 policy emerges as one of the most ambitious state-led attempts in recent years to address entrenched ...Read more.){kind=link}
By Kaleab Azeze
LLB, LLM (Addis Ababa University)
Updated on May 17, 2026 at 1:14 P.M. Toronto Time
Ethiopia’s transitional justice (TJ) policy emerges as one of the most ambitious state-led attempts in recent years to address entrenched cycles of conflict, human rights violations, and political mistrust through a comprehensive institutional framework (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). The policy explicitly links accountability, truth-seeking, reconciliation, reparations, and institutional reform as integrated mechanisms intended to secure sustainable peace and democratic transformation (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). Yet, as critical scholarship on transitional justice reminds us, TJ is never a neutral technical toolkit but a contested political space in which law, politics, and competing visions of justice constantly reshape each other (Bell, 2009).
From the outset, the Ethiopian policy reflects what Christine Bell describes as the “field-making” impulse of transitional justice—an effort to present diverse and even contradictory mechanisms as a coherent whole under the language of justice (Bell, 2009). The policy brings together criminal accountability, truth commissions, conditional amnesty, reparations, and institutional reform under a unified national framework, suggesting an integrated pathway from conflict to democratic consolidation (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). This integrative ambition aligns with global TJ orthodoxy, particularly the African Union Transitional Justice Policy, which frames TJ as a holistic response to past injustices aimed at transformation rather than punishment alone (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2025). However, coherence at the level of design does not necessarily translate into coherence in practice, a tension central to Bell’s critique of TJ as a “cloak” that masks divergent political projects (Bell, 2009).
A notable strength of the Ethiopian framework is its attempt to balance accountability with reconciliation through a differentiated system that focuses criminal prosecution on “most responsible perpetrators” while channeling other cases into alternative mechanisms (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). This selective approach reflects pragmatic recognition of capacity constraints and the scale of violations, echoing comparative TJ experiences in post-conflict societies (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). At the same time, it raises normative concerns about how “most responsibility” will be determined in a politically polarized environment where accountability itself is contested terrain (Bell, 2009). As Bell argues, transitional justice mechanisms often become instruments through which competing actors seek to define not only responsibility but the very meaning of the transition itself (Bell, 2009).
The institutional architecture proposed—special prosecution offices, specialized courts, and an independent truth commission—signals an effort to insulate justice processes from ordinary political and bureaucratic interference (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2025). The emphasis on independence, vetting of judges, and inclusion of international experts reflects an aspiration toward credibility and compliance with international standards (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). However, as transitional justice scholarship cautions, institutional design alone cannot resolve underlying power asymmetries that shape how justice is produced and interpreted (Bell, 2009). In fact, the creation of parallel institutions may deepen contestation over legitimacy, especially where trust in state institutions is already fragile (Bell, 2009).
The Ethiopian policy’s reliance on conditional amnesty is another area where legal pragmatism intersects with political risk. The framework excludes “most responsible perpetrators” from amnesty while allowing lesser participants to benefit under conditions such as truth-telling, apology, and reparations participation (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). This approach reflects established international TJ practice aimed at balancing peace and accountability (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). Yet, as Bell warns, such distinctions often become deeply politicized, with amnesty regimes functioning differently depending on who defines the boundaries of responsibility and reconciliation (Bell, 2009). The risk is that conditional amnesty may be perceived not as justice, but as negotiated impunity, particularly in contexts of unresolved political struggle (Bell, 2009).
Perhaps the most significant challenge lies in the policy’s assumption that truth, reconciliation, and justice can be institutionally harmonized within a single national process. The policy explicitly envisions a coordinated system in which truth commissions, courts, and reparations mechanisms operate in complementarity rather than competition (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2025). However, Bell’s analysis suggests that transitional justice is inherently a “battlefield” of competing meanings rather than a harmonized field of practice (Bell, 2009). In Ethiopia’s context—marked by contested historical narratives and ongoing political fragmentation—this tension is likely to be particularly pronounced, as each mechanism becomes a site of struggle over truth and legitimacy (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2025; Bell, 2009).
Ultimately, Ethiopia’s transitional justice policy represents both a necessary institutional response to mass harm and a deeply political project of defining the terms of national transition. It reflects global norms of accountability and reconciliation while simultaneously revealing the inherent instability of attempting to package justice into a unified policy architecture (FDRE Transitional Justice Policy, 2024). As Bell reminds us, the very act of constructing transitional justice as a coherent field risks obscuring the underlying conflicts over power, meaning, and historical narrative that such processes are meant to address (Bell, 2009). The success of Ethiopia’s model will therefore depend not only on institutional design, but on its ability to withstand the political struggles that inevitably shape any attempt to “do justice” in transition (Bell, 2009).
Kaleab Azeze is Former Lecturer of Law at Debre Markos University and Transitional Justice Researcher and Trainer. He can be reached at : kalnoahide@gmail.com , linkedin.com/in/kaleab-azeze-1a8b92404/
References :
Bell, C. (2009). Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3, 5–27.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). (2024). Transitional Justice Policy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Policy Document).
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