International law governing the sharing and management of Transboundary Rivers: The Nile as a case between Ethiopia and Egypt

By: Tegegnework Gettu 

International law recognizes that a river flowing through several countries is a shared  international watercourse, and that all riparian states have rights and responsibilities  concerning its use and management. The fundamental principle is that no country  automatically owns an entire international river simply because the river originates  within its territory, or because it has historically used a larger proportion of its waters.  Equally, a downstream country does not acquire an absolute legal right to prevent an  upstream country from developing its water resources. 

The law seeks to balance three important considerations: 

1. The sovereign right of each riparian state to use water resources within its  territory. 
2. The right of other riparian states to equitable and reasonable use of the shared  watercourse.  
3. The obligation of all states to prevent significant transboundary harm and  cooperate in managing the river. 

These principles are particularly important for Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan in their  relationship over the Nile. 

I. The principal international legal instrument: The 1997 UN  Watercourses Convention: 

The most important global treaty is the United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted on 21 May  1997. It entered into force on 17 August 2014. It provides a framework for  resolving disputes over rivers shared by two or more countries. Its most important  provisions are the following. 

A. Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization 

This is arguably the most important principle for understanding the Nile  dispute. It states that every country sharing an international watercourse is  entitled to use it in an equitable and reasonable manner.

This means: 

a. Upstream countries have the right to develop dams, irrigation,  hydropower and other water infrastructure. That is exactly what Ethiopia  is today.  
b. Downstream countries have the right to reasonable access to the river’s  waters.  
c. No country has an automatic entitlement to all the water it historically  consumed. This is where Egypt has a problem of accepting.  
d. No country has an automatic right to an equal numerical percentage of  the river. That means a negotiated agreement, not monopoly, is the logical  and reasonable way out.  
e. All countries must consider the interests and development needs of  other riparian states. Egypt should understand this. 

The law therefore recognizes equality of legal rights, not necessarily equality  of water quantities.  

B. Article 6: Factors determining equitable utilization 

International law identifies several factors for determining what constitutes a  fair and reasonable use. 

These include: 

1. Geography and hydrology of the river basin.  
2. Population dependent on the river.  
3. Economic and social needs of each country.  
4. Existing and potential uses of the river.  
5. The effects of one country’s water utilization on other countries.  6. Availability of alternative water resources.  
7. Conservation and efficient utilization of water. 

Importantly, no single factor automatically determines the allocation. All  relevant factors must be considered together. 

For the Nile, this means Ethiopia’s development needs, Egypt’s dependence  on the river, Sudan’s agricultural and other water requirements, and the needs  of other basin countries must all be considered. 

C. Article 7: The obligation not to cause significant harm 

This provision is particularly important to the Egyptian position. 

Countries must take appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other  countries sharing an international watercourse. 

However, there is an important legal distinction: The obligation not to cause  significant harm does not give downstream countries an absolute veto  over upstream development projects. 

Article 7 must be interpreted alongside Articles 5 and 6 on equitable and  reasonable utilization. 

If significant harm occurs, the countries concerned must consult and take  appropriate measures to eliminate or mitigate it. Compensation may also be  discussed where appropriate. 

Consequently, the no-harm principle cannot be interpreted independently of the  equitable-utilization principle.  

D. Article 8: Cooperation 

All countries sharing an international watercourse must cooperate on the basis  of: 

• Sovereign equality. 
• Territorial integrity. 
• Mutual benefit. 
• Good faith. 

This encourages joint institutions and mechanisms for managing shared rivers.

E. Article 9: Exchange of information 

Countries should regularly exchange available hydrological, meteorological,  environmental and water-quality information. 

For a river such as the Nile, this is essential for dam operations, flood  management, drought forecasting and water security.

II. Does international law recognize historical water rights? This is one of the most contentious aspects of the Nile dispute. 

Egypt frequently invokes historical water utilization and the agreements of 1929  and 1959. However, international water law does not establish that historical use  automatically creates permanent, exclusive ownership of a river’s waters.  

Historical utilization is relevant under Article 6 of the 1997 Convention, but it is  only one factor among several. 

In other words: 

• Existing dependence on the river matters. 
• Investments and established uses matter. 
• Population and economic requirements matter. 
• The needs and rights of upstream countries also matter. 
• Historical utilization cannot automatically extinguish the development  rights of other riparian states. 

This distinction is fundamental. Historical use is a relevant consideration, not an  unlimited sovereign entitlement. 

International law also requires consideration of the rights of states that were not  parties to earlier bilateral or regional arrangements.  

III. What about the 1929 and 1959 Nile agreements? 

These two agreements are at the center of the legal disagreement between Egypt  and the upstream Nile countries. 

– The 1929 agreement 

The 1929 arrangement was concluded through an exchange of letters involving  Egypt and Britain, which represented several territories under British colonial  administration. Among its provisions were restrictions on upstream projects  that might affect the flow reaching Egypt, together with recognition of Egypt’s  existing water use. The whole British objective was to keep its colonial cotton  farm and supply from Egypt, and Sudan to its textile industries.  

The upstream countries’ principal objection is that they were not independent  sovereign participants in negotiating the arrangement and that it cannot  permanently restrict their development rights. The fundamental and critical  error was to totally ignore independent Ethiopia’s interests that provide 86% of  the Nile water to Egypt and Sudan. 

– The 1959 agreement 

The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement was concluded between Egypt and Sudan. It allocated: 

• 55.5 billion cubic metres annually to Egypt. 
• 18.5 billion cubic metres annually to Sudan. 

These figures were based on the assumed average annual flow at Aswan of 84  billion cubic meters, with an allowance for estimated evaporation and other  losses. The critical legal issue is that the total source of the water, Ethiopia and  the other upstream countries were not parties to this agreement. Again Egypt  and Sudan, when building Aswan and other Dams never consulted Ethiopia or  taken Ethiopia’s legitimate right and interest into account.  

The agreement is a bilateral treaty between Egypt and Sudan. It cannot, simply  by its existence, impose obligations on Ethiopia without Ethiopia’s consent or  the other Nile upstream countries. This reflects Article 34 of the Vienna  Convention on the Law of Treaties: a treaty does not create obligations or  rights for a third state without its consent. Consequently, the 1959 agreement  cannot, by itself, establish an internationally binding allocation of all Nile waters  among all riparian countries.  

IV. The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) This is particularly important for Ethiopia. 

The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement was developed through  negotiations among the Nile Basin countries to establish a basin-wide framework for  cooperation. 

Its objectives include: 

• Equitable and reasonable utilization. 
• Sustainable development of Nile resources. 
• Protection and conservation of the river ecosystem. 
• Regular exchange of information. 
• Notification and consultation concerning planned projects. 
• Establishment of a permanent Nile River Basin Commission. 

The agreement entered into force on 13 October 2024, following the necessary  ratifications. Ethiopia is among its parties.

Why is this significant? 

The CFA provides a regional legal framework based on the participation and  equitable utilization of the Nile Basin countries. It challenges the idea that the  Nile should be governed exclusively by arrangements made between Egypt  and Sudan. 

However, an important qualification is necessary: the CFA does not itself  establish fixed numerical water allocations for every country. It establishes  principles, obligations and an institutional framework for cooperation. The  absence of Egypt and Sudan also means that the CFA cannot automatically  impose its treaty obligations on those two countries. 

Nevertheless, its entry into force is a significant development in Nile Basin  governance. 

V. Can Egypt legally prevent Ethiopia from constructing  dams? 

This is one of the most important practical questions. 

International law does not prohibit Ethiopia from constructing dams on rivers within  its territory merely because those rivers eventually flow into another country. Ethiopia  has sovereign rights to develop its water resources, subject to its international  obligations. However, these rights are not unlimited. 

Ethiopia must take appropriate measures to: 

• Assess potential transboundary impacts. 
• Notify and consult affected countries where the applicable legal framework  requires it. 
• Exchange relevant technical information. 
• Cooperate on dam safety and operational arrangements. 
• Avoid significant transboundary harm. The Ethiopian side has shown  willingness to take these points into account.  

The same principles apply to Egypt and Sudan when undertaking projects that affect  other countries. There is no general international legal rule giving Egypt an automatic  veto over Ethiopia’s dam construction. Likewise, Ethiopia cannot disregard the  legitimate water-security interests of downstream countries. 

The International Court of Justice has addressed equitable utilization and  cooperation in cases involving international rivers, including the Gabčíkovo Nagymaros dispute between Hungary and Slovakia. 

VI. Are these international legal principles binding on  Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan? 

An important legal distinction must be made. 

The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention is a treaty. Its provisions bind countries that  are parties to it. Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan are not parties to that Convention. 

However, several of its central principles, particularly equitable and reasonable  utilization, cooperation and the obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent  significant transboundary harm, are widely recognized as customary international  law. 

This means that these principles can apply beyond the countries that have ratified  the Convention, although the precise legal obligations must be assessed individually. 

Not every procedural provision of the Convention automatically becomes customary  international law. The Nile Basin CFA, meanwhile, is binding as a treaty among its  parties.  

VII. What would a legally sound Nile water-sharing  arrangement look like? 

In my assessment, a sustainable solution requires moving beyond the argument over  historical ownership and toward a comprehensive basin-wide agreement. I would  suggest six essential elements. 

A permanent Nile River Basin Commission could oversee these arrangements.

It should include all basin countries, with technical committees addressing: 

• Water availability and allocation. 
• Hydropower development. 
• Agricultural requirements. 
• Climate change and drought. 
• Flood management. 
• Dam safety. 
• Environmental protection. 

An important principle should be that water-sharing arrangements must be flexible  enough to accommodate changing rainfall patterns, population growth and economic  development. 

VIII. What does all this mean for Ethiopia’s position? There are several important legal conclusions. 

First: Ethiopia has a legitimate right to utilize the Blue Nile. Its upstream  geographical position does not deprive it of the right to develop its water resources. 

Second: Egypt does not possess an internationally recognized exclusive ownership  right over the Nile. Its historical dependence and existing water consumption are  relevant considerations, but they do not automatically establish exclusive rights over  the river. 

Third: The 1959 agreement cannot automatically bind Ethiopia. It was concluded  between Egypt and Sudan without Ethiopia’s participation or consent. 

Fourth: Ethiopia must respect downstream water security. Its development rights  coexist with obligations of cooperation, due diligence and prevention or mitigation of  significant transboundary harm. 

Fifth: The CFA represents an important regional legal development. It establishes a  framework for cooperation among participating Nile Basin states, although its  effectiveness would be strengthened considerably by the participation of Egypt and  Sudan. 

IX. The fundamental legal and political issue 

There are essentially two competing approaches to the Nile question. 

1. The historical-rights approach: Emphasizes historical utilization, established  water consumption and the protection of existing downstream dependence.

2. The basin-wide equitable-utilization approach: Emphasizes the sovereign  equality of riparian countries, equitable utilization, sustainable development  and cooperation among all basin states. 

The international legal framework does not support either unlimited historical control  or unlimited upstream freedom. 

It requires balancing the rights and interests of all riparian countries. 

Overall conclusion: The Nile should be governed as a shared international  watercourse, not as the exclusive property of the downstream countries or the  upstream countries. Egypt’s water security deserves protection, but so does  Ethiopia’s right to development. Neither country’s legitimate interests should be used  to extinguish the rights of the other. 

The ultimate solution is a legally binding, inclusive Nile Basin agreement that  establishes equitable utilization, predictable dam operations, drought-management  arrangements and permanent mechanisms for cooperation not covert operation to  destabilize and fragment a country.  

One further question deserves particularly serious examination: Does international  law give Ethiopia a stronger legal argument than Egypt on the question of equitable  utilization, and can Egypt legally continue to insist on the 1959 allocation as the  basis for controlling the Nile?  

That is where the legal, historical and geopolitical dimensions of the Nile dispute  come together. 

X. Ethiopia versus Egypt: Who has the stronger legal position  under international water law? 

My assessment is that Ethiopia has a substantial and well-founded legal  argument against Egypt’s claim to an exclusive or predetermined entitlement to  the Nile waters based on the 1959 agreement. Ethiopia has a legitimate right to  equitable and reasonable utilization of the Blue Nile, including hydropower  development. 

However, this does not mean Ethiopia has an unrestricted right to use the river,  nor does it mean that every Egyptian legal argument is without merit. 

The distinction between the right to develop a shared river and the obligation to  protect other riparian countries is central to understanding the dispute. 

Let us examine this from the perspective of international law, treaty law, historical  agreements and the legal implications for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam  (GERD).

1. The 1959 agreement: Egypt’s strongest historical argument, but a weak  basis for controlling Ethiopia 

The 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters was concluded  between Egypt and Sudan on 8 November 1959. The United Nations Treaty  Collection registers it explicitly as a bilateral agreement.  

The problem with using this agreement as the legal foundation for controlling  the entire Nile is straightforward. 

Ethiopia: 

• Was not a negotiating party. 
• Did not sign the agreement. 
• Did not consent to its water allocations. 
• Was not represented in the allocation of the river’s water. 

The agreement allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters annually to Egypt and 18.5  billion to Sudan. Even some Sudanese government questioned the fairness of  the agreement.  

But these are allocations between its two contracting parties, not a basin-wide  allocation agreed by all riparian countries. 

The Vienna Convention principle 

Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes  the principle that a treaty creates neither obligations nor rights for a third state  without its consent. 

This is known as pacta tertiis. 

The legal consequence is important: Egypt and Sudan cannot simply conclude  an agreement between themselves and thereby impose a binding water  allocation on Ethiopia. 

Nor can they use their bilateral agreement to extinguish Ethiopia’s independent  rights under general international law. 

There is also a distinction between the validity of the 1959 agreement between  Egypt and Sudan and its applicability to other countries. It is automatically  invalid for Ethiopia, since it did not participate.  

My conclusion: Egypt can legitimately invoke the 1959 agreement to explain its  bilateral arrangements with Sudan and its established water use. It cannot treat  the agreement as a binding allocation of the entire Nile against Ethiopia.

2. Does historical use give Egypt a superior legal right? 

Not automatically. This is where the principle of equitable and reasonable  utilization becomes decisive. 

Under the international water-law framework, existing uses are relevant, but they  must be considered alongside: 

• The needs of the population in each country. 
• The economic development requirements of each country. 
• Geographic and hydrological circumstances. 
• Potential future uses. 
• Environmental sustainability. 
• The availability of alternative resources. 

The International Law Commission’s 1994 commentary is particularly instructive.  It explains that the rights of states sharing an international river are qualitatively  equal, although that does not mean that each must receive an identical volume of  water.  

This has two important implications. 

For Egypt: Its long-standing dependence on the Nile, its population and its  agricultural economy are legitimate considerations. 

For Ethiopia: Its population, development requirements, hydropower potential  and historical underutilization of the Blue Nile is equally relevant considerations. In addition Ethiopia is the source of 86% of the Nile water which it tries to do.  

Egypt cannot turn historical use into permanent ownership.  

Equally, Ethiopia cannot argue that because it contributes a large proportion of  the river’s flow, it automatically owns a corresponding proportion of the water  which Ethiopia never did.  

The law is based on equitable utilization, not ownership according to contribution. 3. Does Ethiopia have the right to develop the Blue Nile? 

Yes, this is a fundamental principle of international water law. 

Ethiopia has territorial sovereignty over the parts of the Blue Nile and its  tributaries within its territory. It has the right to develop those resources, subject  to its obligations toward other riparian countries. The International Law  Commission’s commentary recognizes that every watercourse state has the right 

to utilize international watercourse waters within its territory, with the scope of  that right determined by equitable utilization.  

Hydropower development is a legitimate use of an international river. 

Furthermore, a hydropower dam does not necessarily consume water in the  same way as irrigation. Water released through turbines continues downstream, although the timing, regulation and evaporation associated with reservoir storage  can affect downstream conditions. 

This distinction is important when assessing the GERD. Ethiopia’s legal  argument is therefore that it is exercising a legitimate development right, rather  than appropriating water belonging to Egypt. 

That right must nevertheless be exercised with appropriate regard for  downstream water security. 

4. Does the no-significant-harm principle give Egypt a veto? 

No, Egypt’s argument concerning potential harm is legally relevant, but it must be  interpreted in conjunction with equitable utilization. 

The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention contains both principles: ∙ Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization. 

∙ Article 7: Obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent significant  harm. 

These provisions must be read together. 

A downstream country cannot automatically prohibit an upstream project simply  by asserting that the project might affect its water supply. 

The legal question is whether the upstream country’s utilization is equitable and  reasonable and whether it has exercised appropriate due diligence to prevent,  minimize and address significant harm. 

There is an important distinction between: 

• An upstream project changing the timing of water flows. 
  • An upstream project causing temporary inconvenience. 
• An upstream project causing serious and demonstrable harm to  downstream water security. 

These are not legally identical situations. 

The burden of assessing the actual circumstances cannot be replaced by political  assertions.

5. What does international jurisprudence say? 

An important precedent is the 1997 International Court of Justice judgment in the  Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case involving Hungary and Slovakia. 

The two countries disagreed over a joint dam project on the Danube. 

The Court addressed: 

• Shared rights over international water resources.  Equitable and reasonable utilization. 
• Environmental protection. 
• Cooperation and good-faith negotiations. 
• The consequences of unilateral actions affecting a shared river. 

The Court emphasized the need for a coordinated and equitable regime for the  use, development and protection of the shared watercourse. The lesson for the  Nile is significant. 

Neither upstream nor downstream countries should have exclusive control over a  shared river. The objective should be a regime that accommodates the legitimate  interests of all riparian states. 

There is no ICJ judgment; however, that has specifically determined the legal  allocation of Nile waters between Ethiopia and Egypt. That distinction matters:  the Danube judgment supplies relevant legal principles, not a direct ruling on the  Nile dispute. 

6. The 2015 Declaration of Principles: An important legal commitment by all  three countries 

One development that deserves greater attention is the Declaration of Principles  signed by Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan on 23 March 2015. 

This document is especially important because Egypt itself signed it. Its ten principles include:

This is widely distributed international water law. 

What does this mean legally? 

Egypt cannot easily maintain that Ethiopia has no right to develop the Blue Nile while  disregarding the principles of equitable utilization and sovereign equality that Egypt  itself accepted in 2015. 

However, an important legal qualification is necessary. 

The Declaration of Principles is not a comprehensive Nile water-allocation treaty. Its  precise legal character and the extent to which individual provisions create  enforceable obligations can be debated under international treaty law. Its wording  and the circumstances of its conclusion must be considered when determining its  binding effect. 

Nevertheless, it is a major diplomatic and legal reference point. All three countries  accepted a framework of cooperation, equitable utilization and peaceful dispute  settlement. It should not be treated as though it never existed. 

7. The Cooperative Framework Agreement: A major change in Nile Basin  governance 

In force since 13 October 2024 

The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is another important  development. 

It was negotiated through the Nile Basin Initiative and is intended to provide a basin wide legal and institutional framework. 

Ethiopia ratified it in 2013. It subsequently entered into force on 13 October 2024  after the required ratifications and accession.  

The agreement establishes principles including: 

• Equitable and reasonable utilization. 
• Cooperation among basin countries. 
• Sustainable development.
• Protection and conservation of the river. 
• Information exchange. 
• Institutional cooperation through the Nile River Basin Commission. 

Egypt and Sudan have opposed the CFA in its present form, particularly in  connection with disagreements over water security and Article 14. 

This creates a significant legal and diplomatic divide. The important point is that  Egypt and Sudan’s non-participation does not invalidate the CFA among its parties.  Equally, the CFA cannot impose its treaty obligations on Egypt and Sudan without  their consent. It does, however, provide an institutional foundation for participating  countries to develop a more inclusive approach to Nile governance. 

8. What is the strongest legal case Egypt can make against Ethiopia? 

For fairness, Egypt’s legal position should not be reduced to the 1959 agreement.  Egypt has several legitimate arguments under international law. 

A. Protection against significant harm 

Egypt can argue that the operation of a major upstream dam must not expose its  population and economy to serious and avoidable water insecurity, which Ethiopia  positively answered through practice.  

B. Existing dependence 

Egypt can demonstrate that its population, agriculture, industry and economy are  heavily dependent on Nile water. These are important considerations in  determining equitable utilization. 

C. Cooperation over droughts 

Egypt has a legitimate interest in ensuring that reservoir operations during  prolonged droughts do not create disproportionate downstream harm. 

D. Dam safety and information exchange 

Egypt and Sudan have legitimate interests in receiving appropriate operational  information, flood warnings and dam-safety assurances. 

E. The 2015 Declaration 

Egypt can invoke the Declaration of Principles to demand good-faith cooperation  over the filling and operation of the GERD. These arguments are not legally  frivolous. They must be taken seriously. 

But none of them automatically establishes Egypt’s ownership of the Blue Nile or a  right to dictate Ethiopia’s development policy.

9. What are Ethiopia’s legal vulnerabilities? 

Ethiopia also has obligations and potential areas of legal exposure. 

These are not concessions of Ethiopian sovereignty. They are responsibilities  associated with exercising sovereign rights over shared water resources. 

One important distinction: the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention is not itself a  treaty binding Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. Its central principles are nevertheless  important evidence of the wider international legal framework, including customary  international law.  

10. Overall legal assessment 

Here is how one would distinguish the principal legal questions.

An important qualification 

It would be premature to claim that Ethiopia has conclusively won the legal dispute  simply because the 1959 agreement cannot bind it. 

A court or tribunal examining the wider dispute would need to consider the actual  hydrological evidence, the GERD’s operation, the impacts on downstream countries,  the 2015 Declaration and the applicable customary international law. 

11. What should Ethiopia pursue legally and diplomatically? 

I would suggest five priorities. 

1. Defend equitable utilization: Consistently assert that the 1959 allocation cannot  be imposed on Ethiopia and that Ethiopia has an independent right to develop  its water resources. 

2. Strengthen the CFA: Work with participating countries to make the Nile River  Basin Commission an effective institution, while keeping the door open to  Egyptian and Sudanese participation. 

3. Offer a predictable GERD operating framework: Establish transparent  arrangements for data exchange, drought management, flood warnings and  dam safety. 

4. Use international legal institutions: Develop a strong technical and legal record  that can support negotiations, mediation or arbitration by mutual agreement. 5. Separate water allocation from dam operation: These are related but different  questions. An operational agreement for the GERD need not require Ethiopia  to accept the 1959 allocation as the basis for dividing the entire Nile. 

12. The fundamental question: What kind of Nile settlement should replace  the historical arrangements? 

I would advocate a new Nile Basin Treaty based on the following principles: XI. A proposed framework for a new Nile Basin Treaty 

1. Sovereign equality 

All riparian countries have equal standing in negotiations, regardless of their  geographical position. 

2. Equitable utilization 

Water utilization should reflect population, economic needs, existing uses,  hydrology and future development requirements.

3. No exclusive historical ownership 

Existing water use is protected as a relevant interest, but cannot automatically  extinguish other countries’ development rights. 

4. Guaranteed cooperation 

Establish binding arrangements for data exchange, consultation and  notification of major projects. 

5. Drought and emergency protocols 

Establish agreed rules for prolonged droughts, floods and other exceptional  circumstances. 

6. Joint economic benefits 

Expand regional hydropower trade, agricultural cooperation, flood control and  electricity interconnections. 

7. Independent dispute settlement 

Establish a permanent mechanism for technical investigation, mediation and,  where the parties consent, arbitration. 

XII. Final judgment 

There is a fundamental distinction between two propositions: 

1. Egypt has a legitimate right to protection of its water security. 
2. Egypt has an exclusive right to determine how the Nile is used. 

International law supports the first proposition. It does not establish the second. Similarly: 

1. Ethiopia has a legitimate right to develop the Blue Nile. 
2. Ethiopia has an unlimited right to do whatever it wishes with the river. International law supports the first proposition, not the second. 

The most important legal principle for Ethiopia to defend is equitable and reasonable  utilization, not exclusive upstream ownership. 

And the most important principle for Egypt to accept is that historical dependence  does not confer permanent ownership over a shared international watercourse. 

The Nile’s future should be based on sovereign equality, equitable utilization, and  mutual security and shared development.

In my view, that is the most defensible foundation for a lasting settlement under  international law. 

Egypt continued covert operation, supporting and arming dissident groups to  destabilize Ethiopia or encircling Ethiopia through various proxy campaigns via Eritrea, Sudan, Somali will not solve the Nile issue. Only cooperation, mutual respect  and shared benefit can solve the problem, if the two countries cooperate through  mutual trust and understanding, invest jointly on economic, power, agriculture, the  people of Ethiopia and Egypt as well as Sudan and Eritrea will benefit. The area will  be stabilized, poverty will be reduced, and the region could prosper. Therefore,  Egypt must revise its approach, shift towards mutual recognition and respect for the  right and dignity of all countries involved could pave the way for a win-win  agreement.

Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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