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By Addissu Admas
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (CFDRE) came into “full force and effect” on the 21st day of August 1995. That was almost exactly 30 years ago. Has it delivered on the expectations of the Ethiopian people? I am sure that many are those who would say that it has, and perhaps many others too who may argue that it has not since it has not been implemented as it should. I don’t think I am in the minority in saying that it has not satisfied the expectations of the majority, since it appears clearly that it has made things worse as I will explain in this piece. I will also argue that it is well past-due to either profoundly rework it, or better yet to draft a new one.
What did we expect the CFDRE to accomplish in the first place? It was designed to 1) resolve the question of self-determination with all its attendant issues 2) decentralize political power as much as possible 3) effectively eliminate the causes for all irredentist rebellions 4) rid Ethiopia of exclusionary politics 5) establish the foundation of democracy and democratic culture. These, I consider to be the most important. But I am sure that one can very well think of other ones too.
(1) Can anyone claim in good faith that the CFDRE has accomplished any one of these objectives, let alone some or all of them? Unless we engage in forced interpretation, I doubt that it has accomplished any single one of our long-held expectations. The fact that it has failed is not entirely due to lack of goodwill and commitment on the part of past and present regimes. It has far more to do with its inherent limitations as any constitutional law scholar would know.
The fact that the country is divided into territories that correspond with ethnic and linguistic areas was destined to fail from the outset since it would have been impossible to divide the country in at least 80 separate enclaves, each corresponding with an ethnicity or linguistic territories. The Constitution, as we know, recognized initially only 9 states or regions and one chartered city (Addis Ababa). No rationale, clause or gloss was provided why these and no other ethnic enclave qualified as a state, region or Killil. It only left provisions how other ethnic enclaves could, if they wish to, become a region or Killil. As we have witnessed, the process of becoming a Killil has not been as transparent as one would expect. On the contrary, it was in full display how arbitrary and capricious it had been. In their infinite wisdom, the drafters of the Constitution decided to gather the smaller minorities, numbering some 50 of them, into one Killil while ignoring others that have their historic homeland in the midst of larger ethnic enclaves, leaving them thus at the mercy of their larger hosts. This in and of itself has created a lot of tension and conflicts. It remains a fact that it is impossible to “contain” neatly an ethnic group within a delimited geographic territory. The complexity of Ethiopia’s ethnic composition still requires a different arrangement.
If states, regions or Killils, however one wants to call them, become de facto autonomous nations, not only in terms of administering themselves politically, but also managing their own economic resources, how exactly would the smaller minorities having very limited resources are expected to survive and function? It remains rather nebulous how the economy is run in our kind of ethnic federalism where so much tension and conflicts remain pervasive, and the guiding economic ideology remains inscrutable as ever.
The ethnic arrangement ushered by the Constitution has in fact brought to the surface the ethnic animus that had remained just under the surface before the Woyane regime. Let’s be clear, it is one thing to declare that every ethnicity, large or small, has equal rights as any other in Ethiopia, and a very different proposition conducting a politics of grievance which has no other objective than sustaining the politics of “divide and rule”. The sad fact is that the Constitution has been implemented more with the divisive spirit of the Woyane regime than with the projected emancipation of marginalized minorities. Today, perhaps as never before, Ethiopians of various ethnicities live in uneasy interaction with one another if not in open hostility towards each other. Consider simply the campaign of ethnic cleansing that has been conducted and continues to be conducted overtly or in secret in every major region of the country.
What we see more and more before us is the steady diminution of our shared identity as Ethiopians. In fact, the larger ethnicities, with perhaps a qualified exception of the Amhara people, are not averse to thinking to “go it alone”. How or what benefit this would bring is not something that they appear to have thought through. Naturally, the smaller ethnicities which have much to lose from Ethiopia’s disintegration appear to be the only ones determined to preserve the unity and integrity of Ethiopia.
(2) Even though in theory the ethno-federalism envisioned by the Constitution has for objective the decentralization of political power, the reality is that it did not achieve it because of its internal contradictions. In principle, power should be devolving from the Killils to the center, i.e. the Federal Government. However, how the Constitution has been designed and written, the center has the ultimate say in every aspect of governance. Not only are policies, plans and decisions flowing regularly from the center to the regions, but an important reason for which the Constitution was designed, i.e. the decentralization of power, never took place. What we have today is the same old autocratic rule that we have known under the Emperor, Mengistu H. Mariam and Meles Zenawi, only under different garbs. In fact, PM Abiy does not seem to feel a twinge in retelling his mother’s prophecy that he would one day become a king. A leader with democratic sensibilities would have never retold such a story even if it were true, not even in jest. That he can even entertain such an idea is indicative how far we are from having seriously begun a democratic culture. As long as the PM office holds the powers of a king that had been bestowed upon it, we will forever continue to live under autocratic rule, or the constant danger of relapsing into one.
(3) One of the immediate effects that was expected from the CFDRE was the cessation of irredentist conflicts. This would have logically ensued because the fundamental demands of ethnic based armed parties would have in theory been met by the CFDRE. However, all the major liberation fronts, like the OLF and the ONLF, never ceased, except for a very short spell, their organized fights. The EPRDF, let’s not forget it, was not, at least initially and for a long time, a veritable coalition of political parties independently formed. It was essentially a coalition of parties created by the TPLF itself to garner some legitimacy which it would otherwise have never gained on its own. In fact, the coalition parties were essentially clones of the TPLF imposed upon every ethnic group. They became the most efficient tools for the implementation of TPLF’s divisive and crippling policies. The Prosperity Party (PP) has not shown very much originality in its structure and modus operandi. In fact, it has replicated much of the TPLF’s structure and governing style. It has in fact shown even less commitment to implementing the federalist aspect of the Constitution.
Today, Ethiopia is riddled with far more conflicts than ever. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that we have never come this close to disintegration. Whether Ethiopia will cease to exist or not will, ironically, depend more on the center than the regions (Killils) coming together. The Constitution, incongruously I may add, allows “the right to secession” unlike any other ethnic federalist constitution. If every region were to decide to implement this right, there won’t be a country called Ethiopia anymore. The provision may have been put there with the presumption that the majority would never take a) such an option b) the process for seceding is too arduous and time consuming to tempt anyone c) It would be very hard for a region to have the majority needed in the referendum. Besides these, there is not a single Killil or region that has the economic resources to become by itself a viable independent country.
So far, it appears that what is holding Ethiopia together is not the Constitution, but a vast military apparatus and the hope that somehow and somewhere down the line we will come to a form of coexistence without mutual destruction. What we have witnessed so far is not only the very poor implementation of the CFDRE, but how it remains inadequate in addressing the foundational needs of the country and its peoples.
(4) In a specifically ethnic federalist constitution, one would expect the end of ethnic based armed or unarmed parties since all the demands of self-determination would be addressed in it. Yet, from the beginning, we have witnessed the rampant proliferation of ethnic-based parties rather than the emergence of ideologically formed national parties. Even though this was not the intention of the Constitution, it was encouraged by the very party that was responsible not only for its drafting, but also for its implementation. It would seem logical to anyone that an ethnic federalism would have put an end to every and all ethnic parties because all the reasons at the source of their creation would have simply been addressed by an ethnic federalist constitution. Yet they not only persisted but multiplied like never before! Indeed, they have become the premier conduit of grievances, hostility and hatred.
A side effect of ethno-federalist politics is the emergence of the notion of Teregnanet. Even though it is only recently that the word has come into common use with a specific meaning, the idea it contains has been around since the early days of the TPLF regime. What Teregnanet means is that Ethiopia cannot be ruled co-equally by all who claim her citizenship, but only by members of the “greater majoritarian peoples”, such as the Amhara, Tigrean and Oromo peoples, alternatingly. The presumption is that if Ethiopia is to remain one and viable, one of these and not all together should be the dominating power of the federal government. The idea would not have been so repugnant if the word implied a kind of historical covenant accepted by all Ethiopia’s peoples, and if the majoritarian ethnicity assumed their historic responsibility with fairness and justice. But on the contrary, it has been a rationale for legitimizing and justifying the abuses and corruption that the present and previous regimes have committed and continue to commit. In the name of Teregnanet, the dominating ethnicity would be allowed to allocate the highest positions in the bureaucracy, military and all access to economic resources to its members. The other ethnicities would have to make do with the crumbs falling from the masters’ table. This is indeed the full realization of tribalist rule. Obviously, the politics of Teregnanet is not sanctioned by the Constitution. However, by recognizing the statehood of some ethnic enclaves and not of others, by de facto subordinating the needs of the smaller minorities to the demands of the larger ones, the Constitution has effectively endorsed the politics of Teregnanet. Unless we at least amend the inequalities baked into it, this will remain the reality in Ethiopia.
(5) Why is democracy virtually impossible under the CFDRE? By its very structure, ethno-federalism does not allow a balanced power sharing. There will always be unequal power relations not only between the federal and regional governments, but more frequently between the majoritarian and minoritarian ethnic groups. This in and by itself precludes the possibility for democracy to exist and function effectively. Despite its grandiose title, the CFDRE has made it nearly impossible for democracy to take root in the country not only for the reason already stated, but also for not placing effective guard rails to the very extensive powers of the chief executive of the federal government. We are witnessing today that even in mature democracies an unchecked executive leads inevitably to authoritarian rule. It should come as no surprise that the CFDRE rather than put an end to authoritarian tendencies it has essentially legitimized them.
I am convinced that the present disarray will persist until a conscious and deliberate plan is made to transition to another form of federalism that both fulfills the demands of self-determination and the ideals of genuine democracy.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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