By: Tingirtu Gebretsadik Tekle
The ongoing conflict, initiated and directed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) against the people of the Amhara region, is a continuation of the PM’s genocidal campaign in the Tigray region. This campaign concluded with the Pretoria Agreement, also known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), in November 2022, following two years of intense civil war. Additionally, lethal Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks on civilians have persisted, causing further suffering for the Amhara people for over 15 months now.
The urgent need for military drones by the Fano forces remains a critical and pressing issue for the Amhara community both within and outside Ethiopia. This necessity arises from the ongoing conflict, which has persisted since April 2023. While Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s regime possesses aerial drones, the Amhara Fano military forces are driven by a public cause, demonstrating justified and courageous warfare enthusiasm. However, the conflict remains uneven. The Fano army is a vital force for the Amhara people and beyond, as has been demonstrated sporadically.
The key difference between Fano combatants and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) lies in their respective missions and resources. Fano fighters are engaged in a legitimate struggle for freedom, despite having limited military weapons. In contrast, the regime’s forces are using modern ammunition, including drones, to massacre civilians under the guise of restoring law and order. These actions by Abiy Ahmed’s army have led to violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws, yet the international community and the West remain largely indifferent.
The use of drones in warfare raises serious ethical concerns about civilian casualties and perpetuates a cycle of violence and retaliation, further complicating the conflict. Consequently, the freedom fighters rely on guerrilla tactics, hit-and-run operations, and local support to counterbalance their lack of drones. The international community’s response can significantly influence the conflict’s trajectory and overall perspective. External support, whether through arms or diplomatic pressure, is crucial given the disproportionate distribution of armaments, which currently favors the regime.
UAVs Ownership
Many countries possess UAVs (drones), and the cost of these instruments is notably high. For instance, the US operates expensive Predator drones, which cost around $12 million (£9.5 million). However, more affordable drones are produced by Turkey, Iran, and China1. Remarkably, these three countries have been supplying drones to Abiy Ahmed’s army. Consequently, these ‘cheaper’ drones are being provided to the current governments in Ethiopia and neighboring countries, resulting in significant financial costs and numerous civilian casualties.
There are numerous international laws regarding the ownership of military drones, though these laws are often not strictly enforced2. Consequently, many poorer countries are acquiring drones with the assistance of governments like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. These nations procure drones from their partner and producer governments and then supply them to African dictator governments to serve their own interests. For example, the UAE, a major consumer of Chinese drones, has been discreetly exporting them to the continent to support allied forces, as seen in Libya and Ethiopia. Turkey also produces military technologies and has been selling them to the Ethiopian government. Ironically, Turkey is a signatory of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an intergovernmental initiative aimed at curbing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, another intergovernmental framework designed to enhance international security and stability by promoting transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies3.
Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports to Ethiopia surged to $51 million in the first three months of 2021, with further increases in August and September4. This was during December 2021, while Abiy Ahmed’s ENDF was engaged in war with Tigray forces. It is conceivable that many more drones have been purchased (or borrowed) since then, investing multiple millions of dollars solely to slaughter civilians in its own country.
In addition to Turkey, China is also providing drones for its interests. The Chinese-made Wing Loong 2 armed UAV has been spotted at Ethiopian airbases5. Moreover, Iran is also supplying Abiy’s army with these technology-induced lethal weapons. Armed drones consistent with Iran’s Mujaher-6 have also been spotted in Ethiopia6. At least these three countries have been identified as arming dictators like Abiy and causing massacres of civilians.
Unenforced international laws indirectly enable dictators to possess devastating weapons, causing immense suffering for civilians. Turkish officials have responded to these sales with impudence and irresponsibility. For instance, then-foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated at the G20 summit in Rome in November 2021, “If a country buys [those] [drones] from us, they are no longer Turkish.”7
Iran is another producer of drones, supplying incumbent governments in Africa. Over the past six months in 2024, Iran has provided the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with weapons, a strategy some analysts believe is intended to establish an Iranian naval presence on Sudan’s Red Sea coast8. Iran’s involvement adds another layer of complexity in the Horn of Africa, obstructing the interests of oppressed people.
Abiy Ahmed has received a variety of drones from different ‘partner’ governments to target his own citizens. Since August 2022, Ethiopia’s military has assembled a diverse fleet of Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish drones9. The consequences of these actions are evident daily, with civilian lives being lost in the Amhara region.
It is evident that these governments supply drones to further their own interests, often at the expense of civilian lives. For example, the informal delivery of Bayraktar TB2 drones to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government in 2021 was accompanied by the closure of a dozen schools affiliated with Hizmet, the movement led by preacher Fethullah Gülen, which is opposed by Ankara10. However, such narrow interests should not justify the use of drones in civil conflicts, as is currently happening in the Amhara region.
The Awful Fact Behind Military Drones in Civil Wars
The past six years under Abiy Ahmed’s leadership have been marked by tumultuous conflicts, waged not to defend the country’s sovereignty but as civil wars. A genocidal war with the Tigray region’s forces began in November 2020 and concluded in November 2022 with the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). The conflict with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLA) has been ongoing for a few months after Abiy’s inauguration in April 2018. Additionally, the genocidal war in the Amhara region has persisted for the past 15 months.
Despite the regime’s claims of ‘restoring’ law and order, the genocidal war on Amhara has continued since April 2023, with the government’s control over the region’s territories remaining tenuous. Even with the advantage of importing and using heavy weaponry, including UAVs, Abiy has been unable to seize substantial areas of the country’s second most populous region. The government often exhibits lenient attitudes, dreaming of controlling this vast geographic area, but these ambitions have proven largely inaccessible, resulting only in suffering for the people of Amhara.
International laws of war prohibit attacks on civilians and civilian properties. Unfortunately, these laws are not being enforced to pressure Abiy Ahmed’s unjust war against the Amhara people and region. According to Action on Armed Violence, there have been 79 incidents of explosive weapons use in Ethiopia since 2013, with 61% (48 incidents) occurring in 2021 and 2022, and a further nine incidents recorded in 202311. These drone attacks clearly demonstrate the genocidal intent and actions of Abiy’s Prosperity Party (PP) ruling government.
In addition to other drone purchases made by the Ethiopian government, Iran’s direct involvement in the civil war prior to the current Amhara struggle is significant. Iran has sold several UAVs to Ethiopia during the Tigray war and to General Abdel al-Burhan in the current conflict in Sudan12. This sale to Abiy for his civil war project inside the country has continued into the later civil war in Sudan as well.
If an armistice is not declared soon, the tragedy will not only worsen but could also destabilize neighboring countries in the already fragile Horn of Africa (HoA). To prevent this, it is crucial to address the imbalance in drone possession, allowing the Fano forces to acquire drones. Without this, the civilian loss of lives will dramatically increase as the unjust control of the skies continues. All involved parties must work towards an attainable solution to prevent further disintegration and annihilation in the country and its neighbors.
Ethiopia’s Borrowed UAVs versus the Asymmetrical Skies
The skies over the regions where the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) operate are a vacuum for the Fano freedom fighters, who lack air power, particularly drones. In contrast, the skies above the Amhara forces and even the Amhara population are filled with military drones and aircraft. This imbalance results in unfair and devastating bombings on civilians, leading to massive catastrophes. This unbalanced situation should be a serious concern for all involved countries and partners.
For instance, on the morning of Monday, February 19, an Ethiopian drone struck a truck while it was dropping off passengers near Sasit, a town in Ethiopia’s embattled Amhara state. The truck was reportedly carrying up to 50 passengers, resulting in at least 30 civilian deaths and 18 injuries13&17. Additionally, weeks after a deadly drone attack on November 30 killed five civilians in the town of Wegel Tena in Ethiopia’s Amhara region, about 570 km (350 miles) north of the capital, Addis Ababa, witnesses are still reeling from the trauma14. These incidents are just a few examples of the numerous drone attacks that have caused significant civilian casualties in the Amhara region.
The real solution lies not only with the warring parties but also with the international community, particularly the West and UN bodies, in addressing this unjust warfare and the massacres of civilians. The primary step that all concerned countries should take is to stop the civilian bombings of Amharas by Abiy Ahmed’s government. Additionally, ensuring a level playing field in terms of weaponry ownership is a matter of justice that must be considered.
Possible Resolutions
Under Abiy Ahmed’s six years of tumultuous and insecure rule, there is a widespread longing for the peaceful coexistence that existed before March 2010. During these years, Abiy’s government has bombed civilians, moving from one region to another.
When Fano forces carry out bold military operations on the ground, resulting in significant losses for ENDF soldiers, Abiy’s government retaliates with borrowed drones, targeting helpless civilians. These military responses disproportionately affect civilians, leading to humanitarian crises, mass casualties, displacement, and long-term psychological trauma for the Amhara community. It is crucial for the international community to address these human rights violations and advocate for peaceful resolutions to prevent further escalation and suffering.
Letitia Bader, Deputy Africa Director for Human Rights Watch, stated in July that “foreign governments and international organizations have sought to return to ‘business as usual’ with the Ethiopian government despite the absence of normality on the ground.”15 She also warned that “continued civilian suffering from the conflict in Amhara means much greater international scrutiny is needed in Ethiopia.”16 This perspective is accurate, but no significant action has been taken yet. Therefore, foreign countries, particularly those in the West, and international organizations need to urgently address this pressing issue before it worsens.
Abiy’s regime has continued to issue incendiary rhetoric, showing no interest in engaging in inclusive negotiations. Western nations can exert pressure on dictator rulers like Abiy Ahmed. Primarily, imposing more sanctions on Abiy’s government is crucial. Additionally, similar and proportional sanctions on agents and drone suppliers, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are necessary for the common good and to stabilize the African continent. Unless the international community increases pressure on Abiy to halt his atrocities and come to the negotiation table, the situation will likely worsen. Above all, as the proliferation of drones continues to escalate, with an increasing number of countries acquiring these technologies, it is imperative that we establish a comprehensive global treaty-based protocol to manage their use. The devastating consequences of ill-managed drones have already been witnessed in various conflicts, resulting in the indiscriminate massacre of civilians. To prevent such atrocities from becoming the norm, we must learn from the nuclear non-proliferation regime and establish a similar treaty-based framework for drones. A treaty-based approach would provide a more robust and binding commitment from nations, ensuring that drones are not used as weapons of mass destruction. This would entail stringent regulations, transparent monitoring, and accountability mechanisms, as well as regular inspections and verifications to prevent non-compliance. By establishing a treaty-based protocol, we can ensure that the international community is united in preventing the misuse of drones and protecting civilian lives, thereby avoiding the catastrophic consequences of unregulated drone usage.
Mr. Tingirtu is a former Assistant Professor of Sociology at Jigjiga University (JJU) until May 2023. He was forced to immigrate to the United States due to the worsening political situation in Ethiopia. The author continues to advocate for human rights and social justice. He can be reached at tingirtsocy@gmail.com
Footnotes
1. The Guardian, “The Guardian view on the new drone wars: as prices fall, casualties mount”, Feb. 13, 2024. The Guardian www.theguardian.com
2. Geoffroy Van Der Hasslet, “Africa, the new playground for drone exporters”, Jan. 05, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/05/africa
3. Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey admits to allowing Ethiopia to deploy drones involved in mass civilian casualties”, August 1, 2024. Nordic Monitor nordicmonitor.com
4. Alex Gatopoulos, “How armed drones may have helped turn the tide in Ethiopia’s war” Dec. 10, 2021. Al Jazeera www.aljazeera.com
5. Alex Gatopoulos, “How armed drones may have helped turn the tide in Ethiopia’s war” Dec. 10, 2021. Al Jazeera www.aljazeera.com
6. Alex Gatopoulos, “How armed drones may have helped turn the tide in Ethiopia’s war” Dec. 10, 2021. Al Jazeera www.aljazeera.com
7. Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkey admits to allowing Ethiopia to deploy drones involved in mass civilian casualties”, August 1, 2024. Nordic Monitor nordicmonitor.com
8. ADF, “Iran Pours Weapons Into Sudan In Push For Naval Base”, Jul. 30, 2024. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/iran-pours-weapons-into-sudan-in-push-for-naval base/
9. Fred Harter, “Ethiopia’s drone wars: Iran, China and Turkey deliver the air power behind Abiy’s resurgence”, January 25, 2022. The Africa Report www.theafricareport.com
10. Geoffroy Van Der Hasslet, “Africa, the new playground for drone exporters”, Jan. 05, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/05/africa
11. Chiara Torelli, AQAV, “Ethiopia: 30 killed, 18 injured in Ethiopian air strike on passenger truck near Sasit, Amhara”, Feb. 23, 2024. ReliefWeb https://reliefweb.int
12. Geoffroy Van Der Hasslet, “Africa, the new playground for drone exporters”, Jan. 05, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/05/africa
13. Chiara Torelli, AQAV, “Ethiopia: 30 killed, 18 injured in Ethiopian air strike on passenger truck near Sasit, Amhara”, Feb. 23, 2024. ReliefWeb https://reliefweb.int
14. Zecharias Zelalem, “‘Collective punishment’: Ethiopia drone strikes target civilians in Amhara”, Dec. 29, 2023. Al Jazeera www.aljazeera.com
15. HRW, “Ethiopia: Army Attacks Health Care in Amhara Conflict”. July 03, 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/03
16. HRW, “Ethiopia: Army Attacks Health Care in Amhara Conflict”. July 03, 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/03
17. Max Bearak, Meg Kelly and Joyce Sohyun Lee, “How Ethiopia used a Turkish drone in a strike that killed nearly 60 civilians”, Feb. 7, 2022. Washington Post
www.washingtonpost.com
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Amhara won’t get Drones nobody will give it to you. Western Tigray is Tigray land. Using Drones against Fano is legitimate. You don’t need a level playing field. You don’t deserve fairness at all. Fano and Amhara supporters have run out of your usefulness.
Why are Amhara crying about Drones now? The Drones have been there for years. It’s proof Amhara are losing the war. Zero point to crying about Drones now. “Fairness in war” doesn’t exist Cope and seethe Amhara.