints of highland settlers expanded into these frontiers in search of agrarian stability (Britannica, 2026, para. 7). Periodic royal expeditions later resulted in the establishment of forward operating bases and tribute-collection centers. Gradually, the process led to the establishing a demographic density of various ethnic groups including the Amhara population (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 4). These and other demographic and political processes took place centuries earlier than the Oromo people set feet in the area. 

g) Hararge (Dawaro) 

Hararge corresponds to the historical Islamic state of Dawaro and the frontier of the Adal Sultanate (Scribd, n.d., para. 12). Independent Amhara merchants and agriculturalists established communities here early on (Britannica, 2026, para. 8). Because of its strategic importance and the constant threat of war with Adal, Solomonic kings heavily fortified the region with massive garrison towns, including the Bäṣär waǧät regiment (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, Table 1). These settlements acted as the primary defense against eastward invasions, resulting in significant cultural exchange and Christian settlement (Wikipedia contributors, 2024, para. 5). 

To summarize these sections, the assertion that the regions encompassing modern-day “Oromia”—specifically Bale, Arsi, and Welega, Shewa—were historically devoid of Amhara prior to the late 19th century is contradicted by extensive pre-16th-century historical records. The Amhara, an agrarian society indigenous to the Ethiopian highlands, had established a profound demographic and political footprint extending far into the southern frontier zones under the Zagwe and early Solomonic dynasties (Tamrat, 1972, pp. 119-122). 

Historical evidence, including the royal chronicles of Emperor Amda Seyon (1314–1344), unequivocally indicates that the Christian kingdom had established suzerainty and thriving demographic outposts in the southern provinces. During this period, the Ethiopian empire’s frontiers extended deep into Dawaro, Bali (Bale), Hadiya, and Fatagar (Pankhurst, 1997, p. 284). Crucially, the Amhara demographic presence in Bale was not limited to northern enclaves but extended significantly, comprising the areas south of the Shebele River (Tamrat, 1972, p. 133). In these southern frontier zones, Amhara robust agricultural settlements, and clergy established had deep demographic roots centuries before the Oromo crossed the Shebele River in large numbers. Prior to the 16th century, the Oromo were pastoralist communities primarily inhabiting the peripheries of modern-day southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya (Levine, 1974, p. 78). 

5.2 The 16th-Century Oromo Expansions: Atrocities, and Forced Assimilation The geopolitical and demographic landscape of the Horn of Africa was violently altered in the 16th century. Following the exhausting Ethiopian-Adal wars spearheaded by Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi in the 1520s and 1530s, a severe political and demographic vacuum was created in the Ethiopian highlands and southern provinces. Capitalizing on this, the Oromo pastoralist confederacies initiated a massive, militarized migration northward and westward from their southern cradles (Hassen, 1990, pp. 19-21). 

This movement, documented extensively by the 16th-century monk Abba Bahrey in his seminal work Zenahu la Galla (History of the Galla), was not a peaceful migration but a series of highly aggressive conquests resulting in documented atrocities and massacres of the indigenous populations (Bahrey, 1955, p. 115). The expansions were driven by the Gadaa system, a socio-political structure that systematically militarized Oromo society, ensuring that all young men in specific age grades were organized into fierce warrior classes (Legesse, 1973, p. 61). 

● Demographic Displacement and Loss of Territory: The expansion resulted in the permanent loss of vast territories previously populated by the Amhara. Historic provinces in the south and center (such as parts of Shewa, Fatagar, Dawaro, and future Wollo) were overrun. Many Amharas were forced to flee northward toward Gojjam, Gondar, and Tigray, severely contracting the Amhara demographic footprint (Hassen, 1990, p. 19). 

● Indiscriminate Slaughter by the Luba: The early Oromo advancing into the southern and central Amhara provinces practiced a form of total war aimed at clearing land for pastoral use. History notes with horror that the Luba “killed those who were not their kind,” indiscriminately slaughtering men, women, and the elderly (Pankhurst, 1997, p. 282). 

● Decimation of Agrarian Communities: As the Oromo expanded, sedentary agricultural communities were frequently massacred to seize lands and cattle, involving “frightful slaughter” that depopulated former Amhara and Christian strongholds before survivors were driven north or assimilated (Hassen, 1990, p. 20). 

● The “Scorched Earth” Reality: These massacres were compounded by the destruction of the agricultural base. By killing farmers and burning crops, advancing forces caused secondary mass casualties through engineered famines. This dual strategy of direct massacre and starvation effectively broke the demographic hold the Amhara had on the central and southern highlands (Hassen, 1990, p. 22). 

Communities that resisted the expansion were massacred, leading to mass displacement and near total annihilation of original settlements (Bahrey, 1955, p. 122). The demographic transformation of those who remained was achieved through brutal mechanisms of forced assimilation, primarily the institutions of Mogasa (naturalization) and Gudifacha (adoption) (Hassen, 1990, pp. 21-23; Jalata, 2005, p. 62). Through Mogasa, conquered indigenous peoples (referred to collectively as Gabbaro) were forcibly absorbed into Oromo clan structures. Their original ethnic identities, languages, religions, and cultures were systematically erased and replaced by Oromo identity under the threat of death (Hassen, 1990, p. 22). Original place names were obliterated and renamed after occupying Oromo clans, artificially engineering the modern demographics of regions like Arsi and Welega. 

5.3 Application of the Illusory Truth Effect: Ethnonationalist Narrative Engineering 

The theoretical framework of the Illusory Truth Effect directly explains how ethnonationalist organizations and activists—including figures like Jawar Mohammed—have successfully inverted historical reality. By persistently and aggressively repeating the narrative that the “Amhara are colonizers” and the “Oromo are the colonized indigenous victims,” these actors exploit cognitive processing fluency to solidify a fabricated history in the public consciousness. 

Through relentless repetition across media, political speeches, and academic revisionism, the historically verifiable realities of the brutal 16th-century Oromo expansion and the forced assimilation of the Amhara are deliberately suppressed. Consequently, the public experiences knowledge neglect; even those aware of the pre-16th-century Amhara presence fail to apply that knowledge, considering, leaning to accommodate or accept the repeated falsehoods instead. This strategic application of the Illusory Truth Effect allows activists to confidently argue that Fano should not enter regions like Welega—falsely framing Amharas as outsiders or non indigenous to the area and the Oromo demographics as ancient. By repeating these inversions, ethnonationalists legitimize the eviction and massacre of Amhara civilians under the guise of “decolonization,” effectively neutralizing public outrage through an engineered, manufactured historical consensus. 

5.4 Deconstructing the anti- Amhara Narrative 

The military expansions of the late 19th century under Emperor Menelik II were executed by a centralizing state and a highly diverse imperial army comprising Oromos, (particularly the Shewan Oromo who had intermarried heavily with the Solomonic elite), Tigrayans, and others (Zewde, 2001, p. 62). The ruling class during the feudal era was multi-ethnic, united by genealogy and socio-economic and political relations rather than ethnicity (Kebede, 2008, pp. 120–125). Emperor Menelik II and many other Solomonic kings draw their ancestry from Tigray ( Emperor Menelik I) and not from Amhara. Almost all of them had a mixed ethnic background and none of them ruled with the intention and practical partisan benevolence to the Amhara people and Amhara- dominated areas.  

Empirically, the Amhara as a people and demographic have had neither the culture nor the history of invading, occupying, and assimilating other populations. The Amhara are traditionally an agrarian society heavily tied to the land through the rist system (Levine, 1974, p. 118). Culturally and historically, the Amhara peasantry lacked the cultural and organizational mechanisms for mass inversion, demographic replacement, or institutionalized forced assimilation (such as the Mogasa). To label the entire Amhara people as “colonizers” conflate an ethnic group with a multi-ethnic ruling elite.that, often than not, was at war with local chiefs and rulers from Amhara heartlands. 

Table 1: Leaders of the Post- Oromo expansion period and their ethnic background. 

*F: father 
**M: mother 

5.5 Modern Atrocities: The Weaponization of History 

The weaponization of this inverted history—portraying the Amhara peasantry as colonizers—laid the groundwork for horrific massacres when the Amhara were deliberately kept in the dark and unorganized. 

5.5.1 The Colonial Era (Italian Occupation: 1935–1941) 

During the 1930s, the Italian Fascist regime sought to dismantle Ethiopia by inflaming ethnic tensions. Notably, in 1936, organized Oromo ethnonationalist elites in the west formed the “Western Oromo Confederation.” Thirty-three Oromo chiefs from Welega, Jimma, and Illubabor formally requested the British government to establish a mandate over them, seeking to be colonized by Britain, to be separated from Ethiopia. When Britain declined, these ethnonationalist elites actively collaborated with the invading Italians. 

Table 2: Comparative Analysis: Demographic Assimilation vs. State Centralization 

The Italians subsequently armed and encouraged these ethnonationalist mobs, leading to devastating atrocities in Welega and Jimma. The Amhara peasantry, kept entirely in the dark regarding these geopolitical maneuvers, were caught completely off-guard as Italian-backed Oromo militias perpetrated widespread massacres, evictions, and the looting of Amhara properties (Geremew, 2024, p. 1892; LSE, 2023). 

5.5.2 The Haile Selassie Era (Post-Occupation to 1974) 

In the post-occupation period, ethnonationalist insurgencies intensified. Figures like Waqo Gutu, a prominent leader of the Bale Revolt (1963–1970), and Jara Abageda, an early armed ethnonationalist in Hararge and Arsi, spearheaded localized rebellions. Under their leadership, genuine grievances over land tenure were weaponized into violent ethnic hatred against Amhara farmers, uniformly labeling them as Neftegna. Waqo Gutu and Jara Abageda’s forces contributed significantly to the massacres of unsuspecting Amhara peasants and clergy. 

Table 3: Atrocities During the Colonial Era (Italian Occupation) 

Through the centuries, the Amhara people were kept in the dark regarding the atrocious narratives that soon would lead to their massacre. 

Table 4: Atrocities During the Haile Selassie Era 

Perpetrators & Mobs Ethnonationalist insurgent leaders (Waqo Gutu, Jara Abageda); localized anti-Neftegna mobs; 

radical student groups formulating the ideological framework. 

Estimated Victims Thousands of Amhara civilians were displaced or killed in rural insurgencies. 

Despite the full knowledge by the Emperor regarding the colonial anti-Amhara narratives, the Amhara people were kept entirely in the dark during the era of Emperor Minilik II. Because they were unaware of the ideological target on their backs, the Amhara peasantry remained unorganized and highly vulnerable to the sudden violence unleashed by these insurgent groups (Bahru, 2008). 

5.5.3 The Derg Era (1974–1991) 

As fully organized ethnonationalist fronts like the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) gained prominence during the Derg era, the structural violence against the Amhara reached unprecedented levels. The impoverished Amhara peasantry remained fundamentally in the dark regarding the organized political hatred directed at them by these ethnonationalist manifestos. As a result, they were frequently ambushed in regions like Welega, Illubabor, Hararge, and Arsi, subjected to systemic massacres, kidnappings, and ethnic cleansing by OLF and TPLF guerillas. This systematic dehumanization culminated in the explosive, genocidal violence in Arba Gugu and Bedeno immediately following the Derg’s collapse (Human Rights Watch, 1991). 

Table 5: Atrocities During the Derg Era 

Estimated Victims Tens of thousands of Amhara civilians killed or displaced, leading into the mass genocidal 

violence of the early 1990s. 

5.6 Contemporary Imperatives: Self-Defense and the Role of Fano The historical data firmly repudiates the exclusionary rhetoric pushed by contemporary ethnonationalist activists. Jawar Mohammed’s argument that the Fano should not enter Welega politically outrageous since he tends to advocate for the continuation of mass killings without any attempt to self-defence. His argument to keep the Amhara resistance away from Welega asserting that the Amhara exclusively belong to the Amhara region is no less outrageous. As indicated above, the Amhara maintained a deep, established presence in Welega (and regions like Bale, Arsi, Hararge, Illubabor, Jimma, and Shewa) centuries prior to the Oromo expansions. The forced resettlement of Amharas in Welega during the Derge regime can never make them foreigners or illegal settlers to the area. The dwindling number of Amharas in the area due to invasion, forced expansion, atrocities and massacres can only strengthen the legitimacy of the Amhara (and whatever force they use in their defence) to the area. 

History demonstrates that whenever the Amhara were kept in the dark and unorganized, they faced devastating massacres. Passive reliance on state actors is no longer tenable. Following the horrific Arba Gugu massacres in Arsi, protective armed groups led by Asmare Dagne successfully averted further atrocities. Learning from these historical atrocities, the subsequent targeted violence during the TPLF regime, and the exponential rise in massacres following Abiy Ahmed’s ascent to power in 2018, it is an existential necessity for the Amhara people to establish local Fano movements in self-defense wherever there are actual or potential risks for imminent massacres. The persistence of anti-Amhara atrocities despite the current Fano struggle does not negate its necessity; rather, it proves that such protective units are not yet stronge enough and must be strengthened, that the Amhara people need to  realize that their survival chance has solely rested on their organized resistance. The lack of solidarity and sympathy for Amhara massacres domestically and internationally make this point clearer. . 

6. Conclusion 

Empirical historical evidence affirms beyond doubt that Amhara and others inhabited the current ‘Oromia region’ for centuries before the 16th-century Oromo expansion (Tamrat, 1972, p. 133). The arrival of the Oromo in these regions was a militarized conquest that utilized devastating violence, massacres, and structural forced assimilation to obliterate existing indigenous identities (Bahrey, 1955, p. 115). In contrast, the historical reality of the Amhara reveals a sedentary, agrarian demographic that did not possess the cultural or institutional structures to engage in mass ethnic colonization. Wherever the Amhara have lived, they settle by historical and natural demographic movements rather than mass invasion organized on ethnic basis. The assertions that have conflated rulers with the Amhara demographics never stand the test of historical empirical evidence. A pure, single- ethnic- group- dominated- rule was experienced during the TPLF era. The subsequent seizure of power by the ethnic Oromo dominated PP is also an ethnocratic rule that has continued the TPLF- legacy.

The reverse rhetoric attributing demographic colonialism to the Amhara, sustained and weaponized by the Illusory Truth Effect, has enabled cyclical, devastating massacres against an unorganized Amhara population (from the Italian-backed atrocities in Welega, through the insurgencies of Waqo Gutu and Jara Abageda, to the Derg, TPLF, and Abiy Ahmed eras). Recognizing this historical continuum of violence mandates the ongoing organization of protective Amhara units, such as the Fano, to defend vulnerable populations against existential threats in all regions they historically and currently inhabit. 

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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