“Where Is the Fuel, Abiy?” – The Hormuz Trap, Prosperity Party’s Broken Promises, and the Fury of a Nation Paralyzed

Analysis: How Geopolitics Exposed Years of Mismanagement, Corruption, and Public Betrayal

Surafel Getahun 

Introduction: A Crisis Manufactured by Nature and Negligence

For the past month, Ethiopia—a nation of over 130 million people—has been brought to its knees. Not by war, not by drought, but by a bottleneck 2,000 kilometers away. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the escalation of the US-Israel-Iran conflict has exposed the raw nerve of the Ethiopian state: a complete and utter dependence on foreign fuel with zero strategic buffer.

Yet, to frame this solely as a geopolitical tragedy is to ignore the glaring reality on the ground. While the world’s attention is fixed on the Gulf, ordinary Ethiopians are enduring a man-made catastrophe. As fuel queues stretch for kilometers in Addis Ababa, as ambulances in Tigray run silent, and as a liter of black-market petrol costs more than a day’s wage, a bitter question is taking hold in the public consciousness: Where is the fuel, Abiy?

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration has long championed a narrative of “renaissance” and “reform.” The government points proudly to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and a pioneering electric vehicle (EV) policy as the future. But today, those future-facing policies are colliding with a present reality of catastrophic supply chain mismanagement, fiscal irresponsibility, and a growing chasm between the ruling party’s technocratic optimism and the visceral anger of a populace that simply cannot move.

This opinion analysis argues that the current fuel crisis is not merely a result of the Hormuz closure. It is the inevitable consequence of years of policy complacency, a failure to diversify import logistics, and a Prosperity Party leadership that has consistently prioritized political consolidation over economic resilience. The result is a national crisis that threatens to undo the fragile stability Abiy has sought to build since the end of the Tigray war.

Part I: The Anatomy of a Collapse—Why Ethiopia Was the Perfect Victim

1.1. The Single Point of Failure

The Strait of Hormuz closure is a global event, but its impact on Ethiopia is uniquely devastating due to a fundamental strategic flaw. Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked country in the world. Its economic lifeline is the Port of Djibouti, through which 95 percent of its maritime trade, including virtually all its fuel, passes.

During the Prosperity Party’s tenure, despite the rhetoric of diversifying ports through deals with Somaliland (the controversial Memorandum of Understanding) and Berbera, the reality is that Djibouti remains a stranglehold. When the Hormuz crisis hit and global shipping insurers hiked premiums, the Port of Djibouti became a bottleneck. A single shipment of 180,000 metric tons failed to arrive, and daily diesel availability plummeted from 9.2 million liters to just 4.5 million liters.

This is not an act of God; it is a failure of strategic foresight. For years, economists and security analysts warned that Ethiopia needed a robust strategic petroleum reserve—a stockpile capable of lasting 90 days or more. Today, Ethiopia has virtually none. The government is now scrambling to purchase emergency fuel on the spot market at triple the standard price, draining foreign currency reserves that were already critically low.

1.2. The Illusion of the EV Revolution

The Prosperity Party’s signature energy policy—the ban on fossil-fuel vehicle imports and the push for electric mobility—was hailed as visionary. In 2024, Ethiopia became the first country in the world to take such a drastic step. The logic was sound: leverage Ethiopia’s 95 percent renewable energy grid to bypass the need for imported gasoline.

But in practice, this policy has created a Frankenstein’s monster of a transport sector. While wealthy elites in Addis Ababa can afford to import expensive electric vehicles (with tariffs slashed to 15 percent), the vast majority of the population—the taxi drivers, the long-haul truckers, the farmers in the highlands—remain entirely dependent on diesel and gasoline.

The EV policy did not reduce the country’s fuel import bill significantly; it simply created a two-tiered system. When the Hormuz crisis hit, the government found itself subsidizing fuel for a fleet of aging, inefficient internal combustion engines while the infrastructure for EV charging remains limited to urban centers. As one transport union leader put it, “They tell us to buy electric cars, but there are no charging stations outside the capital, and we cannot afford to replace our minibuses. Now we cannot even afford to fill them.”

Part II: The Prosperity Party’s Failures—A Chronicle of Mismanagement

2.1. Fiscal Fantasy vs. Economic Reality

The core of the public anger lies in the government’s handling of the economy long before the Hormuz closure. The Prosperity Party has been running a fuel subsidy regime that is fiscally unsustainable. To keep prices artificially low and stave off protest, the government has been absorbing the difference between the global market price and the retail price.

Finance Minister Ahmed Shide recently admitted that the government is spending between 15 and 20 billion birr per month on fuel subsidies. This is money that is not going into healthcare, education, or infrastructure. It is a short-term political fix that has created a culture of dependency. When the global price spiked due to the Hormuz crisis, the subsidy burden exploded, and the government was forced to either let prices skyrocket (which they did, with diesel hitting 139.84 birr per liter) or watch reserves vanish.

The Prosperity Party’s economic team has been accused of “kicking the can down the road.” Instead of gradually liberalizing the fuel market and allowing prices to adjust slowly while building strategic reserves, they maintained a fragile status quo. When the external shock came, the system shattered.

2.2. The Failure of Communication and Leadership

Perhaps more damaging than the economic mismanagement is the perceived indifference of the leadership. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s response to the crisis has been largely limited to a social media appeal for citizens to “use fuel with a sense of responsibility.”

For a population already battered by years of inflation, conflict, and displacement, being told to “conserve” by a leader who travels in a motorcade of SUVs is a political miscalculation of staggering proportions. The government’s communication strategy has been reactive. Information about fuel allocations, price changes, and rationing has been inconsistent, leading to panic buying and hoarding.

The Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) has called for a “three-pillar strategy” to address the crisis—including diversification and storage—but such technocratic solutions ring hollow to the driver in Addis Ababa who has been sleeping in his car for three nights to get 20 liters of fuel.

2.3. The Black Market: A Symptom of State Failure

When a government cannot provide a basic commodity, the black market fills the void. The nationwide crackdown that has detained over 650 individuals, including public employees, is a stark admission of the state’s loss of control over its own supply chain.

Reports indicate that fuel intended for subsidized distribution is being diverted by cartels operating with impunity. In rural areas, petrol stations are deliberately hiding fuel to sell later at black-market rates. In Mekelle, a 20-liter jerrycan now costs 8,000 birr—more than ten times the official price. This is not merely a supply crisis; it is a governance crisis. It suggests that the Prosperity Party’s internal security apparatus, which has been heavily militarized in recent years, is unable or unwilling to police the very distribution networks it controls.

2.4. The Corruption Connection: Who Is Profiting?

Perhaps the most incendiary accusation circulating in Addis Ababa’s business circles and social media is that the fuel crisis has become a lucrative enterprise for connected elites within the Prosperity Party. Whispers of “fuel mafias” operating with the protection of high-ranking officials have grown too loud to ignore.

Multiple sources suggest that fuel import licenses, which are tightly controlled by the state, have been concentrated in the hands of a few companies with deep ties to the ruling party. As the official supply dwindles, these same entities are allegedly the ones supplying the black market—selling at exorbitant prices the very fuel they obtained with subsidized dollars from the National Bank of Ethiopia.

The government’s crackdown, which has netted over 650 individuals, has conspicuously avoided touching the higher echelons of the fuel import chain. As one Addis Ababa resident put it bitterly: “They arrest the small fish selling five jerrycans on the street corner, but the big fish who emptied the tankers in the first place are sitting in Prosperity Party offices, counting their profits.”

This perception of elite enrichment amid public suffering is perhaps the most dangerous development for the Prosperity Party. It transforms the fuel crisis from a policy failure into a moral indictment—a charge that the party is not merely incompetent, but predatory.

Part III: Public Anger—A Quiet Storm Ready to Burst

3.1. The Transport Sector on the Brink

The most immediate flashpoint is the transport sector. Addis Ababa’s iconic blue and white minibuses (Higer), which form the backbone of urban mobility, are disappearing from the streets. The Addis Ababa City Administration’s decision to hike public transport tariffs has provided some relief, but it has also passed the burden onto the poorest citizens.

Union leaders are warning of a potential paralysis. If fuel supplies do not stabilize, drivers will be forced to abandon their vehicles. This would not only strand commuters but also disrupt the supply of food and medicine to the capital. The government’s prioritization of fuel for “security establishments” and “state-run projects” has led to widespread resentment among the private sector, which feels it is being sacrificed to prop up a bloated bureaucracy.

In interviews conducted across the capital, a common refrain emerges: “We voted for prosperity; we got scarcity.” The Prosperity Party, which positioned itself as the guarantor of stability and development, is now being blamed for the very chaos it promised to end.

3.2. Regional Grievances Resurface

The crisis is exacerbating regional tensions. In Tigray, where the memory of the 2020–2022 war is still raw, the fuel shortage is being viewed through a political lens. Tigrayan officials have accused the federal government of deliberately starving the region of fuel as a form of collective punishment. Whether or not this is true, the perception is deeply damaging to Abiy’s promise of “national reconciliation.”

Similarly, in Amhara and Oromia regions, where armed conflicts persist, the inability to fuel security forces or move goods is creating pockets of instability. The federal government’s focus on securing the capital and major industrial corridors has left peripheral regions to fend for themselves, reigniting old grievances about marginalization.

In the Somali region, where cross-border trade with Somaliland and Djibouti is vital, fuel smuggling has become rampant. Local authorities complain that federal policies are driving fuel out of the country, creating shortages that harm legitimate businesses.

3.3. The Social Media Battleground

Ethiopia’s vibrant—and often toxic—digital space has become a battleground for the crisis. Hashtags criticizing the Prosperity Party are trending daily. Memes mocking the government’s EV policy circulate widely. Opposition figures, many of whom operate in exile, are using the crisis to galvanize support, calling for mass protests.

The government has attempted to counter this narrative by touting its diplomatic engagements—such as Abiy’s visit to Abu Dhabi—and by emphasizing the “external enemy” (the conflict in the Gulf). But this framing is struggling to gain traction. For a populace that has heard endless promises of prosperity, the sight of empty fuel stations is a more powerful indictment than any opposition propaganda.

One viral video shows a taxi driver in Addis Ababa removing his car’s license plates in frustration, saying, “If the government cannot provide fuel, why should I pay taxes for a car I cannot drive?” The video has been viewed millions of times, capturing the mood of a nation at its breaking point.

3.4. Voices from the Streets: The Human Toll

Beyond the statistics and political analysis lies the human cost. Take the case of Worknesh, a mother of three in Addis Ababa’s Merkato district. She relies on a minibus to transport vegetables from the countryside to sell in the city. With fuel prices tripled and supply uncertain, her profit margins have vanished. “I used to make 500 birr a day,” she told a local reporter. “Now, I am lucky if I break even. My children are going to bed hungry.”

Or consider Dr. Alem, a physician at a hospital in Mekelle. His ambulance service has been forced to ration fuel, meaning only the most critical patients receive transport. “We have had two maternal deaths this month because mothers in labor could not reach us in time,” he said, his voice heavy with grief. “These are deaths that should not have happened. They are deaths caused by empty fuel tanks.”

These stories are multiplying across the country. The fuel crisis is no longer an economic issue; it has become a humanitarian emergency with a political face.

Part IV: The Diplomatic Mirage—Abiy’s Gulf Gambit

4.1. The Abu Dhabi Visit: Substance or Spectacle?

As the crisis deepened in mid-March, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made a high-profile visit to Abu Dhabi. Official statements described the trip as a success, emphasizing the “strong brotherly relations” between Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates. Photographs showed Abiy smiling alongside UAE leaders, projecting an image of diplomatic mastery.

But what did the trip actually achieve? While the UAE is a key player in the Gulf, it does not control the Strait of Hormuz, nor can it force Iran to reopen shipping lanes. The visit yielded no concrete announcements of emergency fuel shipments, no reduction in prices, no strategic deal to bypass the Hormuz chokepoint.

Critics argue that the trip was a public relations exercise—an attempt to show a beleaguered population that the government was “doing something” while avoiding the hard choices required at home. One opposition figure quipped: “Abiy went to Abu Dhabi to look for fuel and came back with selfies. Meanwhile, Ethiopians are still waiting in line.”

4.2. The Limits of Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy

The crisis has exposed the limits of Ethiopia’s diplomatic influence. For years, Abiy has cultivated an image as a regional statesman, mediating conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, hosting African Union summits, and positioning Ethiopia as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. But when the chips are down, those relationships have not translated into tangible energy security.

Ethiopia’s reliance on Gulf producers—primarily Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait—for its fuel imports has created a dependency that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can easily overcome. When global markets tighten, Gulf producers prioritize their own needs and their strategic allies. Ethiopia, for all its diplomatic outreach, remains a secondary concern.

4.3. A Call for Diversification

The crisis makes clear that Ethiopia must diversify its sources of fuel imports. While Gulf producers will likely remain the primary suppliers for the foreseeable future, the government should explore agreements with non-Gulf producers such as Russia, Azerbaijan, or even Venezuela—nations whose supplies do not depend on the Strait of Hormuz.

Such diversification would not be without challenges. Longer shipping routes, different fuel specifications, and geopolitical complications would all need to be managed. But the cost of inaction is now starkly visible: a single closure in the Gulf has brought the nation to its knees.

Part V: Opinion—The Path Forward and a Reckoning for the Prosperity Party

5.1. The Necessity of Political Accountability

For the Prosperity Party to survive this crisis politically, it must abandon its instinct to centralize and control and instead embrace transparency. The public needs to know exactly how much fuel is available, where it is going, and why prices are set where they are. The secrecy surrounding fuel imports and distribution only fuels the conspiracy theories that the government is hoarding fuel for its own elite.

Moreover, there must be accountability for the years of neglect. The officials who oversaw the failure to build strategic reserves, who approved the unsustainable subsidy regime, and who allowed the import logistics to remain a single point of failure should be held to account. Without such accountability, public anger will fester and eventually boil over into unrest.

The Prosperity Party must also confront the corruption allegations head-on. If fuel import licenses have indeed been concentrated among party-connected elites, that system must be dismantled. If officials are profiting from the black market, they must be prosecuted—regardless of their rank. Half-measures and scapegoating of small-time dealers will not restore public trust.

5.2. Rethinking the EV Transition

The EV policy is not a mistake, but its implementation has been. The government must accelerate the development of charging infrastructure outside Addis Ababa. It must also provide incentives for converting existing commercial fleets—taxis, buses, trucks—to electric or hybrid systems, rather than simply banning imports of new fossil-fuel vehicles, which has led to an aging, inefficient fleet.

More importantly, the government must recognize that the transition to EVs is a long-term solution, not a short-term fix. In the meantime, it needs to secure diversified fuel supply contracts, perhaps with Russia, Venezuela, or other non-Gulf producers, to reduce vulnerability to Strait of Hormuz volatility.

5.3. A Marshall Plan for Energy Resilience

What Ethiopia needs is not piecemeal reforms but a comprehensive, nationally funded energy resilience strategy. This would include:

· Strategic Petroleum Reserves: Immediate construction of storage facilities capable of holding 90–120 days of national fuel consumption, located not only in Addis Ababa but also in regional hubs to ensure equitable distribution.

· Port Diversification: Aggressive pursuit of alternative port arrangements, including the long-discussed Berbera corridor and potential agreements with other regional ports, to reduce the Djibouti monopoly.

· Decentralized Renewable Energy: Expansion of solar, wind, and hydro projects not just for grid power but for direct transport applications—including charging stations powered by renewable microgrids in rural areas.

· Fuel Market Liberalization: A phased, transparent approach to reducing fuel subsidies, coupled with direct cash transfers to protect the most vulnerable households, rather than the current system of opaque, regressive subsidies.

Such a strategy would require significant investment and political will. But the alternative—continued vulnerability to external shocks—is no longer acceptable.

5.4. The Prospect of Mass Protest

Perhaps the greatest unknown is whether the public anger will translate into organized protest. Ethiopia has a recent history of mass movements: the 2014–2018 Oromo protests that brought Abiy to power, and the subsequent ethnic conflicts that have plagued his tenure.

The Prosperity Party is acutely aware of this history. The fuel crisis is unfolding in a context of existing grievances—inflation, unemployment, insecurity, and unresolved ethnic tensions. If the government fails to demonstrate progress in alleviating the crisis within weeks, the risk of widespread protests is real.

Such protests would not necessarily be coordinated by opposition parties; they could emerge spontaneously from the transport unions, from market women, from the frustrated youth of Addis Ababa. And once the streets fill, the Prosperity Party’s already fragile legitimacy could crumble.

Conclusion: A Defining Test of Leadership

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has delivered a shock to the global economy, but in Ethiopia, it has detonated a crisis that was years in the making. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party now face a defining test of their leadership.

If they respond with the same top-down, security-focused approach that has characterized their tenure—cracking down on black markets while ignoring the structural rot, preaching conservation while maintaining an aura of elite impunity, targeting small-time dealers while protecting the party-connected cartels—they risk losing the fragile legitimacy they have built since the end of the Tigray war.

If, however, they seize this moment to initiate a genuine national dialogue on energy security, to decentralize economic management, to confront the corruption that has hollowed out the state, and to build the strategic reserves that should have been built years ago, they could yet turn catastrophe into reform. The electric vehicle revolution, the GERD, and Ethiopia’s renewable potential remain powerful assets. But assets are useless without competent stewardship.

For now, the image that will define this era is not the gleaming dam or the silent electric car. It is the endless queue—the line of desperate citizens, waiting for a resource that should have been secured long ago. In that queue, one finds not just a fuel crisis, but the accumulated frustration of a nation that feels its leadership has failed to deliver on its most basic promises.

The Prosperity Party promised prosperity. In the absence of fuel, that promise is burning out. And in the streets, in the markets, in the hospitals, and on social media, one question echoes louder with each passing day: Where is the fuel, Abiy?

Surafel Getahun is a Political Science and International Relations lecturer,researcher, seasoned political analyst, and journalist. With numerous insights into the Horn of Africa’s geopolitics, diplomacy, and conflicts, he has published several scholarly articles and numerous analyses in various national and international media outlets.

Sources:

· Addis Standard (Ethiopia’s fuel crisis and regional impact)
· The Reporter Ethiopia (Fuel subsidies and government expenditure)
· Xinhua News Agency (Impact on public transport and EV policy)
· Anadolu Ajansı (Black market crackdown and detentions)
· Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) (Strategic analysis of maritime chokepoints)
· social media trends

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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