Wondmagegn Ejigu Kebede
Enköping, Sweden
It is difficult to regard Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party as serious political figures or a credible political movement. His public persona, along with the messaging of his “prosperity” agenda, feels closer to a spiritual or wishful-thinking spectacle than to a substantive political platform grounded in evidence and ideological depth.
The rise of Abyi has been made possible by two entrenched features of Ethiopian politics: the cadre-based mentality of the former EPRDF, and the pervasive practice of political “personification.” Personification—the rhetorical strategy of reducing complex systems, such as a nation or an ideology, into a single, relatable character or person. It simplifies intricate policies for public consumption. It fosters emotional identification and can legitimize an individual by portraying them as a benevolent guardian, just as easily as it can be used to demonize opponents.
Personification is woven into the DNA of Ethiopian political culture. Consider Meles Zenawi, who was treated as the alpha and omega within the TPLF circle. Berhanu Nega was once hailed as the singular leader of freedom, Lidetu Ayalew was celebrated as a freedom fighter, and Eskinder Nega was elevated to an almost angelic, untouchable status. Jawar Mohammed, too, was once portrayed as an all-knowing political scientist who could single-handedly deliver liberation. The list goes on, but these examples suffice to illustrate how personification operates as a powerful and recurring force in Ethiopian politics.
My point is this: the combination of personification as a political norm and the legacy of EPRDF’s cadre-oriented structure has left the door wide open for a figure like Abiy—with his cult-like appeal—to walk straight into the palace at 4 Kilo.
What is a Cult?
A cult, in sociological terms, is a group or movement exhibiting excessive devotion to a charismatic leader, employing manipulative persuasion often coercive or control, and isolating members from critical outside information. It creates an us-versus-them mentality, demands absolute loyalty, and often requires the rejection of objective reality in favor of the group’s dogma.
Abiy’s prosperity political party operates precisely as a cult. Its cultish nature stems from its foundational myths promised, exclusive prosperity and its leader’s charismatic authority, which frames success as a spiritual destiny rather than a political outcome. By systematically denying verifiable crises like economic collapse or war, the party enforces a collective delusion. This denial is not mere ignorance; it is a core control mechanism. Followers are taught that acknowledging suffering is a failure of faith or loyalty, effectively isolating them from the empathy and critical thought needed for genuine political engagement.
Thus, “prosperity” functions as a cult because it replaces political ideology with theological fervor. Politics is inherently about negotiating conflicting realities and interests. A cult, however, demands the abolition of external reality. By spiritualizing governance and branding dissent as spiritual weakness, the party evades accountability. It offers not policies but a salvational narrative, where the leader is a prophet and prosperity is a sign of divine favor. This transforms citizens into devotees and critical debate into heresy, hollowing out
democracy’s substance while performing its rituals. The ultimate goal is not societal welfare but the perpetuation of the group’s own power and dogma, irrespective of the tangible suffering it denies.
Abiy the bad cult leader
Abyi, the mastermind of a prosperity cult that substitutes political ideology with theological fervor, serves as a stark example of this pattern in a failing national context. His profile aligns precisely with the established traits: his rhetoric is laden with claims of being the “elect of God, anointed by Jesus,” fulfilling the need for special status. This is underpinned by extreme narcissism and a grandiose self-image visible in his public declarations.
However, Abyi deviates from the archetype in a critical and dangerous way: he is a bad cult leader. His impulsivity, intuitive cruelty, and compulsive need to crash, kill, and vanish enemies reveal a lack of strategic cunning, placing him outside the smart row of manipulative leaders. This recklessness is compounded by a palpable lack of formal education and real-world experience, which undermines his credibility and exposes the hollow core of his claimed authority.
The true peril of this scenario lies in the symbiotic relationship between the bad leader and his followers. Abyi maintains control not through sophisticated ideology but through a carrot of authority and money bestowed upon a core cadre. For these followers, Abyi is not a spiritual guide but a transactional necessity, the thin line between their privilege and destitution. Without him, they revert to being illegal criminal gangs. Consequently, these enablers are often more dangerous to the nation than the leader himself; they are invested in perpetuating the cult’s power to protect their illicit benefits, long after its ideological or practical expiration date.
The way out
In the final analysis, it is clear that a destructive cult leader like Aaby, who has risen to lead a nation, must be removed from power. Yet his followers—whose privileges and benefits are deeply tied to his survival—will not easily relinquish their grip. Without the theological façade of the Prosperity Party, they would be exposed as little more than criminal enablers, which makes them, in many ways, more dangerous than the leader himself.
The deeper malaise, however, lies within the society itself. For generations, the political DNA of this nation has been one of personification placing faith in individuals rather than institutions. This has allowed a figure like Aaby to replace political ideology with a cult-like theological fiasco. The public, mentally conditioned by this legacy, clings to the passive hope that a “freedom fighter” will one day arrive to deliver them.
Yet such waiting is a form of surrender. Even opposition elites often rush to fill this imagined “savior” role, rather than engaging in the hard, collective work of politics: mobilizing, building movements, and strengthening democratic institutions. We are thus trapped in a triad of dysfunction: a dangerous cult leader sustained by his protectors, a political culture addicted to personification, and a suffering society caught in a cycle of hope and paralysis.
Who will break this deadlock? That remains the million-dollar question—one that demands not a solitary hero, but a collective awakening.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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I read the ‘Rebuttal’ this article by Mohamud A. Ahmed – Cagaweyne, and then I read this article (as suggested by him)… Then an idea crossed my mind ‘what would AI say?’
Well,see/read for your selves .
AI analysis:
Summary
The article argues Ethiopia’s political culture—rooted in cadre-style party structures and habitual “personification” of leaders—enabled Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party to develop a cult-like following.
It defines a cult as excessive devotion to a charismatic leader, enforced denial of reality, isolation from critique, and absolute loyalty; claims the Prosperity Party fits this model by spiritualizing governance, denying crises, and treating prosperity as salvational proof.
The author labels Abiy a “bad cult leader”: charismatic but impulsive, cruel, lacking strategy and substantive competence; control rests on patronage and a core cadre who protect privileges.
The piece concludes the regime must be removed but warns that the real obstacle is social and political: a culture that expects saviors, opposition elites who imitate personification, and an enabling elite whose interests make them more dangerous than the leader. The cure proposed is collective mobilization to rebuild institutions rather than seeking another singular hero.
Analysis and critique
Framing strength: The article persuasively links historical patterns of leader-personification in Ethiopian politics to contemporary dynamics, giving useful political-cultural context rather than reducing the problem to individual biography.
Conceptual fit: Using the sociological “cult” concept is rhetorically powerful and highlights mechanisms (isolation, denial, loyalty). However, it risks stretching a clinical term: many political parties use charismatic leadership and propaganda without exhibiting the full repertoire of coercive control, information isolation, or religious-mystical coercion typical of classic cults. A more careful distinction between “authoritarian populism,” “personality cult,” and religious cult dynamics would strengthen the claim.
Evidence and balance: The essay relies on strong normative judgments (e.g., “Anointed by Jesus,” “compulsive need to crash, kill, and vanish enemies”) presented as fact; it cites few concrete, sourced examples of the party’s systematic informational isolation or direct coercive practices. That weakens empirical credibility for readers who require evidence to move from plausible interpretation to conclusion.
Agency and structure: The piece correctly emphasizes structural enablers (cadre mentality, patronage) and the role of enablers who profit from the system. Its diagnosis that elites who benefit from the status quo can be more dangerous than an impulsive leader is insightful and important for strategy.
Remedies: The call for collective awakening and institution-building is appropriate but underdeveloped. Practical measures—how opposition actors might weaken patronage networks, rebuild independent media, or strengthen civic institutions under repression—are absent. The piece implies removal of the leader is necessary but does not weigh feasibility, risks, or transitional scenarios (violent contestation, military involvement, negotiated elite pacts).
Brief commentary / implications
The article is valuable as a forceful critique that reframes Abiy-era politics as a cultural and structural problem, not merely a policy failure. Its strongest contribution is spotlighting the durable incentives of patrons and the societal habit of seeking saviors.
Policymakers, opposition actors, and civil society should take away: focus on dismantling patronage channels, protect independent information spaces, and invest in institutions that shift legitimacy from personalities to rules, representation, and accountability.
Caution for readers: accept the “cult” framing as a provocative analytical lens rather than a diagnostic certainty; follow-up with concrete evidence and differentiated concepts (personality cult vs. religious cult vs. authoritarian populism) will produce clearer strategies.
Suggested concrete next steps (minimal, actionable)
– Map patronage: document who benefits materially from the party to identify leverage points.
– Strengthen information resilience: support independent media, fact-checking, and secure communication for civic actors.
– Build coalitions: encourage cross-ethnic, cross-class civic platforms focused on institutional reforms, not new messianic leaders.
– Prepare transitional frameworks: develop nonviolent strategies and transitional governance proposals to reduce the risk of power vacuums.
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I did do the same AI analysis on the ‘rebuttal’, and the combined AI assessment of both articles & its combined suggestions; since the rebuttal was assessed based on the original the combined result & suggestions are posted there…
The idea here is, not to create friction among brothers, but bring them together and build a coherent evidence based critique that provides tangible solutions that can be clearly identified, measured, or experienced.
Be well