The views, statements and opinion in the article reflects that of the writer’s , NOT borkena.com ‘s
By Henok Alemayehu
A few weeks ago, as Ethiopia and Somalia’s foreign ministers prepared for their second meeting in Ankara under Turkey’s auspices, reports surfaced indicating that Somalia was nearing an agreement to grant Ethiopia access to its ports. At
At the same time, Ethiopia was reportedly contemplating abandoning the memorandum of understanding it had signed with Somaliland.
The pivotal issue that reportedly reconciled the two governments is Somalia’s willingness to provide Ethiopia with access to a port. In exchange, Ethiopia agreed to abandon the memorandum of understanding it had signed with Somaliland last January.
Reflecting on regional and geopolitical issues, we observe how global powers, particularly in the Horn of Africa, act based on their evaluations of gains and losses. Notably, the involvement of Arab countries has become more pronounced than ever.
The primary interest of Arab countries is to curb Iran’s potential influence in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandab passage, and the broader Gulf region.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates took active part in the war in Yemen which began in 2015 , against the Iran-backed Houthis through the military base they established using the port of Assab.
Both governments have been unable to end the war in Yemen as quickly as they had planned. Despite voluntarily stepping back from the conflict, they continue to operate in the region, from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, including Yemen, with their national interests in mind.
Saudi Arabia is actively safeguarding its regional interests through the Red Sea Council, established in partnership with Egypt. Additionally, it operates independently from other member nations, including Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia.
Conversely, the United Arab Emirates, which is not a member of this council, has reasserted its influence in the Red Sea region via the Gulf of Aden to protect its economic and military interests.
Without consulting the Somali government, the UAE, through DP World, directly acquired a 51 percent stake in the port of Berbera via an agreement with Somaliland and established a military base nearby. The UAE has undertaken similar activities at Bosaso Port in Puntland.
It is reported that through an internal agreement with separatist forces in southern Yemen, the UAE has gained control over islands in the area. This demonstrates how Abu Dhabi has extended its influence from the Persian Gulf (Arabian Gulf) to the Gulf of Aden. The UAE aims to further expand its regional presence to the Red Sea.
Abu Dhabi is not alone in its geopolitical activities; it has a significant partner. When Prime Minister Abiy came to power, the United Arab Emirates, a key supporter of the Ethio-Eritrea relations, had plans to benefit from the agreement between the two countries.”
Eritrea’s Assab Port was initially envisioned as a dual-purpose hub: a business center for both Ethiopia and Eritrea, and a strategic military hub in the Red Sea. However, the deterioration of the once-promising Ethio-Eritrean relationship has rendered these plans for Assab Port unfeasible.
Although the United Arab Emirates has set aside the Eritrea issue, it still seeks to foster friendly relations with the countries bordering the Red Sea. This is one of the reasons why the UAE involves itself in Sudan’s internal affairs, collaborating with General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the Rapid Support Forces. Recently, with the facilitation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the UAE has also attempted to build closer ties with General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese National Army.
It is now evident that Abu Dhabi continues to support Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration as a regional partner since the onset of political changes. This friendship remains strong and is further reinforced by agreements in economic, military, and other fields.
Last year around this time, the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, visited Addis Ababa with senior officials and signed agreements on approximately 17 agendas. One of these agreements involves a cooperation framework for the two governments to work together in establishing a naval force.
Months after the Ethiopian government and the United Arab Emirates reached an agreement, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi signed a memorandum of understanding in Addis Ababa. This agreement grants the Ethiopian government the right to use the port of Berbera and lease naval land.
Turkey, a longstanding ally of both Ethiopia and Somalia, has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts to mediate the situation. The Ethiopian government’s decision to recognize Somaliland’s statehood has resulted in heightened tensions with neighboring Somalia. In response, Turkey has actively sought to reconcile the parties involved.
Amid these tensions, it has been reported that Ethiopia and Somalia have reached a tentative agreement. Under this agreement, Somalia will develop a port if Ethiopia abandons the memorandum of understanding signed with Somaliland.
Upon securing the right to use Berbera Port, Abu Dhabi plans to leverage Ethiopia’s market, with its population exceeding 120 million, as a prime destination for its products. Additionally, Abu Dhabi aims to safeguard its regional interests by forming an alliance with the Ethiopian Navy, utilizing Somaliland’s strategic location in the Gulf of Aden.
Similar to Abu Dhabi, the Ethiopian government prefers to utilize Berbera Port as a major facility for the joint operation of naval forces in the Gulf of Aden.
The security threat posed by the Houthi rebels in the waters from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, exacerbated by the Israel-Hamas conflict, has prompted Abu Dhabi to reassess its regional strategies. Additionally, the Houthi rebels’ strategic partnerships with al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda present further concerns.
If Ethiopia shifts its focus to Somalia’s ports, as Turkey advocates, it could forfeit not only the right to use Berbera Port but also its regional alliance with Abu Dhabi. This situation involves not just Ethiopia and Somalia, but also the broader geopolitical maneuvers of influential global powers.
Berbera Port is superior to the Merka and Kismayo ports that Somalia could offer Ethiopia as alternatives. It is closer to the center of the country and provides more efficient services. Additionally, Berbera Port does not face the same security and safety concerns as Somalia’s ports.
Given Turkey’s anticipated deployment in the Somali sea region, it seeks to have Ethiopia shift its focus from Berbera to Somali ports to avoid future tensions and protect its national interests.
In addition to Türkiye’s efforts to mediate an agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia through shuttle diplomacy, the deployment of Egyptian forces in Somalia raises further concerns for Ethiopia and its ally, the UAE.
Considering these and other related issues, it appears unlikely that Ethiopia and Somalia will reach an agreement.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed seems to have understood this and said, “We are not ready to negotiate on any issue unless Ethiopia respects our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Unless the international community exerts significant pressure, it is highly unlikely that the Ethiopian government will easily abandon the agreement signed with Somaliland.
Despite Turkey’s vigorous diplomatic initiatives, it seems unlikely that Ethiopia and Somalia will reach an agreement. Nevertheless, Turkey continues to explore possibilities to bring the two nations to an agreement.
As Turkey endeavors to mediate an agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, the Somali government is inclined to seek Egypt as an ally or supporting force. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian government enjoys backing from the UAE. This complex geopolitical landscape is further complicated by the historical and strategic interests of these regional powers.
Turkey has been actively involved in the Horn of Africa, leveraging its diplomatic and economic influence to foster stability and cooperation. Despite these efforts, the deep-seated tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, rooted in territorial disputes and political rivalries, pose significant challenges to achieving a lasting agreement.
On the other hand, Somalia’s inclination to align with Egypt is driven by shared interests and mutual concerns, particularly regarding the Nile River and regional security dynamics. Egypt’s involvement could potentially shift the balance of
power, adding another layer of complexity to the already intricate relations in the region.
Ethiopia, with the support of the UAE, seeks to strengthen its position and counterbalance the influence of other regional players. The UAE’s strategic investments and military cooperation with Ethiopia underscore its commitment to maintaining a foothold in the Horn of Africa.
In this multifaceted geopolitical chess game, Turkey’s role as a mediator is crucial, yet fraught with challenges. The interplay of alliances and rivalries among Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, and the UAE will continue to shape the region’s political landscape, with far-reaching implications for peace and stability.
Editor’s note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
__
To Publish an Article On borkena , please send submission to info@borkena.com for consideration.
Join our Telegram Channel : t.me/borkena
Like borkena on Facebook
Add your business to Borkena Business Listing/Business Directory Jobs
Join the conversation. Follow us on X (formerly Twitter ) @zborkena to get the latest Ethiopian news updates regularly. Ethiopia To share information or for submission, send e-mail to info@borkena.com