By Mekuria
I would like to share some thoughts on the ongoing debates taking place both on social media and among grassroots supporters. These conversations—though often contentious—serve an important role in shaping public discourse, refining ideas, and encouraging critical thinking grounded in real-world perspectives. The key issues I aim to address include the rise of gang-like factions, widespread warlordism, the counterproductive “I know it all” mentality, the debate over political alliances, and the current leadership role of Colonel Demeke Zewdu.
The Gang of Eight
Within the Amhara Fano movement, there are individuals who display a mindset more destructive than that of 18th-century warlords. Unlike those historical figures, who at least had the moral clarity to declare their intentions openly, these modern actors operate through deceit and manipulation under the guise of resistance.
In today’s Amhara Regional State, certain Fano leaders claim to be the sole legitimate voice of the struggle against existential threats. This self-appointed group includes Zemene Kasse, Asres Mare, and Marshet Tsehaye from Gojam; Mirie Wodajo and Abebe Fentaw from Wollo; Abdela Idris from Shewa; and Baye Kenaw and Yohannes Negussu from Gondar.
Among their controversial actions: the Gojam Fano leadership is known for targeting Colonel Getahun, a key figure in the fight against Abiy Ahmed near Achefer. They have also attacked Masresha’s forces in Eastern Gojam. Mirie Wodajo unsuccessfully attempted to capture Colonel Fantahun Muhabie, and the group has reportedly even opened fire on members of the Afhad (አፍሃድ) army.
These individuals claim to be the only true fighters against Abiy Ahmed. Yet their actions and rhetoric suggest otherwise—they undermine the very cause they profess to defend. They go as far as dismissing the sacrifice of others for the Amhara cause and accuse the የአማራ ፋኖ ህዝባዊ ድርጅት (Afhad), a grassroots resistance organization, of collaborating with the regime. This, despite Afhad’s leadership’s long-standing opposition to Abiy Ahmed and, earlier, to the TPLF-led EPRDF—the same system that helped shape Abiy’s anti-Amhara policies.
Abebe Fentaw disgracefully referred to Afhad leaders as “berbans,” likening them to the criminal crucified beside Christ. Zemene Kasse’s faction spreads falsehoods through their media channels, defaming Afhad leaders. Meanwhile, Abdela Idris (real name Yared), the true power behind the Shewa Fano—though Desalegn Yismashewa serves as the public face—continues to smear Afhad from the shadows. Recently, a group of four representatives of the gang issued a press release labeling Afhad as Abiy’s Fano organization and declared war. These allegations and the hostility directed at Afhad are baseless and must be unequivocally rejected and condemned. It is essential that social media journalists, activists, Amhara elites, and Ethiopians as a whole respond with responsibility, integrity, and critical awareness.
The so-called gangster faction has the option to unite and form an organization similar to Afhad, rather than resorting to violent conflict with it. If both groups share the common goal of defending against the existential threats facing the Amhara people—without being driven by a hunger for power—then collaboration is not only possible but necessary. It is crucial to remember that genuine power comes from the will and support of the people, not through force or imposition, as Abiy Ahmed demonstrated in his dealings with the Amhara community.
The Amhara diaspora can play a pivotal role in shaping the future of the Fano movement. Ethiopians and Amharas who believe in justice, equality, and democratic values must reject the rise of warlord-style leadership. Instead, they should support Fano leaders who uphold integrity, unity, and a principled resistance to oppression.
The Case of Colonel Demeke Zewdu: Propaganda, and the Real Threat
Colonel Demeke Zewdu has become a polarizing figure on social media, frequently at the center of controversy that often spills over into real-world tensions. Media activists like Asaye Derbie have not only criticized him but have also launched smear campaigns against committed Amhara figures working on the ground. Asaye, who fled Ethiopia disguised in traditional Jelebiya attire to resemble an Arab merchant, has since settled in Uganda, where he continues to spread divisive propaganda. One of his main talking points is the claim that Colonel Demeke Zewdu is collaborating with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (PP), and that Ashete Demellie is an active PP member. But what exactly is the purpose of such claims?
Since Demeke Zewdu and Ashete Demellie assumed leadership roles in the Wolkayit region, the TPLF has not been able to replicate its aggression in Raya by invading Wolkayit. This in itself is a noteworthy success. The core grievance many Amharas have with former ANDM leaders is not merely that they joined the Prosperity Party—it is that they have failed to prioritize Amhara interests or act with accountability toward their own people.
If Demeke Zewdu and Ashete Demellie are effectively defending Wolkayit from TPLF encroachment, that is an achievement that should not be dismissed. There is no justification for Fano to intervene unless these leaders capitulate to TPLF demands.
TPLF-aligned propagandists on social media continue to spotlight Colonel Demeke and label him a Prosperity Party affiliate, hoping to erode his credibility among the Amhara base. But this narrative does not serve the interests of the Amhara people—it is a calculated attempt to create division between Fano and the two leaders who have so far played a vital role in safeguarding Wolkayit.
Amharas must recognize these efforts for what they are: a propaganda campaign aimed at weakening internal unity. Rather than falling for these distractions, the focus should remain on practical outcomes—especially the defense of strategic territories and the long-term well-being of the Amhara people.
The Question of Alliances: Fano, Tigray, and Eritrea
The topic of a Fano alliance has been the subject of recurring discussion, particularly among anchor media political commentators. I previously addressed this issue in an article published on the Borkena website. The notion, often naively promoted by some pundits that a strategic alliance between Amhara and Tigray could emerge was quickly disproven when TPLF forces invaded Raya. For anyone familiar with the political posture of the TPLF and the broader Tigrayan elite, the idea of a meaningful collaboration between Amhara and Tigray is more aspiration than realistic.
Historically, Tigray has been more of a rival than a partner to the Amhara region. This rivalry continues to manifest in different forms today, with Amharas frequently branded as expansionists, neftegnas, or oppressors. The current actions by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appear to be shaped by long-standing narratives and propaganda propagated by Tigrayan elites. As such, a genuine partnership between the two regions is unlikely to materialize anytime soon. It may take an entirely new generation, one unburdened by the ideology of ethnic federalism, to make such cooperation possible.
Extremist Tigrayan factions—arguably more radical than the TPLF—such as Bytona, Salsawi Woyane, and Wunat, have gone as far as to lay claim to territories extending into the Amhara heartland, including Gondar and Woldia. These groups, along with mainstream Tigrayan elites, continue to push for Tigrayan sovereignty and the reclamation of Wolkayit, an agenda that was partly advanced with Abiy Ahmed’s help during the conflict in Raya. As long as these territorial claims persist, prospects for meaningful cooperation remain dim. Neither Debretsion’s TPLF nor Getachew Reda’s breakaway faction offers a constructive alternative for the Amhara region. Portraying Getachew’s group as progressive or transformative is misleading. His political journey—from EPRDF propaganda to support for Hailemariam’s administration and involvement in the Tigray conflict—speaks volumes about the continuity in political ideology and goals.
In contrast, pursuing cooperation with Eritrea presents a more pragmatic and beneficial path. Despite tensions during Eritrea’s independence struggle, the Eritrean government has shown a readiness to reconcile with the Amhara people. Notably, Eritrean officials have visited Bahir Dar, the Amhara regional capital, to express regret for past hostilities and propaganda. This contrasts sharply with the TPLF and Tigrayan elites, who have yet to acknowledge or apologize for the suffering inflicted during their rule.
Unlike Tigray, Eritrea has no ongoing territorial dispute with the Amhara region. The internationally recognized border along the Tekeze River provides a clear and stable demarcation. Eritrea has not targeted Amharas since gaining independence, and as a sovereign UN member state with defined borders, it offers a level of political and diplomatic predictability. Furthermore, its strategic ports—Assab and Massawa—are geographically advantageous for the Amhara region’s economic interests.
For these reasons, forging stronger ties with Eritrea is in the best interest of the Amhara people. Politicians like Lidetu Ayalew, who have historically downplayed Amhara concerns and aligned with the TPLF elites, should not be given the platform to influence strategic decisions. Eritrea should not be viewed as a mortal enemy. Unlike with Tigray, there are no fundamental or unresolved conflicts of interest between Amhara and Eritrea.
Conclusions
The Amhara Diaspora—and Ethiopians at large—must reject the destructive mindset of “I am more pure than you,” as well as the rise of warlordism across the four Amhara regions. Fragmented leadership under figures like Zemene Kasse in Gojam, Baye Kenaw in Gonder, Mire Wodajo in Wollo, and Abdela Idris in Shewa undermines the unity of the Amhara cause. In the end, such disunity not only weakens the collective struggle but also damages the credibility of the movement in the eyes of the international community.
If we fail to reject warlordism and gangster-style leadership, and continue to ignore lies while pretending that mere advancement within Amhara Fano structures is enough, we are only deceiving ourselves. This path leads us back to the same mistake we made when we supported Abiy Ahmed—helping him consolidate power, only to be met with oppression in return.
In contrast to the negative propaganda, Colonel Demeke Zewdu and Ashete Demellie are making significant contributions in the Wolkayit region. As long as they continue to keep Wolkayit beyond the reach of the TPLF, Fano should not interfere in their efforts. Undermining effective leadership only benefits adversaries.
The notion of forming an alliance with the TPLF is deeply misguided. This is a group that has historically incited hatred against Amharas, invaded North Gondar, much of Wollo, and parts of Shewa, and still lays claim to Amhara territories. Any Fano group entertaining the idea of collaborating with such a force should be firmly rejected. Getachew Reda’s splinter faction, in particular, poses a growing threat. Their goal is to align with Abiy Ahmed, reassert territorial claims in Amhara, and rehabilitate their political image with the backing of diaspora-based Tigrayan elites who have lost faith in defeating Abiy by force. Many of these same elites once denounced the Pretoria Agreement, but now support Getachew’s repositioning—an opportunistic and strategic shift, not a genuine change of heart.
By contrast, an alliance with Eritrea offers clear strategic advantages. Eritrea provides Fano with an opportunity to gain both international recognition and logistical support. The issue of Assab, often raised in pan-Ethiopian discourse, is irrelevant to the immediate needs of the Amhara people. Amharas have been displaced from Oromia, denied access to Addis Ababa, subjected to drone attacks, kidnappings, and systematic disenfranchisement. In such circumstances, there is no rational benefit for Amharas to advocate for Assab “on behalf of 86 nationalities.”
Instead, a pragmatic relationship with Eritrea should be built around mutual respect, security cooperation, and economic ties. Eritrean ports such as Assab and Massawa can serve as valuable trade routes for the Amhara region—without the need for conflict. Peaceful and practical diplomacy should take precedence over idealistic, pan-Ethiopian agendas that offer little in return.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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