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Facing Dangerous Partnerships: The Strategic Challenge of Amhara and Fano in Ethiopia’s Shifting Conflict 

Amsal Woreta- August 15,2025 

Summary 

Since the federal decision in April 2023 to dismantle regional special forces and centralize security, Ethiopia has entered a renewed cycle of conflict, most acutely in Amhara where Fano militias have fought federal forces. Meanwhile, formerly antagonistic actors—including Oromo nationalist networks linked to Qeerroo mobilization and elements of the TPLF—now float tactical partnerships with Amhara groups to oppose Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Drawing on alliance formation theory, conflict theory, and transitional justice, this paper evaluates (1) historical precedents of Ethiopian opposition alliances; (2) the risks embedded in today’s proposed coalitions; and (3) comparative lessons from Afghanistan and Libya. It concludes with policy safeguards for the Amhara/Fano movement: accountability-first pacts, clearly negotiated governance principles, enforceable alliance terms, and independent capacity-building.  

1. Introduction 

In April 2023, the Ethiopian federal government announced it would dismantle regional special forces and fold them into national security structures. The move sparked gunfire and protests in Amhara and accelerated clashes with Fano beginning August 2023. Human Rights Watch has since documented abuses in the Amhara conflict, including attacks on health care by government forces, underscoring the war’s civilian cost.  

Against this backdrop, a striking realignment is underway. Influential Oromo figures once associated with Qeerroo mobilization have pivoted from confrontation with Amhara groups to signaling tactical cooperation against Abiy’s rule; some TPLF elements express similar openness. Yet Ethiopia’s own history warns that anti-regime coalitions often fracture once the common enemy is weakened. This paper asks: under what conditions—if any—can such alliances serve Amhara security and Ethiopia’s stability rather than reproduce the cycle of betrayal and renewed conflict?

Fano Strategic Challenge

2. Theoretical Framework 

2.1 Alliance Formation Theory 

Stephen Walt’s balance of threat argues that alliances cohere not simply against power but against perceived threat (capabilities, proximity, and intentions). Glenn Snyder’s Alliance Politics adds that alliance durability depends on credible commitments, bargaining equilibria, and management of intra-coalition fears of entrapment/abandonment. These insights predict instability in coalitions built on narrow, short-term convergence without institutionalized safeguards. 

2.2 Conflict Theory & Transitional Justice 

Conflict theory anticipates elite instrumentalization of identity cleavages under competitive stress. Transitional justice—particularly restorative justice models as demonstrated in South Africa’s TRC—offers mechanisms (truth-telling, acknowledgment, limited amnesty tied to disclosure, reparations) to rebuild trust and prevent recurrence, though critics warn against overreliance without material redress.  

3. Ethiopian Precedent: Opposition Alliances, 1974–1991 

During the anti-Derg struggle, the TPLF, EPLF, OLF, and ONLF coordinated militarily to remove Mengistu. The coalition rapidly unraveled post-1991; TPLF dominance within the EPRDF institutionalized ethnic federalism, which reshaped political competition around ethnic parties and deepened zero-sum dynamics. 

For Amhara communities, this translated into cycles of marginalization and vulnerability under an identity-federal architecture. Two generalizable lessons emerge: (1) No shared governance blueprint = post-victory fragmentation; (2) Unaddressed wartime abuses corrode trust.  

4. The TPLF Manifesto Ethnic Federalism, and How the “Amhara Enemy” Idea Was Built 

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) left a lasting mark on Ethiopia’s political structure after 1991 through its ideological framework. The TPLF Manifesto of 1976 shaped by MarxistLeninist revolutionary ideas and influenced by Western colonial ethnography, labeled the Amhara as a “colonial oppressor nation” within Ethiopia. This idea did not serve as a random argument; instead, it formed the main basis for the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution’s federal system. This is seen in Article 39, which gives “nations, nationalities, and peoples” the absolute right to secede. 

This constitutional system did more than shift power to smaller levels of government. It cemented the idea that ethnic identity, not shared civic identity, was the key measure of political legitimacy. In the story told by the TPLF, the Amhara were portrayed as the long-standing enemy of all other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. This perspective echoed tactics used during colonial times to divide and rule, which focused on pointing out a “main oppressor” to justify breaking apart multiethnic nations. 

4.1 How Colonial Ideas Shaped the Notion of the Enemy 

Researchers have shown that anti-Amhara ideas during the early days of the TPLF borrowed themes from Western colonial anthropology. These writings often described Ethiopia’s centralized rule as “Amhara imperialism” dominating other “oppressed nations.” The TPLF used these colonial concepts to justify armed resistance and rally ethno-nationalist allies. This led to a political system that made ethnic competition part of the law and rooted hostility against the Amhara as a key idea in running the country. 

4.2 Effects on Amhara Safety 

The ethnic-based governance introduced under the TPLF-led federal system created conditions for years of horrific violence against Amhara communities. In regions like Oromia and BenishangulGumuz, people faced targeted killings, homes were destroyed, and many were forced to flee. Reports from eyewitnesses and human rights groups describe some of the most horrific acts— babies ripped from their mothers using machetes pregnant women attacked, and elderly individuals burned alive inside their own homes. These acts were not isolated but were often fueled by antiAmhara rhetoric that the TPLF’s ideology had made commonplace. 

4.3 Silence and the Problem of Lost Trust 

Between 2019 and 2025, waves of massacres have taken tens of thousands of Amhara lives. Prominent Oromo political figures, civil society leaders, and activists, some of whom are now seeking alliances with Amhara forces, have refrained from condemning these atrocities. This lack of public outcry during years of ethnic cleansing and mass killings has left lasting wounds in the political memory of the Amhara people. The Fano movement and Amhara leadership recognize a key issue from this history. They see alliances with groups that have neither rejected the antiAmhara ideology nor spoken against the atrocities committed on their basis as risky and questionable. 

4.4 Strategic Meaning to Reflect on Current Alliance Debates 

The constitutional framework from the TPLF era remains in place and functions under the Prosperity Party. This means the political system still relies on ethnic divisions, which in the past supported the narrative labeling Amhara as adversaries. Amhara and Fano face a challenge in forming alliances if there are no clear promises to change both ideology and the constitution. Without such assurances, they risk keeping alive the same system that allowed large-scale violence against them. 

Any approach to alliances must include: 

  • To reject how the TPLF portrays the Amhara as historical enemies 
  • To commit to breaking down the ethnic federalism system that spreads this idea 
  • To recognize and denounce past massacres and atrocities, along with guarantees of justice and reparations 

Without meeting these conditions, history shows tactical alliances might achieve short-term unity or even worse lead to recurring betrayal, violence, and state-led oppression. 

5. Today’s Realignment: Narratives, Actors, and Signals 

5.1 When Two Giants Awakened: The Human Story Behind Ethiopia’s Political Revolution (Oro-Amhara) 

The sound of gunfire echoed through the streets of Gondar as thousands of Amhara protesters faced government forces. Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away in Oromia, farmers watched their ancestral lands being marked for urban expansion. These weren’t just political protests, they were the desperate cries of people who had endured decades of marginalization. What happened next would reshape Ethiopia forever. 

The Weight of Twenty-Seven Years 

For nearly three decades, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had maintained an iron grip on Ethiopian politics through the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. While the coalition ostensibly included representatives from the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern regions, real power flowed from the mountains of Tigray to the halls of Mekelle. 

Picture this: You’re an Oromo farmer whose family has worked the same land for generations, only to wake up one morning to find surveyors marking your fields for “development.” Or imagine being an Amhara intellectual, watching your people’s historical territories transferred to other regions while your voice remains unheard in national politics. This was the daily reality for millions of Ethiopians. 

The ethnic federalism established in 1995 had promised self-governance but instead created a system where one group—comprising less than 6% of the population—controlled the destiny of over 100 million people. The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group at 40% of the population, and the Amhara, representing 25%, found themselves increasingly alienated from their own government. 

The Spark That Lit the Fire 

What started in 2014 as a project labeled “development” turned into a calculated tool for political control. It aimed to change the demographic makeup of the capital and nearby areas all while being presented as urban renewal. In both cases—whether it was the Oromo opposition to the Master Plan or the struggles faced by non-Oromo groups under Prosperity Party rule—urban planning became a method to erase cultures and enforce political power. 

Imagine watching bulldozers approach the graves of your ancestors, knowing that your government views your heritage as an obstacle to “modernization.” 

By 2015, Oromo students began what would become the largest protest movement in Ethiopian history. These weren’t hardened revolutionaries; they were young people who simply wanted their voices heard. University campuses across Oromia erupted as students raised their hands in the “X” gesture, symbolizing their opposition to the master plan and, more broadly, their rejection of TPLF dominance. 

The government’s response was swift and brutal. Security forces opened fire to peaceful protesters, turning university campuses into battlegrounds. Videos of students being shot spread across social media, transforming local grievances into national outrage. Each funeral became a rally, each rally became a protest, and each protest brought more people into the streets. 

When Gondar Rose Up 

The Amhara had watched the Oromo protests with a mixture of sympathy and recognition. They, too, had grievances—the “Wolkait Question” burned in their hearts like an unhealed wound. Wolkait, a district they considered historically Amhara, had been transferred to Tigray, along with its fertile lands and proud people. 

In July 2016, the dam burst. Thousands gathered in Gondar’s historic squares, their voices echoing off ancient castle walls as they demanded the return of their territories. The symbolism was powerful—in the shadow of emperors’ palaces, ordinary citizens were reclaiming their dignity. 

Picture elderly women, their faces lined with decades of quiet suffering, finally finding the courage to speak truth to power. Imagine young men, educated but unemployed, channeling their frustration into collective action. 

The government deployed the same brutal tactics used against Oromo protesters. But something had changed. The Amhara, traditionally seen as supporters of centralized authority, were now in open rebellion. TPLF’s carefully constructed narrative of ethnic divisions was beginning to crumble. 

The Moment Everything Changed 

What happened next defied decades of political orthodoxy. Instead of viewing each other as competitors for resources and recognition, Oromo and Amhara activists began to see their common oppressor. 

Social media became the bridge between these communities. Jawar Mohammed, the influential Oromo activist, publicly supported Amhara protesters. Amhara intellectuals reciprocated, condemning violence against Oromo demonstrators. Hashtags like #OromoProtests and #AmharaResistance began appearing together, creating a digital solidarity that transcended ethnic boundaries. 

For the first time in generations, an Oromo mother in Adama and an Amhara father in Bahir Dar were fighting the same fight. 

This wasn’t just political calculation, it was an emotional breakthrough. People who had been taught to see each other as threats suddenly recognized their shared humanity and common struggle. The TPLF’s greatest fear was materializing unity between Ethiopia’s two largest ethnic groups. 

The Avalanche Begins 

By 2017, the protests had evolved into something unprecedented coordinated, cross-ethnic resistance movement. Roads were blocked in Oromia while strikes paralyzed Amhara cities. State ceremonies were boycotted, and government officials found themselves isolated in their own regions. 

The cracks within the EPRDF became visible. Lemma Megersa in Oromia and Gedu Andargachew in Amhara—regional leaders who were supposed to be TPLF allies—began openly defying orders to crush the protests. These weren’t acts of political opportunism; they were moments of moral courage by leaders who chose to stand with their people rather than their party. 

Imagine the tension in those closed-door meetings where TPLF officials demanded harsh crackdowns, only to be told “no” by their supposed subordinates. 

The OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organization) and ANDM (Amhara National 

Democratic Movement) began forming an alliance within the EPRDF, effectively isolating the TPLF. The minority that had ruled for decades suddenly found itself outnumbered and outmaneuvered. 

The Fall of Giants 

In February 2018, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn announced his resignation in a televised address that shocked the nation. His words were carefully chosen, but the message was clear: the government could no longer govern. The protests had made Ethiopia ungovernable under TPLF rule. 

Picture families across Ethiopia gathering around their televisions, hardly believing what they were hearing. After 27 years, the seemingly invincible system was admitting defeat. 

The selection of Abiy Ahmed as the new Prime Minister in April 2018 marked the end of an era. 

For the first time since 1991, an Oromo leader—backed by Amhara political elites—would lead Ethiopia. The TPLF’s dominance over the central government was over. 

The Mathematics of Change 

The success of the Oromo-Amhara alliance wasn’t accidental—it was demographic destiny. Together, these groups represented nearly two-thirds of Ethiopia’s population. Geographically, their regions surrounded Tigray, limiting TPLF influence across vast swaths of the country. 

But numbers alone don’t explain the victory. The economic leverage was crucial: Oromia surrounds Addis Ababa, the nation’s economic heart, while Amhara controls vital trade routes to Sudan. When these regions united in resistance, they could literally strangle the government’s ability to function. 

Most importantly, their unity shattered the TPLF’s divide-and-rule strategy. For decades, the TPLF had maintained power by playing ethnic groups against each other. Once the two largest groups found common cause, this strategy became impossible. 

The Price of Victory 

The unity that toppled the TPLF, however, proved more tactical than strategic. Like many revolutionary alliances, it was bound together by what it opposed rather than what it supported. Once the common enemy was defeated, underlying tensions quickly resurfaced. 

The same social media platforms that had united protesters in 2016 became battlegrounds for ethnic nationalism by 2019. 

Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party, formed from the ashes of the EPRDF, attempted to transcend ethnic politics entirely. But in a country where identity and politics are deeply intertwined, this approach created new conflicts. The absence of a shared vision for post-TPLF Ethiopia led to fragmentation, violence, and ultimately, new forms of authoritarianism. 

Lessons from the Streets 

The Oromo-Amhara alliance of 2015-2018 offers profound lessons about the power of unity and the fragility of oppressive systems. It shows us that: 

  • Solidarity can transcend historical divisions when people recognize their common humanity 
  • Social media can be a powerful tool for building bridges between communities 
  • Even the most entrenched systems can fall when enough people say “enough” 
  • Victory requires not just unity in opposition, but unity in vision for what comes next 

The story of these four transformative years reminds us that political change, at its core, is deeply human. It’s about mothers who want better futures for their children, students who demand to be heard, and ordinary people who find extraordinary courage when they stand together. 

As Ethiopia continues to grapple with the legacy of this period, one truth remains: when people unite across their differences, they can move mountains—and topple governments. 

Scholarly and journalistic work links Qeerroo’s organizational evolution to figures like Jawar Mohammed. By 2020–2021, Jawar publicly condemned Abiy’s trajectory and emphasized Oromo grievances—signals of estrangement from the center. The emerging overtures toward tactical coordination with Amhara groups thus stem more from mutual opposition to the federal center than from reconciled visions about Ethiopia’s constitutional order. 

5.2 TPLF’s Pragmatic Turn 

Elements within Tigray’s political spectrum have floated coordination with Amhara actors against federal military pressure, despite the fresh memory of inter-communal violence and territorial disputes. Given the post-1991 record, the abandonment risk (Snyder) is non-trivial unless concrete guardrails are negotiated in advance.  

5.3 Conflict Tempo and Humanitarian Harm 

Since August 2023, Amhara has been a principal theater of violence. HRW details attacks on medical care; Reuters reports continuing civilian casualties and displacement; ACLED quantifies a high incidence of political violence. These dynamics incentivize short-horizon bargains, but they also raise the cost of alliance failure for civilians.  

6. Comparative Case Studies 

6.1 Afghanistan (1992–1996): From Common Victory to Civil War 

After the Soviet exit and Najibullah’s fall, mujahideen factions who had cooperated fractured overpower-sharing, producing devastating urban warfare, mass civilian casualties, and ultimately the Taliban’s rise. Key pathologies: no enforceable political settlement; fragmented command; and “abandonment” behavior as factions cut side-deals. Lesson: Victory coalitions need binding institutions, DDR pathways, and credible enforcement—or they disintegrate. 

6.2 Libya (2011–present): Militia Politics and Perpetual Fragmentation 

The anti-Qadhafi coalition splintered into localized armed groups and rival governments. International Crisis Group and subsequent analyses show failed DDR, contested oil rents, and foreign patronage entrenching militia fiefdoms; 2024–2025 reporting underscores how resource flows still fuel factionalism. Lesson: Without security sector unification and revenue-sharing compacts, “temporary” wartime partners morph into permanent veto players.  

7. Psychological, Sociological, and Economic Dimensions 

7.1 Collective Trauma and Trust 

Amhara communities have endured massacres, displacement, and exclusion, intensifying threat perceptions and lowering tolerance for ambiguous bargains. Attacks on health care in 2024 exemplify how civilian protections erode when command structures are diffused and accountability absent.  

Implication: Any alliance must start with acknowledgment and remedial commitments to be psychologically credible.  

7.2 Political Economy of Alliances 

Alliances reallocate rents—land, taxation, checkpoints, trade corridors. Libya’s experience shows how illicit energy revenue and subsidy arbitrage bankroll armed groups and lock in fragmentation; Ethiopia’s equivalent risks include control of trade routes, local taxation, and aid access.  

Implication: Design revenue-sharing rules ex ante to deter predation.  

8. Risk Analysis for Amhara–Fano Partnerships with Oromo and TPLF Actors 

The Amhara–Fano movement finds itself at a strategic crossroads. On one side lies the urgent need to counter a federal regime perceived as hostile to Amhara survival; on the other lies the historical memory of betrayal by past wartime allies. Ethiopia’s constitutional order—rooted in the ethnic federalism institutionalized by the TPLF—has created a political marketplace where alliances are transactional, identity-based, and prone to rapid dissolution. 

This environment magnifies the importance of understanding two interlinked challenges: 

8.1 Risk analysis 

  • Identifying the structural dangers in forming coalitions with actors who have historically marginalized or attacked Amhara communities. 
  • Safeguard architecture — building enforceable, principled, and institutionally grounded agreements that can prevent post-victory disintegration. 

8.2 Alliance Formation and Breakdown 

Walt (1987) and Snyder (1997) describe alliances as inherently fragile when formed under asymmetric threat perceptions. Risks include abandonment—partners defecting when costs outweigh benefits—and entrapment—being drawn into conflicts contrary to one’s core interests. Empirical studies (Leeds, 2003) show that alliances lacking clear commitments and enforcement mechanisms dissolve faster, especially in ethnically polarized contexts. 

8.3 Post-Conflict Coalition Failures 

Comparative experiences from Afghanistan (1992–1996), Libya (post-2011), Bosnia (post-1995), and South Sudan (post-2011) demonstrate that victory coalitions without institutional safeguards devolve into renewed violence, often producing humanitarian crises worse than the original conflict. 

8.4 Transitional Justice as Alliance Insurance 

Research by Teitel (2000) and Hayner (2011) suggests that truth-telling, acknowledgment of past abuses, and material reparations can serve as “political trust-building” mechanisms—particularly in alliances between former enemies. 

8.5 Accountability Deficit 

  • Definition: The absence of acknowledgment, apology, or restitution for past atrocities committed against Amhara civilians by potential alliance partners. 
  • Historical Context: During 2019–2025, Amhara communities experienced massacres in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz, often without condemnation from Oromo nationalist leaders or the TPLF. 
  • Risk Mechanism: Without accountability, alliances risk being purely instrumental, making Amhara actors vulnerable to renewed targeting once the common enemy is removed. 

9. Safeguard Architecture: Conditions for Any Alliance 

9.1 Accountability-First Preconditions 

• Written acknowledgment of specific abuses against Amhara; agreement on a joint investigative truth-telling mechanism with victim participation, drawing on TRC-style practices but tied to material redress. 

9.2 Shared Governance Blueprint (Before Joint Ops) 

• A concise pre-commitment “constitutional core”: equal citizenship guarantees; ban on ethnicized collective punishment; independent judiciary; and a sequenced roadmap to security-sector reform (SSR) and DDR. Rationale: Alliances that fight first and negotiate later rarely survive success.  

9.3 Enforceable, Monitored Alliance Contracts 

• Create a  Council with balanced representation; publish rules of engagement protecting civilians and humanitarian services; establish third-party monitoring (religious councils, bar associations, medical associations) empowered to name and shame violations. 

Rationale: Reduces abandonment risk and civilian targeting.  

9.4 Independent Amhara Capacity-Building 

  • Invest in political organization, media, legal defense networks, and economic resilience to avoid dependency on partners with diverging endgames. (Alliance theory: decrease partner leverage to improve bargaining power.)  
  • Agree in advance on revenue-sharing (customs, checkpoints) and interim administration of contested localities, with escrowed funds and audit triggers to deter predation—learning from Libya’s rent wars.  

9.5 Revenue and Territory Rules 

• Agree in advance on revenue-sharing (customs, checkpoints) and interim administration of contested localities, with escrowed funds and audit triggers to deter predation—learning from Libya’s rent wars. 

10. Implications for International Stakeholders 

External actors should condition support on civilian protections and transparent alliance compacts; strengthen documentation of abuses in Amhara; and avoid fueling fragmentation via securitized aid. HRW’s findings on Amhara and UN/Western reporting on Libya and Afghanistan demonstrate the cost of supporting coalitions without governance strings attached.  

11. Conclusion 

The Amhara–Fano movement’s strategic challenge is to resist the allure of expedient alliances that replicate the failures of Ethiopia’s past. Historical and comparative evidence shows that without accountability, constitutional consensus, enforceable commitments, and independent capacity, alliances with former adversaries are more likely to produce renewed conflict than durable peace. The safeguard architecture outlined here is not a guarantee of success—but without it, the risks of betrayal, abandonment, and fragmentation are almost certain. 

Ethiopia’s present realignment tempts actors to “ally now, fix later.” History—in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Libya—shows that is a recipe for renewed violence. For Amhara and Fano, survival with dignity requires principled cooperation: accountability first, shared constitutional ground rules, enforceable alliance contracts, and independent capacity. Anything less risks repeating 1991’s arc—victory without a peace architecture that protects those who bled for it. 

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com  

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2 COMMENTS

  1. Absence of clear democratic visions , which entails fundamental democratic principles. Any coalition among ethiio nationalist in Ethiopia is doom to fail and catastrophic to civilians. Your writings is more a reacearh paper and time consuming to prepare. I am wondering,if Fano and Oromo shene deserve such analysis because they are Warlords

  2. An alliance must be formed to remove Abiy Ahmed. It is now clear that he stands as a common and imminent threat to the sidelined Oromo population and, in particular, to the Amharas. For any meaningful resistance to succeed, the Amharas should consider aligning even with the former Qeerroo operatives on the condition that they refrain from operating within the Amhara region and agree to respect the autonomy of Addis Ababa and its residents.

    The previous attempt at an Oromara coalition failed to safeguard Amhara interests, largely due to the ineffectiveness of the former ANDM leadership. That party lacked a coherent strategy to confront Abiy’s centralization of power. Gedu Andargachew’s decision to abandon his regional responsibilities for a federal ministerial post was a strategic misstep that weakened the Amhara front. Similarly, Dr. Ambachew’s cooperation with Abiy, instead of building a strategic alliance with figures like General Asamnew Tsige, proved disastrous. Meanwhile, Demeke Mekonnen did not prepare for the eventual betrayal by Oromo political elites.

    The diaspora, too, bears responsibility. In their optimism, they supported Abiy Ahmed without articulating or demanding a tangible, long-term agenda. This miscalculation allowed him to consolidate power unchecked. In contrast, individuals like Eskinder Nega deserve recognition for identifying early on that Abiy’s agenda was not inclusive governance, but a personalized, authoritarian project in the mold of the TPLF he replaced.

    Currently, the Amhara diaspora is repeating past mistakes by failing to condemn the actions of individuals like Zemene Kasse and Asres Mare. These figures are undermining the broader Fano movement by monopolizing power and refusing to cooperate with other groups unless they can assume leadership roles. Their refusal to allow other Fano forces to operate in regions like Gojam is divisive, short-sighted, and must be called out. Such actions fracture resistance efforts and play directly into the regime’s hands.

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