
Metta-Alem Sinishaw
Washington, DC
Executive Summary
Ethiopia’s evolution from “Empire to People’s and later Federal Republic” has not resolved the fundamental authoritarian behavior of the state. The symbiotic relations between patrimonial figures and self-serving intellectuals continue to be a major impediment to the “modernization project. ”Despotic leaders recruit opportunist intellectuals to control national narratives and exploit Ethiopian diversity without inclusion as a survival strategy. While intellectuals that stood against power faced persecution or fled the country, some served under coercion for survival. However, most became complicit and offer critical services willfully in return for personal gains. Rarely do they align with regime’s ideology by conviction but justify their support by sugarcoating as service to the nation.
The imperial regime expanded modernization, centralized power, and consolidated state coercive capabilities that undermined regional autonomy. Dergue prioritized sovereignty, undermined political tolerance, and pushed groups towards rebellion. Under the guise of federalism, TPLF reinstituted colonial Italy’s tribalization project, dominated the center, marginalized minorities, and proliferated vertical and horizontal conflicts. Despite initial optimism, Ethiopia under the Oromo-led Prosperity Party (PP) continues grappling with a fiercely contested political, security, economic, and social crisis even today. Successive regimes profess intensive rhetoric about equality, democracy, and federal devolution of power but exhibited more totalitarian tendencies than the ruling elite they despised and replaced.
Neither centralization nor fragmentation ensures stability. The status quo is unsustainable and only a devolution of power and reconciling individual and group rights could lead to salvation. The impending multifaceted crisis calls for alternate political imagination. Despite consensus, however, there is no clarity whether the change would focus on political reform or alter the social structure. Social contradictions without a political adaptation entail perpetual instability. Broader than politics, social change redefines social relationships and resolve enduring political violence. While the objective structural conditions for change are ripe, subjective conditions remain unfulfilled due to lack of shared vision and unified leadership.
PP is unable to resolve the political deadlock singlehandedly and yet rejects oppositions call for transition to circumvent power-sharing, integrate rebel combatants, and constitutional revision. Characterized by fragmentation, unclear policy and organization, shifting alliances, and victimhood mentality, opposition coalitions couldn’t offer alternative vision. Despite substantial leverage, diaspora clashes with domestic realities and remains unable to play midwifery role for a genuine democratization. Its media serves as an alternate source of information in a tightly controlled environment. Yet, except for a few, most platforms entertain only handfuls of disgruntled politicians, radical activists, and disconnected intellectuals.
PP remains functional government, despite opposition’s claim to the contrary. In the face of ineffective diaspora and disorganized opposition, PP will continue rejecting the call for transition against the backdrop of massive insecurity and economic distress that demand new political imagination. If there was organized group with credible national vision that earned public buy-in and diaspora’s support, the international community could have pressurized PP to consider transitional government.
The lack of dominant group among the traditional trio ethnic powerbrokers (Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray) could lead to virulent competition. However, the emergence of Fanno as formidable force, TPLF’s implosion, and power struggle among Oromo elite contributed to the increasing realization of the need for cooperation among belligerent groups, a marked paradigm-shift from decades of horizontal conflicts. Although the motivation could be power grab, coming together brings optimism and courage in search of emancipatory surplus about whether political actors would stay together and work collaboratively to address the political deadlock, beyond immediate power contestation.
PP’s continued rejection of a transitional government limits the option into either a caretaker or a technocratic administration depending on the desire for access to power or structural reform. A caretaker administration likely perpetuates current arrangement, prolongs marginalization of minorities, and proliferates ethnic hostility and undermined national integration. Ethnonationalists are likely to favor a caretaker government to gain expedited access to power within the existing system. Alternatively, a technocratic arrangement would neutralize partisanship, curb identity conflicts, introduce equitable governance structure, empower citizens, and restore state functionality and credibility. Nationalists and other minorities would prefer technocratic administration that will offer equitable governance platform, empower citizens, and engage civil societies.
Dominant ethnic groups could resist technocracy for fear of losing their established hegemony. Ethno nationalists could be apprehensive of the impacts of scientific solutions on cultural homogeneity. As a compromise between nationalist and sub-nationalist demand, partial technocracy with limited priority focuses on security, economic, and legal sectors would help to resolve the political stalemate. The future lies in how and who would better design an inclusive governance structure that responds to the shifting demographic, economic, and technological gaps. Given the current political gridlock, if not technocrats, who else would chart a shared vision and avoid zero sum game in the face of increasing insurgency, diplomatic isolation, and geopolitical adversaries.
The incumbent government has limited legitimacy, and the opposition couldn’t offer alternate vision. Oblivious of the limitations of urban centered “modern state” structure, PP and opposition groups accuse each other of causing disintegration by overlooking centuries old resilient social web that ties Ethiopian society together. Decades of political polarization have weakened indigenous institutions that could have guaranteed national continuity in the unlikely event of state failure. In the absence of a compromise and reconciliation, awaiting the implosion of the ruling party will only complicate Ethiopian future trajectories.
All political actors must acknowledge the structural failure collectively, avoid blaming each other, halt externalizing domestic ills, be remorseful for past wrongdoings, restraint from brinkmanship, and repent for subjecting the Ethiopian people for delayed development and democratization. Genuine dialogue and compromise that recognize collective responsibility for structural breakdown is urgently needed to chart a new political dispensation aiming at resolving the enduring fiasco in governance.
1. Introduction:
Since overthrowing centuries old monarchy, Ethiopia has seen a more malign authoritarian regimes with intermittent political openings. The 1974 revolution has not led to resolution of the fundamentals, but it appeased the peasants via “land to the tiller” proclamation and reformed religious group rights. The military regime prioritized sovereignty and territorial integrity over political tolerance. It engaged in armed conflicts, dismantled nationalist groups, and enabled sub nationalists to seize state power and redefine the state singlehandedly.
Masquerading under the guise of Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) institutionalized colonial Italy’s tribalization project under the pretext of liberating “nations and nationalities” from the inexistant Amhara domination. The ethno-linguistic constitution was more a victor’s prescription than a genuine solution to the “national question.” TPLF’s domination at the center and minorities marginalization in the regions deter transethnic consensus, proliferate vertical and horizontal conflicts and undermine social cohesion.
In 2018, TPLF’s representatives in the Oromo and Amhara regional states forged the ephemeral Oro-Mara (Oromo- Amhara) partnership. Despite common grievances, the alliance lacked shared vision but emerged as formidable tactical front and removed TPLF from power. The commitment to improve governance within democratic Ethiopia remain unaccomplished. Despite initial optimism about the Oromo led Prosperity Party (PP), Ethiopia today continues grappling with a fiercely contested political, security, economic, and social disorders.
Failure to build consensus on whether the ethnic federal arrangement should be preserved, reformed, or revised grew into violent conflicts. PP registered impressive urban beautification and tourism sector development. However, it counters legitimate political grievances with military force, and the dialogue commission is unable to end the insurgencies nor attract major political actors. Expanding insurgencies diminish its tax base and monopoly on the legal use of force.
This paper attempts to highlight the dominant national challenges, manifestations, and survival strategies. It then assesses whether objective and subjective situations are ripe for change. After reviewing emerging trends, it explores what kind of intermediary arrangement and leadership would transform Ethiopia. Finally, the paper attempts to search for emancipatory surplus by examining the causes of the emerging trends and reviewing the possible reactions of major political groups towards alternative imagination.
2. Major National Predicament and Manifestation
The symbiosis between authoritarian figures and opportunistic intellectuals is the major detriment to Ethiopia’s modernization project. Authoritarian regimes seek political absolutism through patrimonial arrangement by exploiting the services of opportunistic intellectuals in return for elevated social status or personal advancement.
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In terms of international diplomacy, the late Emperor was a giant in it. Even in domestic diplomacy, he rates way ahead of them. In his times, the youth was streaming into the capital in greater numbers than joining the secessionists. These three don’t even come close. They are not even qualified to tie his bootstraps. The two that followed him were followers of the demonic philosophy of Marx, Lenin and Mao. The current one, on many occasions, he looks and sounds to me that he is confused by his own philosophy. But there is one stark similarity between the one that toppled and murdered the Emperor and the current Prime Minister. Both were targets of assassination attempts. That is not good. Who is he the one that will come next? May be Minnesota? I will leave it at that.