By: Amanuel Agajjie Wasihun
Over the past decade, Ethiopia has undergone a significant digital transformation. Millions of citizens have gained internet access and become active on platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter (X), Telegram, and TikTok. This digital awakening created new avenues for public expression, inclusive dialogue, and civic engagement, fostering hopes for greater accountability and participation in national affairs.
However, as Ethiopia’s political environment has grown increasingly fragile and polarized—particularly under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the ruling Prosperity Party (PP)—the government has adopted a more authoritarian approach to digital governance. Social media has emerged as a powerful force, frequently used to criticize government policies, mobilize dissent, and challenge state authority.
In recent months, several former high-ranking officials, members of the prosperity party central committee, and once-close allies of Prime Minister Abiy have come forward in interviews and public statements, revealing sensitive information about internal decision-making processes. These individuals—many of whom held influential positions during the early years of Abiy’s administration—were once considered part of his trusted inner circle. Their accounts have exposed hidden aspects of how the Prosperity Party operates and raised serious concerns about transparency, political repression, and the centralization of power.
These disclosures have sent shockwaves through the Prime Minister’s Office at 4 Kilo Palace, generating internal panic. In response, the government has intensified efforts to discredit or silence these former insiders. Various strategies are being employed to suppress dissent, manage public perception, and contain the growing wave of criticism in a bid to preserve the ruling party’s credibility and prevent further erosion of public trust.
Amid these efforts, the government has struggled to maintain control over digital spaces. Sensitive information, including state data and classified documents, has been leaked by internal and external actors—raising concerns about cybersecurity, secrecy, and the balance between national security and digital freedoms.
In its shift toward digital authoritarianism, the Ethiopian government has employed a wide array of tactics aimed at suppressing critical voices and concealing its genocidal and war crimes—both within the country and across the diaspora. These strategies include surveillance, legal repression, propaganda, cyber operations, and platform manipulation.
1. Surveillance, Detention, and Intimidation by State Agencies
Ethiopia’s state agencies—including NISS, INSA, the Federal Police, and telecom operators like Ethio Telecom and Safaricom—collaborate to monitor citizens’ communications using advanced tools such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to track internet traffic, call records, SMS, and social media activity in real time. Despite Safaricom’s entry breaking Ethio Telecom’s monopoly, both providers remain under government influence and are legally compelled, under laws like the Computer Crime Proclamation (2016) and the Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation, to retain user data and allow surveillance, sometimes without judicial oversight. The government also deploys spyware like Remote Control System (RCS) and FinFisher to target diaspora journalists and activists by intercepting calls, logging keystrokes, and remotely accessing device cameras and microphones—often through phishing campaigns. Individuals flagged through this surveillance network frequently face detention and interrogation based on intercepted communications and metadata, fostering a climate of fear that leads many to self-censor online. Overall, this system of telecom control, legal authority, and advanced surveillance technology enables the government to intimidate, silence dissent, and maintain authoritarian control.
2. Deployment of a Government-Sponsored “Digital Army”
The government has built and deployed a coordinated “digital army”—a network of pro-government operatives tasked with dominating online discourse across all regions and languages. Regional Prosperity Party offices are obligated to establish and manage these networks down to the woreda level. In Addis Ababa, the effort is particularly concentrated, led by the city mayor’s office in coordination with the Government Communication Service and the Prime Minister’s Office. These operatives flood social media platforms with state-approved narratives, spread misinformation to discredit opposition voices, and carry out targeted harassment against activists, journalists, and critics.
By manipulating online narratives and engaging in bot-like behavior or fake accounts, this digital army amplifies propaganda, distracts from government failures, and suppresses alternative viewpoints—making it increasingly difficult for legitimate voices to be heard. Tactics include hashtag hijacking, coordinated comment raids, and organized smear campaigns, often planned through closed Telegram groups.
3. Co-opting and Threatening Social Media Influencers
High-profile influencers—especially those with large followings in Ethiopia and the diaspora—have become key targets of state influence. The government approaches these individuals with offers of payment, condominium housing or land in Addis Ababa, sponsorship deals, or business incentives in exchange for promoting pro-government narratives.
Those who resist face various forms of pressure, including threats, detention, or character assassination. In some cases, influencers are coerced into making public statements that align with government positions. This tactic enables the state to borrow the credibility of popular figures to shape public opinion, while systematically silencing independent digital voices.
4. Direct Pressure on Social Media Companies
In an attempt to exert control over platforms beyond its jurisdiction, the Ethiopian government has directly engaged with social media companies such as Meta (Facebook), X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, YouTube, and Telegram. Tactics include sending legal complaints, takedown requests, and threatening letters accusing specific accounts of inciting violence or spreading misinformation. These efforts are often channeled through embassies, international forums, and during official visits by government leaders.
Additionally, the government employs international lobbyists and mediators to pressure tech companies into removing or suspending activist accounts. This transnational pressure campaign is particularly aimed at silencing critical voices in the diaspora—individuals who operate beyond the reach of domestic repression.
5. Investment in Social Media Monitoring and Sentiment Analysis Tools
To proactively manage digital discourse, the government has invested in advanced monitoring and sentiment analysis tools. These technologies track trending topics, monitor hashtags, and analyze public sentiment in real time. This enables authorities to identify key influencers, measure the spread of criticism, and respond swiftly through digital counter-campaigns or enforcement actions.
Some of these tools are believed to be AI-driven, capable of detecting potential threats to the government’s image or stability before they escalate. The system is reportedly managed by the government’s AI office, based in Wollo Sefer.
6. Strategic Internet Shutdowns and Platform Blocking
During times of political tension, protest, or conflict, the government has resorted to imposing internet shutdowns and regional restrictions. Entire regions—such as Tigray, Amhara, or Oromia—have experienced prolonged disconnections, particularly during military operations or civil unrest.
In other cases, specific platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram or YouTube have been blocked to prevent coordination among protestors and limit the spread of critical content. These blackouts serve to isolate communities, suppress information flow, and prevent international attention.
7. Legal Repression Using Vague Legislation
The government increasingly uses vague laws on cybercrime, terrorism, hate speech, and misinformation to target journalists, bloggers, and digital activists. These laws are applied selectively to justify censorship, arrests, and intimidation, forcing many media outlets into self-censorship.
Key laws include the Hate Speech and Disinformation Proclamation (No. 1185/2020), criminalizing broad “hate speech” and “disinformation” with harsh penalties; the Computer Crime Proclamation (No. 958/2016), used to prosecute online speech and intercept communications; and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (No. 1176/2020), which enables authorities to label critics as terrorists. Other measures, like the Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation (No. 761/2012) and the Personal Data Protection Proclamation (No. 1321/2024), restrict communication tools and facilitate surveillance.
Additionally, unofficial asset recovery actions since 2023 have targeted diaspora Ethiopians, often under vague accusations, raising concerns of politically motivated reprisals. Together, these laws form a sophisticated framework for digital repression, allowing the state to control narratives and criminalize dissent under the cover of legality.
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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