The United Arab Emirates and Its Role in Fueling Instability Across African Conflicts

When Conflict Becomes Business: The UAE’s Proxy Wars, Geopolitical Competition, and the Crisis of Regional Stability in Africa

By  Caleb Ta. (Dr.)
Independent Researcher in African Political Affairs; Human Rights Advocate

Abstract

The expanding role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in African conflicts has emerged as one of the most consequential geopolitical developments of the twenty-first century. Across Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the wider Red Sea corridor, Abu Dhabi has increasingly projected power through proxy militias, arms transfers, private military contractors, logistical networks, and financial leverage. Recent research by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) argues that the UAE has become “one of the most aggressive external actors in African conflicts,” fueling instability while simultaneously portraying itself internationally as a stabilizing and modernizing force (Kurtz et al., 2026).

This article critically examines the UAE’s interventions in Africa, focusing on Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. It argues that Emirati foreign policy increasingly operates through a model of indirect intervention and plausible deniability that allows Abu Dhabi to shape conflicts without large-scale deployment of its own military forces. The article further demonstrates how Emirati involvement has contributed to prolonged warfare, humanitarian crises, ethnic violence, refugee displacement, and the erosion of international diplomatic mechanisms such as United Nations embargo regimes.

Drawing primarily on the 2026 SWP report The Destabilising Role of the United Arab Emirates in African Conflicts, alongside reports from the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and International Crisis Group, this analysis concludes that the UAE’s interventions are driven by overlapping economic, ideological, and geopolitical motivations. These include competition with Saudi Arabia, control over Red Sea trade corridors, suppression of Islamist political movements, and access to strategic resources such as gold and maritime infrastructure. The article also examines how Western governments, particularly in Europe, have frequently avoided confronting Abu Dhabi directly despite extensive evidence linking Emirati networks to conflict escalation.

Introduction

Over the past decade, the UAE has transformed itself from a relatively cautious Gulf monarchy into one of the most interventionist external powers operating across Africa and the Middle East. Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi has pursued an ambitious foreign policy designed to project power far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. While Emirati officials consistently frame their interventions as counterterrorism operations or stabilization initiatives, mounting evidence suggests that these policies have frequently intensified conflicts rather than resolved them (Kurtz et al., 2026).

The UAE’s involvement in Africa accelerated dramatically following the Arab uprisings of 2011. Abu Dhabi increasingly viewed political instability, democratic mobilization, and Islamist movements—especially those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood—as existential threats to monarchical authoritarianism. As a result, Emirati foreign policy evolved into a proactive strategy aimed at suppressing political movements perceived as ideologically threatening while simultaneously expanding Emirati geopolitical and economic influence across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.

The 2026 SWP report argues that the UAE now functions not merely as a participant in African conflicts but as a structural enabler of warfare through its support for militias, mercenary networks, and parallel security systems. Unlike traditional state interventions that rely on overt military occupation, the Emirati model emphasizes proxy warfare. Abu Dhabi rarely deploys large numbers of Emirati soldiers directly. Instead, it finances and arms local actors capable of advancing Emirati strategic objectives while maintaining plausible deniability.

This intervention model has become particularly visible in Sudan, where the UAE has been identified as the principal external backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary organization accused of mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and widespread crimes against civilians. Similar patterns appear in Libya through Emirati support for Khalifa Haftar, in Somalia through ties to Puntland and Somaliland security structures, and in Ethiopia through drone warfare assistance during the Tigray conflict.

The consequences extend far beyond individual wars. According to SWP researchers, Emirati interventionism increasingly undermines regional stability, weakens international diplomacy, facilitates war economies, and contributes to refugee flows affecting both Africa and Europe.

The UAE’s Strategic Expansion into Africa

Economic Corridors and Maritime Power

A central pillar of Emirati foreign policy in Africa involves control over trade routes, logistics corridors, and strategic ports. The UAE’s economic diversification strategy seeks to reduce dependence on oil revenues by transforming Abu Dhabi and Dubai into global hubs linking Africa, Asia, and Europe.

State-linked corporations such as DP World and AD Ports Group have acquired or developed infrastructure projects across the continent, including ports in:

• Somalia
• Senegal
• Tanzania
• Mozambique
• Angola
• Egypt

According to Stephan Roll (2026), these investments are part of broader Emirati efforts to dominate maritime trade routes connecting the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean. However, the SWP report argues that military and security interventions frequently accompany these commercial projects, blurring the line between economic investment and geopolitical coercion.

The UAE’s strategic interest in ports such as Berbera, Bosaso, and facilities along the Red Sea reflects the growing importance of maritime choke points in global commerce. Control over these corridors grants Abu Dhabi leverage not only over regional trade but also over military logistics, resource extraction, and political influence.

Sudan: The Epicenter of Emirati Intervention

Support for the RSF

The war in Sudan represents the clearest and most devastating example of Emirati involvement in African conflicts. SWP researchers identify the UAE as the principal military, logistical, and financial supporter of the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.

The RSF emerged from the Janjaweed militias responsible for atrocities during the Darfur conflict of the early 2000s. Since the outbreak of Sudan’s civil war, the RSF has faced accusations of:

• Ethnic cleansing
• Mass killings
• Sexual violence
• Forced displacement
• Hostage-taking
• Attacks on hospitals and civilians
• Systematic looting

Particularly severe atrocities occurred after the RSF captured El-Fasher in North Darfur in October 2025. A United Nations fact-finding mission concluded that attacks against non-Arab communities such as the Masalit and Zaghawa displayed “hallmarks of genocide” (United Nations, 2025).

According to SWP researchers, the UAE maintained extensive logistical support networks for the RSF through cargo flights routed via:

• Ethiopia
• Chad
• Libya
• Kenya
• Uganda
• Rwanda

The Puntland port city of Bosaso reportedly served as a major transshipment hub for arms deliveries and mercenary transport operations.

Humanitarian Catastrophe

The Sudan conflict has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis according to the United Nations. By 2026:

• 33.7 million people required humanitarian assistance
• More than 15 million people had been displaced
• Famine conditions spread across multiple regions

Human Rights Watch (2025) documented widespread atrocities committed by RSF forces against civilians, particularly targeting non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur. The humanitarian consequences have also expanded beyond Sudan through refugee flows toward Europe via Mediterranean migration routes.

The SWP report argues that Emirati military support has directly contributed to prolonging the conflict by enabling the RSF to sustain large-scale military operations despite international diplomatic efforts.

Libya: Proxy Warfare and Foreign Militarization

Emirati Support for Haftar

Since 2014, the UAE has played a central role in the Libyan civil war through support for Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF). Emirati backing intensified during Haftar’s 2019–2020 assault on Tripoli against the internationally recognized government.

According to multiple investigations, the UAE supplied:

• Armed drones
• Air-defense systems
• Intelligence support
• Financial assistance
• Logistical coordination

The intervention transformed Libya into a battleground for transnational proxy warfare involving the UAE, Türkiye, Russia, and other external actors.

SWP researchers further document close operational cooperation between Emirati networks and the Wagner Group. This reportedly included:

• Shared logistics infrastructure
• Transport flights originating from the UAE
• Coordination of drone targeting operations
• Deployment of Pantsir air-defense systems operated by Wagner personnel

The Libyan case demonstrates how Emirati intervention contributed to long-term state fragmentation and entrenched foreign military influence.

Ethiopia: Drone Warfare and Regional Logistics

UAE Support During the Tigray Conflict, and the ongoing Amhara genocide

During the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia, several reports have alleged that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided drone support to the federal government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. These accounts claim that Emirati-operated drones were deployed during key phases of the fighting in late 2021 and influenced the balance of the conflict.

In contrast to UAE involvement in Libya and Sudan, where its support is often linked to non-state armed groups. Its engagement in Ethiopia is generally characterized as formal backing of a recognized central government rather than militia factions.

Some research institutions, including the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), have argued that Ethiopia later became strategically significant within broader Emirati regional logistics networks. According to these analyses, Ethiopian territory may have served as a transit or coordination hub linked to UAE activities connected to the Sudan conflict, particularly after neighboring states reportedly restricted airspace access associated with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) supply routes.

Further allegations cited in such reports suggest possible RSF-linked training activity in western Ethiopia, including areas such as Benishangul-Gumuz. These claims are typically framed within a wider interpretation of African conflicts as increasingly interconnected through transnational logistics systems, alliances, and proxy dynamics.

Since the Tigray war, the UAE’s role in Ethiopia has remained debated among analysts and researchers. Some argue that Emirati influence is tied to broader regional competition in the Horn of Africa, including Red Sea security and shifting dynamics involving Sudan and Somalia. However, most assessments emphasize indirect engagement, including alleged arms transfers, drone-related cooperation, and logistical or strategic involvement rather than sustained, formal military deployment.

Somalia and Somaliland: Fragmentation Through Security Networks

Puntland and Somaliland

In Somalia, the UAE cultivated deep ties with:

• The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF)
• Somaliland security institutions
• Regional militias and paramilitary structures

According to SWP researchers, the PMPF originated through a South African-run private military company financed by Abu Dhabi. Although Emirati officials frame these partnerships as anti-piracy and counterterrorism initiatives, critics argue they undermine Somalia’s federal government and contribute to political fragmentation.

Strategic ports such as:

• Berbera
• Bosaso

have become increasingly important within Emirati maritime strategy because of their proximity to Red Sea shipping lanes.

Mercenaries, Private Military Networks, and War Economies

A defining characteristic of Emirati interventionism is its reliance on private military actors and foreign mercenaries. The SWP report details how the Emirati-linked security firm Global Security Services Group facilitated the recruitment and transport of Colombian mercenaries to Sudan.

According to U.S. sanctions announcements in 2025, these individuals served as:

• Drone operators
• Infantry personnel
• Artillery specialists
• Vehicle operators
• Military trainers

Some reportedly participated in training child soldiers.

This intervention model resembles a transnational war infrastructure combining:

• Private military contractors
• Arms-smuggling routes
• Financial networks
• Proxy militias
• Resource extraction systems

Gold trafficking from Sudan represents a particularly important component of this conflict economy. The UAE’s role as a global gold-trading hub has raised increasing concerns regarding the laundering of conflict resources extracted from war zones.

Evading Accountability and Manipulating Diplomacy Participation Without Compliance

One of the most striking findings of the SWP report is the argument that the UAE simultaneously participates in diplomatic initiatives while undermining them through continued military support for belligerents.

Examples include:

• The Berlin Libya Process (2019–2020)
• Sudan Quad negotiations (2025)

In both cases, Abu Dhabi publicly endorsed ceasefires and diplomatic frameworks while allegedly continuing logistical and military operations behind the scenes.

The report notes that Emirati aircraft reportedly continued flying military supplies to eastern Libya even during the Berlin peace conference itself.

International Silence

Despite extensive documentation of Emirati involvement in embargo violations and proxy warfare, Western governments have often avoided publicly confronting Abu Dhabi.

SWP researchers argue that this reluctance reflects broader geopolitical considerations including:

• Security partnerships
• Economic ties
• Energy cooperation
• Strategic competition with China and Russia
• UAE-Israel relations

As a result, no United Nations Security Council member had explicitly raised Emirati support for the RSF in formal sessions by 2026.

The report concludes that this diplomatic leniency has severely weakened the credibility of:

• United Nations sanctions regimes
• Arms embargoes
• Multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms

Geopolitical Rivalry with Saudi Arabia

Competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia increasingly shapes African geopolitics. While both Gulf powers cooperate in some areas, they also compete intensely over:

• Red Sea maritime corridors
• Logistics infrastructure
• Port networks
• Investment routes
• Energy transportation systems

The rivalry intensified after disagreements over Yemen and OPEC+ strategy. According to SWP researchers, African conflicts now function as arenas for indirect competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Saudi Arabia’s temporary closure of airspace to Emirati supply missions linked to Sudan reportedly increased Ethiopia’s importance as a logistical corridor for RSF-related operations.

European Responses and Policy Recommendations

The SWP report proposes five major policy recommendations for Germany and European partners:

1. Publicly identify the UAE’s role in African conflicts instead of using vague diplomatic language.
2. Expand targeted sanctions against Emirati actors involved in embargo violations.
3. Reevaluate European arms exports to the UAE.
4. Strengthen anti-money-laundering enforcement concerning Emirati financial centers.
5. Reassess strategic partnerships with Abu Dhabi unless meaningful policy changes occur.

Researchers argue that growing tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, combined with vulnerabilities exposed during the Iran conflict, may create opportunities for external diplomatic pressure.

Conclusion

The UAE’s expanding role in African conflicts represents one of the defining transformations in contemporary geopolitics. Through proxy warfare, logistical networks, private military actors, and economic leverage, Abu Dhabi has become deeply embedded in conflicts across Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

While Emirati leaders frame these interventions as counterterrorism and stabilization efforts, extensive evidence compiled by SWP, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and other organizations suggests that these policies frequently prolong wars, intensify humanitarian suffering, weaken state institutions, and undermine international diplomacy.

The Sudan conflict demonstrates the devastating consequences most clearly. Yet the broader implications extend across the Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Red Sea corridor, where competition over ports, trade routes, resources, and regional influence increasingly shapes patterns of violence.

Ultimately, the challenge for African states and the international community extends beyond managing individual conflicts. It involves confronting the transnational systems of arms transfers, financial networks, proxy militias, resource extraction, and geopolitical competition that sustain modern warfare across the continent.

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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