Fracture and Future: Ogaden National Liberation Front’s Crisis in the Era of Peace

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com

Hud Abdulahi

The signing of a peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in 2018 was widely regarded as the beginning of a new era—one filled with hopes.

However, internal friction and fallout in the following years gradually led to a full-blown split, dividing the party into rival factions. In the climax of a prolonged conflict over the former rebel movement’s leadership and legitimacy, the leading faction deposed the chairman and called a congress in Jijiga on 26 June 2025 to pick new leaders.

The key question now is whether ONLF is finally on a path to healing—or whether it remains caught in a cycle of fragmentation and uncertainty.

From Rebel Army to Political Party—ONLF’s Stalled Transformation  

Founded in 1984, ONLF, a Somali nationalist party, began its political oppressions in Ogaden, the Somali regional state. The party had briefly ruled the region from 1991 to 1994 before it took arms and waged war against the TPLF regime. In the worst part of this war, ONLF engaged with the notorious Somali administration in Jijiga under Abdi Mohamoud Omar (Abdi Ilay), the former president of the Somali region. 

ONLF’s goals revolve around the Somali people’s right to self-determination. After nearly three decades of a devastating war with Ethiopia, ONLF signed a peace deal with the current Ethiopian government, led by Abiy Ahmed, returned home and committed to pursue its political struggle through peaceful means. 

When ONLF returned, its future was uncertain. On the one hand, there was hope and optimism, symbolised by the triumph at Jijiga Stadium, where the organisation’s leaders received a hero’s welcome, showing its popular support at home.  Additionally, at the podium, a new Somali region president(Mustafe Muhumed Omar) held hands with ONLF leaders in a symbolic gesture of unity and peace. 

However, indications of a turbulent future loomed nearby. The hosting city was reeling from the recent violence following the removal of Abdi Mohamoud Omar. Just outside the jubilant stadium, the letters ‘O.N.L.F.’ were cruelly sprayed on vandalised buildings, churches and businesses. The vandalism was carried out by followers of Abdi Ilay impersonating ONLF, but the blame remained with ONLF, casting a lengthy shadow over ONLF’s reintroduction into the region’s political sphere.

As these two competing realities continued to shape the future of the organisation, the peace deal proved to be the start of a new struggle rather than the end of one. ONLF found itself at the centre of multiple transitions. Once an armed rebel group opposing Ethiopia, it now faced the challenge of transforming into a registered political party within the country. For the first time, its long-exiled, diaspora-based leadership and the younger commanders of its military wing had to collaborate in the same environment, while influential diaspora activists sought to redefine their roles in the evolving political landscape.

All of this occurred in the context of altering political dynamics in Ethiopia, where a sudden change in leadership and the subsequent difficult transition pushed the country towards civil war. 

This convergence of ONLF factions united individuals with diverse experiences and expectations during a truly pivotal moment. For a group like ONLF, navigating such complexity was always going to be challenging. However, the leadership lacked both the ability to manage this change and a real discussion about it.

While middle-level leaders (the reformist group) advocated for open deliberation regarding the party’s future, long-exiled leadership (the old guard) chose to consolidate power, effectively stalling the organisation’s transformation.

Fracture, Factionalism and Fallout

In my previous article, ‘An Ogadeni Feud and Somali Folktale’, I explored how ONLF’s leadership was pulled in opposing directions, pushing the organisation towards an uncertain future—risking everything, yet possibly ending up with nothing. Since then, the party split into factions and lost even the minimal political relevance to participating in the new political opening in the country. 

Ironically, ONLF wasted the opportunities that were presented to them. At a pivotal moment, it became a contested prize in Ethiopia’s shifting politics. Abiy Ahmed’s government removed it from the terrorist list and signed a peace accord; the Somali regional government welcomed its leaders into Jijiga and invited them to participate.

However, other forces intervened. The ousted TPLF, seeking to reinvent itself as the defender of ethnic federalism, reached out to the ONLF with long-denied promises—a move considered a desperate bid for survival.

For ONLF, the choice seemed obvious: between the regime that once called it terrorist and the government that legitimised it. 

Yet under Chairman Abdirahman Mahdi, the party drifted into a political twilight, torn between the peace process and sympathy for both TPLF and Abdi Ilay, despite internal opposition.

The internal conflict centred on a strategic choice: align with the reformist federal government or side with TPLF, ONLF’s long-time enemy now at war with the state.  This was a turning point, sparking a conflict over the party’s future.

The old-guard faction, led by Mahdi, maintained an ambiguous stance during Ethiopia’s civil war. As conflict escalated, his position peaked into a strategic duplicity—quietly reaching out to TPLF while reaffirming the peace agreement. In the Somali region, his political manoeuvres bordered on subversion and accusations of incitement.

 Internally, Mahdi began to reframe ONLF’s armed struggle as a civil war—downplaying Abdi Ilay’s atrocities. He sidestepped party structures, created parallel leadership bodies and cultivated a clan-based support network as a substitute for ONLF’s traditional base.

In contrast, the reformist faction—led by his deputies, Ahmed Yassin and later Abdikarim Muse, among others—rejected ties with TPLF and Abdi Ilay. Comprising former field commanders and diaspora figures with grassroots backing, they aimed to reintegrate ONLF into Ethiopia’s evolving political landscape.

Mahdi views Ethiopia’s turmoil as an advantage, believing the reformist government will struggle to withstand TPLF’s comeback. This view ties back to his controversial meeting with TPLF leaders and Abdi Ilay in Nairobi, just days before their collapse. A purported secret arrangement is widely believed to be the reason he protected Abdi Ilay and refused to disassociate ONLF from violent impersonators following Ilay’s removal in Jijiga.

To the reformist faction, it was reminiscent of the 1990s, when the ONLF participated in Ethiopia’s democratic transformation only to get involved in conflict. They saw promise in the hope and triumph that welcomed their return.

As Mahdi’s strategy strained relations with federal and regional governments and raised concerns about the durability of the peace deal, the reformists filled the void. Some observers misinterpreted this rise as a result of government interference, but evolving internal dynamics drove the shift. The reformist bloc developed a functional relationship with federal authorities, gained a majority in the Central Committee and gradually dismissed Mahdi in cross-party engagements.

 The Congress and Contest for Legitimacy

After years of contested leadership and ideological drift, the reformist faction, now commanding a majority in the Central Committee, convened a party congress in Jijiga on 26 June 2025, without Mahdi in attendance.

Growing friction within his own camp, particularly after he floated the idea of returning to armed struggle, hastened his downfall. 

Mahdi is anticipated to oppose the outcome, but his opposition will most likely be ineffective.  Even so, a symbolic reunion with the party may still have meaning for a group that has long been torn apart by internal conflict.

While many challenges remain, the congress resolved the long-standing question of legitimacy. There is, once again, one ONLF. Symbolically and strategically, the congress preserved the party’s legal standing, which had been at risk, but it will in no way be the panacea for ONLF’s backlogged problems. 

Is ONLF Heading Towards Healing?

Although the successful congress represents a significant advancement, it would be premature to declare ONLF’s recovery complete.

The new leadership faces a daunting task: repairing the damage from years of internal conflict, reviving a stalled transformation and restoring public trust. ONLF has grown disconnected from the very communities it claims to represent. Thus, re-engaging these constituencies and addressing the internal scars of factionalism is crucial.

A major challenge is also generational: years of war deprived many supporters of basic education and political experience. The party must now integrate younger, educated members while honouring the contributions of its older generation.

It must also confront its past—addressing atrocities committed under former regimes and seeking justice for the victims.

Finally, to survive and thrive in Ethiopia’s volatile political environment, ONLF must develop a forward-looking policy that transcends historical grievances. 

Furthermore, ONLF’s ability to be fully healed or remain in a cycle of uncertainty will be determined by how it responds to these obstacles in the coming months.

Conclusion: paradox of past glory and present Gridlock

In conclusion, the party finds itself caught between its historical success and current stagnation. The movement that once inspired a generation to dream of self-determination is now entangled in internal factionalism, leadership paralysis and strategic confusion. 

However, the key to breaking this deadlock lies within: in the party’s ability and willingness to evolve. The group is not without assets; it carries the political capital of being the longest-running rebel movement in the Somali region, having confronted one of Africa’s most formidable military regimes and survived the global counterterrorism era. It formerly governed the region, which may be repurposed for legitimacy and transformation with vision and humility. 

The recent election of new leadership brings both new hope and challenges. There is hope that a fresh mandate can steer the organisation towards relevance, reform and unity. However, there is the burden of high expectations—to heal rifts, modernise strategies and reconnect with the very people it once claimed to represent.

 The movement’s future now hinges on whether this new leadership views change as a legitimate continuation rather than a betrayal of legacy.

Hud Abdulahi, a writer and member of the ONLF, can be reached at badrihuud@gmail.com.

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com      

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