By Abraha Belai
The TPLF has died. What remains is to bury the beast.
But to understand why the demise of the TPLF would represent a devastating blow to Eritrea’s ruling EPLF, it is necessary to revisit a political strategy that, I contend, has operated for more than half a century.
The Eritrean Secret That Lasted 51 Years
Eritrean insurgents understood that they could not defeat the army of a much larger Ethiopia on their own. So, after the Derg military regime came to power, they helped launch a rebel movement in Tigray in 1975 under the cover of “fighting a military dictatorship.”
The strategy, as I see it, was clear: Eritreans born and raised in Tigray were not to cross the border and join the Eritrean struggle directly. Instead, they were to join the TPLF, capture its leadership and transform it into an Eritrean force operating under a Tigrayan name. Soon, Sebhat Nega — whom I regard as Isaias Afwerki’s loyal slave — and subsequently Meles Zenawi rose to dominate the organization.
The leadership then eliminated Tigrayans who questioned why the TPLF appeared more committed to the Eritrean cause than even the Eritrean organizations themselves. Fear spread, and challenging the party’s position on Eritrea became taboo.
Whenever Ethiopian forces launched major offensives such as the Red Star Campaign in 1982 against the EPLF and ELF — and even when the Ethiopian army came close to crushing the EPLF — tens of thousands of TPLF fighters entered the battlefield in Eritrea and helped break those offensives.
For 17 years, the TPLF army effectively served as cannon fodder for the Eritrean struggle. Meles carefully built a politburo around Tigrayans prepared to champion Eritrean independence with extraordinary zeal.
At the same time, Sebhat Nega imposed a Stalinist political structure in Tigray, cultivating absolute loyalty to the party and elevating it almost to the status of a deity. Tigray was deliberately transformed into a garrison state — a permanent reservoir of fighters from which forces could be rapidly mobilized and deployed wherever necessary to protect the party and, later, Meles Zenawi’s hold on power throughout Ethiopia.
1991: The Strategy Reaches Addis Ababa
Then came 1991.
Isaias Afwerki’s EPLF entered Asmara, while Meles Zenawi — whom I contend had presented himself as Tigrayan, and therefore Ethiopian, while fundamentally serving the Eritrean cause — took power in Addis Ababa.
Eritrea soon became independent.
Even though some Ethiopians expected their country to retain access to the Port of Assab, Meles and Sebhat maintained that both Massawa and Assab belonged to Eritrea — a position they asserted in the presence of former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen.
The result was historic: Ethiopia, one of Africa’s largest and oldest states, became landlocked.
From the Border War to Algiers
The pattern, in my view, continued during the 1998–2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea War.
Ethiopia had an enormous military opportunity to defeat Isaias Afwerki’s government and fundamentally alter the strategic relationship between the two countries. Yet Meles stopped short of doing so. He witnessed Eritrean forces fleeing into Sudan in defeat. Meles had to rescue his Eritrea from falling into Ethiopian hands and declared “the war would be over in 24 hours.”
His message was clear: Don’t panic; I’m in control and remain in your Eritrea. No Ethiopian soldier would dare march into Eritrea’s capital, Asmara.
Then came the Algiers Agreement.
Its boundary framework relied heavily on the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908 between Ethiopia and Italy, and the subsequent arbitration process was made “final and binding.” I contend that Meles accepted a legal framework that ultimately strengthened Eritrea’s territorial position while leaving Ethiopia without sovereign access to the Red Sea.
Thus, in my view, the proceedings at The Hague produced an extraordinary situation: what appeared formally to be two adversaries – Ethiopia and Eritrea – amounted politically to two establishments defending Eritrean interests, one operating from Addis Ababa and the other from Asmara.
For decades, questioning this history remained politically explosive. But the consequences are impossible to ignore: a vast country at the heart of the Horn of Africa was left dependent on neighboring states for maritime access.
A New Strategic Moment
Now the equation may be changing.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has returned Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea to the center of the national debate. For a country of more than 130 million people, the question is no longer merely historical. It is economic, geopolitical and strategic.
This is where the collapse of the TPLF takes on significance far beyond Tigray.
For half a century, I argue, the EPLF and TPLF functioned as two arms of the same historical project: one operating from Eritrea and the other from inside Ethiopia. Whatever disputes later erupted between them, their intertwined history profoundly shaped Ethiopia’s political order, Eritrea’s independence and the geopolitical configuration of the Horn of Africa.
If the TPLF has now ceased to function as a decisive military and political force, then the EPLF has lost the Ethiopian arm on which it historically depended.
That is why the death of the TPLF means the EPLF is half-paralyzed.
Conclusion: The End of a 51-Year Political Cycle
The story that began in 1975 may finally be approaching its end.
The disappearance of the TPLF as a dominant military force would not merely close a chapter in Tigray’s history. It would dismantle one half of a political and military relationship that, in my view, shaped Ethiopia and Eritrea for more than five decades.
But burying the TPLF is only half the story. Ethiopia must now confront the strategic consequences of the past: its dependence on foreign ports, its relationship with Eritrea and the unresolved question of equitable and peaceful access to the Red Sea.
The answer should not be another generation of endless war. It should be a new regional order based on security, economic interdependence and a durable maritime arrangement that recognizes the legitimate interests of both Ethiopia and its coastal neighbors.
If the old EPLF-TPLF political architecture is indeed collapsing, Ethiopia has an opportunity not simply to settle old scores, but to correct strategic mistakes without creating new ones.
A 51-year cycle may be ending. What replaces it will determine the future not only of Ethiopia and Eritrea, but of the entire Horn of Africa.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
__
Join our Telegram Channel: t.me/borkena
Like borkena on Facebook
To submit a press release, send the submission to info@borkena.com
Add your business to Ethiopian Business Listing / Ethiopian Business Directory
Join the conversation. Follow us on X (formerly Twitter) @zborkena to get the latest Ethiopian news updates regularly.