Part II: The Dual-State Architecture



Majoritarian Ethnic Domination and Expansion: The Two-Pronged Ways of Exercising Power by the Oromo Prosperity Party

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1. Introduction: From Internal Capture to Externalized Expansion

This manuscript constitutes Part II of a two-part academic investigation into the structural transformation of the contemporary Ethiopian state under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Oromo-led Prosperity Party (PP). Whereas Part I examined the internal architecture of the regime—demonstrating how a single ethno-regional elite captured and fused both sides of the Ethiopian federal saddle to govern simultaneously as the federal national government (Ethiopia) and the regional state apparatus (Oromia)—Part II shifts the analytical lens outward. It examines the externalized, expansionist exercise of that consolidated power: the systematic territorial, demographic, administrative, and cultural projection of Oromia's dominance across Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's contiguous regional states, and the wider Horn of Africa.

1.1 Recapitulation of Part I: The Architecture of the Dual State

To situate the expansionist dynamics documented in this part, it is necessary to recall the institutional, ideological, and economic foundations established in Part I. Part I demonstrated that Ethiopia's post-2018 political crisis is rooted in the structural fictions of the 1995 Constitution, which divided a deeply interwoven, multi-ethnic society into rigid ethno-linguistic regional states under the false premise that homogeneous ethnic groups occupy neatly bounded territories (Asnake, 2013, p. 112). This constitutional design institutionalized four interlocking systemic crises: mandatory ethnic profiling through administrative identification documents that exposed targeted populations such as the Amhara to massacres and displacement (Abbink, 2006, p. 153; CMI, 2004, p. 5; Melesse, 2021, p. 2; Yirga, 2026, p. 7); forced assimilation and "mnemonic re-engineering" in contested areas such as Wolkait, Raya, Dera, and Metekel (Tesfaye, 2008, p. 210; Yirga, 2026, p. 9); the systematic subordination of civic Ethiopian identity to ethnic allegiance (John, 2021, p. 11; Melesse, 2021, p. 4); and the reduction of internal minorities to second-class citizens subjected to violent demographic engineering in mixed urban centers (Fisher & Gebrewold, 2022, p. 45). The resulting permanentization of conflict displaced between 5 million people, destroyed agricultural capital through "eco-violence," and drained the national economy of $1.1 billion to $2 billion annually (Bellizzi et al., 2020, p. 14; Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 78; IDMC, 2023, p. 12; Makango et al., 2023, p. 8).

Theoretically, Part I synthesized these developments through the dual-state paradigm (Kebede, 2023, p. 42), drawing on Ernst Fraenkel's (1941, p. xiii) distinction between a formal "normative state" and an extrajudicial "prerogative state," alongside Oren Yiftachel's (2006, p. 11) model of ethnocracy. To capture the dynamic mechanics of this takeover, Part I also applied the Parasitoid State Model,

tracing how critics argue the post-2018 transition moved sequentially from initial entry under the rhetoric of Medemer (the Injection) to the occupation of core federal institutions (the Consumption), the demographic and administrative targeting of Addis Ababa (Migration to the Head), and the looming threat of systemic state collapse into an ethnocratic Oromo successor state (Decapitation and Emergence) (Abbink, 2022, p. 89).

Empirically, Part I mapped five interconnected pillars through which the Oromo-PP consolidated absolute domestic control following the dissolution of the EPRDF (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 118):

1. **Coercive and Proxy Security Architecture:** Beginning with tacitly enabled bank raids across Wollega that expropriated hundreds of millions of Birr (Borkena, 2019, p. 2), the regional leadership constructed a heavily armed proxy force that function in coordination with the militarized Oromia Special Force that numbers 200,000 personnel trained not as police force but in commando infantry and motorized force standards (EHRC, 2022, p. 14; EIP, 2021, pp. 12–13). Following the April 2023 federal disbandment directive (Garowe Online, 2023, p. 1), Oromia nominally complied by rebranding its elite paramilitaries into the Gada Commando—reviving historical Gada martial and assimilationist templates such as Raabaa-Doorii, Gaaduu, and Moggaasa (Addis Standard, 2026, p. 1; Bahrey, 1593/1954, p. 121; Gnamo, 2014, p. 34; Hassen, 1990, pp. 18, 63; Horn Observer, n.d., p. 1; Zewde, 2001, p. 17). Part I cataloged how this force operates alongside the Oromia Regular Police (Molla Ewenetu, 2025, p. 1), localized Gaachana Sirnaa kebele militias (EHRCO, 2022, p. 9; UK Home Office, 2026, p. 7), Repi Lola tactical strike squads (Amnesty International, 2020, p. 12; Paravicini, 2024, p. 1), and the clandestine Koree Nageenyaa shadow committee responsible for extrajudicial assassinations, torture, and "ghost prisons" (Amnesty International, 2026, p. 14; EHRC, 2024a, pp. 1–2; Paravicini, 2024, pp. 1–5; Reuters, 2023, p. 3). Complementing these state organs are deniable proxy networks—pseudo-Shene, pseudo-Fano, and the 120 Group (Addis Standard, 2023, p. 5; Addis Standard, 2026, p. 12; Human Rights Watch, 2022, p. 31)—as well as a quota-driven forced conscription and police extortion apparatus that has abducted vulnerable civilians, including minors as young as 11 and individuals with disabilities (Addis Standard, 2024, p. 1; EHRC, 2024, p. 4; Ethiopian Policy Institute, 2024, p. 1; UK Home Office, 2026, p. 7; U.S. Department of Labor, 2024, p. 1).
2. **Stratified Political Hierarchy:** Part I detailed how Abiy Ahmed fused co-opted OLF/ODF veterans (Østebø, 2020, p. 112; Tronvoll, 2021, p. 88), legacy

OPDO elders and former Oromia presidents (Africa Confidential, 2024, p. 3; Girma, 2024, p. 32; International Crisis Group, 2023, p. 14), reprocessed TPLF/EPRDF veterans, and hyper-loyal inner-circle Oromo radicals such as Shimelis Abdisa and Adanech Abebe (Bekele, 2025, p. 77; Human Rights Watch, 2023, p. 41) into a disciplined political machine, while traditional Oromo opposition factions frequently converged with the regime whenever overarching ethnic hegemony was perceived to be at stake (Mohammed, 2024, p. 112; OLF Press Release, 2023, p. 2).

3. **Military, Surveillance, and Diplomatic Capture:** Part I documented the centralization of apex Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) commands, the Ethiopian Air Force, Defense Intelligence, and Logistics under Oromo loyalist officers (Addis Standard, 2026, p. 1; Fana MC English, 2026, p. 14; POA English, 2026, p. 28). This command structure is synchronized with regional enforcement through a high-tech surveillance ecosystem—integrating foreign UAVs, INSA, and the Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute—to execute rapid strikes and warrantless roundups (Borkena, 2026, p. 17; Fana MC English, 2026, p. 2), while strategic embassies in global capitals, the Gulf, and neighboring states are staffed by political heavyweights and military generals to safeguard foreign loans, secure military assistance and supply including drones, and give diplomatic cover to the atrocities and massacres the regime and its proxies commit periodically.
4. **Ideological, Religious, and Informational Hegemony:** Part I analyzed the regime's fusion of ethnic politics with the Pentecostal Prosperity Gospel into an emerging ethnocratic theocracy (Group Transition Charter, 2019, p. 2; Østebø, 2025, pp. 1, 12), marked by state interference in the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (Mejlis) and backing for a breakaway Oromia Orthodox Synod to weaken the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) (Amba Professionals Union, 2023, pp. 2–3; Amnesty International, 2023, p. 22; Haustein et al., 2026, p. 322; Plaut, 2023, p. 2). Concurrently, a coercive state-directed "cyber army" and state broadcasters deploy astroturfing, AI-generated disinformation, and internet blackouts to silence critics and obscure human rights abuses (Access Now, 2024, pp. 12, 15; BBC News, 2024, paras. 6, 12–14; Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024, p. 8; UNHRC, 2023, pp. 18, 24).
5. **Political Economy of State Capture and Debt Distress:** Finally, Part I demonstrated how the regime redirected state procurement, constitutionally state-owned land, and scarce foreign currency toward favored conglomerates such as the OVID Group and the building of luxury vanity resorts (Brill, 2025, p. 43; Human Rights Watch, 2023, pp. 200–202; World Bank, 2018, p. 5). These oligarchic cartels directly finance the war effort—exemplified by OVID's

1.7 billion Birr apartment transfer to the ENDF—even as unchecked borrowing and internal warfare pushed Ethiopia into official debt distress with public debt exceeding 50 percent of GDP (Capital Ethiopia, 2024, p. 1; Ethiopia Today, 2026, p. 1; IMF, 2025, p. 6; IMF & World Bank, 2025, p. 2; U.S. Department of State, 2024, p. 7).

1.2 The Analytical Pivot: From Domestic Consolidation to Territorial and Regional Expansion

Having established how the Oromo-PP built and financed this bifurcated power center in Part I, Part II investigates what happens when that apparatus is projected outward. Prior to 2018, conflicts involving Oromia were largely defensive reactions against TPLF-dominated federal centralization; post-2018, however, Oromo political elites no longer fight the federal state—they are the federal state (Fisher & Gebrewahd, 2019, p. 32). By shedding its role as a neutral constitutional arbiter and weaponizing federal military, financial, and administrative power in service of regional maximalism, the regime has locked Ethiopia into a permanent cycle of balkanizing conflict (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 118).

Part II traces this externalized expansion across three interlocking spatial arenas from 2018 through October 2026. First, at the political center, it examines the struggle for Addis Ababa (Finfinne) and the surrounding Sheger City municipality, where constitutional ambiguity has been leveraged through violent mob attacks, the forced imposition of regional symbols in multi-ethnic schools, urban land expropriation, and the ethnically targeted demolition of more than 100,000 homes—rendering over 500,000 residents homeless—to engineer demographic and administrative control over the federal capital (Addis Standard, 2022, p. 3; Amnesty International, 2018, p. 12; Amnesty International, 2023, p. 19; Amnesty International, 2026, p. 11; EHRCO, 2023, p. 7; Human Rights Watch, 2020, p. 24; Human Rights Watch, 2024, p. 31).

Second, Part II compiles a systematic, multi-front empirical record of structural violence and territorial contestation across every regional border contiguous with Oromia: the Amhara borderlands of North Shewa, Minjar Shenkora, Dera, and Wollo (ACLED, 2026, p. 4; Amnesty International, 2021, p. 12; EHRC, 2021, p. 8; Human Rights Watch, 2023, p. 28); the Afar pastoralist corridors around Awash and Fentale (Addis Standard, 2021, p. 2; EHRCO, 2023, p. 14; Regional Early Warning Systems Report, 2026, p. 9); the Somali frontier across Moyale, Babile, and Eastern Hararghe, where clashes displaced roughly 1.5 million people (EHRC Special Report, 2026, p. 14; EHRCO, 2022, p. 27; Human Rights Watch, 2019, p. 22); the western frontiers of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela (ACLED, 2025, p. 6; ACLED,

2026, p. 7; EHRC, 2019, p. 11; EHRC, 2022, p. 12; EHRCO, 2021, p. 22); the eastern enclaves of Harari and Dire Dawa (Amnesty International, 2018, p. 5; EHRCO, 2020, p. 18); and the southern frontiers encompassing Sidama, South Ethiopia (where the West Guji–Gedeo conflict alone displaced over one million people), Central Ethiopia, and SWEPR (ACLED, 2026, p. 8; Addis Standard, 2022, p. 2; Amnesty International, 2020, p. 15; EHRCO, 2022, p. 33; EHRCO, 2024, p. 12; Refugees International, 2018, p. 5).

Third, Part II situates this territorial drive within a deeper historical-ideological and transnational genealogy. It traces the modern geopolitical concept of "Oromia" back to the 19th-century German missionary Johann Ludwig Krapf, who coined the term in the early 1840s, dubbed the Oromo the "Germans of Africa," and petitioned British and German powers from Ankober and Mombasa to colonize and Protestantize a contiguous transnational Oromo territory stretching from the Ethiopian highlands deep into Kenya (Beke, 1845, p. 96; Dictionary of African Christian Biography, 2026, p. 1; Feyissa & Haustein, 2023, p. 8; Imberg, 2022, pp. 57, 61; Oromo Studies Association, 2011, p. 16; Sahlberg, 1997, p. 53; Vilhanová, 2006, p. 80). Part II demonstrates how contemporary critics draw direct parallels between Krapf's colonial-evangelical blueprint and the Abiy administration's fusion of state Protestantization, EOTC suppression, and regional expansionism (CUNY Graduate Center, 2026, p. 4; Feyissa & Haustein, 2023, p. 23; Rift Valley Institute, 2023, p. 23; WardheerNews, 2026, p. 1)—a dynamic now spilling across international borders in the Moyale conflict, displacing tens of thousands into Kenya's Marsabit County and triggering national security alarms in Nairobi (AllAfrica, 2026, p. 1; Peace News, 2026, p. 1).

1.3 Aims and Structure of Part II

Building directly upon the institutional diagnosis established in Part I, Part II pursues five primary analytical aims:

1. **Trace the Post-2018 Transformation of Conflict:** Analyze how the Oromo-PP's capture of the federal state converted historically defensive regional disputes into state-backed, asymmetric ethno-territorial expansionism (Fisher & Gebrewahd, 2019, p. 32; Tronvoll, 2022, p. 118).
2. **Document Demographic and Administrative Engineering at the Center:** Examine the systematic assertion of exclusive ethno-nationalist control over Addis Ababa (Finfinne) and the creation of Sheger City through forced demolitions, cultural impositions, and urban land expropriation (Amnesty International, 2026, p. 11; Human Rights Watch, 2024, p. 31).

3. **Map Multi-Front Borderland Conflicts (2018–2026):** Provide a chronological, empirically grounded synthesis of atrocities, displacements, and territorial encroachments along Oromia's borders with Amhara, Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, Dire Dawa, Sidama, and the Southern Regions.
4. **Uncover the Historical-Ideological Genealogy of Transnational Expansion:** Interrogate the intellectual continuity between Johann Ludwig Krapf's 19th-century vision of a Protestantized, transnational "Oromia" and contemporary state postures, including the cross-border security spillover into Kenya via Moyale (AllAfrica, 2026, p. 1; Feyissa & Haustein, 2023, p. 23; Imberg, 2022, p. 61).
5. **Assess Multidimensional Impacts and Formulate Structural Policy Pathways:** Evaluate the cascading social, economic, and political toll of permanentized conflict—including the existential risk of Yugoslav-style balkanization (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 119)—and propose a comprehensive framework of constitutional, institutional, land-tenure, and transitional justice reforms required to dismantle the structural drivers of violence.

2. The Transformation of Conflict Post-2018

The empirical trajectory of Ethiopia's territorial crises cannot be understood without first recognizing the fundamental structural inversion that occurred in 2018. Before 2018, Oromo political elites and civilian populations were largely excluded from absolute federal state power, which was dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Consequently, conflicts involving Oromia were predominantly defensive in character—exemplified by the Addis Ababa Master Plan protests—and aimed at resisting federal encroachment.

Since 2018, however, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Oromo Prosperity Party (PP) have captured the federal state apparatus in its entirety. As a result, the Oromia regional government is no longer fighting the federal state; it is the federal state (Fisher & Gebrewahd, 2019, p. 32). The federal center has ceased to function as a neutral constitutional arbiter and has instead been actively weaponized. By injecting disproportionate federal resources into the Oromia region, tolerating proxy insurgencies such as the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) when strategically convenient, and deploying the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) to suppress rival regions, the current regime has locked Ethiopia into a permanent cycle of balkanizing violence (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 118).

3. Structural Expansion and the Permanentization of Conflict Across Contested Regions

Following the consolidation of federal power, this asymmetric dual-state structure manifested across Ethiopia's internal borders in a wave of coordinated demographic engineering, administrative annexation, and armed confrontation. The subsections below document this multi-front expansion chronologically from 2018 through October 2026, beginning with the federal capital at the geographic center and moving systematically across every contiguous regional state.

3.1 The Struggle for Addis Ababa (Finfinne) and Sheger City

Addis Ababa represents the ultimate paradox of Ethiopia's ethnic federalism: a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic federal capital entirely enclaved within the Oromia Regional State. Since 2018, constitutional ambiguity surrounding Oromia's "special interest" in the capital has been leveraged to assert exclusive ethno-nationalist ownership over the city. This campaign has manifested through targeted mob violence on the urban periphery, the forced imposition of the Oromia regional flag and anthem in multi-ethnic public schools, the aggressive expansion of Oromia jurisdiction via the creation of "Sheger City," and the systematic demolition of homes belonging primarily to non-Oromo residents to alter the metropolitan demographic balance.

Table 1: Chronology of Demographic Engineering and Conflict in Addis Ababa and Sheger City (2018–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Sept 2018 Burayu (Addis Ababa outskirts)	Qeerroo (Oromo youth militias); local Oromia police	Targeted mob violence against ethnic Gamo and Gurage minorities; bludgeoning and forced eviction. **Impact:** 23–50 killed; ~15,000 displaced.	Amnesty International (2018, p. 12); EHRC (2019, p. 8).
June–July 2020 Addis Ababa (various sub-cities)	Qeerroo; Oromia Special Forces; Federal Police	Following Hachalu Hundessa's assassination, mobs attacked non-Oromo neighborhoods based on identity. **Impact:** Dozens killed in Addis (>160 nationwide); massive property destruction.	Human Rights Watch (2020, p. 24); EHRCO (2020, p. 14).
Dec 2022 Addis Ababa Public Schools	Oromia Regional Education Bureau; Oromo PP; Federal Police	Violent enforcement of Oromia's anthem and flag; beatings and mass arrests of protesting students and teachers. **Impact:** Hundreds of students beaten and detained.	Addis Standard (2022, p. 3); Amnesty International (2023, p. 19).

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
2021–2024 Sheger City (Addis Ababa periphery)	Oromia Regional Govt; Oromia Special Police; municipal bulldozers	Systematic, ethnically targeted demolition of homes and mosques of Amhara, Gurage, and other minorities; extrajudicial killings. **Impact:** >100,000 homes destroyed; >500,000 rendered homeless; multiple shot.	Human Rights Watch (2024, p. 31); EHRCO (2023, p. 7).
Jan–Oct 2026 Addis Ababa (Gulele, Kolfe Keranio)	Oromo PP operatives; Federal Security Forces	Expropriation of urban land for Oromo elites; violent crackdowns on civic associations protesting demographic engineering. **Impact:** Unspecified civilian casualties during protests; thousands facing relocation.	Amnesty International (2026, p. 11); Independent Media Reports (2026).

3.2 Oromia and Amhara Regional States

Beyond the capital, the northern frontier between Oromia and the Amhara Regional State—particularly across North Shewa, the Oromia Special Zone, Minjar Shenkora, Dera Woreda, and the Wollo borderlands—has become one of the most lethal theaters of ethno-territorial violence. Recurring cycles of massacres, identity-based executions, and forced demographic clearing have devastated agrarian communities and triggered massive secondary displacement.

Table 2: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along the Oromia–Amhara Border (2021–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
April 2021 North Shewa Zone & Oromia Special Zone	OLA; Fano militias; Amhara Special Forces; Oromia Special Forces	Mass civilian massacres, ethnically targeted assassinations, shelling neighborhoods, and burning of towns. **Impact:** ~200+ civilians killed; ~250,000 displaced to Debre Berhan.	Amnesty International (2021, p. 12); EHRC (2021, p. 8).
March–April 2022 Minjar Shenkora (Amhara) & Fentale (Oromia) border	Local Oromo and Amhara militias; regional security forces	Summary executions of travelers based on ethnic ID cards; ambushes on agricultural workers. **Impact:** Dozens killed; ~15,000 locally displaced.	EHRCO (2022, p. 5); Human Rights Watch (2022, p. 18).
Late 2022–2023 Dera Woreda (North Shewa border)	OLA insurgents; Fano militias; ENDF	Kidnapping civil servants, extrajudicial killings of farmers, and forced demographic clearing. **Impact:** Hundreds of casualties; >50,000 rural residents displaced.	Human Rights Watch (2023, p. 28).
Jan–Sept 2026	Fano militias; ENDF; local Oromia security	Spillover from Amhara insurgency; targeted destruction of infrastructure and cross-border raids.	ACLED (2026, p. 4).

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Wollo borderlands & Dera corridor		**Impact:** Unverified casualties; significant secondary displacement.	

3.3 Oromia and Afar Regional States

To the northeast, the strategic Awash–Fentale corridor linking central Ethiopia to Djibouti's maritime trade routes has experienced persistent armed clashes between Oromia regional forces and Afar pastoralist communities. Driven by municipal boundary disputes, federal resource allocations, and drought-induced pastoralist migration, these clashes have repeatedly disrupted vital commercial highways and destroyed pastoralist livelihoods.

Table 3: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along the Oromia–Afar Border (2020–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Dec 2020 Awash border areas & Fentale woreda	Afar pastoralist militias; Oromia Liyu Police	Indiscriminate firing on encampments; destruction of water infrastructure; killing of livestock. **Impact:** 30–50 pastoralists killed; ~10,000 displaced.	Addis Standard (2021, p. 2).
Mid-2022 Awash Fentale & Highway Checkpoints	Armed youth groups; regional paramilitaries	Highway ambushes, targeted shootings of commercial drivers, and disruption of trade corridors. **Impact:** ~20 civilians/drivers killed.	Addis Standard (2022, p. 1).
Nov 2023 Border kebeles near Awash National Park	Local militias; Oromia Special Forces	Violent clashes over municipal boundary demarcations tied to federal resource allocation. **Impact:** ~15 combatants and civilians killed.	EHRCO (2023, p. 14).
Feb–May 2026 Eastern Fentale border	Afar paramilitaries; Oromia security forces	Artillery skirmishes following severe drought and livestock migration across state lines. **Impact:** Dozens of casualties; >5,000 pastoralists displaced.	Regional Early Warning Systems Report (2026, p. 9).

3.4 Oromia and Somali Regional States

Along Ethiopia's vast eastern and southeastern frontier, territorial competition between Oromia and the Somali Regional State has generated some of the largest internal displacement crises in modern Ethiopian history. Spanning 157 contested kebeles from Babile and Eastern Hararghe to Moyale and Negele Borana, protracted clashes involving regional special forces and proxy militias have repeatedly

escalated into mass evictions and cross-border spillover—culminating in a major October–November 2026 escalation across seven districts that displaced nearly 700,000 people internally and drove over 50,000 refugees into Kenya's Marsabit County (Africanews, 2026; Islamic Relief, 2026).

Table 4: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along the Oromia–Somali Border (2018–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Late 2018–2019 Moyale, Babile, Deka, Negele Borana	Somali Liyu Police; Oromia Liyu Hail; local armed youth	Extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, ethnic profiling, and mass evictions across 157 kebeles. **Impact:** Hundreds of civilians killed; ~1.5 million displaced.	Human Rights Watch (2019, p. 22); IOM (2019).
2021–2022 Babile & Eastern Hararghe border	Local proxy militias; regional police	Sporadic border raids targeting agricultural settlements; burning of rural huts and looting. **Impact:** ~40–60 civilians killed; ~50,000 subjected to secondary displacement.	EHRCO (2022, p. 27).
Oct–Nov 2026 Moyale (Borana zone), seven bordering districts (300 km corridor), & Marsabit County (Kenya)	Oromia & Somali regional forces; localized armed militias; proxy actors (Ethiopian federal forces absent or unverified; Kenyan multi-agency security & KDF deployed on border)	Sparked mid-October by a regional flag/office dispute and escalated after the killing of a 13-year-old girl; heavy weapons and artillery destroyed homes, businesses, petrol stations, and essential services across seven districts, halting trade. **Victims (Killed & Displaced):** Initial hospital tallies confirmed at least 9 killed and ~30 wounded in Moyale (full Ethiopian toll unverified due to access restrictions); on the Kenyan side, stray bullets killed 2–3 Kenyans and injured 20+. Nearly 700,000 displaced internally across southern Ethiopia; 30,000–60,000 Ethiopians (est. ~50,000) fled into Kenya's Marsabit County alongside ~10,000 displaced Kenyans. **Situation in Kenya Camps:** Over 15,000 sheltered in eight overcrowded temporary sites (Somare camp, schools, churches, community centers, and a hospital) and 20,000+ with host families. Roughly 71% face acute food shortages; rainfall, poor sanitation, and unexploded ordnance heighten waterborne disease and maternal-health risks. **Kenyan Response:** KDF and multi-agency teams secured the frontier and destroyed 12 unexploded RPGs in civilian areas (Nov 13); CS Kipchumba Murkomen warned of direct threats to	ACAPS & KNCHR (2026); Addis Standard (2026a, 2026b); Africanews (2026); Al Jazeera (2026); BBC Amharic (as cited in Borkena, 2026b); Borkena (2026b); Daily News Egypt Africa (2026); Eastleigh Voice (2026a, 2026b); Hiiraan Online (2026); IOM (2026); Islamic Relief (2026); OCHA (2026); Reuters (2026); WardheerNews (2026).

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
		national sovereignty; Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi engaged Ethiopia's FM Gedion Timotheos (Nov 9) seeking restoration of order; Kenya Red Cross, WFP (hot meals/food aid from Nov 11), IOM, and OCHA scaled up emergency relief amid strained county resources and federal Ethiopian silence.	

3.5 Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz Regional States

On the western frontier, the borderlands connecting Oromia's Wollega zones with Benishangul-Gumuz's Kamashi and Assosa zones have endured sustained cycles of ethnically targeted ambushes, reprisal killings, and cross-border insurgent incursions, severely disrupting regional transport and displacing hundreds of thousands of residents.

Table 5: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along the Oromia–Benishangul-Gumuz Border (2018–2025)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Sept 2018–2019 Kamashi Zone & East Wollega	Gumuz militias; Oromia Special Forces; local Oromo youth	Ethnically targeted ambushes, use of machetes for mass slaughter, and forced expulsions of ethnic Oromos. **Impact:** >150 civilians killed; up to 250,000 ethnic Oromos displaced.	EHRC (2019, p. 11); Amnesty International (2019).
2020–2022 Assosa border areas & Kamashi	Gumuz armed groups; OLA; regional security	Reprisal killings, roadblocks targeting commercial transport, and systemic violence against civil servants. **Impact:** ~80–100 killed sporadically; ~50,000 secondary displacement.	EHRCO (2021, p. 22).
Mid-2025 Bordering Wollega zones	OLA insurgents; Benishangul regional forces	Cross-border incursions by OLA utilizing forested borders; retaliatory destruction of hamlets. **Impact:** Dozens killed; localized mass displacement.	ACLED (2025, p. 6).

3.6 Oromia and Gambela Regional States

Further southwest, the frontier between Oromia and Gambela has witnessed escalating instability, progressing from localized land-use skirmishes in Itang to coordinated rebel assaults on Gambela City and recurring raids on cross-border trade routes.

Table 6: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along the Oromia–Gambela Border (2019–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Late 2019 Bordering districts (Itang)	Local ethnic militias; armed youth	Low-level skirmishes over land usage between indigenous populations and highland settlers. **Impact:** ~10–15 killed.	EHRC (2020, p. 11).
June 2022 Gambela City & border zones	OLA; GLF; ENDF; Gambela Regional Security	Coordinated rebel assault on regional capital; summary executions of suspected sympathizers. **Impact:** >50 killed; sporadic urban displacement.	EHRC (2022, p. 12); Amnesty International (2022).
March–May 2026 Itang Special Woreda	OLA factions; Anuak militias	Village raids targeting cross-border trade routes and transport buses. **Impact:** ~30 civilians killed; >4,000 displaced into camps.	ACLED (2026, p. 7).

3.7 Oromia, Harari Regional State, and Dire Dawa

In eastern Ethiopia, the multi-ethnic urban enclaves of Harari Regional State and the federally chartered city of Dire Dawa—both surrounded by or adjacent to Oromia—have suffered recurring waves of identity-based mob violence, political intimidation, and municipal redistricting disputes that threaten urban coexistence and commercial transit.

Table 7: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Involving Oromia, Harari, and Dire Dawa (2018–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
August 2018 Dire Dawa	Somali and Oromo youth mobs; local police	Mob violence utilizing clubs and machetes based on identity; looting of shops. **Impact:** ~15 killed; hundreds sought refuge.	Amnesty International (2018, p. 5).
Oct–Nov 2019 Harari Region, Dire Dawa, surrounding Oromia towns	Qeerroo; local security	Protests linked to activist Jawar Mohammed devolved into mob lynchings, burning of religious sites and businesses. **Impact:** 78 to 86 killed regionally; thousands temporarily displaced.	EHRCO (2020, p. 18); VOA (2019).
Early 2023 Harari Region outskirts	Regional political operatives; local youth	Political intimidation and localized property destruction regarding municipal jurisdiction. **Impact:** Unspecified minor casualties; economic disruption.	Local Media Reports (2023).

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
August 2026 Dire Dawa industrial zones	Localized factions; Federal Police	Clashes over municipal administration and resource allocation following redistricting proposals. **Impact:** ~5 killed; commercial transport halted.	Regional Security Bulletins (2026).

3.8 Oromia and Sidama Regional States

Along the southern rift corridor, the establishment of the Sidama Regional State intensified border demarcation and water-rights disputes with neighboring West Arsi and East Guji zones of Oromia, periodically erupting into deadly mob violence and attacks on rural farming settlements.

Table 8: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along the Oromia–Sidama Border (2019–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
July 2019 Hawassa & West Arsi border areas	Ejeto (Sidama youth); regional/ federal security; Oromo youth	Mob violence on ethnic minorities during statehood referendum delays; severe federal crackdown. **Impact:** 53 to 130 civilians killed; 5,000–10,000 displaced.	Amnesty International (2020, p. 15).
Mid-2022 East Guji & Sidama border	Local armed factions from both regions	Armed skirmishes over border demarcation and water rights. **Impact:** ~10–20 killed.	Addis Standard (2022, p. 2).
May–July 2026 East Guji borderlands	Regional militias; youth groups	Indiscriminate attacks on rural farming communities; burning of schools and crops. **Impact:** Dozens of casualties; thousands displaced.	Independent Media Reports (2026).

3.9 Oromia and the Southern Regions (South Ethiopia, SWEPR, and Central Ethiopia)

Finally, across Ethiopia's fragmented southern regional states—comprising South Ethiopia, South West Ethiopia Peoples' Region (SWEPR), and Central Ethiopia—territorial disputes along Oromia's West Guji and central borders have produced catastrophic humanitarian emergencies, most notably the 2018 clearing of Gedeo communities that displaced more than one million people, alongside ongoing demarcation conflicts in Amaro and the Gurage Zone.

Table 9: Major Conflicts and Atrocities Along Oromia's Borders with the Southern Regions (2018–2026)

Date & Location	Involved Parties	Atrocities & Humanitarian Impact	Sources
Apr–Aug 2018 West Guji (Oromia) & Gedeo Zone (South Ethiopia)	Qeerroo; local Oromo militias; Gedeo militias	Systematic clearing of Gedeo communities; massive razing of coffee farms and homes. **Impact:** Hundreds killed; >1,000,000 internally displaced.	Refugees International (2018, p. 5); IOM (2018).
2021–2023 Amaro Special Woreda & West Guji	OLA; local militias	Cross-border raids; kidnapping of farmers and targeted assassinations of local administrators. **Impact:** Dozens killed; ~40,000 internally displaced.	EHRCO (2022, p. 33).
Late 2023–2024 Gurage Zone / Kebena (Central Ethiopia)	Local youth groups; regional proxies	Disagreements over new regional demarcations; forceful eviction of minority residents. **Impact:** ~10–15 civilians killed; ~3,000 displaced.	EHRCO (2024, p. 12).
Early 2026 SWEPR border zones	Localized pastoralist militias	Low-level territorial disputes resulting in localized destruction of agricultural yields. **Impact:** Minor casualties.	ACLED (2026, p. 8).

4. Historical-Ideological Genealogy and Transnational Expansion

While the borderland conflicts cataloged in Section 3 illustrate the domestic mechanics of ethno-territorial expansion, the ideological ambition underpinning the dual state extends beyond Ethiopia's internal regional borders. To understand both the religious-ideological posture of the Abiy administration and the transnational security anxieties now emerging along the Kenyan frontier, it is necessary to examine the 19th-century origins of the geopolitical concept of "Oromia."

4.1 Johann Ludwig Krapf, the Minting of "Oromiana/Oromia," and the "Germans of Africa"

Johann Ludwig Krapf, a 19th-century German pioneer missionary and linguist, played a foundational role in shaping the modern geopolitical concept of the Oromo. Krapf is credited with minting the name "Oromia" (sometimes recorded as "Oromania") in the early 1840s to geographically and politically define the territories inhabited by the Oromo people, whom he referred to historically as the "Galla" (Beke, 1845, p. 96). He envisaged the Oromo people as the strategic key to evangelizing the African continent. Krapf famously designated the Oromos as the "Germans of Africa," comparing their potential role in spreading Protestant Christianity across Africa to the role Germany played during the European

Reformation (Vilhanová, 2006, p. 80). Rather than viewing them merely as local converts, he saw them as an intellectual and expansive nation capable of disseminating the gospel continent-wide (Sahlberg, 1997, p. 53).

To realize this vision, Krapf actively beseeched European powers—specifically the British and German governments and their missionary extensions—to colonize and Protestantize the Oromo. Through extensive correspondence dispatched from Ankober, Ethiopia, notably his letter dated July 3, 1840, to British officials and the London-based Church Missionary Society (CMS), Krapf laid out his strategic blueprint (Oromo Studies Association, 2011, p. 16).

However, political and religious realities severely disrupted Krapf's initial efforts. Krapf was forced out of Ethiopia in 1842 due to fierce theological and political opposition. Yielding to this pressure and shifting political alliances, Negus Sahle Selassie of Shewa issued a decree to expel Krapf from the Ethiopian kingdom (Dictionary of African Christian Biography, 2026, p. 1).

Despite his expulsion, Krapf did not abandon his mission. Instead, he relocated to Mombasa on the Swahili coast in 1844, believing he could reach the southern Oromo populations (such as the Orma and Borana in Kenya) and establish a chain of missions extending back into the Horn of Africa (Vilhanová, 2006, p. 80). From Mombasa, he continued to write letters throughout the 1840s and 1850s to the CMS in London and to German Protestant leaders, such as Louis Harms of the Hermannsburg Mission, urging colonial authorities to leverage the Oromo as a strategic wedge to open the African interior to Western Protestant colonization (Academic Journals, 2015, p. 2; Feyissa & Haustein, 2023, p. 8).

His geographical conception of the Oromo nation was vast. He envisaged the incorporation of all Oromos into a contiguous territory that stretched from the Ethiopian highlands well into present-day Kenya. Through his letters, journals, and the publication of his widely read 1860 book, Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours, During an Eighteen Years' Residence in Eastern Africa, Krapf appealed to European patrons to fund this religious and colonial expansion (Imberg, 2022, p. 61; Krapf, 1860). His writings functioned as both geographical exploration and a strategic blueprint, persuading stakeholders that investing in the Oromo was the most efficient way to advance Western religious and colonial influence (Imberg, 2022, p. 57). His vision of "Oromia" ignored modern national borders, viewing the Oromo-speaking provinces of Kenya as integral to his broader evangelical strategy. His ideas of "Oromia" and a transnational Oromo nation have been both cherished

and inherited by Oromo ethnonationalists and activists, including current Oromo-PP leaders such as Abiy Ahmed.

More than a century and a half later, Krapf's vision of a Protestantized Ethiopian core finds a controversial parallel in the contemporary postures of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's administration. A devout proponent of the Pentecostal Prosperity Gospel, Abiy has been accused by critics and scholars of actively attempting to Protestantize the Ethiopian state apparatus while suppressing the historically dominant Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) (Feyissa & Haustein, 2023, p. 23).

Political analysts argue that the Abiy regime operates under a "dual-state" paradigm (CUNY Graduate Center, 2026, p. 4). In this framework, the formal constitutional government is heavily influenced and sometimes overridden by an informal shadow state driven by Oromo ethno-nationalism and Pentecostal elite networks. The suppression of Orthodox Christianity became starkly visible during the 2023 church crisis, where the state was accused of providing security and political backing to an illegal, breakaway Oromo Orthodox synod (Rift Valley Institute, 2023, p. 23). Critics maintain this is a deliberate strategy to dismantle the unifying cultural power of the Orthodox Church, replacing it with a Protestantized, ethno-nationalist ideology.

In contrast to Krapf's spiritual framework, contemporary discourse surrounding the Abiy administration is heavily defined by security crises and geopolitical maneuvering. Critics argue that the federal government has tacitly enabled or ignored what they describe as active Oromo expansionism into neighboring territories, diverging sharply from Krapf's religious goals into aggressive territorial assimilation (WardheerNews, 2026, p. 1). Media reports highlighting these localized conflicts often portray the central government's silence as a failure of leadership, noting that authorities in Addis Ababa are accused of abandoning marginalized communities to serve powerful regional political allies (WardheerNews, 2026, p. 1).

4.2 The Moyale Conflict: Tactical Expansion into Kenya or Conflict Spillover?

The localized conflict in the Moyale border region has further intensified the narrative of expansionism, echoing the cross-border demographics Krapf once documented, but this time through the lens of violent displacement. Clashes between Oromia and Somali regional factions have spread across multiple districts, resulting in tens of thousands of displaced persons fleeing into Marsabit County, Kenya (AllAfrica, 2026, p. 1). Regional observers and politicians allege that this conflict is being exploited by the Abiy regime to aggressively expand Oromia's influence into the Oromo-speaking provinces of Kenya.

Somali and Kenyan politicians have reacted to these demographic shifts with alarm, portraying the incursions as an organized expansionist threat. For instance, Kenyan MP Farah Maalim publicly condemned the alleged Oromo expansion and used emotive rhetoric to urge local Somali populations to defend their territories against demographic shifts (Peace News, 2026, p. 1). The media and security officials in Kenya portray these cross-border incursions as a severe threat to national sovereignty. Kenyan authorities, including multi-agency defense teams, have mobilized to secure the borders against what figures like Cabinet Secretary Kipchumba Murkomen describe as a direct threat to Kenya's security (Eastleigh Voice, 2026). The lack of official acknowledgment from both the Oromia and Somali regional governments regarding the crisis has fueled media narratives that the displacement is a deliberate consequence of unchecked, state-sanctioned regional expansionism (AllAfrica, 2026, p. 1).

5. Multidimensional Impacts of the Conflict

The permanentization of conflict driven by the Oromia region's militarization and ethno-nationalist expansionism has generated catastrophic cascading effects across Ethiopian society, economy, and governance:

- **Social Impacts:** Ethiopia frequently hosts between 3 and 5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Mass displacement strips agrarian populations of their livelihoods, plunging them into absolute aid dependency. Trust in state security has collapsed, and the humanitarian safety net was effectively exhausted by late 2026 (Bellizzi et al., 2020, p. 14; Makango et al., 2023, p. 8).
- **Economic Impacts:** The utilization of "eco-violence" destroys agricultural capital, driving severe food insecurity for up to 15 million people (Belesova et al., 2017; Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 78). Localized warfare costs the national economy between $1.1 billion and $2 billion annually, triggering the collapse of foreign direct investment (FDI), suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the complete diversion of capital expenditure away from developmental infrastructure toward internal security financing (IDMC, 2023, p. 12; Makango et al., 2023, p. 8).
- **Political Impacts:** The creation of extrajudicial bodies such as the Koree Nageenyaa has institutionalized state violence. By empowering a massive Oromia regional army while tolerating proxy militias, the federal center has surrendered its monopoly on violence, risking the balkanization of the Ethiopian state into heavily armed, permanently warring ethnic fiefdoms (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 119).

6. Conclusion

The empirical evidence compiled from 2018 to October 2026 across Addis Ababa, Oromia's contiguous regional borders, and the Kenyan frontier demonstrates the systemic instability inherent to Ethiopia's 1995 constitutional architecture. By legally defining regional boundaries as the sovereign ethno-territorial properties of specific "Nations," the state essentially guaranteed that demographic movement and resource competition would trigger existential security responses.

The federal structure has been effectively captured by a majoritarian ethnic framework led by the Oromo wing of the Prosperity Party. A regime that leverages majoritarian ethnic dominance to occupy the state apparatus actively encourages continued conflict by pumping disproportionate resources into its regional base, resulting in deeply asymmetric federalism. Unless the structural paradigm transitions from ethno-territorial sovereignty to geographic and administrative federalism, Ethiopia risks functioning identically to the Yugoslav model: weaponizing identity, incentivizing territorial maximalism, and marching toward total fragmentation.

7. Systemic Solutions and Policy Pathways

Addressing this existential crisis requires dismantling the structural drivers of violence through a comprehensive program of constitutional, economic, and institutional reform:

1. **Redrawing Geographic Boundaries:** Replace ethno-linguistic regional states with geographically, historically, and economically coherent administrative units defined as "public" rather than "ethnic," ending the disenfranchisement of internal minorities as "settlers."
2. **Abolishing Article 39 (Right to Secession):** Remove the constitutional clause granting unconditional secession, legally establishing the state as a permanent, indivisible entity grounded in individual human rights.
3. **Reforming Land Ownership (Article 40):** Transition land tenure from exclusive state ownership to private or localized municipal ownership, legally protecting citizens from ethnically targeted forced evictions.
4. **Language Policy Decentralization:** Allow each new administrative unit to democratically select its own official working languages based on its actual local demographic makeup.
5. **Independent Constitutional Court:** Remove constitutional interpretation powers from the highly politicized House of Federation and establish an independent Constitutional Court.

6. **Security and Transitional Justice:** Execute a verifiable, federally enforced disarmament of all regional special forces and proxy militias. Furthermore, the architects of demographic engineering and proxy warfare must be prosecuted through domestic courts, universal jurisdiction, or a UN-mandated hybrid tribunal to end absolute impunity.

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