Ethnos to Demos: The Vision Confirmed, The Path Diverges

A Reflection on Amsale Woreta’s Proposal to Transition Ethiopia from Ethnos to Demos

Sirak Zena

Abstract

The article “From Ethnos to Demos: A People’s Blueprint to End Ethiopia’s Cycle of Conflict” by Amsale Woreta presents a normatively compelling and institutionally nuanced proposal to replace Ethiopia’s system of ethnic federalism with a civic-territorial federation founded on the principles of equal citizenship, empowered municipalities, and reformed electoral and fiscal frameworks.

This reflection acknowledges the intellectual rigor and moral clarity inherent in Amsale’s vision while arguing that a direct transition from the existing ethnic federal order to a civic-territorial federation, without an intermediate transitional phase, faces significant political, security, institutional, and societal constraints within Ethiopia’s current context.

Drawing on comparative experiences and the overarching logic of “trans-ethnic” or hybrid arrangements, this paper succinctly advocates for a phased, transitional approach that incorporates elements of the existing system and incremental reforms to cultivate the necessary preconditions for a future civic-territorial constitutional settlement. The conclusion is not that the “Ethnos to Demos” objective is misguided, but rather that the pathway to achieving it must be more gradual and politically adaptive.

1. Introduction

“Ethiopia is bleeding not because ordinary people harbor animosity towards one another, but because a system incentivizes factionalism over citizenship and fear over trust.” This assertion encapsulates the fundamental tragedy of Ethiopia’s current constitutional framework as articulated by Amsale Woreta. In her article, “From Ethnos to Demos: A People’s Blueprint to End Ethiopia’s Cycle of Conflict,” she contends that ethnic federalism has not only failed but has effectively fulfilled its intended design: to prioritize ethnicity as the principal organizing principle of the state, resulting in predictable outcomes of polarization, fragmentation, and recurrent violence.

Ethnic federalism, as a principle, is an ambivalent tool: it can effectively manage deep diversity or, depending on its implementation, political context, and practice, solidify and weaponize identities. In the Ethiopian scenario, it has predominantly leaned towards the latter outcome.

The proposed blueprint is ambitious, advocating the replacement of ethnic federalism with a civic-territorial federation that preserves federal checks and local representation while restructuring the incentives of political competition to prioritize equal citizenship over ethnic gatekeeping. Furthermore, it delineates a sequenced transition strategy, from an Interim Governance Pact (IGP) and integrity institutions to a constitutional convention, new regional delineations, municipal empowerment, disarmament and demobilization (DDR), and elections conducted under a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system.

This reflection articulates the long-term aspirations outlined in the blueprint while recognizing its intellectual rigor. However, it contends that, despite its normative justification, a direct transition from the current ethnic federal system to a civic-territorial federation without an intermediate transitional step is unlikely to be feasible, even in the post-authoritarian context for which the blueprint is primarily intended. 

Moreover, if such a transition is implemented improperly, it could elicit a destabilizing backlash. The central argument of this reflection postulates that an intermediate, trans-ethnic, or hybrid framework, one that acknowledges entrenched ethnic realities while actively advancing cross-ethnic coalitions and civic institutions, may represent a more pragmatic initial step toward realizing the “demos” ideal.

The reflection amplifies her critique of the existing constitutional framework, specifically Article 39 and the Preamble, to illustrate how the FDRE Constitution enshrines ethnic sovereignty while leaving the unified Ethiopian demos conspicuously undefined.

2. Acknowledging the Author’s Insight

Amsale’s article constitutes a significant contribution to Ethiopia’s constitutional discourse in three principal ways.

First, it provides a comprehensive analysis of the structural deficiencies inherent in ethnic federalism, elucidating how the secession clause, security fragmentation, politicized boundaries, internal minority vulnerability, and opaque fiscal arrangements collectively contribute to chronic instability rather than offering protection.

Second, it proposes a coherent civic-territorial alternative grounded in comparative federalism, encompassing citizenship-first rights, territorially defined regions, empowered municipalities, mixed-member proportional elections, transparent, equitable formulas for equalization, neutral, integrity institutions, a unified security sector, and digital tools for transparency. Collectively, these elements form a logically consistent model rather than a mere collection of aspirations.

Third, the proposed blueprint is attentive to sequencing and implementation, suggesting a phased roadmap that begins with stabilization and an Interim Governance Pact, advances through a Constitutional Convention, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), new elections, and eventual entrenchment. This plan is further complemented by an initial 100-day package of visible reforms aimed at building trust. (I take the 100 days as a proposal that can be modified in light of actual, objective realities on the ground.)

Underlying all of this is a clear and courageous normative position: that Ethiopia can and must transition from a system characterized by ethnic ownership of the state to one founded on equal citizenship without compromising the protection and flourishing of its diverse cultures and languages.

3. Core Rebuttal: Major Obstacles to Immediate Comprehensive Replacement-Briefly Addressing Key Challenges.

Endorsing the ultimate objective does not resolve the critical questions of how and when to achieve it. As the author has clarified in response to public comments, the blueprint is primarily designed as a roadmap for “the day following the change,” after the current coercive order has collapsed, rather than as a program to be implemented by the present regime. Nevertheless, even in a post-authoritarian context, Ethiopia’s structural realities will render a direct transition from the existing ethnic federal system to a civic-territorial federation, without an intermediate transitional phase, exceedingly challenging and potentially destabilizing.

3.1 Absence of Broad Elite Consensus

Constitutional transformation typically necessitates at least a minimal consensus among key political and military actors. As acknowledged in the blueprint’s section on risk management, Ethiopia’s current order is sustained by armed elites affiliated with specific ethnic constituencies, established economic interests dependent on existing arrangements, and regional power brokers who perceive autonomy as a means to secure their interests.

The civic-territorial federation proposes reducing ethnic claims in power and resource distribution, strengthening neutral national institutions (such as courts, commissions, and security forces), and reframing regional authority on functional rather than ethnic criteria.

For numerous political elites, this redesign constitutes an existential threat. They are likely to interpret it not as a neutral reform that enhances citizenship but as a re-centralization that could expose them or their communities to dominance by other groups or the federal center. In a political environment characterized by ethnic and security-based competition, the absence of elite agreement severely limits the practicality of initiating a transformational constitutional process, regardless of its theoretical sequencing.

3.2 Ongoing Armed Conflicts and Security Fragmentation

The blueprint identifies security fragmentation as a central issue and proposes establishing a unified, professional security sector with community policing accountable at the local level. However, the current situation is characterized by numerous regions maintaining their own armed forces and allied militias, active or latent armed confrontations in several areas, and overlaps among ethnic identity, command structures, and mobilization narratives.

In this context, the fundamental assumptions underpinning the initial phases of the plan, localized ceasefires, DDR registration, and a credible, neutral policing framework, pose significant challenges for implementation. In the absence of an initial layer of security stabilization and trust among combatants and communities, efforts to radically alter boundaries or reshape the security architecture risk being perceived as partisan, potentially provoking resistance or opposition.

3.3 Weak Incentives to Build and Respect Constraining Institutions

The proposed blueprint envisions a robust Constitutional Court to check abuses, an empowered Elections and Boundaries Commission, an Auditor General to expose fiscal mismanagement, and binding rules limiting opaque allocations. These elements are essential to establishing a functioning civic federation. However, as the author’s own challenge map indicates, the existing order is characterized by judicial weakness and politicization, opaque fiscal transfers, and ethnic vetting within the civil service.

Even in a post-authoritarian context, these legacies do not dissipate overnight. Political actors emerging from armed or highly polarized struggles typically prioritize consolidating their positions and rewarding loyal networks; they are often reluctant to empower strong, independent oversight bodies quickly, which could, in turn, impose constraints on them. Consequently, a structural tension persists: the very actors required to establish and uphold constraining institutions are also those whose short-term interests may be jeopardized by such institutions. 

This structural tension does not invalidate the proposed end state or its phased rollout. Still, it tempers expectations about how quickly such institutions can be built and the degree of self-restraint that emerging elites might exhibit in the chaotic aftermath of regime change.

3.4 Institutional Fragility and Capacity Deficits

Civic–territorial federalism, particularly with empowered municipalities and complex fiscal formulas, presupposes a reasonably capable civil service, reliable administrative data (e.g., population, land, service coverage), effective local governance with experience in service delivery, and infrastructure for MMP, DDR, national ID, and e-governance.

The article correctly identifies several shortcomings in the current system, including inadequate registries, potential corruption, overreliance on humanitarian aid for development, and limited capacity to generate local revenue. This brings up a practical question: if a significant overhaul is implemented, could it overwhelm already fragile institutions? For instance, if communities view the reform as likely to cause administrative chaos, with delays in salary payments, uncertainty about service provision, and disputes over land and jurisdiction, the failures in governance might overshadow the positive aspects of civic federalism.

3.5 High Conflict Potential of Boundary Redesign in the Current Climate

The proposal outlined in the blueprint to redraw regional boundaries based on administrative efficiency, infrastructure, and watersheds, rather than on ethnic delineations, is conceptually aligned with its rejection of ethnically defined maps. It further advocates a structured process that includes establishing a Boundaries Commission, mediation, and, where necessary, referenda.

However, numerous border areas, such as those between Oromo and Amhara, Afar and Somali, Oromia and Somali, Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz as well as specific regions in the south, are currently characterized by intense competition and periodic violence, with boundaries serving as symbols of identity and security for communities that fear demographic engineering, displacement, or marginalization, particularly along the Amhara-Tigray frontier.

The introduction of a comprehensive territorial reorganization in the near term would likely be perceived through a zero-sum lens, in which any alteration of jurisdiction is viewed as a gain or loss for specific groups. There is a significant risk that maps, which are technically rational and oriented toward service provision, could catalyze new waves of mobilization and conflict in an environment already saturated with grievances.

3.6 Societal Readiness and the Legacy of Ethnic Federalism

Over the past three decades, ethnic federalism has profoundly influenced citizens’ perceptions of rights, representation, and security. Many communities regard regional autonomy, despite its shortcomings, as a response to historical centralization and perceived domination. It serves as a partial safeguard for language, culture, and local decision-making, as well as a platform for negotiation with the federal center.

The blueprint recognizes and seeks to protect language and cultural rights independently of territorial considerations. Nevertheless, the psychological and historical dimensions cannot be adequately addressed by institutional design alone. A premature transition to a civic model, without a gradual confidence-building process and demonstration of the trustworthiness of national institutions, risks exacerbating concerns that “equal citizenship” may ultimately lead to the re-emergence of previous hierarchies.

3.7 Economic Constraints on Managing a Deep Transition

The proposed transition encompasses several costly components, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) stipends, training and reintegration programs; a “health and roads surge” alongside other visible service improvements; investments in digital infrastructure, such as national ID systems, registries, and portals; and operational costs for new institutions and consultative processes.

The blueprint outlines various financing options, domestic reprioritization, diaspora bonds, and international budget support contingent upon transparency. While these strategies are coherent, the state’s capacity to sustain such a transition is impeded by economic constraints, high inflation, and foreign exchange shortages. Financial hardship may also exacerbate ethnic competition over limited resources, complicating efforts to reframe political discourse around shared citizenship and long-term institutional benefits.

3.8 The Leadership Question: Who Orchestrates the Transition?

Another ambiguity in the blueprint concerns the entity responsible for coordinating and ensuring the transition. The document appropriately underscores that the roadmap is “a step-by-step, risk-aware transition plan that the public can execute,” consistently highlighting the roles of citizens, civil society, and local communities. However, within a highly securitized and polarized environment, invoking “the public” as the primary driver of significant constitutional change raises practical concerns.

A transition of the magnitude envisioned, freezing boundary changes, establishing interim integrity institutions, convening a Constitutional Convention, redesigning the federation, initiating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and managing new elections, requires, in the power vacuum following regime collapse, a coalition of emerging political leaders willing to share power, organized opposition and armed actors prepared for negotiated reform, independent societal actors (e.g., religious institutions, community elders, and civic organizations) for mediation and monitoring, and external guarantors (e.g., the African Union, United Nations) for support and pressure.

The blueprint indirectly acknowledges some of these actors in its discussions of the Interim Governance Pact, DDR, and international support. Nonetheless, it remains unclear which coalition of forces is realistically positioned to initiate and sustain the process. This uncertainty is particularly salient in the Ethiopian context, where incumbent incentives do not align with the empowerment of constraints, regional elites may resist the loss of leverage, and civil society remains fragmented.

Building on the blueprint’s references to the Interim Governance Pact (IGP) as a mechanism for convening diverse actors post-collapse, along with DDR processes and international guarantors to support them, a more precise delineation of leadership could further clarify the coalition required to operationalize the IGP.

A more politically grounded strategy must identify a feasible coalition of actors; however, in Ethiopia, this task is complicated by the significant fragmentation of opposition forces: they are divided among those who defend ethnic federalism, those who advocate for various forms of civic federalism, and those who pursue secessionist projects, often with mutually incompatible end states. In this context, “the public” cannot be regarded as a singular, cohesive actor; any viable leadership structure would first necessitate an unprecedented convergence among these competing factions around a minimum common program for transition before broader civic aspirations can be translated into enforceable constitutional change.

4. Toward a More Gradual and Trans-Ethnic Transitional Pathway

The concept of a trans-ethnic, intermediate constitutional order in Ethiopia is not entirely novel; Professor Messay Kebede first articulated it in his 2018 article “On Transitional Government and Ethnic Federalism.” In an unpublished article, the author of this reflection has further developed this concept. The following brief argument builds upon this insight and engages with Amsale Woreta’s civic-territorial blueprint.

Acknowledging these constraints does not imply an endorsement of the status quo or a rejection of the civic ideal. Instead, it suggests that the transition from ethnos to demos may require an intermediate constitutional arrangement that:

• Recognizes and engages with existing ethnic realities.
• Initiates change in incentives to promote cross-ethnic cooperation.
• Gradually strengthens neutral national institutions.
• Promotes social and elite confidence in the feasibility of equal citizenship.

A trans-ethnic or hybrid approach, aligned with several of the author’s principles, could function as an effective intermediary.

4.1. Conceptual Features of a Trans-Ethnic / Hybrid Transitional Path

A trans-ethnic, hybrid approach can be conceptualized as a deliberately intermediate regime design that acknowledges the enduring realities of ethnic federalism while reconfiguring incentives toward cross-ethnic political engagement and civic institutions. Rather than abolishing ethnic federalism in a single constitutional moment, this approach seeks to maintain regional autonomy in sensitive domains (such as language, culture, and local governance) while reshaping federal-level regulations to ensure that political survival requires broad, cross-regional support.

At its core, this path would encompass four fundamental elements.

First, a dual executive system, a nationally elected president alongside a prime minister accountable to parliament, serves as a mechanism for power-sharing. This structure provides previously marginalized groups with a visible stake in governance, facilitates the development of co-governance practices, and prevents the immediate concentration of authority within a single office.

Second, a mixed electoral system (for instance, Mixed-Member Proportional representation) is employed not only to enhance proportionality, as proposed by Amsale, but also to compel candidates and parties to secure support across multiple regions. This encourages the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions rather than promoting mono-ethnic mobilization.

Third, institutionalized minority protections, such as reserved seats, guaranteed representation in regional executive bodies, or veto-like “alarm bell” mechanisms concerning issues that affect vital interests, help alleviate concerns that a civic transformation will undermine hard-won safeguards.

Fourth, a phased constitutional strategy conceptualizes the hybrid order as an explicitly time-bound stage. Initial reforms prioritize national dialogue, census accuracy, data integrity, fundamental judicial and electoral guarantees, and coalition-building among both state and non-state actors. Only once these foundational elements are deemed credible would more extensive initiatives toward a fully civic, territorial federation be advanced.

In this context, trans-ethnic federalism does not oppose the “Ethnos to Demos” objective; instead, it serves as a conduit. This approach retains sufficient elements of the existing structure to be politically feasible for key stakeholders while progressively normalizing cross-ethnic competition, fortifying neutral institutions, and preparing both society and the state for the more profound civic-territorial transformation that Amsale aptly envisions.

4.2. Alignment and Divergence of This Transitional Path with Amsale’s Framework

Importantly, a trans-ethnic, hybrid phase does not signify a departure from the fundamental premise of “From Ethnos to Demos”; rather, it operationalizes that premise under more challenging political conditions. Many of its characteristics align with Amsale’s framework. Her advocacy for Mixed-Member Proportional representation and party regulations that incentivize cross-regional organization directly addresses the necessity of coalition-building across ethnic divides; a hybrid system utilizes similar mechanisms while recognizing that this coalition-building will initially occur within a partially reformed federal structure.

Moreover, her emphasis on empowered municipalities, transparent equalization formulas, independent judicial and oversight bodies, constitutional amendment, a unified security apparatus, and a digital state can all be implemented and assessed during a transitional hybrid phase. This approach alleviates the identity burden associated with regional boundaries and enhances the institutional capacity required for the civic-territorial model.

The divergence of the hybrid path lies less in its ultimate destination than in its tempo and sequencing. It explicitly acknowledges that ethnic federal structures and associated apprehensions cannot be dismantled overnight; thus, it preserves regional autonomy in fundamental cultural and local matters while embedding stronger minority protections to prevent internal domination. Over time, as cross-ethnic parties and coalitions emerge, municipalities gain credibility, and integrity institutions demonstrate genuine neutrality, the political costs and perceived risks associated with transitioning toward Amsale’s fully civic-territorial federation diminish.

In this manner, trans-ethnic federalism functions as a bridge rather than an alternative: it employs many of the instruments Amsale advocates but staggers their implementation, thereby rendering Ethiopia’s evolution from ethnos to demos not only normatively compelling but also politically viable.

Amsale’s aspiration is for a relatively rapid transition to a well-designed civic framework; however, pragmatism, prudence, and caution necessitate slower, more gradual transitions to ensure stability as the old, precarious foundations are dismantled. The hybrid system is an essential initial phase that mitigates risk by providing a flexible transitional framework before the secure realization of the comprehensive, unified goal.

The distinction between the two approaches can be illustrated by the analogy of a ship traversing a storm:

The Civic Territorial Federalism (CTF) blueprint is a design for a fundamentally new and safer vessel that Ethiopia requires for long-term peace and stability. However, the endeavor to construct this new ship amid the current perilous storm (characterized by conflict and fragmentation) may lead to disorder.

Conversely, the Trans-Ethnic/Hybrid System serves as a necessary life raft and temporary bridge. This system enables the existing passengers and crew to gradually build mutual trust and enhance capabilities through power-sharing and phased reform, thereby laying the groundwork for the eventual construction of a cohesive vessel when conditions are more favorable. This phased approach represents the most pragmatic pathway toward achieving the vision of a stable, unified Ethiopia predicated on the principle of equal citizenship.

5. The Missing Nation: Sovereignty and the Constitutional Logic of Ethiopia

The Structural Omissions and Semantic Contradictions of the Preamble, and Their Origins in Article 39

In Section 2 of her article, Amsale offers a sharp diagnosis of Ethiopia’s constitutional design, focusing in particular on Article 39 and the way it embeds a permanent “exit threat” into the federal order. She shows how this provision transforms ordinary political bargaining into high-stakes hostage-taking within what she aptly calls a “federation of convenience.”

I fully concur with this reading and find her analysis both clarifying and provocative. It is precisely because her critique is so compelling that it invites further elaboration, especially on how the very first page of the Constitution, the Preamble, prepares the ground for Article 39 and the fragmentation it enables. 

This section acts as an addendum to the reflection, offering an analysis of the constitutional text. It places particular emphasis on the preamble and Article 39, while further elaborating on and reinforcing Amsale’s perspectives as supplementary.

My central claim is that Ethiopia is effectively absent from its own fundamental law. It has not been referred to by its leaders by name for more than twenty-seven years; the Constitution has avoided affirming Ethiopia as a unified, indivisible political community; and in recent years, the term “Ethiopia” has been further instrumentalized and hollowed out in official discourse, creating a deceptive narrative that fails to acknowledge its true essence. This is not a semantic quibble. The absence of a clearly named and constitutionally affirmed Ethiopian demos in the Preamble is a structural choice that shapes and distorts the entire constitutional order.

It does not take a constitutional scholar, like myself, to recognize the weaknesses and intent embedded in the Constitution’s first page; the Preamble elucidates the foundational principles, the established framework, and the prospective ramifications of the political order it would create.

This becomes clear the moment one examines the Preamble itself, where the framers’ deliberate choices and silences outline a constitutional order grounded not in a unified Ethiopian people but in the sovereignty of fragmented groups.

A close reading of the Preamble of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) reveals a foundational design shaped less by the logic of nation-building than by an ideological commitment to ethnic self-determination. The Preamble begins not with a unified people but with “We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia,” placing sovereignty in the hands of multiple ethno-political units rather than a singular Ethiopian demos. This is not a benign stylistic choice; it reflects an intentional departure from international constitutional norms, in which virtually all modern constitutions affirm the unity, indivisibility, and continuity of the state as core principles of constitutional legitimacy.

The omissions in the Ethiopian Preamble are therefore not accidental; they are structural. The text does not declare Ethiopia’s indivisibility, nor does it articulate a shared national identity, a unified sovereign people, a commitment to territorial integrity, or the historical continuity of the Ethiopian state. It does not affirm Ethiopia as a permanent political community. Instead, it emphasizes the rights of groups to self-determination, equality, and the rectification of “historically unjust relationships,” but without grounding these aspirations in a common national project or an enduring state.

This set of omissions becomes intelligible only when read in relation to Article 39, which constitutionally guarantees every “Nation, Nationality and People” an unconditional right to secession. Article 39(1) and (4) explicitly affirm this right, while Article 39(3) provides detailed procedures for exercising it. This unique feature in comparative constitutional law is perhaps unprecedented. The absence of national indivisibility in the Preamble, combined with a fully operational secession clause in its substantive articles, constitutes a unique configuration found in only a handful of cases, particularly Saint Kitts and Nevis and Ethiopia. The omissions in the Preamble are not gaps but deliberate exclusions designed to ensure the philosophical coherence of Article 39.

Globally, the notion of constitutionally enshrined secession is exceedingly rare, underscoring its inherent dangers. Ethiopia and the tiny dual-island nation of Saint Kitts and Nevis (population 52,600 in 2025), a UN member state, are the only two examples.

The result is a constitutional architecture in which the federal state exists only contingently, a temporary association of sovereign ethnic polities rather than a unified nation. Because the Preamble does not affirm a single Ethiopian sovereign people, Article 8 further entrenches fragmentation by declaring that “all sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia,” rather than in Ethiopia as a whole. This reinforces the Preamble’s premise that the federation is built from below, by groups whose ultimate loyalty is not to Ethiopia but to their ethno-political identities.

The falsity of the Preamble’s claim to form a “political community” lies here. A political community, by definition, presupposes shared purpose, sovereignty, identity, and fate. Yet the Preamble offers none of these. It speaks of “common interest” and a “common outlook” arising from interaction, but these are sociological observations, not political commitments. They do not declare that Ethiopia is a nation, nor do they bind the constituent groups to a permanent constitutional order. They do not affirm Ethiopia’s immutability as a state. In the absence of these elements, Ethiopia’s purported political community exists only so long as no group exercises the constitutionally protected right to exit.

The consequences of these omissions are profound. First, they create perpetual constitutional fragility: the state is one referendum away from disintegration. Second, the absence of a unifying national ethos impedes the development of a shared civic identity capable of sustaining democratic institutions, particularly during crises. Third, the constitutional privileging of ethnic sovereignty over national unity incentivizes political entrepreneurs to mobilize grievances along ethnic lines, knowing that secession is a constitutionally legitimate endpoint. Fourth, the lack of an indivisibility clause deprives the federal government of the moral and legal authority to uphold territorial integrity against pressures for fragmentation.

In sum, the Preamble’s omissions reflect an intentional project: to constitutionally decentralize sovereignty to ethnic groups, weaken national cohesion, and render the Ethiopian state secondary to its constituent identities. Article 39 is not simply a clause; it is the gravitational center around which the Preamble was crafted. The failure to affirm unity, nationhood, and continuity is therefore not a drafting oversight but a foundational design choice, whose consequences continue to shape Ethiopia’s political instability, contested statehood, and recurrent centrifugal crises.

A revealing ambiguity lies in the Constitution’s repeated invocation of the phrase “Peoples of Ethiopia.” While the formulation appears inclusive, it is constitutionally empty. All Ethiopians are already exhaustively subsumed within the sovereign categories of “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples,” to which Article 8 assigns exclusive sovereignty.

The introduction of “Peoples of Ethiopia” therefore does not create a civic demos; it merely repackages fragmented ethnonational sovereignties under a rhetorically national label. Comparative constitutional practice makes this maneuver conspicuous: even multinational federations such as India, Germany, South Africa, and Nigeria constitutionally affirm a single sovereign people while recognizing internal diversity. Ethiopia does the reverse. It disperses sovereignty downward and then gestures upward through language that lacks juridical substance.

As Amsale’s analysis of Article 39 makes clear, this semantic sleight of hand is not incidental but structural. The Preamble’s refusal to constitute an Ethiopian demos renders the “exit threat” coherent: a federation assembled without a sovereign people can be held together only conditionally. “Peoples of Ethiopia” thus functions less as a legal category than as narrative camouflage, masking a constitutional order that is, in substance, a pact among sovereign groups rather than the founding charter of a nation.

Conceptually, the FDRE Constitution is best understood not as the founding charter of a unified Ethiopian nation but as a constitutional pact among sovereign Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples, in which Ethiopia itself remains an unnamed and unconstituted political subject.

The Perilous Provision: Article 39 and the Fragmentation of Ethiopia’s Federal Compact

The constitutional guarantee of secession, specifically Article 39, does not promote stability; it transforms political grievances into existential threats, thereby fueling armed mobilization and territorial fragmentation that risk unraveling Ethiopia’s intricate social fabric. Historical precedents, such as the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and conflicts in Sudan, demonstrate that secession rarely occurs without triggering ethnic cleansing, severe refugee crises, and economic collapse.

The Elite-Driven Threat to National Cohesion

In Ethiopia, where elites have politically instrumentalized ethnic identities, Article 39 does not serve as a genuine tool of liberation. Instead, invoking secession betrays the promise of a shared destiny, reducing a nation of 130 million to fractured, perpetually unstable fiefdoms. Given Ethiopia’s sheer scale and interdependence, secession would irrevocably shatter established trade networks, disrupt vital supply chains crucial for agriculture and manufacturing, and inevitably ignite resource conflicts over shared water bodies, ports, and critical infrastructure.

This pursuit of separation does not indicate democratic progress; it represents an abdication of democratic principles, forsaking dialogue, compromise, and reform within a united structure for the chaos inherent in territorial separation. Political elites, trapped in their self-imposed straitjacket of self-determination, continue to champion secessionist rhetoric without substantive justification, treating it more as a belief rather than a political theory. 

Ethiopia’s resilience can be attributed to the top-down enforcement of ethnic politics, which has permeated social consciousness without genuine grassroots support. The true motivation for secession is often found among the political elite rather than the broader public, which has undoubtedly contributed to preventing national disintegration.

Reclaiming Unity Through Inclusive Governance

Ordinary Ethiopians, bound by centuries of intermarriage, commerce, cultural exchange, and adaptation through continuous contact, have developed multilingualism across the nation, and their shared history largely rejects this engineered division. Their aspiration is for a cohesive, unified nation in which complex problems are resolved through inclusive governance and political dialogue, rather than territorial amputation.

While a theoretical argument exists for secession as an ultimate extension of democratic self-determination, particularly for oppressed minorities in multinational states, this argument fails to hold in Ethiopia. Here, claims for separation are often elite-driven manipulations rather than authentic demands for liberation stemming from the majority of the population. Genuine self-determination is best achieved within a robust federal system that safeguards cultural freedom, ensures equitable political representation, and delivers economic justice without disrupting the state’s territorial integrity.

Embracing secession under Article 39 would invite violence, precipitate economic ruin, and erode the democratic ethos of negotiation and mutual accommodation that has sustained Ethiopia through numerous epochs.

By repealing Article 39 and re-emphasizing indivisibility and shared citizenship, policymakers can honor the grassroots desire for unity rather than succumb to a political elite’s dangerous escape hatch. This fundamental constitutional shift is necessary to ensure that Ethiopia’s rich diversity strengthens the nation rather than splinters it.

In essence, the FDRE Constitution, particularly in its Preamble and Article 39, is better understood as a pact among sovereign ethnic polities than as the constitution of a unified Ethiopian nation. By decentralizing sovereignty to “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” and omitting any affirmation of Ethiopia’s indivisibility, shared national identity, or historical continuity, it creates a permanent “exit threat” that turns political negotiation into high-stakes conflict and leaves the state perpetually one referendum away from disintegration.

It is called the “Ethiopian Constitution,” yet in its very architecture, it refuses to recognize Ethiopia as a single sovereign nation, offering a catalogue of ethnic sovereignties without ever affirming a unified people, an indivisible state, or a common political home.

6. Conclusion: Vision Affirmed, Path Re-sequenced

“From Ethnos to Demos” constitutes a significant intellectual contribution to Ethiopia’s pursuit of a stable, just, and inclusive political framework. It offers:

• A compelling elucidation of how ethnic federalism, by its very design and practice, perpetuates cycles of conflict and insecurity.
• A comprehensive, comparative, and internally coherent alternative that emphasizes equal citizenship and civic-territorial governance.
• A carefully crafted roadmap that seeks to anticipate risks while prioritizing visible public benefits.

This reflection does not doubt the value of the end goal. Instead, it suggests that the political, security, institutional, and societal challenges that Ethiopia is likely to face, even in the post-authoritarian setting targeted by the proposed plan, may not align with the speed and scope of a straightforward transition. Armed fragmentation, a lack of elite consensus, weak institutional capacity, contested boundaries, a constitutional framework that decentralizes sovereignty to ethnic groups, deeply entrenched ethnic fears, and economic stress all pose significant obstacles to an immediate, wholesale replacement of the constitutional order.

A more pragmatic approach is to conceptualize the civic-territorial framework as a long-term aspiration while developing an intermediate trans-ethnic or hybrid phase that:

• Retains sufficient elements of the existing structures to reassure communities.
• Introduces and assesses civic mechanisms (such as mixed-member proportional representation, municipal empowerment, transparency, and national identification).
• Gradually advances the trust, institutional capacity, and security environment necessary for a comprehensive transition to a demos-based federation.

Any credible roadmap from ethnos to demos must not only delineate institutions and sequencing but also identify the coalition of actors, within the state, society, and the international community, who can legitimately convene, lead, and guarantee the transition. This approach must avoid relegating “the public” to an undifferentiated and unsupported bearer of this historic endeavor. 

At the same time, any transitional leadership must recognize that, in a post‑authoritarian order, final authority rests with the people themselves. If Ethiopia is to move beyond dictatorship into genuine democracy, citizens cannot be treated merely as spectators or symbols; they must be informed, organized, and empowered to make and ratify the decisive constitutional choices that shape their future.

In Ethiopia, this task is further complicated by the fragmentation of opposition forces into ethnic-federalist, civic-federalist, and secessionist projects; forging a minimum common program among these groups is itself a precondition for a successful constitutional refoundation.

In summary, the vision presented is robust; however, the approach requires refinement. The pertinent question for Ethiopia is not whether to transcend ethnos as the organizing principle of the state but rather how to achieve this transition in a manner that is politically viable, socially legitimate, and sensitive to potential conflicts. Amsale’s framework effectively delineates the desired outcome; the current objective is to develop a transitional pathway that Ethiopia can realistically traverse to achieve it.

Final Personal Note:

I wholeheartedly resonate with Amsale’s message of “read on and pass it forward,” emphasizing the importance of not merely consuming ideas but also amplifying, challenging, commenting on, and diversifying them. Crafting an article and sharing it in the digital landscape can sometimes feel like shouting into a bottomless pit, where echoes fade into nothingness. While the situation can be discouraging, it serves as a poignant reminder to persevere with unwavering determination and boundless creativity, as we have only one Ethiopia and its diverse, remarkable people.

From Empty Rhetoric to Concrete Blueprint

The political environment is currently dominated by a curious and frustrating phenomenon: many voices advocate for replacing ethnic federalism with civic administration as a supposed panacea for our national issues, yet these proponents consistently fail to furnish the essential, concrete ideas necessary for such a massive transition. This clamor is often just noise.

The Barren Wasteland of Ideas Meets a Tangible Plan

This is why the contributions of thinkers like Professor Messay Kebede, who has explored trans-ethnic federalism as a related concept, are so significant. However, where most demands for replacing the current system remain vague and abstract, Amsale Woreta provides one of the most comprehensive and insightful blueprints. She offers more than just a general wish for change; she lays out a structure that moves beyond the feckless proposals and slogans we hear in YouTube commentary and pieces.

My initial expectation – that Amsale’s article would prompt a flood of insightful comments and ideas from diverse sources – was mistaken, with all due respect to the individual who provided feedback. A profound, curious contemplation prompted me to explore concepts that may alter my perspective, strengthen Amsale’s plan, or offer alternative implementation methods. A commonly cited criticism is that slogans do not equate to effective strategies.

I am hopeful that we will receive pragmatic and objective proposals from advocates of civic-territorial administration. Based on my observations, the organic nature of the digital platform will likely push this prominent article off the front page in the near future, diminishing its visibility and eventually leading to its obscurity.

A Call for Intellectual Action

This barren terrain demands action. I encourage academics and political leaders to recognize this deficit. Instead of resting on generalized demands, they must actively promote discussion of civic governance, share their perspectives, and illuminate overlooked avenues grounded in our current realities. We demand concrete, implementable ideas to advance. Until then, the majority of the pro-civic governance movement will remain trapped in wishful thinking, empty rhetoric, and irrelevance, devoid of actionable insights.

My position unequivocally supports trans-ethnic federalism as the most realistic transitional framework. This hybrid solution recognizes Ethiopia’s ethnic realities while advancing toward a fully civic model, subject to prevailing on-the-ground circumstances.

The objective of inviting academics, political leaders, and intellectuals to engage in a vigorous discourse on civic governance alternatives is to consolidate efforts rather than disperse them, thereby identifying viable options through thorough debate and subsequently directing our collective energy towards the most feasible and implementable choice in our present context.

Thank you, Amsale, for presenting your excellent article for dialogue. 

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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