By Addissu Admas
Will Ethiopia be here in the coming decades in the form we have known her since Atse Menelik II? Or is she already in the process of complete and irreversible disintegration? Will Ethiopians of all ethnicities find a viable, equitable, and durable system of co-existence, or will they part ways violently and rancorously? Is it good indeed for Ethiopians to remain united, or should they form as many economically viable states as possible? What are the benefits of staying together if all we have witnessed so far are constant conflicts and wars? What would it take to forge a union that would be impervious to separatist and hegemonic tendencies? These and similar questions need to be properly addressed if any form of political discourse aspires to any legitimacy or, at the very least, to relevance.
The question of Ethiopia’s unity in diversity, though mentioned or alluded to by mostly foreign scholars in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia, received full consideration and analysis among Ethiopians only during the student movements of the 1960s and the ensuing revolution (Abiyot) of 1974. The perspective that emerged on the topic was understandably heavily influenced by Stalin’s writing on the subject, even though it did not coincide with its conclusions entirely (see Andreas Eshete).
The Derg, influenced by Marxist intellectuals of the day, recognized not only that the question of nationalities needed to be considered, but proceeded to address it in its own ham-handed fashion. Having inherited and being the prime constituent of the imperial ethos, it could not countenance the real consequences of the right of self-determination of nations. Thus, under its regime, Ethiopians were fed a steady stream of “Ethiopian nationalism” where their ethnic diversities were underplayed in the name of unity and stability. This is what lay at the heart of the many wars the Derg engaged in against the so-called liberation fronts of the time.
The EPRDF regime, which was created and run entirely by the TPLF, came to power primarily to address the question of nationalities and provide a permanent solution to it. It made historical sense that the party that thought and fought hard for the self-determination of its own people would be the one to find the most cogent and acceptable solution for it. In actuality, however, rather than solving the problem, it has complicated and even muddied it—not only because of a lack of intellectual clarity but because of its opportunistic desire to dominate the Ethiopian political system for as long as it could.
I have pointed out elsewhere in this forum the shortcomings of the Ethiopian Constitution, and I don’t intend to repeat them here. What I would like to address here is how the TPLF’s political agenda and its implementation have not only given a bad name to the idea of self-determination of peoples, but to the whole federalist agenda. The TPLF started, evolved and gained power under the banner of Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. It considers itself to this very day to be a genuine Marxist party. However, its actions are anything but Marxist. If I were to sum up what the TPLF stands for and continues to stand for, I would say that under a Marxist cloak, it has always been an irredentist movement that found a semblance of respectability and legitimacy by overmagnifying the plight of the Tigrean people, which in truth was not particular to them but was a condition they shared with most Ethiopians. It was, at the same time, a hegemonic movement—without, of course, openly saying so—seeking Tigrean supremacy because it was convinced that as a nation forming Ethiopia’s historic core, Tigray needed to reclaim her historic position at the top.
The TPLF, rather than solving the question of nationalities, has hollowed it out to the point that no one wants to address it seriously today. What the TPLF has shown us is how to stay in power for nearly three decades as a minority ethnic group by pitting one ethnic group against another; how to hijack the entire nation’s wealth to benefit one’s own nationality; how to project respectability to foreign governments while engaged in petty tribalism and blatant corruption at home; how to suppress opposition voices while sounding democratic abroad; how to project prosperity while the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians live in dire poverty, etc.
PM Abiy, whose party is expected to win more than 95 percent of the votes in this June 2026 election, is also one of the legacies of the TPLF. To be sure, though he has been convincingly accused of straying from the federalist agenda, he and his party are basically marching in the footsteps of their predecessors. He has not only embraced the autocratic tendencies of the TPLF, but he appears to have cloaked them in messianic and theological terms. I would not be surprised nor befuddled if PM Abiy declares himself president for life before the end of his coming term. The signs are all there already for all to see. He is as anti-democratic and autocratic as Meles Zenawi or, for that matter, even Mengistu H. Mariam. The federalist agenda has been drastically subordinated to his unionist tendencies. He has either actively or reactively allowed one ethnicity to dominate, just as the TPLF had done before him. He has given preferential treatment to this same group in the bureaucracy, military, business, banking, and commerce. Under a deceptively benevolent appearance, PM Abiy has jailed a record number of journalists, opposition party members, and even common citizens without due process. Most of all, he has been singly responsible for the re-emergence and proliferation of irredentist ethnic movements, which could very well lead to the country’s disintegration.
Why can’t Ethiopia continue with the present state of affairs? It is clear to anyone reflecting on Ethiopia’s current situation that if the divisive, separatist, and tribalist tendencies continue, there will be no Ethiopia to speak of in the coming decade or two. If Ethiopia is to remain one and united, her political parties should recommit first and foremost to a more serious and solid form of federal arrangement that must fulfill not only the deepest aspirations of the peoples of Ethiopia and meet the ideals of self-determination but must also guarantee that no violent conflict could arise among them. There are too many ambiguities in the current constitution for it to meet these conditions. It is therefore necessary that a new constitution be drafted as soon as it is viable.
This “eventual” constitution must provide what it calls “Killils” or regions—terms for which I nurture deep antipathy—far greater autonomy than they currently possess. Rather than calling them Killils, in fact, which in itself is an ambiguous term and does not indicate any form of self-governance or autonomy, I would suggest that they be called Gizat (pl. Gizatoch) to emphasize their presupposed sovereignty and self-agency. In some ways, this would correspond roughly to the notion of “states” as conceived by most federal systems around the world. The states (Gizatoch), which may or may not coincide entirely with ethnic enclaves, would effectively function as independent states except regarding the few functions they agree among themselves to delegate to the federal or confederal government, for example, foreign affairs, national defense and the codification of citizenship.
The effect of a decentralized federal or confederal system will have several benefits besides thoroughly fulfilling the ideals of self-determination. It will, first and foremost, defang—or better yet, make irrelevant—irredentist movements within the country. It will substantially diminish, if not eliminate altogether, Ethiopia’s constant tendency towards authoritarian rule. It will foster responsible and engaged political participation among all strata of society. Given the peace and rule of law that are likely to ensue, it will foster economic growth and improved living conditions for all Ethiopia’s citizens.
The accusation levelled by the TPLF against PM Abiy and his party regarding their lack of commitment to the federalist ideals and regional autonomy is not completely unjustified. The current government is highly centralized and becoming ever more so as time goes by. Even the process of becoming a Killil, which the constitution clearly affirms to belong to the people, has been hijacked by the federal government. This aligns quite clearly with PM Abiy’s aspirations for an imperial presidency.
The other major component of Ethiopia’s disarray stems from a lack of a consistent and pragmatic economic ideology. Since the Revolution, Ethiopia has lived virtually under economic statism. Whether this was called state capitalism under the Derg regime or developmental state under the TPLF regime, the central government has been for over fifty years the primary mover of the economy in Ethiopia. This is not per se negative or unproductive. However, it can hamper faster economic growth and can even become an obstacle to eliminating extreme poverty.
As the world has come to learn quite well in the past few decades, neither unfettered capitalism nor state-planned economy is the way to go. We are witnesses today, perhaps more than ever, that unregulated capitalism, even though it can and does produce unimaginable wealth, leaves the vast majority of humanity in poverty. Communist states, on the other hand, continue to struggle to survive, their promise of equality never fulfilled.
What Ethiopia needs to commit to is an economic system that avoids these two extremes. The best examples of states that have successfully avoided these extremes and integrated the best features of both systems are, of course, the social democratic countries. While social democracy provides great space for private enterprises, it also guarantees that all citizens are provided with the necessary conditions to lead fulfilling lives and not be abandoned to the vagaries of life, or worse yet, be at the mercy of a greedy and predatory capitalist class.
What we as Ethiopians need at this juncture is not properly monitored elections, substantive foreign investments, or beautification of our capital city. All these will not last unless the foundational structures of our coexistence are laid properly once and for all. What we have lived through the past five decades are a series of experiments that have all ended in virtual disaster. This current one is no exception. In fact, if this current regime does not address and resolve the foundational structures of the coexistence of the multitude of Ethiopia’s peoples, there is a good chance that it will be the one to witness the end of Ethiopia as we have known her since Emperor Menelik II. The choice is not between who can best lead Ethiopia, but what can maintain Ethiopia as a law-governed, stable, self-sufficient, and peaceable nation for decades to come.
Editor’s Note: Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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‘Will Ethiopia be here in the coming decades in the form we have known her since Atse Menelik II?’
What kind of a question is that? Ethiopia was not in the same form in 1936 as it was in 1896.
Russia is not in the same form now as it was in 1988.
Germany was not in the same form in 1946 as it was in 1941.
Good Ole USA was not in the same form on August 21, 1959 as it was just a day before on August 20, 1959.
Back to Ethiopia. It will not be in the same form as it is today 10, 20, 50, 100 years from now and all for the better, ThankThe Almighty for that.
I hope all is still well here.