Getahun Assefa
Currently, genuine and committed supporters of the Amhara Resistance Movement (Fanos) are digesting the cause and consequences of the split within the movement. They are also reflecting on and contemplating the circumstances that led one of the senior leaders of Fanos (Assegid Mekonen) to surrender to the ethno-apartheid regime led by Fascist Abiy Ahmed Ali, the Prime minister of Ethiopia. Did Assegid ignore the objectives of the movement and the sacrifices he and his colleagues made for the Amhara causes? Was he forced to abandon the struggle because of disagreements within the movement? Was he “purchased” by the authorities to switch sides? Was he tracked by GPS as he uses smartphones and other ICT devices? More importantly, is Fano Assegid’s defection or surrender an isolated incident or part of the systemic collapse of the movement? Is he the first to defect and surrender or the first and the last? I leave time to respond to these timely, controversial, and vexing questions.
As I usually do in similar circumstances, I spent a great deal of time in the last few days reflecting on and reading similar historical parallels in Africa and elsewhere. Assisted by a summer slowdown of professional duties and responsibilities, I skimmed and sifted through knowledge banks, studies, and available theoretical or practical evidence. The aim was to understand the causes and consequences of splits or fragmentations within armed resistance movements, how best such splits were addressed, and what useful lessons could be drawn. Therefore, this article is the synthesis of a blend of my eclectic knowledge and what I learned from my latest readings. I think that the lessons can give some fresh or additional perspectives to the followers of our country’s politics and supporters of Fano. As with the previous case, I invite Ethiopians and foreign readers across the aisles to reflect and share their perspectives as well.
I came across infinite studies on the roles and behaviors of leaders in armed resistance movements, insurgencies, or rebellions against establishments. There are an equal number of insightful studies on how leaders influence the behavior of their movements (rebellion groups) and vice versa. Available studies also evaluate leadership qualities based on size, organization, motivation, cohesion, similarities, and differences of movements, within severely constraining situations – be they within a given state or between different movements. The studies provide convincing arguments and evidence on the relationship between the structure of resistance movements and the decisions of the leaders, particularly, during conflicts. They conclude that it’s the primary responsibility of the leaders to develop workable, realistic, and implementable plans to lead their movements to success. This means that those in leadership positions within the Fanos must realize their unique roles and heavy responsibilities. This is because their behaviors and decisions will have ramifications for the entire movement and the achievement of intended objectives. Those in leadership positions also bear heavy responsibilities in fostering cohesion within the movement, reducing operational costs, maximizing opportunities, and leading to success in the achievement of broader objectives and specific goals. That is, success depends not only on the quality of armed forces and armaments, but also on the quality, agility, legitimacy, and determination of the leadership. Fragmentation within armed movements can prolong the duration of conflicts and may give unnecessary time for the establishments to enhance their military and security capabilities. Splits and fragmentation, in addition to exploding operational and financial costs to the movements, also tend to serve as barriers to entry for recruits and newly able persons willing to join the resistance.
Out of the series of studies I reviewed, three important ones caught my attention. As relevant and timely as they are, they all dealt with the causes and consequences of splits and fragmentation within rebellion groups and resistance movements. They provide data and statistical information to back up their respective findings and conclusions. What the studies teach us is that fragmentation or splits within movements are common and, at times, unavoidable. Differences and fragmentation are not unique to any particular group or region. However, it is important to understand the causative factors behind the divisions and address them systematically and responsibly without damaging the causes and the intended objectives.
The study by Rudloff and Findley (2016) finds that fragmentation and splits have occurred in at least 45% of active conflicts in the world since 1989. Likewise, Woldemariam (2018) concludes that out of the 171 Saharan African rebel groups studied, 32% were split or fragmented. A further study by Fjelde and Nilsson (2018) documents episodes of conflicts worldwide from 1975 to 2013. The authors found that out of 249 conflict episodes studied, there were rebel contenders (the rise of one or more split groups) in 65 of them. Of these, 36 episodes experienced one year of fragmentation, 17 saw fragmentation two times whereas the remaining 12 conflict episodes exhibited three or more instances of fragmentation throughout their lifespan.
The studies are not categorial about the nature, motivation, or causes of movements. That is, there is no indication whether they are ideologically motivated, ethnic, or territorial. However, the studies indicate that fragmentation within resistance movements is widespread and not specific to any one group or region. From Ethiopia’s contemporary episode of political differences and eventual fragmentation, some occurred right from the inception of liberation movements. For instance, the division between the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Jabha occurred early in the 1960s. Eventually, TPLF eliminated Jebha and emerged as a cohesive resistance movement until the collapse of the Dergue in 1991 and the cessation of Eritrea in 1993. The latest split within the top leadership of EPLF recurred after the independence of Eritrea. The 1970s split within the leadership of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) is another classical case of elite fragmentation which led to the annihilation and demise of the entire movement. The case of the Tigray Liberation Front (TPLF)- later the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)- is slightly different from the other two examples. The splits within TPLF (later EPRDF) occurred throughout the Fronts’ longevity until the succession of EPRDF by the so-called Prosperity Party (PP) in 2018. PP’s cardinal principles are in line with or motivated by the Prosperity Gospel (PG). I continue to argue that PP is artificially glued together more by the sham prophecy of the PG than the unity of purpose among its core ethnocentric pillars. What is more interesting or compelling are the causes or factors behind the fragmentation of the movements irrespective of their motivation or typology. These include (but are not limited to) external pressures to negotiate peaceful settlements (that divide the “nays, the indifferent, and the years” groups), external sponsors or fund mobilizers manipulating resistance movements along with their entrenched interests, pre-war social networks, ideology, power struggle, relative military capabilities, feeling of betrayal (real or perceived) and, greed or corruption of elites.
Leadership in business and armed movements
As with the various research studies in the field of armed conflicts, leading or elitist business schools across the developed world offer core courses in strategic leadership. The focus is on how best to equip leaders, ensure coherence and cohesiveness within and among the leaders, and foster their capabilities. The courses particularly provide strategic insights into ways and means of taping opportunities and minimizing potential risks, uncertainties, and pitfalls, including fragmentation within. The objectives are to offer wider options for strategic decision-making, address key obstacles, and more importantly deliver results at low cost or higher operational efficiency. This notwithstanding, what makes effective leadership in business and organizational settings may be irrelevant in armed struggles. However, this does not mean that approaches that made businesses successful would not be beneficial to strategists of movements and combatants. Assessing the overall environment, strategic thinking, making difficult decisions, and balancing the cost-benefit of such decisions are all relevant in every circumstance, irrespective of the nature of the operation or the type of business – armed conflicts or otherwise.
Organizational or business leadership is about maximizing profits, enhancing productivity growth, and the growth of output, sales, and profit. It is understanding competitive positions and knowing rival business entities (competitors). Some organizations also devote time, resources, and energy to ensuring high-level social outcomes such as health, education, security, justice, and the police. Some others confine their engagements to development policies and strategies with a focus on poverty reduction, employment creation, and industrialization. The key objectives are to achieve inclusive economic growth, improve the standards of living of citizens, and accelerate overall development processes.
However, leadership in armed struggles involves downgrading the risk of losing one’s life or sustaining lifelong injuries. More importantly, the priorities are saving the lives of others and preventing exposure to permanent hazards. This means that the kind of leadership in military situations means dealing, daily, with matters of life and death both for combatants and civilians alike. It also means minimizing collateral damage to societies, infrastructure, and the economy. Therefore, in armed conflicts or wars, effective leadership is key to achieving the key objectives of the struggle at a low cost to lives and the economy. This is the same for armed resistance movements such as Fano. The priority is to have a common understanding of the enemy’s nature, capabilities, and key objectives binding the struggle against the established enemy.
As I argued previously, the key objectives binding Fanos are (a) to undo ethnic apartheid and fascism in Ethiopia that subjected Amharas to life in permanent isolation, marginalization, intimidation, harassment, constant fear, and never-ending grief; (b) to ensure the protection of the rights of Amharas to exist with dignity and freedom as well as full respect of their fundamental human rights as citizenry; and (c) to revere the combination of ethnic cleansing and cultural, linguistic, and historical genocide being perpetrated on Amharas by Abiy’s regime. The question is what kind of leadership is necessary to achieve such grandiose objectives?
Qualities of leaders in armed struggles with implications for Fanos
There are several qualities of leadership in any armed struggle. I will offer here the five most important and often sighted “qualities of successful leadership”. First, successful leaders in armed struggles are those taught and shaped by experience more than by formative education received, degrees obtained, or decorations bestowed. Experience makes leaders of movements in armed conflicts perfect and enables them to make quick decisions under the most difficult circumstances. Such decisions are not abrupt or random. Instead, they are based on critical assessment of available information and evidence gathered through effective intelligence. Any misinterpretation of the situation and bad judgment about the information can be dearly costly. Second, leaders in armed struggles are also required to be principled, with a high level of integrity, professionalism, and devotion to the cause. Successful army leaders are selfless no matter what. They have no personal political or economic interests other than leading movements to achieve broader objectives. Leaders of movements must lead by example and should be not only reshaped and tested by situations, but they must also be agile and quick to convert challenges into opportunities. Third, leaders in armed resurgences must build mutual credibility and trustworthiness with their subordinates, colleagues, and combat forces. Credibility and wider acceptance are vital for any strategic leadership to communicate along the echelon i.e., with their subordinates, peers, and superiors. Every single combatant irrespective of the hierarchy must be viewed as a vital resource to a successful armed struggle and operation-overt or covert. Therefore, they must seek formal and informal feedback from every entity and every personnel along the echelon. They must also motivate subordinates by recognizing collective and individual achievements as well as contributions to the overall objectives. Fourth, successful leaders in resistance movements are also avid strategists and dynamic to quickly change themselves and their plan to the changing operational environment and specific circumstances. Rigidity, stubbornness, and “I know all” approaches are key traits that must be avoided in any armed struggle or movement. Finally, leaders of resistance movements must devote their time and energy to reflective thinking with a focus not only on foreseeing potential dangers and risks but also on developing appropriate contingency plans to mitigate adverse impacts of risks and uncertainties on the achievement of the overall goals and objectives.
Conclusions
It is vital for the Amhara Resistance Movement (Fanos) not to be destabilized and disenfranchised by the defection and surrender of Cornel Assegid. Instead, they must focus on ways and means of addressing their differences and building internal consistency and unity. They must also focus on the core causes of their struggle and how best to achieve their overall objectives at the least operational cost or the maximum operational efficiency possible. Internal consistency and consensus on the key objectives and operational strategies should be core in Fanos demarche ahead. Available evidence suggests that, while fragmentation is unavoidable in any armed resistance movement, no movement has ever achieved its objectives without consolidating internal unity of purposes. Because unity is power or strength!
Whether Assegid’s defection and surrender is an isolated incidence, or if it would have broader cascading impacts or a domino effect will be seen shortly. Whatever the case may be, there are a series of measures that must be urgently undertaken as part of damage limitation and with a specific aim of building internal unity. These include the following:
(a) It is important to quickly identify and address any potential or actual ramifications of Assegid’s departure to the safety, integrity, and unity of Fanos. This should include openly discussing and addressing obstacles and challenges with a focus on followers, confidants, and sympathizers of Assegid.
(b) Fanos must undertake collective and individual self-reflection and soul-searching within the core leadership about internal grievances, indignation, and causes of the splits or fragmentation.
(c) Urgent actions must also be undertaken to disable all communication lines, hard copies, and ICT apparatus including smartphones, laptops, messaging devices, radio communication waves, and satellite signals used or have links to those that had been used with or by Assegid and his followers.
(d) The diasporas and their social media which have been gaslighting the division by taking sides, must stop now. Because such behaviors will have devastating impacts on the security, unity, operational integrity, and morale of the fighting forces on the ground. It is vital to particularly stop degrading Assegid’s contributions, shaming him based on his past affiliations, and spreading diatribes regarding his fighting forces or close associates. This is key to stopping whitewashing by the propaganda machine of the ethnic political elites currently in power in Ethiopia. We must know that the regime invests hugely in concealing and incriminating facts about the achievements thus far of Fanos and pitching one group against another by propagating little or non-existent divisions along religions, birthplaces, or regions. And
(e) Senior leadership of Fanos must espouse modern, dynamic, and collaborative leadership, instead of solely relying on a single individual’s shoulders. This is vital to foster the credibility and unity of the movement. It is key to develop diverse capabilities to formulate and execute strategies through collective decision-making and “shared responsibilization” of actions and decisions at the least cost possible.
Footnotes :
1Rudloff, P. and Findley, G. M (2016). The downstream effects of combatant fragmentation on civil war recurrence. Journal of Peace Research 53(1):19–32.
2Woldemariam, M. (2011). Why rebels collide: factionalism and fragmentation in African insurgencies. PhD thesis, Princeton University. Available at: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01c247ds11q.
3Fjelde, H., and Nilsson, D. (208). The rise of rebel contenders. Journal of Peace Research, September 2018, Vol. 55, No. 5 (September 2018), pp.551-565.Sage Publications, Inc. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48596183.
Editor’s note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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The death toll from two landslides in a remote region of southern Ethiopia on Monday has risen to 229, according to local authorities.
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Published 12:42 PM EDT, Tue July 23, 2024