By Sisay Mulu (Amoraw)

I am writing this piece despite the advice of people I respect. The noise surrounding this alliance debate is clouding the realities. This is a brief response to Yhienew Ewnetu’s article, “Propaganda or Evidence-Based Criticism? A Short Evaluation of the Anti-Alliance Critique” published on October 17, 2026, in response to my October 16 article,  The Alliance Failed. The Amhara Cause Must Not. In under 24 hours, he assembled 29 references and several theories of alliance formation. I commend him for the speed and effort. 

But the practical question remains simple and direct: What has this alliance delivered for the Amhara cause that would likely not have happened without it? Mr. Yihenew explains how alliances can form among groups with different interests, how a movement can survive territorial losses, and how a common opponent can bring armed groups together. Those points do not establish that this alliance protected Amhara priorities, gave Amharas meaningful influence, or improved the position of the Amhara struggle.

My position is firm: the alliance was wrong from the outset, and it has now collapsed as an effective coordinated project. I do not claim that a formal dissolution has been announced or that every member has stopped acting. The issue is whether the alliance still has a shared strategy and produces value for Amharas. Its name and public statements cannot answer that question.

Criticism must be answered with evidence

Mr. Yihenew labels my commentary propaganda, says it relies on fear and manipulation, and assigns it “approximately 85% propaganda.” He also suggests that opposition to the alliance may reflect state-sponsored psychological operations, political clientelism, or the weaponization of historical trauma. I found that ridiculous, not because he disagrees, but because he treats disagreement as evidence of bad faith. That reads like a social-media provocation , not a serious rebuttal. It falls short of the elevated, evidence-based exchange his academic framing promises.

What did he measure to arrive at 85%? Which claims did he test, and against what evidence? Without a transparent method, that figure is a rhetorical label dressed up as precision. The gap between demanding evidence from critics and relying on insinuations about their motives raises a serious question about the integrity of his analytical judgment: will he apply to his own claims the same standard he demands from others?

Calling a critic manipulated, self-interested, or propagandistic does not prove the criticism wrong. It shifts attention from the argument to the critic’s supposed motives. People can oppose this alliance, question its partners, terms, timing, and safeguards, and still oppose the government and support an alliance where it serves the public. Concerns about territory, past violence, and community security deserve direct answers, not dismissed as as stsrtegeic invieneces or labaled as regime’s talking points. If Mr. Yihenew wants an elevated exchange, he should answer those concerns on their merits.

Theories can frame the question; they cannot explain this alliance

Mr. Yihenew invokes Fotini Christia’s civil-war alliance theory, asymmetric warfare, and historical examples from China and El Salvador to describe the coalition as a “marriage of convenience.” These frameworks can help explain why groups sometimes cooperate despite competing interests. They cannot prove that this particular alliance is sound or that its members can coordinate in Ethiopia’s present circumstances.

Political judgment depends on the actors, their interests, their institutions, their history, and the choices available at a given time, place and context. Aristotle makes a related point in Politics: statesmanship must consider what is practicable under particular circumstances, not only what is best in the abstract.¹ That principle applies here. A framework’s assumptions must fit the groups and conditions being analyzed; a general pattern is not evidence that its conclusion applies to this alliance.

The domino theory offers a brief caution. U.S. officials feared that a communist victory in Vietnam would trigger a chain reaction across Southeast Asia. Yet a 1964 U.S. government memorandum called the theory “over-simplified” and said wider effects depended on the circumstances in Vietnam and in other countries.² This does not make the theory worthless or every concern behind it baseless. It shows why a broad framework cannot determine how each scenario will play out. Likewise, examples from China or El Salvador may raise questions about coalition formation, but they cannot substitute for evidence about this alliance’s commitments and results.

We have passed the stage of using broad theories and distant historical parallels to justify the alliance’s formation. The task now is to test it against the realities on the ground, without treating different countries, periods, and purposes as interchangeable. That is the practical standard Mr. Yihenew’s response does not meet.

Pressure on the government is not proof of an alliance benefit

Mr. Yihenew argues that the alliance stretched federal forces across several fronts and strained government logistics. But pressure on the government does not, by itself, show that the alliance created that pressure or that Amharas benefited from it. The same pressure could have arisen from separate conflicts, whether or not the groups had formed an alliance.

The TPLF’s conflict with the federal government and its political objectives predated the coalition. It might have pursued them regardless of whether it joined. Fano and other movements also had their own conflicts and objectives. The government would likely have deployed forces wherever it saw a serious threat. Several fronts existing at the same time may strain government capacity, but that does not prove the alliance caused the strain or that coordination produced an added military advantage.

The relevant question is what the alliance made possible that its members could not have achieved separately. Did joint planning, shared resources, or coordinated action create pressure beyond what the separate conflicts would have generated? Did that added pressure change an outcome in a way that advanced Amhara priorities? If the alliance added value, that value should be demonstrable.

A shared opponent is not a shared political project

Calling the Prosperity regieme a common enemy does not explain what each group is fighting it over or what each wants to replace it with. As the Amharic saying goes, “እናቱ የሞተችበት እና እናቱ ገበያ የሄደችበት ልጅ እኩል ያለቅሳሉ”, loosely trsnlated as the child whose mother has died and the child whose mother has gone to market may cry alike. The sound is the same. The loss is not.

The same is true of calling the government a “common enemy.” Groups may oppose the same government for entirely different reasons, with different stakes and different goals. TPLF and political forces associated with OLA have boldy defended the existing ethnic-federal structure while contesting who controls power within it. 

The Amhara struggle raises different demands: structural change, constitutional reform, justice, and resolution of territorial and identity questions. These reach beyond who holds office under the current arrangement. The prosperity regieme could potentially accommodate the TPLF or Oromo political forces through changes in power or representation while leaving the basic structure intact. The core Amhara demands cannot be resolved by changing officeholders while leaving everything else as it is.

So when we call the government a common enemy, we need to explain in what sense it is an enemy to Ethiopia and in what sense it is an enemy to each partner in the alliance. Are the groups united by a common political program, or only by opposition to the party currently in power? If the goal is simply to remove the ruling party and redistribute control within the existing order, that does not show that the alliance serves the Amhara cause.

Who sets the agenda and whose interests does it serve

Mr. Yihenew argues that Fano is the alliance’s true strategic anchor because of its geographic position, grassroots reach, and pressure in central Ethiopia. Those may be important military factors. They do not, by themselves, establish who shapes the coalition’s political agenda, public identity, or decisions.

Prominent coverages has repeatedly placed the TPLF at the center of the alliance’s public story. Reuters reported that the alliance’s founding statement was read by Fano leader Zemene Kassie but broadcast on Tigrai TV, which Reuters described as TPLF-controlled; Reuters later described the coalition as a “rebel alliance led by the TPLF.”^3,4 Al Jazeera also framed the renewed fighting around the TPLF and its allies.⁵ These descriptions do not prove that the TPLF controlled every decision. They do show why we cannot settle the question of leadership simply by declaring Fano the anchor. The TPLF’s political experience and international connections also gave it influence that geography alone cannot measure.

The alliance’s own response to Rubio made the Pretoria Agreement central to its public explanation for renewed fighting.⁶ That choice deserves scrutiny. The agreement was negotiated by the federal government and the TPLF; Amhara representatives were not parties to it, and it left Western Tigray’s status unresolved.⁷ Fano and OLA were not parties either. Why, then, should the failure to implement that agreement be the shared rationale for every alliance member? Why should Amhara advocates defend a deal negotiated without them while their territorial and security concerns remain unsettled?

This is not a minor communications issue. When one partner’s agreement becomes the coalition’s public rationale, while another partner’s concerns are treated as matters to defer or remain silent about, it raises a practical question about whose priorities shape the alliance. If Fano was the political anchor, that influence should be visible in the decisions and commitments, not inferred from the scale of its struggle.

The alliance may remain on paper while its working premise has collapsed

A coalition can keep its name, issue statements, and still cease to function as a coordinated project. Practical alliance requires more than a shared label: it requires a continuing strategic purpose, mechanisms for joint decisions, sustained coordination, and commitments that remain meaningful as circumstances change. The central actors and conditions behind this alliance have changed sharply in recent weeks.

The fall of Mekelle is the clearest sign. Government-aligned forces entered the Tigray capital on October 4 after the TPLF withdrew.⁸ That is a major loss for a movement that once governed the region and for a coalition publicly described as TPLF-led. The TPLF’s loss of the regional seat of power reduces its access to authority, resources, and political leverage. It changes the balance at the alliance’s center.

Mr. Yihenew points to the TPLF’s loss of Mekelle in 2020 and return in 2021.⁹ The comparison leaves out the changed conditions. Reuters reported in September that the TPLF’s grip within Tigray had weakened, with dissent, defections, and declining public support; the same report contrasted that situation with the broader support the TPLF had in 2020, including in the diaspora.¹⁰ The federal government has since established a caretaker administration, and former fighters have registered for a civilian reintegration program.¹¹ The TPLF must also contend with government-backed Tigray Peace Forces, which entered Mekelle alongside federal forces. They may have some support within Tigray as well.⁸ These are new political and military pressures that were not present in the same way during the TPLF’s 2021 recovery.

In my assessment, the government and its allies have learned more from the 2020–2022 war than the TPLF has. The TPLF is more divided, less supported within Tigray, and less unified in the diaspora than it was in 2021. Mekelle’s fall is therefore more than a temporary battlefiled setback. It is a strategic blow to the TPLF’s ability to serve as the alliance’s anchor; and in the context of the other changes, the last nail in the coffin of the alliance as an effective coordinated project.

The international context adds another complication to the stratgeic equation. Marco Rubio did not name the alliance in his remarks, so it would be inaccurate to claim that he explicitly targeted it. He referred to separatists and terrorist attacks; the alliance rejected that characterization in its response.⁶ This does not prove the alliance has collapsed. It does expose the gap between its claim to offer a national transition and the difficult questions its public position now faces internationally.

The distinction between formal status and practical cooperation is not unique to Ethiopia. China and the Soviet Union signed a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950, but their partnership fractured within little more than a decade and later deteriorated into armed border clashes.^12,13 The comparison does not make the cases equivalent. It illustrates the narrow point that a formal agreement or continuing name cannot preserve the shared purpose and practical cooperation that once gave an alliance meaning.

Practical test for the alliance 

My criticism is not a rejection of cooperation with other Ethiopian constituencies. My previous article also set out what AFNM should do. My point is that any alliance must be judged by its terms, risks, and results. The alliance’s defenders and AFNM should have answered these questions before the alliance was declared:

1. What did the alliance enable the Amhara movement to do that it could not otherwise have done?
2. What specific commitments did each partner make, and what concrete benefits did Amharas receive?
3. Who set the agenda and made consequential decisions, and what authority did Amhara representatives have?
4. How did the alliance protect Amhara priorities when partners disagreed about political objectives, territory, security, or the constitutional order?
5. What costs and risks did the alliance create, who carried them, and how could Amharas review or leave the arrangement if it stopped serving their interests?

These are ordinary questions any constituency should ask before tying its political future to a coalition. If the answers exist, present them. If they do not, the public is entitled to ask why the alliance was promoted as essential before its terms, safeguards, and likely benefits were clear.

In the end, let’s Judge the alliance by what it does for Amharas

The alliance was wrong from the outset, and it has now collapsed in practice as an effective strategic project. That conclusion does not depend on one battlefield event or on a formal announcement of dissolution. It follows from the changed position of its central actor, the unresolved differences among its members, the lack of demonstrated coordination, the chagaing dybamic in the ground, and the absence of concrete gains for Amharas.

A political alliance should be judged by its actual contribution to the people and priorities it claims to serve, in the circumstances and at the time it operates.

References

1. Aristotle. Politics. Book IV, chapter 1. MIT Internet Classics Archive. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.4.four.html

2. US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964: Document 418. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d418

3. Reuters. Seven Ethiopian armed groups announce anti-government alliance. September 21, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/seven-ethiopian-armed-groups-announce-anti-government-alliance-2026-09-21/

4. Reuters. Ethiopian troops enter town on border with Eritrea, stoking war fears. October 13, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-troops-enter-town-border-with-eritrea-stoking-war-fears-2026-10-13/

5. Al Jazeera. Fighting widens across Ethiopia as Tigray clashes escalate. September 24, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/24/fighting-widens-across-ethiopia-as-tigray-clashes-escalate

6. Addis Standard. Alliance for Survival rejects Rubio’s characterization of Ethiopia’s conflict as separatist, terrorist. October 19, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://allafrica.com/stories/202610190343.html

7. Al Jazeera. Can Ethiopia’s seven-group rebel alliance challenge Abiy Ahmed? September 23, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/23/can-ethiopias-seven-group-rebel-alliance-challenge-abiy-ahmed

8. Associated Press. Ethiopia’s government retakes Mekelle after opposition fighters withdraw from Tigray capital. October 4, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-war-tplf-792f66094d4cc5171ec5478e8a994931

9. Ewnetu Y. Propaganda or evidence-based criticism? A short evaluation of the anti-alliance critique. Borkena. October 17, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://borkena.com/propaganda-or-evidence-based-criticism-a-short-evaluation-of-the-anti-alliance-critique/

10. Reuters. Flush with allies, Tigray’s leaders face internal discord in new Ethiopia war. September 24, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/flush-with-allies-tigrays-leaders-face-internal-discord-new-ethiopia-war-2026-09-24/

11. Associated Press. Ethiopia sets up Tigray caretaker government as ex-fighters seek return to civilian life. October 16, 2026. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://apnews.com/article/a6ffdcdb836c7e23d9535b0efd5d3d18

12. United Nations Treaty Series. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. Signed February 14, 1950. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280147e29

13. Oxford Bibliographies. Sino-Soviet relations, 1949–1991. Accessed October 19, 2026. URL: https://academic.oup.com/reference/62338/reference-article-abstract/554173125 

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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