TPLF: Is the Game Over?  

Summary

√ – TPLF’s military and political power has collapsed, its leadership diminished and now dependent on Esayas and Abiy for survival.

√ – Eritrea views TPLF as both a liability and a tool, leveraging its weakness for buffer zones, manpower, and to sign off Bademe and territories.

√ – Mutual distrust reigns—Eritrea wants control, while TPLF seeks access to Sudan, each concealing ambitions under tactical cooperation.

√ – The future hinges on Abiy’s realignment; if he reconciles with Eritrea, TPLF could be discarded—its era as a regional force already declared over.

By Rasselas Weldemariam

When the TPLF attacked the Northern Command of the Ethiopian army, President Esayas Afwerki reportedly declared, “The game is over.”

For nearly three decades, the TPLF had been a thorn in the side of the EPLF, relentlessly working to undermine Eritrea. But as Isayas predicted, the game is now over. Why?

The TPLF has been crushed—its arrogance broken, its leadership forced to crawl to Asmara in a desperate bid for reconciliation and survival. After sacrificing thousands of young lives to the firepower of Isaias Afwerki and Abiy Ahmed, the TPLF finally signed the Pretoria surrender agreement, now relying on Abiy to feed it’s army. Today, it pleads with Isaias to become its unlikely saviour.

The TPLF’s self-perpetuated belief in its unique destiny to dominate & rule over Ethiopians is over. It has bowed to the “Emperor” in Asmara.

The TPLF’s Strategy: An Illusion?

The only secret plan discussed by the TPLF to pacify it’s support is its alliance with EPLF is tactical. It want to work with EPLF till it secure a route to Sudan. If it regains Tsegede and Humera, with access to the Sudanese border, it could turn its guns toward Eritrea in a bid to reclaim territories lost in the Badme conflict.

But Esayas too knows this game. He knows the “Libe-Tigray” strategy, and he aims to ensure that TPLF never becomes independent again. All routes in and out must be sanctioned—by Eritrea.

Now, the game unfolds with each side concealing its ambitions, pretending not to guess the other’s next move. The TPLF needs access to military supplies and an escape route to the outside world. Eritrea might facilitate some of that—but never unconditionally.

So,  can the TPLF Survive under the Eritrean Shadow?

Eritrea once made a grave error by enabling the TPLF’s rise to power in Ethiopia without control over the TPLF. With federal control TPLF got access to national resources, which the TPLF used not to build bridges with Eritrea, but to settle old scores for blocking access to Sudan during the famine.

Now what does the TPLF offer Eritrea in 2025?

No federal resources. No domestic support. No regional influence. It has been abandoned by the very ethno-nationalist movements it once empowered. Today, it appears as a fractured, Adwa-based faction unable to unite even Tigray.

Eritrea’s Strategic Calculus

What does Eritrea want?

First: a buffer zone. By controlling towns and airfields in Mekele, Shire, and Axum, Eritrea would push its defence lines deep into Tigray, complicating any future Ethiopian assault.

Second: manpower. Eritrea’s youth have fled, and its population is aging. While opening the border might help, it also risks accelerating the Eritrean youth exodus. TPLF might  promise  to “return escapees” is but the temptation to get dollar from relatives of the youth from Diaspora is too tempting and very difficult to honour promises. Fighters themselves may be enticed into the smuggling trade, further weakening EPLF ranks. Hence, in that light, Tigrayan youth might become cannon fodder for Eritrea—a grim calculation but one that aligns with Isayas’s strategic vision.

Third, TPLF is now disparate and EPLF wants to sign away Badema and other disputed territories before a genuine support for the TPLF. All the indications are that TPLF wants to delay this issue, but EPLF cannot make the same mistake again. So the agreement to abandon the Algers agreement is unavailable. 

Economic Realities: A Burden Too Heavy?

Here’s the catch. Can Eritrea afford to sustain Tigray? Unlikely. The TPLF army has been voluntarily demobilized now without pay following as it left Abiy to join Esayas. The Pretoria Agreement is dead and Abiy stopped paying salaries.

So Eritrea cannot feed, clothe, or arm them. Once conflict resumes, Abiy will cut off fuel, electricity, and subsidies. Eritrea, already economically fragile, cannot pick up the load. A parasite may die if its host collapses—and vice versa.

An Uncertain Horizon

Yes, the TPLF is momentarily defeated. But Isaias understands Tigray well. Should the TPLF survive federal pressure, it may eventually reorient its hostility toward Eritrea—aiming to reclaim Badme or even attempt regime change in Asmara.

Trust is nonexistent. Eritrea sees Tigray as useful only while weak—and expendable. TPLF wants Eritrea till it secure access to Sudan.  So it is a waiting game for the first breakthrough.

Abiy, the Third Player

A dramatic twist could emerge if Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, under foreign influence—say from Saudi Arabia—brings Essayas and Abiy together. In that case, Eritrea would abandon TPLF in favour of mending ties with Abiy. This isn’t conjecture; EPLF officials have expressed hesitation to engage with Fano leaders for 2 years not to offend Abiy. Their standard reply was we sympathise with you but we are waiting instead for Abiy to formally sever ties.

They didn’t choose to abandon Abiy. They were abandoned by Abiy. And they can be pulled back—with the right apology and incentives like diverting some imports from Djibouti to Asab can be a windfall hard to refuse.

The same is true of Debretsion. He was eager to serve Abiy if granted the governorship of Tigray. He failed. But if given another chance, he would likely return to Addis—and to power than to hangout in Asmera.

So, if Abiy offers renewed privilege and governorship in Mekele, the TPLF could swiftly turn against Eritrea, even joining federal troops in a campaign to retake Badme.

Final Reckoning

The TPLF’s fate remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: its days as a major East African powerbroker are over. That is the game is over! Going forward, it will be controlled—by either OPDO or EPLF. And that prolongs Tigray’s suffering.

In conclusion, the TPLF died with Meles. What remains is a torso—shifting between Addis and Asmara, with no head of its own. The likes of Debretsion or General Megebe cannot feel the vacuum.

The likes of Stalin are activists without head or tail. So the game for TPLF is over. The biggest consequence is it might become a big burden on Shabia to take Shabia with it.

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com      

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