HomeOpinionEthiopia's sea access pursuit is a red herring  

Ethiopia’s sea access pursuit is a red herring  

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com

Eritrea _ Ethiopia _ War
Google Map of Eritrea and the region

By Deb Tesfu 

Much has been said about Abiy’s dangerous statements and dreams which need not be repeated. But  what about the litany of papers being written by individuals closely aligned with Abiy? While they have  not gone unchallenged, I want to add my voice to those calling for the return of sanity in Arat Kilo. The  people of Eritrea and Ethiopia can ill afford another misadventure!  

I focus on the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), which is funded by and affiliated with Ethiopia’s Ministry  of Foreign Affairs. While I discuss specific articles written by IFA’s researcher, Blen Mamo Diriba, we  shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that this institute, to an extent, is a proxy for Ethiopian foreign policy  thinking. I have to admit that my writing skills are no match to Blen’s but I trust that Eritrean scholars will  in due time respond eloquently and in greater quantity with their own papers. Scholarly papers are  needed to buttress the important work of seƫtting the record straight that is being done via social media.  I’m not a scholar but seeing Blen & IFA’s egregious narratives pushed my buttons. So here is my 2 cents  worth in a long-winded article. I quote Blen’s writings to let their own words explain what Ethiopia wants  to achieve.  

Reading Blen’s article, one comes away with Ethiopia having major problems with Eritrea maintaining  control over its sovereign assets even if it engages in good-faith bilateral negotiation that allows for the  effective use of Massawa and/or Asseb. Having failed to achieve direct sea ownership, it would settle for  a treaty with Eritrea that is overseen by dubious international l institutions susceptible to its influence. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s preference of UAE over purported Saudi initiative  to modernize Asseb  infrastructure is one evidence of their cries of “sea access” being a red herring. Indeed, Abiy’s  government sees ownership of a Red Sea coast as a necessary instrument to build Ethiopia as a hegemon  of the region, exercising that power at the discretion of its powerful masters and financiers. 

The Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) is busy churning out articles and Youtube discussions to drive PP’s  dangerous narratives, including through its @HornDialogues & @HornReview accounts.. Blen  contributes to this goal through these and her own X (formerly Twitter) account. In the last three weeks or so, Blen  has published three articles on what Abiy & PP are misleadingly framing as Ethiopia’s sea access  challenge. The tone of Blen’s writings has gradually changed from bellicose musings to now being  couched with some diplomatic yet mischievous and misleading pronouncements.  

Crimea Rhetoric 

Blen’s irresponsible and warmongering language is reflected in her April 7th article titled “Ethio-Eritrea  Tension- A Volatile History that Never Truly Ended: Could Assab Become Africa’s Crimea”. As the title  transparently implies, Blen hypothesizes that Ethiopia has a path to “regain” Asseb if another conflict  breaks out. Her belief in Ethiopia’s military superiority – even while bogged down in numerous deadly,  internal conflicts – in conjunction with an expected muted international  condemnation  represents the  continuation of decades of miscalculations by Ethiopians. Miscalculations  that have held the enƟre  region hostage!  

Of rigid controls and angelic guardians of treaty 

Blen’s April 25th article was initially published on the Institute of Foreign Affairs website. However, that  article is now no longer available there for unknown reasons. Luckily I took screenshots of the article  before deletion. If you find yourself disgusted by what you read below, remember that it was published  by the Institute of Foreign Affairs, a government entity. The article tried to convince readers that “legal access to the Port of Assab” can be achieved through “a choreography of international  law, diplomacy, &  mutual prosperity”. Needless to say, no choreography is needed to achieve legitimate sea access unless  of course that entails the absurd goal of port ownership! In what may be a prime example of ignorance,  she suggests Ethiopia to let go of confrontational rhetoric and construct its approach “around respect for  Eritrean autonomy while advancing the idea that legal access to Assab is not anti-thetical to  sovereignty”. As Americans like to say, isn’t that tone deaf and gaslighting too? I was understandably  triggered by the “Eritrean autonomy” phrase. Given the history and the preponderance of evidence in  her articles, she used this phrase deliberately – a reasonable person would find it hard to attribute it to  unintentional, poor choice of words. Eritreans have not forgotten that the USA and Derg tried, in vain, until  the last second of our independence to reinvent the autonomy wheel of the 1950s federation period.  The people of Eritrea, through the leadership of the EPLF, exercised their right of self-determination and  overwhelmingly voted for independence in the UN-observed referendum of April 1993. So whatever  autonomy idea they have is a non-starter for Eritrea. Insofar as “legal access” is concerned, there is no  one obstructing Ethiopia from legally obtaining port services from Asseb or anywhere else in the Horn of  Africa based on bilateral agreements with its neighbors, Eritrea included!  

Blen’s proposals for “sea access” solution show tell-tale signs of Ethiopia’s furtive, long-term scheme to  attain  port ownership. She proposes that “a bilateral treaty with Eritrea, grounded in UNCLOS principles and informed by Clause 267 (6) would affirm Ethiopia’s right of maritime interface without compromising  Eritrea’s sovereign control. This treaty must delineate the parameters of use…mechanisms for dispute  resolution under international  arbitration”. Would anyone with knowledge of what has transpired the  last two years feel comfortable interpreting what exactly maritime interface entails? Based on Ethiopia’s  stated ambitions and actions the last two years, we can reasonably conclude that this “maritime  interface” is meant to include a naval base that serves as an instrument of hegemonic power. Abiy’s  hegemonic ambitions can’t be without a navy, they believe. So to hell with peace in the country and  region!  

As an aside, the Clause 267 (6) Blen references above is found in the “Report of the UN Commission For  Eritrea”, published in June 1950. Clause 6 recommended “that free zones be established in the ports of  Massawa and Assab to facilitate the exchange of goods and the movement of shipping, taking advantage of the special conditions of the two ports and their strategic geographical position”. Never mind that  Ethiopia unilaterally and violently terminated the Federal structure in 1962. And of course, Blen is not  interested in the first Clause of section 267 that called for Eritrea to be an independent state after 10  years of trusteeship or even its Clause 5 which recommended “that economic agreements be concluded  between Eritrea and Ethiopia for the primary purpose of facilitating trade and the transit of goods”.  Clause 5, in other words, called for bilateral agreements that Ethiopia is now eschewing! However, these  facts are not important to scholars with a habit of cherry-picking lines that align with their irrational  goals. The fact of the matter is that Eritrea has repeatedly shown eagerness to negotiate  a mutually  beneficial bilateral agreement with Ethiopia in good faith. Moreover, the Eritrean government has long  ago set-up Free Trade Zones in both Massawa and Asseb that are operated by the Eritrean Fee Zones  Authority. However, that falls short of Ethiopian ambitions  to themselves exercise total control over the  Eritrean ports.  

IFA’s Blen suggests Asseb special economic and logistical zones be “jointly administered or overseen by a  credible international body such as the AU or UNCTAD” as well as IGAD to “serve as guardians of the  treaty’s integrity”. This is strange coming from Blen since she was trivializing the influence of the UN and  African institutions such as AU and IGAD in her Crimea article published just a couple weeks earlier. I  don’t believe she has short-term memory problems. It rather reflects insidious intentions – having failed to achieve a direct, total control over a sea coast, Ethiopia now vies for weak, corruptible organizations  that are susceptible to its influence. It is hoped that through these proxy institutions, Ethiopia can  exercise significant power on the destiny and administration of Asseb. This is similar to how Hailesilasie  settled for federation after having failed to secure complete “return” of Eritrea to Ethiopia. 

Blen’s desire for international institutions’ involvement suggests Ethiopia’s long-term belief it would be  easy to strip out much of Eritrea’s authority in Asseb by colluding with these organizations. In fact, her  buddies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs (Henok Getachew, Gahaw Ayferam, and Amb. Rashid  Mohamed) pointed out how Ethiopia utilized these organizations. They stated that “Ethiopia made use of  IGAD as a plaƞorm to execute its foreign policy. For instance, IGAD was a foreign policy vehicle of  Ethiopia vis-à-vis securing its national interest as far as Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan were  concerned.” They made this claim in their July 2024 paper (Ethio calendar?), published by IFA, where  they discuss scenarios under which either Kenya or Ethiopia gain “hegemonic power” (their own words!)  in the region, in an anchor state role. They also supported Dina Mufti’ss admission of Ethiopia’s lack of  foreign policy independence by noting “the West has still the leverage to constrain the foreign policy  choice of the country.” A sad reality of Eritrean history is that international institutions have consistently  failed to stand up for our human rights, starting from the times of federation with Ethiopia. Many lives  have been lost to gain and protect our independence so the notion that these institutions  are to play a  substantial role on how our own ports are administered will not be entertained. 

Ethiopia’s refusal to entertain Djiboutian offer of a direct commercial port in August 2024 laid bare  Ethiopia’s ambitions for ownership. Add to this the following quotes or phrases used by IFA’s Blen, it’s  demonstrably clear Ethiopia is not concerned with legitimate sea access but hellbent on a reckless  campaign to wrest control of sea coast from neighbors (read as Eritrea) by any means, including force:  

 “Addis Ababa’s determination to secure an independent maritime route”. What entails an independent maritime route? Full control of the coast, with no say by Eritrea of what happens  within its sovereign territory?  

 “Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime autonomy thus remains a delicate balancing act.” How do you  get maritime autonomy if you are landlocked? What does this entail? 

 “the Red Sea, long a space of fracture and friction, holds the potential to be reimagined, as  a maritime commons”. What exactly is maritime commons? What international legal doctrine  supports communal property in this context? In what logic does Eritrea have to share its sea  coast? There is nothing reimagined here as she’d like us to believe. Taking over someone’s  territory is called invasion, not reimagination. Period! 

 Ethiopia’s approach must be “constructed around respect for Eritrean autonomy while…” Here  goes that triggering word of “autonomy”. Eritrea is independent with full rights as any other  country!  

 Eritrea’s approach is “designed to preserve its leverage over critical maritime routes and  maintain its sovereignty against external economic entanglements By eschewing cooperative  engagement in favor of a rigid assertion of control, Eritrea has effectively…” Why is Ethiopia  bothered by Eritrea’s right to assert control over its territory unless it wants to take over?  

Ethiopia reactions to UAE vs Saudi Arabia 

Blen’s article from April 9th helps shed more light on Ethiopia’s designs and that mysterious, oft repeated “strategic interests” mantra. Speaking of the Asseb-Addis pipeline initiative with UAE’s  involvement, she eerily notes that “the swift deterioration of diplomatic ties, exacerbated by Ethiopia’s  shifting geopolitical priorities, rendered the pipeline project increasingly untenable.” She does not offer any details about Abiy’s shifting geopolitical realities that impacted specifically the pipeline project and  generally the bilateral relationship. Can we reasonably conclude that Abiy’s desire to take over  neighboring ports is one of those shifting priorities? Audaciously, Blen blames Eritrea for “obstructing  Ethiopia’s strategic ambitions” by not cooperating with this shifting policy. 

Abiy was clearly for the pipeline project with UAE involvement. Let’s contrast the positive reception to  UAE with Blen’s expression of concerns with respect to a purported Saudi involvement in modernizing  the port of Asseb. She notes that “while improved infrastructure in Assab could, in theory, facilitate  diversified export routes, it also raises concerns about the extent of Saudi influence over Ethiopian  strategic interests.” Let’s leave aside the veracity of the existence of such Saudi plans. But why is Ethiopia  fine with UAE exerting influence over its “strategic interests” but not ok with Saudi Arabia? Since  Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia have good relations, Ethiopia should be exhilarated about this initiative  especially if Eritrea gives a nod to this Saudi plan. But she tells us Ethiopia is concerned over Saudi  influence over some mysterious “strategic interests”. One would have to be privy to the details of UAE  and Ethiopia alliance that aligned with Ethiopia’s “shifting geopolitical priorities” to understand the  reasons why Saudi involvement is not receiving similar reception. One has to ask what other  “strategic interests” could Ethiopia have that override access to a modernized port that can facilitate its  stated “diversified export routes” strategy? It cannot be anything but Ethiopia’s destabilizing ambitions to take over our ports.  

International Response 

Eritreans are looking for any sign that international  institutions such as the UN and AU as well as nations  far and near do not shirk their responsibility this time around. The world looked away while Ethiopia  dissolved the federation and violently annexed Eritrea in 1962. Similarly, the lack of support during the  violent suppression of Eritrea during the armed struggle and Ethiopian invasion of 1998 – 2000 is fresh in  our minds. We are yet to see any public condemnation of Abiy’s recklessness but it’s hoped influential  countries are advising Abiy against taking a dangerous war path. Of course, one can’t be blamed for  being pessimistic, seeing the IMF and World Bank doling out USD$20 billion to Ethiopia against the  backdrop of Abiy’s warmongering ways. It is confounding if not conspiratorial. As Abiy spends the bulk of  this money on his war efforts, a fact pattern not lost on the super power nations  running World Bank and  IMF, one cannot really be faulted for wondering if the money is a down payment for Abiy’s present and  future wars.  

Reading Blen’s Crimea article  makes it clear that Abiy’s advisers and enablers have convinced Ethiopia on  its superior strength over Eritrea using the same old comparisons that did not bear fruit in the war for  independence as well as the 1998-2000 invasion. Blen masterfully attempts to mask and belittle  Ethiopia’s internal quagmire with that oft-repeated “modern arsenal and superior economic resources”  mantra. However, the reality is so stark that many in the region believed the primary goal of Abiy’s sea  coast campaign is to deflect attention from the self-inflicted internal crisis. I was one of these believers  until recently.  

We can’t outright dismiss Blen and Ethiopia’s belief that “the international community’s response would  likely be muted” were Ethiopia to forcefully take over Asseb. Leaving aside their ability, I can’t help but  wonder where there is smoke, there is fire! It is not hard to guess from which powerful forces this  support would come. But Eritrea is not isolated nor alone as they would like us to believe! In fact, it is  Ethiopia that is currently diplomatically  isolated, especially in the Horn of Africa region. Truth being on  our side, Eritrea has been able to create mutual understandings with all countries in the region whereas  Ethiopian recklessness has frightened all neighbors, including its staunch ally Djibouti. 

Conclusion  

In conclusion, Ethiopia continues to throw various ideas to justify its reckless moves with the ultimate  goal being sea coast ownership. Ethiopian scholars such as Blen are tasked with justifying the illogical,  unreasonable Ethiopian demands to simply hand over control of our ports to them. We hope rationale  thinking and fairness prevails within the circle of Ethiopian politicall leaders and their associated scholars.  No one in the region will benefit from another miscalculated move. If Ethiopia invades Eritrea, the  impact will be devastating to all! In her Crimea article, Blen might be half right when she says “but it  won’t probably stop there [Asseb]. It is going to be a war fought to the last end for it not to breath  another cycle or threat of violence that would destabilize the region and cause more human misery.” We  hope it does not get to this, that Ethiopian provocations are controlled by their enablers. There is no  justification for another war! However, if Ethiopia invades Eritrea yet again, they should also entertain that the final outcome may bring the opposite of what Ethiopia wanted! Wars are unpredictable so it could just as well be their end!  

Links  

1. ETHIOPIA’S ROLE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: FOUR POSSIBLE SCENARIOS https://www.ifa.gov.et/wp content/uploads/2024/07/ETHIOPIA-ROLE-IN-THE-HORN-OF-AFRICA.pdf.pdf 

2. “From Peace to Peril: How Ethio-Eritrean Hostility  Derailed a Game-Changing  Pipeline” https://x.com/HornReview/status/1909921541866795153 

3. “Ethio-Eritrea Tension-A Volatile History that Never Truly Ended: Could Assab Become Africa’s  Crimea?” https://x.com/HornReview/status/1909233932756754738

Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com

__

Subscribe  : https://borkena.com/subscribe-borkena/ 

Join our Telegram Channel : t.me/borkena

Like borkena on Facebook

Add your business to Ethiopian Business Listing / Ethiopian Business Directory  Business Listing Toronto 

Join the conversation. Follow us on X (Formerly Twitter)  @zborkena to get the latest Ethiopian News updates regularly.  Subscribe to YouTube channel To share information or for submission, send e-mail to info@borkena.com

advertisment

1 COMMENT

  1. Ethiopia has the right to take back Eritrea & Djibouti let alone ask for access to the Red Sea. Why should Ethiopia even give anything in return to get back & use its own land?

    Djibouti: Menelik-II leased Djibouti to France for 99(!?) years in exchange for weapons. Hence, Ethiopia should have asked France to hand back Djibouti when the lease ended!

    Affar Region [Mitsiwa-to-Djibouti Red Sea Coast)]: It is Ethiopian Affars’ motherland with Asèb & Sèmèrä as capitals. The ‘Eritrean Affar’ crap was concocted in 1991.

    Bahirè-Nègash Renamed ‘Eritrea’: White Europe’s Scramble for Africa [1880-1914] let Italy occupy Ethiopia’s Bähirè-Nègäsh & even rename it ‘Eritrea’ →didn’t include Aseb.

    Invasion [1991]: Egypt’s Proxies [‘EPLF’/Eritrea & ‘TPLF’/Tigray] co-invaded Ethiopia. They concocted divisive ethnic regional borders & Eritrea-favoring international borders.

    Occupation/Annexation [1991-1998]: EPLF annexed the Red Sea Coast including Asèb. TPLF also annexed parts of Gonder/Wollo/Affar →Humera/Wolqait/Tegede/Tselemt/etc.

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here