
Eyassu Epheraim G Hanna
London UK 21 August 2025
Preamble
A TikTok video circulating on social media first brought my attention to Professor Messay Kebede’s recent remarks. In that video, he was portrayed as an Amhara, and many were disturbed by his comments about the so called ―Amhara ruling class‖. Whether or not he is ethnically Amhara is not my primary concern. What disturbs me is that his political thought appears less shaped by rigorous academic rationality and more by his own mixed identity. Because he is a native speaker of Amharic, some people have assumed he is Amhara, but in his own interviews, he clarified his background. For me, Ethiopia is best understood as a melting pot of nationalities that produces composite identities like his. Yet individuals such as Kebede, rather than embracing this synthesis, often play the ethnic card and retreat into academic authority to shield their biases.
This problem is evident in his article ―Fano and the New Amhara Nationalism: A Review‖ (September 17, 2024, Analysis & Opinion). And the following his discourse on YouTube channels, such as Mengizem Media ምንጊዜም ሚዲያ: and Buffet of Ideas-የሀሳብ ገበታ. Kebede openly acknowledged that his inspiration came from Meskerem Abera’s paper, ―የአማራ ብሔርተኝነት እና የሀገረ-ኢትዮጵያ መስተጋብር‖ (―Amhara Nationalism and its Interaction with Ethiopianness‖). In his conclusion, he stated: “What might we conclude from this analysis of
the new Amhara nationalism? Obviously, the new nationalism, unlike the position conflating Ethiopianness with Amharaness, does not seek the termination of ethnic federalism.” But should a professor of his seniority simply reproduce the framework of a much younger activist-intellectual and treat it as the definitive interpretation of Amhara nationalism? Meskerem Abera, though an articulate figure, is relatively young and holder of MA in Development Studies from Addis Ababa University at the time of writing and now a political prisoner. Kebede, by contrast, is a seasoned academic in the United States with decades of age and intellectual authority on his side. The point here is not that Meskerem was literally his student, but that the relationship resembles one: in principle, it is the professor who should challenge, critique, and refine the ideas of the younger generation, not uncritically adopt them. By taking Meskerem Abera’s work as the foundation of his thesis, Kebede reverses the academic relationship, diminishing his own authority and reducing his role to that of a follower rather than a guide.
Megersa Gemechu, in his article “A Sugar Coated Poison on Fano’s Amhara Nationalism” (Borkena, November 4, 2024), lamented: “The chronic pain is to hear and read from the Ethiopian elites of the old generations who had the knowledge of the Ethiopian history and reality, but had betrayed the Ethiopian people for selfish motives or otherwise.” While this captures the frustration many feel toward Ethiopia’s older intellectual class, I would argue that Professor Messay Kebede’s motivations appear even more troubling. His interventions are not merely misguided or selfish but reflect a deeper, more insidious intellectual project. In this sense, Kebede is not an isolated case: he is part of a broader cohort of elites who have, over decades, injected venomous ideas into Ethiopia’s political bloodstream. These ideas, dressed in academic language but corrosive in practice, have poisoned national cohesion and perpetuated cycles of ethnic resentment and violence.
To be clear, I have deep respect and admiration for my fellow Ethiopian, Meskerem Abera. In fact, during my time with Ras Media, I had the opportunity to interview her for more than
five hours—one of the longest interviews I have ever conducted. I value her opinions and the personal sacrifices she has made in the struggle for justice, equality, and democracy. However, it is important to recognize that Meskerem Abera’s perspective is not the sole voice representing the Amhara cause. Amhara nationalism, like any political discourse, is shaped by a diversity of voices, experiences, and interpretations. While some—including Meskerem herself—emphasize correcting historical misunderstandings, the Amhara as a people have never abandoned their Ethiopian identity or their commitment to the Ethiopian state.
If Professor Messay Kebede assumes that Meskerem Abera’s discourse aligns with his own divisive and deeply problematic prescriptions, then he gravely misreads both her intent and the broader reality. Rather than appropriating her work to validate his sinister arguments, he would do better to revisit and critically examine his own ideas.
Introduction
Education and intellectual leadership are often seen as drivers of progress and enlightenment. Yet, as Thomas Sowell (2009) argues in Intellectuals and Society, intellectuals can also be powerful forces of destruction. Their ideas—when detached from accountability, reality, and lived consequences—can devastate nations. Ethiopia is a striking case where so-called intellectuals, from the radical student movement of the 1960s–70s to diaspora academics today, have contributed more to fragmentation than to unity or development. This essay applies Sowell’s critique to the Ethiopian context, showing how eloquent but untested theories undermined Ethiopia’s political, social, and economic fabric.
Sowell’s Critique of Intellectuals
Sowell distinguishes intellectuals from other professionals in one crucial way: they are rewarded not for the real-world success of their ideas, but for their originality and verbal virtuosity. They operate in insulated environments—universities, journals, politics—where they rarely bear the consequences of their prescriptions. This produces three dangers:
1. Ideas without responsibility – Intellectuals propose, but others suffer the consequences (Sowell, 2009).
2. The presumption of knowledge – Intellectuals assume they know better than traditions, institutions, or ordinary people.
3. Moral superiority complex – They cloak destructive ideologies in the language of justice.
These dynamics have been observed in various historical contexts, from French intellectuals during World War II to the ideological justifications of totalitarian regimes. In Ethiopia, they manifested vividly in the radical student movement and beyond.
Answering the So-Called Intellectuals
To critically evaluate such figures, Sowell’s framework offers clear criteria:
∙ Accountability Test: Have these ideas improved Ethiopia’s unity, prosperity, and stability? The historical record suggests the opposite.
∙ Reality Test: Where have similar models (ethnic federalism, Marxism) succeeded elsewhere? Comparative history shows they have consistently failed.
∙ Unity Test: Do these theories unite Ethiopians or divide them further? Division has been the dominant outcome.
∙ Consequences Test: Who bears the cost—the intellectual, or the ordinary Ethiopian villager? Clearly, it is the latter.
By these measures, Ethiopia’s so-called intellectuals fail the test of genuine intellectual responsibility.
The Radical Student Movement: Wallelign Mekonnen
Wallelign Mekonnen, a 21-year-old student at Haile Selassie I University, wrote the famous essay On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia (1969). His Marxist-inspired text argued that Ethiopia was a ―prison-house of nations‖ and called for radical restructuring along ethnic lines. Though little more than a youthful polemic, it became the intellectual seed of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism (Bahru Zewde, 2014). Sowell would identify this as the hubris of untested theories—a student essay elevated into a national constitutional framework decades later. The result was not liberation but enduring division.
Meles Zenawi and the Codification of Ethnic Federalism
Meles Zenawi, a former medical student who abandoned his studies to join the armed struggle, later codified Wallelign’s vision into Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution. This document formalized ethnicity as the foundation of politics, even granting secession rights to regions (Vaughan, 2003). Sowell would classify this as the epitome of intellectual irresponsibility: a radical theory applied wholesale to millions of lives without regard for historical complexity or practical consequences. The outcomes—ethnic wars, disintegration, and fragile governance—illustrate what Sowell described as the gulf between the eloquence of theory and the devastation of practice.
Contemporary Intellectuals: Perpetuating Division
Even today, academics in the diaspora, such as Professor Messay Kebede, recycle similar frameworks. Instead of reassessing Ethiopia’s failures, they continue to validate divisive ideologies in the name of intellectual rigor. This is particularly troubling given that Professor Kebede has lived through the consequences of Wallelign Mekonnen’s youthful essay and Meles Zenawi’s ethnic federalist experiment. The Amhara genocide, recurring ethnic conflicts, and the devastating civil war in Tigray—which is estimated to have cost over 600,000 lives—are not abstract historical debates but lived national tragedies. For an academic of his stature, having witnessed such consequences over half a century, to still advance theories rooted in Wallelign’s polemics raises questions about intellectual responsibility, academic integrity, and even the capacity to acknowledge reality at this stage of life.
This problem is evident in his recent appearance on a YouTube discussion titled “አሳዳጊ አልባ ኢትዮጵያዊነት እና መጪው ጊዜ፣ ‘አዲሱ የአማራ ብሔርተኝነት‘” Buffet of Ideas-የሀሳብ ገበታ Youtube. Where he is unashamedly reflects a narrow definition of Ethiopian identity. He argues that there was Amhara domination through language, culture, and religion. Yet as a highly regarded intellectual, he fails to grasp the complexity of nation-building. Otto von Bismarck is famously remembered for saying that nations were built through ―blood and iron,‖ and certainly not by endlessly re-litigating cultural dominance. Two centuries ago Ethiopia lacked the institutions to build a democratic nation; today, instead of helping to build one, Messay Kebede turns his back on Ethiopia’s potential and spreads political venom among the youth, perpetuating ethnic division, conflict, and even genocide.
Even more troubling is Kebede’s misunderstanding of his own ethnic background. He has publicly stated that his father is Gurage—an ethnic group linguistically and culturally connected to Amhara and Tigray—and his mother is Oromo. Social anthropology studies indicate that Gurage and Amhara communities are historically intertwined, through culture, lineage, and intermarriage. For instance, even Emperor Haile Selassie himself had Gurage
lineage. When Professor Kebede speaks of ―Amhara domination,‖ he inadvertently speaks of his own composite identity, yet denies it. This reveals a deeper problem: pseudo intellectualism that disregards historical complexity in favour of simplistic narratives. Such distortions do not clarify Ethiopia’s challenges; they inflame them.
Equally contradictory are his proposed solutions. In the same discussion, Kebede declared that Ethiopia’s problem could be solved by a renewed Ethiopianism, yet simultaneously claimed that no one can truly be organized under an Ethiopian umbrella. Instead, he insisted that people could only organize along their respective ethnic identities. This is an inherently self-defeating argument: if Ethiopianism is the solution, it cannot at the same time be declared impossible.
Moreover, Kebede’s own linguistic and cultural background undermines his claim. He speaks either his mother’s or his father’s tongue—Oromo or Gurage—yet by his own framework he could not be fully accepted in either group as a political actor. This contradiction exposes the fragility of his ethno-centric prescriptions.
Even more troubling is his analogy of ethnic relations to nuclear deterrence. He suggested that Ethiopia’s ethnic groups should relate to one another as the USA and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War—through Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). According to this logic, each ethnic group must arm itself to secure respect and peaceful coexistence. Such a vision, however, is both impractical and destructive. While the United States Constitution does enshrine the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment (1791), this principle was grounded in democratic state-building and civic republicanism—not ethnic separatism. To advocate arming each ethnic group as the foundation of mutual respect is to promote perpetual instability, more akin to the collapse of Somalia than the federalist stability of the United States.
These contradictions—invoking Ethiopianism while rejecting its possibility, calling for mutual respect while advocating ethnic armament—illustrate what can only be described as pseudo-intellectual confusion. Rather than contributing to solutions, such arguments risk normalizing division, militarization, and eventual state failure.
As a renowned academician, Professor Kebede should be expected to offer long-lasting, constructive solutions. Instead, he borrows indirectly from Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of suffering, will to power, and overcoming adversity, but distorts it into a nihilistic prescription for Ethiopians to arm themselves and fight until they supposedly learn through destruction. Nietzsche emphasized struggle as a means of personal and cultural growth, not as an excuse for mutual annihilation. To reinterpret such thought as a justification for ethnic warfare is reckless.
Kebede’s suggestion resembles the dangerous realpolitik voiced by figures such as Donald Trump in discussions of the Ukraine–Russia war. In 2025, Trump argued that ―sometimes you’re better off letting them fight for a while and then pulling them apart‖ (The Guardian, 2025). Yet even Trump ultimately acknowledged that peace, not protracted conflict, was the only sustainable solution. For a university professor in the United States—who benefits from democratic stability and prosperity—to advocate a ―fight it out‖ approach for Ethiopia is both dangerous and irresponsible. Such remarks from someone in his position reveal not intellectual courage but intellectual recklessness.
True intellectual responsibility lies not in producing eloquent theories, but in ensuring that ideas serve the people and unite the nation. Ethiopia does not need more theories of disintegration; it needs practical wisdom rooted in unity, accountability, and the lived realities of its people
Sowell (2009) would call this the insulation from feedback: professors abroad face no consequences for repeating theories that tear Ethiopia apart, while ordinary Ethiopians pay the price in poverty, displacement, and war.
Conclusion
Ethiopia’s intellectual history illustrates Sowell’s warning: when intellectuals are rewarded for eloquence rather than outcomes, they become dangerous. Wallelign’s student essay, Meles Zenawi’s ethnic federalism, and today have recycled diaspora theories all share one trait: they prioritize ideology over unity, and theory over lived reality. Ethiopia does not need more ―eloquent disintegration.‖ It requires intellectuals who embrace accountability, respect history, and commit to unity and practical wisdom. True intellectual responsibility, as Sowell reminds us, lies not in dividing a nation, but in contributing to its healing.
References
∙ Bahru Zewde. (2014). The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960–1974. James Currey.
∙ Sowell, T. (2009). Intellectuals and Society.
∙ Vaughan, S. (2003). Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia. University of Edinburgh.
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Dear Eyassu Epheraim G Hanna,
You’ve rendered your argument almost worthless as a result of focusing on the professor’s ethnicity and academic training rather than debating his ideas. Now you have to out yourself (voluntarily, of course)–if you are of a mixed identity or simply “pure” Amhara (or “pure” Oromo), what you do for a living, your age, and where you reside (apparently, outside the homeland). Before you scribble your next article I suggest you read other books in addition to Sowell’s Intellectuals and Society. Otherwise, someone could accuse you of recycling single source ideas and applying it to an individual where Sowell failed to make distinctions between intellectuals and intelligentsia. Btw, I like very much the precision of your two paragraph comments on Wallelign Mekonnen and Meles Zenawi.