Surafel Getahun
The Red Sea is not merely a body of water; it is a corridor of power, a cradle of civilization, and a modern-day geopolitical arena where the fates of nations are intertwined. For landlocked Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation, the azure waters of the Red Sea represent an existential economic imperative and a historical right that was severed three decades ago. At the heart of this national longing lies the port of Assab—a name that evokes deep historical memory, political contention, and a burning aspiration for renewed access to the world’s trade routes. This article delves into the complex rivalry unfolding in the Red Sea, examines Ethiopia’s legitimate historical claims to maritime access, and analyzes the high-wire act of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s strategy to navigate both external pressures and domestic challenges.
The Red Sea: A Geopolitical Crucible Reborn
The strategic importance of the Red Sea has skyrocketed in the 21st century. It is the gateway to the Suez Canal, a chokepoint for global energy shipments, and a front line in the competition for influence among Middle Eastern and global powers.
· Gulf Rivalries Spill Over: The feud between Saudi Arabia (and its allies like Egypt and the UAE) and Iran (and its partners) is played out in the waters and ports of Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia. Military bases, port investments, and political alliances are the currencies of this rivalry.
· The Horn of Africa as a Battleground: Nations like the UAE and Turkey have established significant military facilities in Eritrea, Somaliland, and Somalia, respectively. This militarization turns the Horn into an extension of Gulf security politics, forcing regional nations to navigate a complex web of allegiances.
· The Djibouti Anomaly: Tiny Djibouti has become a powerhouse of military basing, hosting troops from the US, China, France, Italy, and Japan. This concentration of foreign forces underscores the region’s critical value but also creates a dependency for landlocked Ethiopia, which relies on Djibouti for over 95% of its trade, paying over $1.5 billion annually in port fees.
This volatile context is the backdrop against which Ethiopia’s quest for a port must be understood. Its landlocked status is not just an inconvenience; it is a severe strategic vulnerability in a turbulent neighborhood.
Ethiopia’s Historical and Legal Claim: The Case for Assab
The argument that Ethiopia’s quest for Assab is a newfound expansionist desire is a profound misreading of history. Ethiopia’s connection to the Red Sea coast is ancient and integral to its identity as a state.
- A Maritime Empire: Historically, the Ethiopian Empire (Abyssinia) extended to the Red Sea coast. Ports like Massawa and Assab were integral to its trade and interaction with the wider world. The Kingdom of Aksum was a naval power that controlled trade routes across the Red Sea.
- The Legacy of Assab: The modern port of Assab’s development is inextricably linked to Ethiopia. Italy first used it as a coaling station but its major expansion and modernization occurred specifically to serve as Ethiopia’s primary port after the federation with Eritrea in 1952 and following its full integration. For decades, Assab was Ethiopia’s lifeline, handling the vast majority of its fuel imports and general cargo. Industries were built around it, and infrastructure led from it into the Ethiopian heartland.
- The 1993 Severance: A Historical Anomaly: Ethiopia’s loss of its coastline was not the result of a prolonged, natural political divorce but a sudden amputation during a period of extreme internal fragility. As you correctly pointed out, the secession of Eritrea in 1993 was orchestrated by the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) and the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front), which controlled the Ethiopian government at the time. This was a decision made by a specific political faction during a unique transitional period, not a decision reflecting the will of the Ethiopian people across generations. Many Ethiopians view this as a relinquishment of sovereign territory by a government that did not have a holistic national mandate, making the current state of landlockedness an illegitimate and unsustainable condition imposed upon them.
Therefore, Ethiopia’s claim on Assab is not about annexing another nation’s sovereign land in a modern context, but about rectifying what is widely perceived within the country as a historical injustice that crippled its economic and strategic potential.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Gambit: National Mobilization or Strategic Diversion?
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has placed the issue of sea access at the very center of his national agenda. His speeches have been unequivocal: Ethiopia’s lack of a port is an existential threat that must be solved through peaceful means, but solved nonetheless. This has led to intense speculation about his motivations.
The Argument for Legitimate National Strategy:
Abiy is articulating a fundamental national security and economic interest.He is leveraging a powerful, unifying national sentiment to build a strong negotiating position. By mobilizing public opinion, he signals to Eritrea and the international community that Ethiopia’s demand is serious, non-negotiable, and backed by 130 million people. This creates pressure for a negotiated solution, potentially involving long-term lease agreements, shared ownership, or special economic zones in Assab, much like the deal recently secured with Somaliland for Berbera. From this perspective, it is not a diversion but the execution of a core national mission.
The Argument for Domestic Diversion:
Conversely,critics and analysts argue that the intense focus on Assab serves a crucial domestic purpose for Abiy. Ethiopia faces immense internal challenges: severe economic pressures including high inflation and foreign currency shortages, lingering ethnic conflicts, and political fragmentation. By rallying the nation around a common, external, and historically emotional cause like sea access, Abiy can:
1. Foster National Unity: Transcend deep ethnic and political divisions by creating a unifying “us vs. the world” narrative.
2. Divert Attention: Shift public discourse away from intractable domestic problems like the cost of living, unemployment, and internal security towards an external goal.
3. Consolidate Power: A nationalistic mobilization can strengthen the government’s mandate and position Abiy as a strong leader defending Ethiopia’s interests on the world stage.
The reality likely lies in the middle. Abiy’s aspiration for a port is undoubtedly genuine and rooted in sound strategy. However, the timing and rhetoric are undoubtedly also calculated to harness nationalistic fervor to bolster his position at a time of significant domestic fragility.
Implications and The Path Forward
A forceful Ethiopian push for Assab has monumental implications.
- ·For Eritrea: President Isaias Afwerki views sovereignty as sacrosanct. Any perceived threat to Eritrean territory, especially one tied to its hard-won independence, would be met with fierce resistance, potentially destabilizing the entire region.
- For Regional Stability: It could shatter the fragile peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, redraw alliance structures, and draw in Gulf and other international powers, choosing sides in a new conflict.
- For Ethiopia: While achieving access would be an economic game-changer, a failed aggressive push could lead to international isolation, war, and further economic hardship.
The only viable path is a negotiated, diplomatic solution that acknowledges Ethiopia’s legitimate economic needs while respecting Eritrea’s sovereignty. This could involve:
- A long-term lease agreement for a dedicated terminal in Assab.
- A special administrative status for Ethiopia’s use of the port, with shared customs and security.
- Significant Ethiopian investment in modernizing Assab’s infrastructure, making it a win-win economic proposition for both nations.
Conclusion
The geopolitics of the Red Sea are a tangled web of historical grievance, present-day ambition, and great power competition. Ethiopia’s claim to the port of Assab is not a fleeting whim but a demand rooted in deep history and contemporary economic necessity. While the actions of the TPLF and EPLF in 1993 created the current reality, it is a reality that Ethiopia, under Abiy Ahmed, has declared it can no longer accept.
Whether Abiy’s mobilization is a masterstroke of nationalist diplomacy or a calculated diversion from domestic turmoil, it has irrevocably placed the issue on the table. The future of the Horn of Africa now hinges on whether this immense pressure can be channeled into a creative, peaceful, and mutually beneficial solution, or whether it will become the catalyst for the next great conflict in this perpetually volatile region. The world must recognize the legitimacy of Ethiopia’s quest while urgently working to ensure the answer is found at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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1). No Quid Pro Quo for Aseb/Affar: Affar/Aseb has never been part of Eritrea let alone “Eritrea’s Sovereign Territory.” Would you reward Mercenary Bandits for robbing you?
2). Affar [Massawa to Djibouti Red Sea Coast]: Affar is Ethiopia’s Affars’ ancestral land with Asèb & Sèmèrä as alternate capitals. Hence, Affar is Ethiopia’s Land & Sea Coast. It was annexed by Eritrea when EPLF & TPLF invaded-and-occupied Ethiopia in 1991.
3). Alsace-Lorraine [France] vs. Eritrea [Ethiopia]: Germany occupied France’s Alsace-Lorraine twice and returned it twice [≈1918 & ≈1945]. Eritrea was Ethiopia’s land taken by Italy during the First Italo-Ethiopian War (≈1896) and occupied till ≈1945.
When WW-II ended [≈1945], the Italian Command in Eritrea surrendered to the British [Allies] and handed Eritrea over to the British. Why didn’t the British return Eritrea to Ethiopia as the Allied Command in Europe returned Alsace-Lorraine to France?
4). Eritrea & Peace: That’s Oxymoron! No sooner had Eritrea declared its ‘independence’ than invaded Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen [Hanish Islands]. Egypt’s mission for Eritrea’s EPLF/ELF/etc. is to destabilize Ethiopia directly or via proxies, NOT PEACE!
5). Business with Eritrea: How many bitter lessons do we want Eritrea to teach Ethiopia? In 1998, Eritrea took millions of dollars worth of import-export merchandise at Aseb & Massawa. Just recently, Ethiopian Airlines was robbed of millions in cash and property.
6). Abiy & His Motives: To me, Abiy is an Ethiopian Patriot trying to make a difference in Ethiopians’ lives. He is a Nobel Prize millionaire who has had better options than leading Troubled & Turbulent Ethiopia. He is an Ethiopian Patriot to be proud of.