Mohammed Hassen Mohamed (Xareed)
By: Mohammed Hassen Mohamed (Xareed)
The transformation of Ethiopia into a landlocked country was not an accidental event but a carefully negotiated outcome of a turbulent political transition. As the Derg regime collapsed in 1991 after years of civil war, ethnic tensions, and economic collapse, Ethiopia entered a moment unlike any other in its modern history. Power shifted into the hands of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition whose primary mission was stabilizing a fractured nation rather than reclaiming territory through force. In the same historical moment, Eritrea, long fighting for independence under the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), had already gained full military and administrative control over the entire Eritrean territory, including the strategic ports of Assab and Massawa. The military reality on the ground was clear: Eritrea was operating as an independent state even before formal independence was declared.
The new Transitional Government of Ethiopia faced a pivotal choice at this sensitive crossroads. It could contest Eritrea’s de facto independence through prolonged war, or it could prioritize healing, reconstruction, and peace. War fatigue had overwhelmed both nations; families were fragmented, infrastructure destroyed, and the economy paralyzed. Ethiopia’s new leaders understood that attempting to reassert sovereignty over Eritrea would plunge the region into another devastating conflict, sinking the country even deeper into chaos. This moment produced a political philosophy rooted in pragmatism and reconciliation. It was within this environment that Ethiopia voluntarily agreed to a referendum in Eritrea, allowing Eritreans to freely determine their political future.
When Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence in the 1993 referendum, Ethiopia honored the result. This decision was guided not only by political goodwill but also by a belief that peace would yield long-term mutual benefits. The transitional leadership expected that, even with Eritrea becoming sovereign, Ethiopia would continue to enjoy unhindered access to Assab through cooperative economic agreements. There was confidence—perhaps overconfidence—that the brotherhood forged during the struggle against the Derg would translate into open borders, shared prosperity, and stable regional integration. The port of Assab was not seen as permanently lost, but as part of a future partnership in which geography would be negotiated through friendship rather than sovereignty. The decision to let go of the port was therefore anchored in two fundamental reasons: the desire to end a thirty-year war that exhausted the nation, and the conviction that peaceful coexistence would guarantee Ethiopia’s continued use of the ports without needing to own them.
This optimism, however, eroded with time. The years following independence saw growing political, economic, and ideological tensions between the two governments. The relationship that was supposed to support shared access to the Red Sea gradually deteriorated into mistrust, competitive nationalism, and conflicting visions of economic control. The cooperation that Ethiopia had counted on as a justification for allowing Eritrea to become a coastal state collapsed entirely with the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean border war in 1998. When the war severed all ties, Ethiopia’s reliance on Assab ended abruptly, and the country shifted entirely to Djibouti for its maritime trade. The strategic vulnerability of being landlocked became undeniable. Ethiopia had made a historic decision based on hopes of regional integration, but the geopolitical winds had changed; treaties crumbled, trust vanished, and the Horn of Africa entered a new era of hardened borders.
In the decades that followed, Ethiopia grew in population, economic ambition, and regional influence, and its sense of urgency regarding sea access intensified. The 21st century has brought a dramatically altered landscape. Ethiopia is now a nation of more than 120 million people with industrial parks, export-oriented manufacturing zones, growing energy generation capacity, expanding military modernization programs, and an economy deeply dependent on international trade. Every year, billions of dollars are spent on port fees, logistics costs, and trade inefficiencies—expenses that weigh heavily on Ethiopia’s development prospects. The realities of global commerce have made it increasingly clear that economic independence is difficult to secure without maritime access. This economic pressure is compounded by a new geopolitical competition over the Red Sea corridor involving global powers, regional blocs, Gulf nations, and rising African economies. In this environment, Ethiopia’s lack of a port has become more than a logistical inconvenience; it has become a strategic vulnerability that affects national security, diplomatic leverage, and the country’s long-term survival as a regional power.
These factors explain why Ethiopia has revived its quest for a port in the 21st century. The contemporary pursuit is driven by a blend of economic necessity, political confidence, demographic expansion, and a renewed sense of national identity. Ethiopia’s leaders argue that a nation of its size, history, and regional contribution cannot remain indefinitely dependent on a single corridor for trade. The conversation is no longer whether Ethiopia should access the sea, but how, where, and under what legal or diplomatic framework. The nation seeks a solution that ensures stability, respects sovereignty, and promotes regional integration while addressing the structural weakness that emerged when the port was relinquished three decades ago.
In many ways, Ethiopia’s present desire to return to the sea is a reflection of lessons learned from the past. The optimism of the early 1990s—believing that peace alone could guarantee port access—collapsed under the weight of regional conflict. Today’s Ethiopia approaches the question with a combination of realism, strategic calculation, and economic urgency. What was once a symbolic gesture of peace has become a practical necessity for survival in an increasingly competitive global and regional environment.
Conclusion
Ethiopia’s transformation into a landlocked country was the product of a deliberate historic choice made during a rare moment of political transition, national vulnerability, and a genuine desire to end decades of war. The decision to support Eritrea’s de facto and de jure independence, including full sovereignty over its coastline, stemmed from the belief that peace, trust, and cooperation would sustain Ethiopia’s access to the sea without requiring territorial possession. Yet history unfolded differently, and the collapse of bilateral relations exposed Ethiopia’s strategic fragility. The revival of the port question in the 21st century is not an attempt to reverse history, but a response to changing geopolitical realities, economic pressures, and national ambitions. Ethiopia’s quest for maritime access today is rooted in the need for long-term stability, economic expansion, and regional influence, making the Red Sea once again central to its destiny. The story that began with hope in the early 1990s continues to evolve, shaped by lessons of the past and the demands of a new century, as Ethiopia seeks to reclaim its rightful connection to the sea through diplomacy, strategy, and vision.
Mohamed Hassan Mohamed (Xareed), an MBA graduate of distinguished merit, is a seasoned academic and lecturer whose expertise spans scientific economic management, business information systems, human development, and a range of interdisciplinary domains. His intellectual contributions—marked by a fusion of advanced scholarly inquiry and strategic analysis—primarily explore the intricate dynamics of geoeconomic competition and regional conflict across the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at: Xareedmo45@gmail.com
Editor’s Note : Views in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of borkena.com
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With all due respect, Ethiopia became a landlocked country by choice when it signed the treaty of Wuchale on May 2nd, 1889, not in 1991. The abyssinian Empire chose to expand south ward by subjugating other nations and nationalities in the south instead of seeking a direct access to the sea. Why did Mnelik do that? Because he had access to the sea through the port of Djibouti. That is why there is a rail way from Addis Abeba to Djibouti and not to Assab or Massawa. This is the in-covertible truth and you have to accept the historical facts. Be grateful that there is a country called Ethiopia that includes fertile lands, endowed with lots of natural resources on its southern part – else that part could have gone to Kenya. Mnelik made a choice and he chose the fertile lands of the south instead of seeking direct access to the sea.